Copyright Notice for XAWAT© 2025

Copyright Notice for XAWAT

© 2025 Travis L. McCracken, XAWAT. All rights reserved.

All materials on this website, including but not limited to text, images, graphics, designs, and other intellectual property, are protected by copyright law and are the exclusive property of Travis L. McCracken and XAWAT, unless otherwise indicated. Unauthorized use, reproduction, distribution, or modification of any content, in whole or in part, without prior written consent from the copyright owner, is strictly prohibited and may result in legal action.

For permissions or licensing inquiries, please contact us at travis@blackdragon.llc.

POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND ’17

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL ON THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

March 9th, 2017

Introduction. The outstanding men and women who make up the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Team are the very best in the world at what they do. The incredibly dynamic, volatile and tumultuous Central Region presents a complex convergence of compounding multi-faceted security challenges. Such an environment generates near continuous crisis action planning and response. These conditions demand a highly capable, vigilant capability at USCENTCOM Headquarters and our Service Component Headquarters, as well as forward throughout our area of responsibility (AOR). The exceptional individuals on the USCENTCOM Team expertly navigate this challenging environment. In doing so, they effectively protect and promote our Nation’s interests and they represent our values wherever they go around the world. They work selflessly each day in support of our mission and the exceptional men and women serving in harm’s way around the globe. We could not be more proud of them and proud of their families. They truly are the strength of our USCENTCOM Team.

The Central Region is a fascinating area of the world. Spanning over four million square miles it is populated by 550+ million people from more than 20 ethnic groups representing multiple religions and speaking eighteen languages with hundreds of dialects. The region lies at the intersection of three continents and important commercial sea lanes, flight corridors, pipelines, and overland routes run across it supporting regional and global economic networks.

It is also a highly-complex area, widely characterized by pervasive instability and conflict. The 20 nations that make up the Central Region have various forms of government, ranging from absolute and constitutional monarchies to theocratic, parliamentary, and presidential republics. The economic and social-political landscape is diverse, volatile at times, and rivalries often create tensions that affect security and stability. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs), such as the terrorist organizations al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), exploit these conditions to foment unrest, challenge or destabilize governments, and threaten the global economy and U.S. national interests.

The turbulence across the region reflects a number of contributing factors or "drivers of instability," including ethnic and sectarian hostilities between Shia and Sunnis, and Arabs and Persians; economic uncertainty and sustained low oil prices that severely strain energy-based economies across the region, contributing to reduced government services and weakened prospects for economic growth; a disproportionately large youth population facing increasing poverty and unemployment, which may make them susceptible to unrest, radical ideologies, and VEO recruitment; expanding ungoverned or under-governed spaces, exploited by VEOs; civil wars, which are "engines of instability" all by themselves; worsening humanitarian crises, contributing to growing refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) populations; and, competition among outside actors, including Russia and China, seeking to promote their interests and supplant U.S. influence in the region. While we must take the necessary actions to counter immediate threats, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, we also need to find ways to address these and other root causes of instability if we hope to achieve lasting positive effects in that part of the world. This cannot be accomplished solely through military means. The military can help to create the necessary conditions; however, there must be concomitant progress in other complementary areas (e.g., reconstruction, humanitarian aid, stabilization, political reconciliation). There are a variety of interagency programs and efforts underway that are essential to translating military gains into actual achievement of stated goals and objectives. Support for these endeavors is vital to our success.

The current evolving security environment in the Central Region is further complicated by the fact that most challenges transcend borders; they are trans-regional (cutting across multiple combatant commands (CCMD)), all-domain (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace), and multi-functional (e.g., conventional, special operations, ballistic missile defense, cyber). Of note, the Middle East remains the global epicenter for terrorism and violent Islamist extremism. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2016 Global Terrorism Index, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR accounted for 78% of all terrorism incidents worldwide, and the turmoil stretches across CCMD seams into Africa, Europe, South Asia, and beyond.

The security environment is further challenged by the emergence of a "virtual caliphate" and increased access and activity in the cyber domain. Ready access to the Internet, social media, and other messaging platforms has enabled a new generation of extremists to spread their radical Islamist views, incite widespread violence, and recruit new followers to their cause. As we have seen with the ongoing campaign to defeat ISIS, diminishment of the physical organization does not equate to the dismantlement of their virtual presence. To the contrary, terrorist organizations’ activities in cyberspace enable them to remain relevant despite setbacks on the battlefield, while reaching out to direct, enable, and/or inspire audiences well beyond the region’s geographic borders. Countering the "virtual caliphate" will require a concerted ‘whole of government’ effort led by the people of the region. We can support our partners’ activities, but their voices and influence will be required to achieve enduring positive results.

We also acknowledge, particularly in the current resource-constrained environment, the need to find additional means for countering existing and emerging threats and deterring potential adversaries. No other country in the world has a military with a greater ability than the U.S. to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects and sustain those effects. Through the application of "hard" and "soft" power capabilities, including kinetic strikes, raids, and information operations, we have been very effective at degrading and disrupting violent extremist networks in the USCENTCOM AOR and elsewhere around the world. It is an important and a necessary competency. However, a solely military response is not sufficient. We must continue to look for ways to further enhance our effectiveness through the application of military and non-military activities. Ultimately, we want to increasingly involve other elements of the U.S. Government and the International Community, recognizing that it is only through a combination of capabilities that we will achieve and sustain our strongest deterrence posture.

This is especially true today given the changing character of warfare. For much of the past 15+ years our Nation has increasingly operated in the "gray zone" of military confrontation—that range of activities short of conventional conflict; a dangerous space in which miscalculation can easily occur, leading to escalatory conflict and misunderstanding. In the "gray zone," adversaries employ unconventional methods that include cyber warfare, propaganda, and support to proxy elements in an effort to achieve their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. At the same time, these unconventional methods increase tensions between partners by emphasizing competing priorities that detract from support for our common objectives (e.g., Turks and Syrian Kurds). To be successful in this ambiguous environment, we must find alternate ways to compete against our adversaries in the "gray zone" short of conflict, while collaborating with our partners to achieve our desired end-states.

We must – and will – continue to pursue the many opportunities that exist today throughout the Central Region, recognizing that by pursuing these opportunities we will achieve improved stability and security in that challenged part of the world. As Sir Winston Churchill wisely stated, "Difficulties mastered are opportunities won." The key to success is ensuring that we remain ready and capable of effectively countering all threats. We need to make sure that we have an accurate understanding of the situation. We must take care to build and cultivate strong relationships, here at home and abroad. We need to be responsive to our partners and always listen and strive to understand their points of view and priorities. We also need to be properly postured with the necessary capabilities, resources, and appropriate authorities to protect and promote U.S. and partner nations’ interests.

In recent years, we have been encouraged to see many of our regional partners take a more active role in providing for the security of their sovereign spaces. Ultimately, we want to empower our partners and allies by helping them build additional capability and capacity while strengthening relationships and improving cooperation and interoperability among nations. This is – and will remain – a top priority for the USCENTCOM Team at our headquarters in Tampa, Florida, as well as among our Component Commands, combined/joint task forces, and forward in the region. 

U.S. Central Command’s Mission. "USCENTCOM directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests."

Our Strategic Approach. Our strategic approach is focused on protecting our national interests and those of our partners. It is designed to reflect our values, align our behaviors, and support the National Military Strategy. It is proactive in nature and endeavors to set in motion tangible actions in a purposeful, consistent, and continuous manner. Each aspect of our approach – Prepare – Pursue – Prevail – enables the next and collectively contributes to the successful achievement of our goals, objectives, and overall mission.

Prepare the Environment – The volatile nature of the Central Region requires that we be well-postured to protect our enduring national interests. "Well-postured" means that we are ready to execute military tasks; physically and virtually present in the AOR; integrated in all our actions; responsive to the needs of our partners; and, able to provide options for our leadership. Proper preparation in advance of crises creates decision space for leaders and allows for the responsible and effective employment of available resources and forces. Well-prepared and motivated personnel with shared values provide a comparative advantage over our adversaries and competitors. Preparation of the environment – including agreements for assured access, basing, and overflight and the ability to adapt our expeditionary and enduring footprint – ultimately ensures a high level of readiness, increased responsiveness, and strong and productive relationships with partners and allies, all of which serve to enable our success in our various endeavors. 

Pursue Opportunities – In a region beset by myriad challenges we must always be on the look-out for opportunities to seize the initiative to support our objectives and goals. Pursuing opportunities means that we are proactive – we don’t wait for problems to be presented; we look for ways to get ahead of them. It also means that we have to become comfortable with transparency and flat communications – our ability to understand our AOR better than anyone else gives us the advantage of knowing where opportunities exist. Pursuing opportunities also means we have to take risk – by delegating authority and responsibility to the right level, by trusting our partners, and being willing to trust our best instincts in order to move faster than our adversaries.

Prevail in Conflict – There are no easy victories or quick wins in the USCENTCOM AOR – ours is an area of protracted struggles and conflicts. Our overriding objective, despite these challenges, is to prevail. Prevailing means winning; coming out on top of our adversaries. We prevail when our national interests and objectives are preserved; when we maintain decision space for our leaders; and, when we maintain and sustain our access, posture, and relationships with our vital partners. We choose to prevail "by, with, and through" our partners. Prevailing in this AOR requires resolve and resiliency – and continued momentum.

U.S. Central Command Priorities.

Ensure an Effective Posture – An effective posture with trained and ready forward-stationed forces and equipment demonstrates our tremendous capability and enduring commitment to our partners and allies in the region. It reassures them; it enables access and influence; and, it positions us to secure our enduring national interests. An effective posture also optimizes freedom of movement, deters state aggressors, and provides decision space and flexible response options for national-level decision makers.

Strengthen Allies and Partnerships – A coalition approach – at home and abroad – expands our ability to operate on multiple fronts. Strong relationships based upon shared values create greater cohesion and enhance the effectiveness of available resources and capabilities. Integration with partners, within the region and beyond, enriches the benefit of our presence, mitigates resource constraints, and expands the reach of the force. By building the capacity of regional partners, we enable them to assume a larger share of the responsibility for securing their sovereign spaces.

Deter and Counter State Aggressors – Effectively posturing to maintain freedom of movement, freedom of action, and freedom of navigation is essential to securing our enduring national interests and the interests of our partners and allies. We must also actively counter malign influence, and be prepared to confront aggression, while reducing the freedom of action of surrogates and proxies operating in the region.

Disrupt and Counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their Networks – We must protect our Homeland from terrorist threats that emanate from the Central Region. We will accomplish this by degrading and defeating VEOs and their networks, including ISIS and al Qaeda and their associated forces, and by preventing the further spread of sectarian-fueled conflict and VEOs. Ultimately, our goal is to achieve a Central Region where improved security leads to greater stability, and where regional cooperation counters actors that threaten U.S. interests.

Desired End States. Our efforts in support of partners throughout the USCENTCOM AOR are designed to achieve our desired end states. These end states include: USCENTCOM properly postured to protect U.S. interests; free flow of commerce and access to areas in accordance with international law; strong and supportive allies and partners; state aggressors deterred or countered; WMD safeguarded and use prevented; VEOs degraded and their influence eroded; and, lasting increased regional stability and security. The key to achieving these ends is the effective use of available ways and means to address challenges and pursue opportunities in the region.

Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Region. Many conditions exist in the strategically-important Central Region that threaten stability, access to the region, and transit via maritime chokepoints. The resulting challenges – to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, rising tensions with Iran, and increased provocative behavior by Iranian-backed elements in and around the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) Strait – clearly demand our attention and directed efforts. Among the dynamics contributing to the complexity of the current security environment are the same socio-political factors that caused the Arab Awakening, fomenting social unrest and creating conditions for sectarianism, violence, and extremism. In parts of the region, reforms have fallen short, politics remain exclusive, economic growth stagnates, education systems under-deliver, and/or social contracts are falling out of balance. Opportunities for youth remain limited. Concurrently, large-scale displaced populations stress already fragile economies, social welfare systems and security architectures. The resulting instability provides opportunities for VEOs and insurgents and those who actively provide support and sanctuary to them. Competition for water, oil, and other natural resources are other drivers of instability and conflict. Resurgent geopolitics and the continuation of national rivalries fuels inter-state hostility and may potentially hasten the pursuit of nuclear weapons. As we look to address the multitude of challenges present today across the USCENTCOM AOR, it is absolutely essential that we understand the conditions and root causes of the instability and turmoil. If not, our efforts are likely to be insufficient or even misdirected and any gains achieved, temporary.

In addition to addressing challenges, we must pursue the many opportunities present today throughout the Central Region. Doing so will enable us, working together with our partners, to shape the security environment and increase stability across our AOR. Opportunities manifest in a variety of ways, including bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises and training programs, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, information operations and messaging, and other cooperative endeavors in support of common objectives. Most notably, by supporting and enabling partner-led operations we achieve shared goals while limiting U.S. investment and troop presence and increasing regional partners’ capability, confidence, and overall stake in providing for the security of their sovereign spaces. For example, we continue to support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Syrian Democratic Forces in their efforts to counter ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Also, in recent months we supported successful United Arab Emirates (UAE)-led operations in Yemen against the al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In terms of future opportunities, we need to find ways to increase information sharing with key partners, like the UAE, to further enable their efforts. Enhanced information sharing with regional partners can also advance efforts against ISIS and other terrorist facilitation networks. We should pursue increasing our support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which have demonstrated tremendous return on investment in recent years. The need for improved communication between and among elements, particularly regarding common regional disputes (e.g., Sunni-Shia tensions, Kurdish expansionism) also presents opportunities and should be pursued by relevant elements of the U.S. Government (USG). The key outcomes achieved through the pursuit of these and other opportunities present in the Central Region are improved awareness and information-sharing, enhanced capability, and increased trust and confidence among partner nations, all of which are key components underpinning our mission in pursuit of our national interests. Thus, it is essential that we view all challenges with an eye for corresponding opportunities that provide the best means for addressing those challenges and achieving desired end-states.

Given the trans-regional nature of the current security environment coupled with the competing demands for limited resources and capabilities, it is essential that we find efficiencies and alternative means for accomplishing stated objectives. This includes building and enabling coalitions comprised of willing partners, recognizing that collaboration enhances overall capability while providing a stronger, united front against potential adversaries; the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. The initial building blocks for strong coalitions are relationships. The cornerstone for effective enduring collaboration among coalition members is information-sharing which enables coalition compliant planning, resulting in successful execution of campaign goals and objectives. One quick-yield way to enhance the capability and effectiveness of our partners is by expanding our intelligence sharing with them. To date, we have seen significant return on investment each time we have made such allowances in support of our partners.

Key Focus Areas. While the USCENTCOM Team manages a broad range of difficult challenges on a daily basis, a significant portion of our efforts and resources are necessarily focused in five priority areas. These five areas are: Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (Iraq and Syria), Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL and Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan), Iran, Yemen, and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Below are summaries, highlighting substantial challenges and efforts underway aimed at improving stability and security in each of these critical areas.

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (Iraq and Syria). The Counter-ISIS (C-ISIS) Campaign has entered its third year and we are on track with the military plan to defeat the terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. Our "by, with, and through" approach and operational level simultaneity strategy are working, and our partner forces continue to build momentum across the battlespace as we pressure the enemy on multiple fronts and across all domains. Together we are forcing the enemy to deal with multiple simultaneous dilemmas (e.g., ground operations, airstrikes, cyber activities, information operations, and discrete interdictions of resource flows). This is putting increased pressure on their operations and command and control capability while stretching their limited resources. 

The strength of the C-ISIS Campaign is the C-ISIS Coalition consisting of all branches of service and our Interagency and international partners, and the many contributions they willingly make to the fight against our common enemy—"The whole is greater than the sum of its parts." Without the support of the Coalition, our "by, with, and through" approach would not be doable.

Our stand-off fires, including Coalition air and artillery, remain another lynchpin of the C-ISIS Campaign. Improved intelligence has enabled the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to increase the number of deliberate strikes conducted in recent months, targeting ISIS’s infrastructure, oil revenue sources, etc. Over the past year, the Coalition’s precision effects campaign has removed dozens more ISIS senior leaders from the battlefield, attrited large portions of the organization’s forces, further disrupted its command and control capability, and greatly degraded its pool of resources and access to replacements and personnel reinforcements. As the campaign progresses, and as ISIS shifts actions and behaves increasingly like a terrorist organization, hiding amongst civilians as a force protection measure, we will continue to make the necessary adjustments to our air operations. We want to target the enemy effectively, while also ensuring that we minimize collateral damage. International law requires it; and, when America’s sons and daughters go to war, they go with our values. Thus, it is imperative that when we conduct operations we do so in such a way that we limit the loss of innocent lives.

Over the past year, ISIS lost a significant amount of capability and large swaths of territory. The Iraqis are now in control of eastern Mosul, although clearing operations continue in several areas. In Syria, operations are ongoing in three key geographic areas—Raqqa, Manbij, and alBab; it remains a very complex fight given multiple simultaneous activities and the management of partners and battlefield effects. In Iraq, in the coming weeks and months we will continue to support the Iraqi Security Forces as they complete the seizure of western Mosul. After Mosul operations are complete, we expect the Government of Iraq to prioritize military operations to recapture Tal Afar, Sinjar, and Hawija, and to secure the border in order to diminish ISIS’ freedom of movement and ability to target major population centers. In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces have almost completed the isolation phase of Raqqa operations and will, in the coming months, begin operations to seize Raqqa, dismantling a key node in ISIS’ external operations network. Additionally, we would look to continue our security operations along the Jordanian border to prevent re-infiltration of ISIS remnants.

The cumulative effect of operations in Iraq and Syria has cut off key lines of communication for ISIS, while restricting their ability to bring in additional fighters and curbing their flow of financial resources. The terrorist organization is struggling financially and is experiencing low morale in its ranks and steady leadership attrition due to coalition airstrikes. There has also been a nearly 75 percent decline in ISIS’s media and propaganda as compared to a year ago.

Our efforts, in conjunction with our interagency and international partners’ efforts, to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters – both into Syria and Iraq and also those attempting to return to their countries of origin – continue to bear fruit. The U.S. and Coalition member nations are highly concerned about the threat these experienced fighters present to our respective homelands. We have made considerable progress identifying and targeting fighters and insurgent networks, principally through our Joint and Interagency targeting processes, and this will remain a priority.

These processes will also help to combat the evolving hybrid threat (conventional and irregular warfare). U.S. Special Operations Command has been designated lead for external operations (EXOPs) for the U.S. military efforts and this has contributed greatly to organizing the broader efforts against this threat. Whole of government efforts and collaboration with partners have also played a key role in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Spurred by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, more than 60 nations have enacted laws to restrict FTF travel. The U.S. now collaborates through information-sharing agreements with 59 international partners to identify and track travel of suspected terrorists in real time.

While we continue to make great strides towards countering ISIS trans-regionally, we recognize that we are dealing with a highly adaptive enemy. In particular, ISIS’ use of chemical weapons and its evolving application of available off-the-shelf technologies that include unmanned aerial systems now used for both observation and to achieve lethal effects, poses a growing threat. For example, ISIS has reportedly used chemicals, including sulfur mustard and toxic industrial chemicals, in attacks more than 50 times in Iraq and Syria since 2014. Although the threat of chemical weapons has not slowed the Counter-ISIS Campaign, ISIS could further develop its chemical weapons capability. We are committed to working with partners to locate, secure, render harmless, eliminate or destroy any chemical and biological weapon materials found during the course of operations in Iraq and Syria, and to effectively remove this threat from our troops and civilian populations. 

We will defeat ISIS militarily; however, a lasting defeat of this enemy will not be achieved unless similar progress is made on the political front. Instability all but guarantees a resurgence of ISIS or the emergence of other terrorist groups seeking to exploit conditions to advance their own aims. We remain fully committed to the "whole of government" approach and continue to ensure our actions are synchronized with and supportive of the efforts of our partners across the Interagency and the International Community.

This also holds true on the humanitarian front. UN-led efforts to date are having positive impacts and thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have already returned to their homes. However, tough work remains, given the enormity of the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Syria and in neighboring countries. The growing number of displaced persons presents a unique set of challenges that include protection and assistance to civilians caught in the various conflicts, as well as assistance to those seeking asylum in neighboring countries.

Regional actors – There is a significant number of players currently operating in Iraq and Syria with both common and competing interests. While they have been present for many years, several of them have become emboldened and have taken a more active role in addressing regional issues.

In Iraq, we have seen encouraging progress made in the relationship between the leadership of the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). This past year, for the first time since 2013, Prime Minister al-Abadi met with President Barzani in Baghdad to discuss expanded cooperation between the ISF and the Kurdish Peshmerga. We also see increased collaboration between the ISF and elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In November 2016, Iraq’s parliament voted to fully legalize elements of the PMF, including but not limited to Shia militias. While they are achieving some positive effects, their participation does present challenges, particularly post-Mosul offensive, as Iranian-backed elements of the PMF seek to increase their influence in the country through both military and political channels.

Turkey remains an important NATO ally and Counter-ISIS Coalition member that supports the campaign through its operations and by providing access, basing, and overflight permissions. Some Turkish activities and rhetoric, however, have the potential to impact campaign momentum. Turkey’s actions in northern Iraq continue to strain relations between the GoI and the KRG, which serves to further complicate the C-ISIS Campaign. Likewise, in Syria, Turkey has helped clear ISIS from its border, but Turkish-backed forces have also clashed with the Syrian Democratic Forces near Manbij and al Bab and we continue efforts to resolve tensions.

Since Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict en masse in 2015, they have negatively impacted the regional balance of power. Russia’s primary goal is to maintain Syria as a client state in the future and they have propped up the Assad Regime to support this overarching objective. Also very concerning is the fact that Russia’s air operations have targeted civilians and U.S.-supported opposition groups. Without effective de-confliction measures, we see increasing opportunity for miscalculation and potential for unintended, counter-productive engagement between nation states. We are not currently coordinating or cooperating with the Russians; we are simply de-conflicting our air operations. This has become increasingly difficult in the crowded airspace as our operations come into closer proximity. In recent months, the Russians also introduced a number of new surface-to-air systems which can be employed to impact our freedom of maneuver. While our de-confliction efforts have been effective to date, as the fight expands in northern Syria and the battlespace becomes more congested, we should consider enhancing our de-confliction mechanisms with the Russians.

We continue to see Iranian malign influence across Iraq and Syria. While they currently are focused on countering ISIS in Iraq, we remain concerned about Iran’s efforts to prop up the Syrian regime against the opposition and its desire to exploit Shia population centers to increase their malign influence, not just in Syria, but also in Arab states across the region. This supports their long-term aspiration to achieve regional hegemony. Moreover, we are watching closely for indications and warnings of decreasing Iranian concern regarding the threat posed by ISIS, leading to a potential shift to targeting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure in an effort to influence a potential long-term U.S. security presence. Furthermore, we must take care to ensure that our actions do not unintentionally strengthen the Iranian position within the region.

The military campaign plan to defeat ISIS is on track in both Iraq and Syria. The coalition’s "by, with and through" approach is proving effective. Recognizing that ISIS will be defeated militarily, we want to ensure that we have an enduring posture in the region to support and enable partners’ efforts to preserve security and stability. Iraq remains an anchor in the region and we would be wise to continue to support their efforts going forward. We have a willing partner in Iraq and Prime Minister al-Abadi has clearly articulated a desire for continued U.S. support post-ISIS. We are working with the GoI to finalize a Five-Year Plan to ensure enhanced cooperation. This presents an opportunity to preserve gains achieved to date, while strengthening key relationships and countering malign influence in the region.

Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL and Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan). The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are beginning their third year with full responsibility for security with limited U.S. or coalition support. They continue to take the fight to the Taliban and, despite some territorial losses, have retained control of major population areas and key lines of communication. While the Taliban made gains in 2016, namely in the north and south, in most cases, the ANDSF quickly responded to and reversed some of those gains over the past year. While the balance of power favors the government, neither side is currently able to achieve its stated objectives. Looking ahead, it is essential that we continue to assist the ANDSF in addressing their capability gaps, particularly in the areas of aviation, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), personnel management and development, logistics, and sustainment. Our sustained force presence, over 8,400 U.S. military personnel, will allow us to conduct counter-terrorism operations and meet our requirements for staffing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) Mission. However, the RS Mission still has a shortfall of a few thousand personnel needed to conduct the complementary mission of training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF.

In 2015, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) worked with the Afghans to develop a Sustainable Security Strategy based upon three key tenets: "Fight, Hold, Disrupt." The strategy identifies areas the Afghans will hold, areas they will fight to retain, and areas where they will conduct an economy of force effort and disrupt the enemy if they appear, Afghan resources permitting. The ANDSF continues to make progress in implementing this strategy, thereby assuming a more proactive stance in addressing multiple threats while securing the population and denying terrorist safe havens. As General Nicholson, the commander of the RS Mission and USFOR-A stated, "[The Afghans’] ability to deal with simultaneous crises … is a sign of an army that’s growing in capability, [and] that’s maturing in terms of its ability to handle simultaneity and complexity on the battlefield."

While the ANDSF continues to make progress, they do face a number of significant challenges. Poor leadership and corruption are two key factors that need further improvement and President Ashraf Ghani has made addressing these issues a top priority for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The GIRoA established the Anti-Corruption Justice Center in 2016 with the help of the international community and has already tried, convicted, and sentenced senior Afghan officials for corruption. Below are other challenges and critical capability gaps must be addressed.

ANDSF casualty rates – High ANDSF casualties remain a concern. This can be attributed to several factors, including poor leadership, corruption, tactics, and training. Deficiencies in ANDSF leadership occur primarily because of patronage vice merit-based appointments. The extensive use of static checkpoints and the lack of training on how to defend them, as well as a more aggressive posture – which has resulted in the ANDSF more frequently taking the lead and actively taking the fight to the enemy – have also contributed to an increased number of casualties. The ANDSF also experienced an increase in the number of insurgent attacks on inadequately protected fixed positions, and poor and corrupt leadership also may have contributed to higher casualty rates. The ANDSF lacked an operational readiness cycle (ORC) to ensure forces are well-rested and well-trained before returning to the fight. During the Winter Campaign this year, many ANDSF units successfully established ORCs, and our advisors have fostered an increased focus on company-level training and leadership development.

Afghan Air Force – The Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) continue to build capability. Their ability to provide airlift, casualty evacuation, and aerial fires has steadily improved as the U.S. provides more aircraft to the AAF and as its pilots and crew gain additional operational experience. The Afghans are proving effective at integrating their AAF aviation assets as evidenced by a number of successful operations conducted over the past year. However, significant capability gaps remain. The current rotary wing fleet consisting primarily of the Russian-made Mi-17 is both undersized and proving to be more expensive and difficult to sustain than originally envisioned and is experiencing a higher than expected attrition rate. Going forward, transitioning from Russian to U.S. airframes will ensure Afghan forces have a more sustainable fleet that is interoperable with U.S. forces and will enhance the Afghans’ ability to operate independently of coalition forces. The U.S. government is considering a critical AAF initiative to replace the unsustainable Russian-manufactured aircraft fleet and make up for combat losses in Afghan transport helicopters by providing U.S. UH-60s. The DoD-request of $814.5M for FY17 for the first year of our plan to recapitalize the Afghan fleet provides funding to procure 53 UH-60s, with refurbishment and modification of the first 18; 30 additional armed MD-530F helicopters; 6 additional A-29 attack aircraft; and five AC-208s. The requested FY2017 Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget, including the additional funds for the first year of this proposed aviation initiative, went to Congress on 10 Nov 2016. The FY17 proposal is pending approval and we appreciate your support in reaching resolution as soon as possible to mitigate the gaps in Afghan aerial fires and lift capabilities. Transition from Mi-17 to UH-60 airframes will eventually eliminate reliance on Russian sourced parts for maintenance requirements. With our support, we can expect the AAF will continue to build needed capability over the next few years and into the future.

Influence of external actors – Stability in Afghanistan is further challenged by the malign influence of external actors. The enablement of violent extremist groups operating inside of Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, receiving sanctuary or support from outside governments, is of particular concern. So long as these elements remain, they will threaten our hard-earned gains and regional stability writ large.

Pakistan’s shared border with Afghanistan remains a safe haven for terrorist and violent extremist elements. There are 20 U.S.-designated terrorist organizations present today in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban serves as a facilitator to some of these groups’ operations. The death of Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a U.S. strike on 21 May 2016 had a disruptive impact on the Taliban and gave a psychological boost to the Afghans. However, the group still presents a formidable threat to stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) sub-region. The convergence of these groups and, in particular, the convergence of the Afghan Taliban and its component, the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, is of particular concern given the direct threat posed to U.S. and Coalition personnel and the Afghan government. Key to improving the security environment in Afghanistan is eliminating sanctuary of militant groups in Pakistan’s territory. The U.S. maintains consistent diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to take appropriate steps to deny safe haven and work to improve the security of the tumultuous Af-Pak border region.

Illicit narcotics production and trafficking – Illicit narcotics production and trafficking continue to flourish in Afghanistan, particularly in areas where state institutions are weak. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated 2016 Afghanistan poppy cultivation to be 201,000 hectares with a net opium yield of 4,800 metric tons and a farm gate value of $900M, which is a 57 percent increase in revenue generated from the opium trade. In Afghanistan, a symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking where traffickers provide weapons, funding, and material support to the insurgency in exchange for protection. Additionally, some insurgent commanders traffic drugs to finance operations. However, trafficking is not limited to insurgent-controlled areas. The narcotics trade undermines governance and rule of law throughout Afghanistan and plays a critical role in underwriting corruption and a loss of confidence by the Afghan people in the GIRoA.

Regionally, USCENTCOM supports law enforcement counterdrug and border security training, equipping of regional partners, construction activities, and information sharing initiatives to build the capacity of our security force partners that aid in the regional response to illicit drugs trafficking. Counterdrug activities are a critical component of USCENTCOM’s theater security cooperation strategy; provide for regional engagement and comprise a significant source of security assistance funding in Central Asia. These efforts improve regional illicit drug detection and interdiction and improve overall border security for the detection of other forms of contraband, including weapons and IED materials.

Amidst the challenges confronting Afghanistan today are many opportunities. Most notably, we have willing partners in the GIRoA and ANDSF and our collaboration in support of common objectives continues to pay significant dividends. Following are three areas in particular where potential "game-changing" opportunities exist and merit our sustained commitment.

Government of National Unity – The Government of National Unity (GNU) survived several political crises in 2016. President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah provided the leadership that has enabled progress to be made in a number of areas, as well as the development of the framework for enduring partnerships with NATO and the United States. Nevertheless, significant challenges still exist and must be addressed. While the NUG provides needed structure and a source of stability for Afghanistan, it remains fragile. Although the ANDSF has remained apolitical so far, failure of the NUG could threaten ANDSF cohesion and the progress achieved throughout the country. Our message to the political elites of Afghanistan has been that "we respect your political progress, but please do not allow political tensions to undo the hard fought gains you have made."

The International Community’s Demonstrated Commitment to Afghanistan – Thirty-nine NATO allies and partner nations committed more than 13,500 troops to sustain the Resolute Support Mission beyond 2016. Thirty nations have also pledged more than $800 million annually to sustain Afghan security forces through 2020. Combined with the requested U.S. commitment of $3.5 billion for FY2017 and additional funding from Afghanistan, a total of more than $4.3 billion has been pledged for the ANDSF for 2017. Additionally, seventy-five countries and 26 international organizations confirmed their intention in 2016 at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan to provide $15.2B for Afghan development during the 2017-2020 period. The International Community’s strong showing, coupled with the continued commitment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016, has bolstered Afghan confidence and resolve and will surely pay dividends going forward.

Counter-terrorism (CT) Platform – The existence of violent extremist groups in Afghanistan requires a U.S. presence in the region that can monitor and address threats, even as the United States helps to build the Afghans’ capability to deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory. As we adjust the U.S. CT mission, our support to the NATO TAA mission will also evolve in the coming year. Currently, advisory efforts are at four of the six corps and police zone levels, in addition to the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the AAF. In 2017, we will advise all six corps and police zones to provide critical support where needed to capitalize on the success and continued implementation of the sustainable security strategy.

Although we see encouraging progress being made in Afghanistan, it remains a very challenging environment. While the ANDSF confronts difficulties in a number of areas, they are providing for the security of their country, achieving good effects against the Taliban, and building much-needed capacity and momentum while gaining increasing confidence in what is still a tough fight. Additionally, although it does face significant challenges, the GIRoA, under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, has proven to be a reliable and willing partner. The U.S. and our coalition partners have invested greatly in Afghanistan over the last 15+ years. The country merits our continued demonstrated commitment given our national security interests in the sub-region, namely protection of the U.S. Homeland. By strengthening our partners and weakening our enemies we will achieve increased stability in that strategically important part of the world.

Iran. Iran poses the most significant threat to the Central Region and to our national interests and the interests of our partners and allies. We have not seen any improvement in Iran’s behavior since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addressing Iran’s nuclear program, was finalized in July 2015. Iran aspires to be a regional hegemon and its forces and proxies oppose U.S. interests in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and seek to hinder achievement of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and some Central Asian States. They also are working to subvert the GoI by establishing a long-term presence within Iraq’s security forces. Of note, Iran exerts influence and a degree of control over the majority of the nearly 100,000 Shia militias within the PMF. Furthermore, Iran has expanded cooperation with Russia in Syria in ways that threaten U.S. interests in the region.

The JCPOA removed a key threat posed by Iran for at least a number of years. Unfortunately, the agreement has led some to believe that we have largely addressed the Iranian problem set and that is not the case. In addition to its nuclear weapons potential, Iran presents several credible threats. They have a robust theater ballistic missile program, and we remain concerned about their cyber and maritime activities, as well as the activities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Forces (IRGC-QF) and their network of affiliates.

Iran implements its strategy primarily within the "gray zone," the space short of conventional conflict where miscalculation can easily occur, leading to escalatory conflict and misunderstanding. Iran fosters instability by funding and promoting a threat network that employs provocation, violence, and covert arms transfers that serve as the stimulants for a range of conflicts across the region. It complements this subversive arm with conventional military provocation and overt threats to close key maritime sea lanes, especially at critical international economic chokepoints, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the BAM Strait, which puts global political stability and economic prosperity at risk.

Recognizing that Iran poses the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests in the Central Region, we must seize opportunities to both reassure our allies and shape Iran’s behavior. In order to contain Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and blunt its asymmetric advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the "gray zone" through means that include a strong deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and by building partner nations’ capacity. Through both messaging and actions, we must also be clear in our communications and ensure the credibility of U.S. intentions. Iran must believe there will be prohibitive consequences if it chooses to continue its malign activities designed to foment instability in the region. The U.S. Government should also consider communicating directly with Iran’s leadership to improve transparency and lessen the potential for miscalculation. 

To further strengthen deterrence against Iran, we must also take the necessary proactive measures to build the capacity of partners and allies in the region. Ideally we want to improve interoperability, expand communication, and enhance security mechanisms. Stronger, more capable partners, able and willing to assume a greater role in countering Iran, will serve to further enhance deterrence and improve stability in the region.

In addition to ready military actions, we must support the broader USG strategy with regard to Iran which should include new diplomatic initiatives that provide Iran with viable alternatives to its present course. While Iran continues to pose the most significant threat to regional security, we remain optimistic and believe that by taking proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve we can lessen Iran’s ability to negatively influence outcomes in the future.

Yemen. Yemen remains a critically unstable state engrossed in a civil war that has produced a significant humanitarian crisis and growing instability ripe for exploitation by VEOs, most notably al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ISIS affiliate, IS-Yemen. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement that leads to a durable resolution of the conflict under a unified Yemeni government further contributes to continued uncertainty in the country.

The civil war between the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) and the alliance of Former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh- and Huthis has entered its third year with little progress made towards achieving an enduring resolution despite concerted efforts by the United Nations, the broader International Community, and regional stakeholders. While the United States is not directly involved in the civil war, we are providing limited assistance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)-led coalition in an effort to help protect their territorial integrity and sovereign borders. Huthi forces have seized and attacked military border outposts inside KSA territory and continue to occupy Saudi lands. Ballistic missile attacks launched from Yemen have struck deep into the country causing casualties and potentially threatening the Islamic holy sites in Mecca. We will continue to work to resolve the conflict as an ending to the war through a comprehensive political agreement provides the surest security of Saudi’s Arabia’s border and territorial integrity , enables us to conduct counter-terrorism operations, allows the population to receive food and medicine, and blocks Iranian malign activities. Until the war is over, we will assist Saudi Arabia in its efforts to defend against these attacks and restore the territorial integrity of their country.

Our primary focus in Yemen remains protecting the U.S. homeland from threats posed by VEOs operating within Yemen’s ungoverned spaces, while ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce through the southern Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) Strait. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has indicated clear desire and ability to conduct attacks on the U.S. Homeland. Ongoing U.S. unilateral counter-terrorism operations and determined efforts by UAE in leading RoYG and Yemeni tribal forces, as demonstrated during the Mukalla offensive in April 2016, have degraded and disrupted AQAP’s operational networks and reduced their access to sources of financial support. Despite the complexity of the environment, our efforts aimed at degrading AQAP remain critical to protecting our national security interests in the region and must continue. 

In October 2016, the Iranian-supported BAM Maritime Threat Network (BMTN) demonstrated the ability to threaten freedom of navigation by successfully attacking a UAE vessel and a Saudi warship, and attempting to attack U.S. Navy warships in the southern Red Sea. We responded swiftly and decisively, destroying several Huthi coastal defense radar sites. While the origin of these attacks is found in the ROYG-Huthi conflict, the threats posed by the BMTN to the safe passage of vessels, either through deliberate action or unintentional acts, has the potential for significant strategic and economic impacts throughout the region. We continue to closely monitor the BMTN and remain prepared to promptly and decisively respond to any threats.

Going forward, our efforts against violent, non-state actors and support for similar efforts by our regional partners will remain our primary focus in Yemen. At the same time, we continue to do what we can to enable ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a resolution to the hostilities that pose an enduring threat to stability in the country and the region writ large.

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The Central Region remains the global epicenter for terrorism and violent Islamist extremism and the resulting turmoil continues to bleed across geographic combatant command "seams." Terrorism and violent extremism represent trans-regional threats, where malign actors seek to exploit ungoverned and under-governed spaces and vulnerable, disenfranchised populations worldwide.

One aspect of this threat that makes it particularly challenging is the terrorists’ and VEOs’ ability to operate across multiple domains and in both physical and virtual spaces. Today, the unprecedented global access achieved through the use of the Internet and various social media platforms enables terrorist and violent extremist groups to promulgate their radicalized ideologies while reaching a vast pool of potential recruits, many willing to conduct lone wolf-style attacks on behalf of these groups. Also, as we have seen with ISIS, the ability of violent extremist groups to operate effectively in the virtual battlespace, makes them more challenging to defeat due to the nature of that domain. As we degrade their physical capability, groups often shift focus to the virtual battlespace while their forces consolidate and regroup. We must continue to identify attributable and non-attributable methods and techniques for combatting groups in the virtual domain.

We must also find ways to address the drivers of instability that create the conditions that allow these groups to flourish. The root causes of instability must be dealt with if we hope to achieve a lasting defeat of terrorist and violent extremist groups operating in the USCENTCOM AOR. The people of the region must lead this effort; we cannot do it for them. However, we can and will continue to support and promote their efforts wherever possible.

We cannot allow terrorist groups and violent extremist organizations to operate uncontested, enabling them to grow stronger and expand their global reach. By working together with our Interagency Partners and the International Community, operating from multiple strategic platforms around the globe and across all domains, we will reduce the gaps and "seams" exploited by these groups and better protect our interests against this common threat. 

Our Partner Nations in the Central Region. Below are synopses of the current state of affairs, including challenges, opportunities, and status of our military-to-military (mil-to-mil) relationships with partner nations, except Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Yemen which were addressed in the previous section, "Key Focus Areas" (see pages 13-31).

The Gulf States – The Gulf States are among our best partners in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) willingness to provide basing and access for U.S. forces is crucial to our ability to operate militarily in the USCENTCOM AOR. The GCC countries provide critical nodes for achieving operational objectives and continued success against ISIS. Their troops and aircraft continue to play a key role in the ongoing fight against this terrorist organization. At leader-level summits in 2015 and 2015, the GCC countries committed to pursue collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-terrorism and ballistic missile defense; however, progress towards those ends has been relatively slow. Nevertheless, the GCC’s desire to create a unified military command and more closely coordinated economic policy could create opportunities for greater interoperability between GCC and coalition forces over the medium- to long-term. While individual GCC nations’ sometimes divergent foreign policies present an obstacle to achieving a unified defense posture, we remain committed to helping them achieve this desired end state through senior leader engagements, combined exercises, and more standardized equipment and training. As agreed upon at the May 2015 Camp David Summit, we have increased cooperation on maritime security, military preparedness, arms transfers, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and logistics interoperability. Our total GCC FMS open case portfolio is valued at over $150B and continues to help our partners defend their sovereignty and economic interests against emerging threats. As Gulf countries look to the United States for military equipment, training, and assistance, it is essential that we reinforce efforts to include them in our joint endeavors to defeat regional threats posed by violent extremism and Iran’s malign influence. Through our continued support for and collaboration with our GCC partners we will positively impact stability and security in the strategically important Central Region.

Bahrain is an important partner in the region, hosting USCENTCOM’s naval component, U.S. Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) and U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama at the Naval Support Activity Bahrain and Isa Air Base, respectively. The Bahrainis have actively supported coalition operations against ISIS in Syria since the start of the C-ISIS Campaign in September 2014, primarily by allowing us continued use and access to these facilities. They also continue to support Saudi-led operations in Yemen. We are making strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the Bahraini Coast Guard’s capacity, which aim to enable Bahrain to expand its role in countering piracy and violent extremism in the region’s maritime domain. Internally, the Bahrainis are dealing with a tough domestic economic hit by low oil prices and a persistent, low-level threat from Iranian-backed militant groups, and we continue to provide appropriate assistance to help them address the security threat. While we have historically enjoyed a strong mil-to-mil relationship with our Bahraini counterparts, the slow progress on key FMS cases, specifically additional F-16 aircraft and upgrades to Bahrain’s existing F-16 fleet, due to concerns of potential human rights abuses in the country, continues to strain our relationship. We continue to urge the Government of Bahrain to reverse steps it has taken over the past year to reduce the space for peaceful political expression in its Shia population and have encouraged the Bahrainis to implement needed political reforms in the country while reassuring them of our strong commitment to our valued partnership.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undertaking potentially far-reaching economic and related reforms under the banner of Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan. The goal of these measures is to diversify the Saudi economy and generate increased economic growth in the wake of low oil prices, as well as expanded opportunities for the nation’s burgeoning youth population. The Kingdom is a key regional leader, calling upon partner nations to join them in addressing regional challenges, including Iranian malign influence. Having actively supported the fight against ISIS in the early stages of the campaign, KSA shifted its priority of effort to Yemen in 2015 where it leads the coalition against the Saleh- and Iranian-backed Huthis, who continue to pose a threat to Yemen’s internal stability, security in KSA’s southern border region, and the flow of commerce through the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Saudis also are concerned about the threat posed by VEOs operating in Yemen, including the al Qaeda affiliate, AQAP, and the ISIS affiliate, IS-Y. We are principally focused on helping KSA to improve its target development and accountability processes in order to reduce incidence of civilian casualties, while also providing them with focused logistics and intelligence sharing support. Our long-standing partnership with KSA remains critical to maintaining stability in the region given their influence in the GCC and among many Muslim-majority countries. Our mil-to-mil relationship represents the strongest component of that partnership and continues to serve as the foundation for productive collaboration. By continuing to provide opportunities for the Saudis to enhance their defense capabilities, mainly through our substantive training and exercise program and robust FMS valued at $109B in open cases, we aim to improve interoperability while effectively addressing challenges in pursuit of our shared security goals and objectives.

Kuwait continues to be one of our strongest allies in the Central Region. Owing to the generous provisions of the Defense Cooperation Agreement, the Kuwaitis provide one of the most permissive environments in the USCENTCOM AOR with respect to access, basing, and overflight in support of U.S. and coalition presence in theater. Kuwait hosts the forward headquarters of USCENTCOM’s army component, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT). Kuwait is also the most active combat support logistics hub globally and plays a critical role in support of ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Kuwait utilizes its leadership role in the GCC to help mediate internal GCC rifts while promoting a regional response to crises. Kuwait has also led the GCC in helping to address the regional refugee crisis emanating from Syria and been an invaluable partner in supporting the Iraqi government’s C-ISIS efforts. Our mil-to-mil relationship with the Kuwaitis remains strong. Going forward we will look to pursue additional opportunities for joint training and further collaboration in support of common objectives.

The relationship between the United States and Oman remains strong, strengthened by our shared interests in the region and expanding access to Omani bases and ports. Oman is consistently viewed as a source of stability in the Gulf Region, and its neutral stance has enabled it to serve as a key interlocutor, most notably with Yemen and Iran. Of note, in October 2016, Oman’s leadership facilitated the release of two U.S. citizens held by the Huthis in Sanaa, Yemen. Additionally, Oman’s strategic location on the Arabian Sea, outside of the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz provides USCENTCOM with access to key logistical, operational, and contingency capabilities that are crucial to maintaining open sea lines of communication. While Oman does face significant challenges, namely a growing threat from VEOs in neighboring Yemen and a declining economy that could potentially impact its youth population, the leadership of the country is taking appropriate steps to address these and other issues. We enjoy a good relationship with the Omani military and will continue to work closely with them in support of shared interests.

Qatar remains a highly valued partner, providing critical access and basing in support of coalition forces and operations being conducted in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Central Region. The country hosts more than 10,000 U.S. and Coalition service members at Al-Udeid Air Base, home of USCENTCOM’s Forward Headquarters, our air component, U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), and its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Qatar’s Armed Forces also continue to support external operations in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, given their relationships with a wide range of actors, including more moderate elements, the Qataris are well-positioned to play an influential role in facilitating a political resolution to the conflict. Like most GCC countries, they continue to demand the removal of Bashar al-Assad as part of any resolution. Qatar has indicated a strong desire to enhance its partnership with the United States, both in terms of training engagements with U.S. forces and procurement of U.S. military equipment. Our continued role in their military modernization and development presents an invaluable opportunity to help expand their capability while strengthening our mil-to-mil relationship with a key and critical partner in the region. 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of our most steadfast and capable partners in the USCENTCOM AOR. The Emirates have clearly demonstrated a willingness and ability to take an active role in shaping outcomes in the Central Region. The country hosts more than 4,000 U.S. service members and provides critical support for U.S. operations, goals, and objectives. The UAE was among the first countries to join the Counter-ISIS Coalition in 2014. While their primary focus has since shifted to support the ongoing KSA-led military campaign in Yemen, UAE continues to provide support to several of the C-ISIS Coalition’s key lines of effort, including counter-messaging, counter-financing, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. In Yemen, the UAE serves as the leading ground element in ongoing operations against the Saleh- and Iranian-backed Huthis. The Emirates are also supporting our efforts to counter the al Qaeda affiliate, AQAP. In April, using local fighters and tribal militias, the Emirates played a critical role in liberating Mukalla, driving AQAP elements out of the port city and thereby denying them a key source of revenue. In conjunction with its military efforts, the UAE is heavily focused on providing humanitarian assistance to ease the crisis facing Yemen's population. We value our strong relationship with the Emirates and seek to build upon our robust mil-to-mil relationship, including by concluding a new Defense Cooperation Agreement that could serve as a foundation for expanded, mutually beneficial defense cooperation. We will work to expand our collaboration, specifically in the areas of security cooperation and foreign military sales. Additionally, we will work with the Emirates to promote their leadership role among partner nations in the region.

The Levant – The Levant represents the epicenter of ethno-sectarian tension and conflict in the USCENTCOM AOR. Partner nations in this sub-region continue to struggle with the impacts of the fight against ISIS, as well as the ongoing civil war in Syria, which is an "engine of instability" in and of itself. The persistent conflict and resulting widespread unrest have caused an expanding humanitarian crisis with ramifications that reach far beyond the USCENTCOM AOR. Stability in the Levant is further complicated by competition for influence therein from outside actors, principally Iran and Russia. Many of the challenges present today in the Levant originate from or affect neighboring countries and thus are trans-regional in nature and require cross-COCOM coordination. We routinely work closely with our colleagues in U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and other USG agencies and organizations to ensure that our various efforts are complementary and well-synchronized.

With its strategic location, control of the Suez Canal, enduring peace treaty with Israel coupled with a religious and cultural Pan-Arab influence, Egypt remains a stalwart partner in pursuit of shared Middle East policy objectives that include counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism, and improved regional stability. Of particular concern is the threat posed by the ISIS affiliate, IS-Sinai which conducts frequent attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and security services. While the EAF has managed to contain violence in the Sinai Peninsula without a comprehensive strategy to defeat IS-Sinai, we have a vested interest in helping them to effectively address this threat to ensure that the Sinai does not become a safe haven for extremist elements, including by providing additional bilateral military and security training. Egypt is further challenged by a weak economy and widespread unemployment or under-employment, as well as an aggressive approach to countering internal threats which makes its population highly susceptible to radicalization by extremist elements. Continued U.S. support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership, and our long-standing, resilient mil-to-mil relationship represents a key pillar of that partnership. Over the past several months, we have expanded our collaboration while taking steps to bolster our force protection measures and rebalance the Multinational Force Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai. In the coming months, we will continue to work closely with the EAF to further enhance their counter-terrorism capabilities and improve the security of their borders through continued engagement and our robust assistance and security cooperation programs.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of our strongest and most reliable partners in the Levant sub-region. Jordan provides access, basing, and overflight equal to or greater than that provided by any other partner in the USCENTCOM AOR. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) continue to make key contributions in support of the Counter-ISIS Campaign. With U.S. and coalition assistance, the JAF have fortified Jordan’s borders with Iraq and Syria, while enabling the International Community’s ongoing efforts to address the burgeoning humanitarian crisis manifesting inside of Jordan (~650,000 refugees) and in two camps located along the border in southern Syria (~55,000-65,000 IDPs) . It is imperative that we remain actively engaged with our Jordanian partners. Jordan provides a much-needed moderate Islamic voice in the region and is a trusted intermediary in efforts to advance progress between the Israelis and Palestinians. Our strong mil-to-mil relationship and continued demonstrated support for the Government of Jordan, the JAF, and the RJAF remains critical to ensuring that Jordan is able to effectively manage the broad range of challenges facing the country and the region now and in the future. 

Lebanon remains a key partner in our efforts to counter violent extremism in the Central Region, and their ground forces offer one of the greatest returns on investment in the region. They are routinely countering groups that include ISIS and Al Nusra Front, denying them freedom of movement, and strengthening the country’s border defenses with our continued support. U.S. security assistance to Lebanon has enhanced the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to counter malign influences and terrorist elements operating within the country. A strong and capable LAF acts as a counterweight to the militant arm of Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), while diminishing LH’s claim as the sole "resistance" in Lebanon. While LH has been preoccupied with its involvement in the fight in Syria in support of the Assad Regime, the LAF has gained increasing credibility among the Lebanese populace as the most respected institution in the country. On 31 October 2016, the Lebanese parliament ended the over two-year presidential vacancy with the appointment of President Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement Party. While this positive development ended political gridlock and restored government functions, significant challenges remain, exacerbated by the civil war in neighboring Syria. Of particular concern are the approximately 1+ million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This population presents political, economic, and security challenges to Prime Minister Hariri and his newly formed government. In addition to straining national resources, the Syrian refugee population is mostly Sunni and thus could threaten the fragile sectarian balance of power in the country. The humanitarian burden facing Lebanon will require significant international assistance to bolster limited local resources. Our continued support for this valued partner is both merited and has proven to pay tremendous dividends as the LAF has routinely demonstrated the ability to make best use of U.S. assistance to increase its capability and capacity and bring about positive, measurable results. 

Central and South Asia – Our primary interests in the Central and South Asia (CASA) sub-region are to prevent the establishment of terrorist safe havens, assure continued U.S. access, and support the sovereignty and independence of partner nations. Our engagement strategy is focused on these three interests and strengthening our bilateral relationships with the seven partner nations. We also encourage multi-lateral cooperation amongst these same seven nations, and our annual CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference serves as a mechanism for facilitating expanded dialogue and increased cooperation. This past year, we also held the highly successful inaugural CASA Directors of Military Intelligence Conference. The increased participation and elevated levels of mil-to-mil discussions clearly convey increased appetite for further U.S.-led engagement.

Despite increasing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian pressure designed to limit U.S. influence in the sub-region, the U.S. maintains its regional position by focusing on security cooperation areas where we have a comparative advantage such as counter-terrorism, border security, defense institution building, and professional development. Several CASA governments support transit of supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. We anticipate a continued need for these access routes. In this regard, our CASA partners have been and continue to be strong partners in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Other areas of shared interest include countering violent extremism and counter-narcotics. Our training and exercise programs in the CASA sub-region clearly demonstrate our strong commitment to addressing these and other common challenges. For example, Exercise STEPPE EAGLE, traditionally a trilateral exercise with the U.S., U.K., and Kazakhstan, has become more regional in scope with Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also now taking part. Additionally, we are increasing multilateral collaboration with our CASA-wide annual USCENTCOM Exercise REGIONAL COOPERATION.

We share two primary concerns with our CASA partners regarding stability and security in the region: 1) persistent worries about the long-term stability and viability of Afghanistan and 2) the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. The United States and NATO’s continued commitment to the ongoing Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan is helping to assuage these concerns, primarily by bolstering the Afghan security forces’ ability to defend their security interests. At the same time, we continue to pursue opportunities that would allow for increased information sharing, improved border security, and enhanced training and multi-lateral collaboration to support our shared interests.

While our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to require significant investment, elsewhere in the CASA sub-region we have clearly demonstrated the ability to achieve good effects with modest investments in terms of building partner nations’ capabilities, improving multi-lateral cooperation, and addressing common security threats. Going forward, we intend to strengthen relationships and build on previous accomplishments while working together with our Interagency Partners to explore and pursue new opportunities in this strategically important part of the world.

The U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced military relationship in Central Asia. We are making notable progress as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense continues to focus on institutional reform of its NCO corps, training management, human resources administration, and professional military education system. This progress continues despite enduring Russian influence and a Kazakhstani economy that is still recovering from the recent downturn in oil and gas prices. Kazakhstan remains the most significant regional contributor to Afghan stability, donating money to the ANA Trust Fund, continuing to provide educational opportunities to Afghans, and offering technical support services. Kazakhstan is also moving closer to a United Nations peace-keeping operations deployment with a unit that has been trained with U.S. assistance. Looking at future opportunities to strengthen our partnership, Kazakhstan has expressed interest in working with the U.S. to improve its logistical, medical, and engineering military branches. Kazakhstan also partnered with the Arizona National Guard through our State Partnership program, providing us the ability to assist in this effort.

The Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asia’s sole democracy, faces a number of challenges including economic and border security issues. The Kyrgyz Republic sees political pressure from its larger, more powerful neighbors, including Russia, hosting a small Russian airbase outside the capital, Bishkek. Despite ongoing challenges in our bilateral and security cooperation, we continue to seek opportunities to improve our mil-to-mil relationship. After a lengthy period of time during which few bilateral activities occurred, the Kyrgyz military may be increasingly receptive to higher level military engagements and expanded cooperation in the areas of border security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and countering violent extremism. Furthermore, we continue to assist the Kyrgyz in building a deployable peace-keeping (PK) hospital capability that should be ready to support United Nations PK operations in the near future. Looking ahead, we intend to pursue opportunities for increased cooperation while taking steps to strengthen our relationships with the Kyrgyz. 

Pakistan remains a critical partner in the counter-terrorism fight. Twenty U.S-designated terrorist organizations operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region; seven of the 20 organizations are in Pakistan. So long as these groups maintain safe haven inside of Pakistan they will threaten long-term stability in Afghanistan. Of particular concern to us is the Haqqani Network (HQN) which poses the greatest threat to coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. To date, the Pakistan military and security services have not taken lasting actions against HQN. We have consistently called upon the Pakistanis to take the necessary actions to deny terrorists safe haven and improve security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. We have seen some promising coordination between the Pakistan and Afghanistan militaries aimed at addressing instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Pakistan military in particular continues to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in the FATA and facilitate, via ground and air lines of communication, the sustainment of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

This past year we became increasingly concerned about the growing threat posed by the ISIS affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). Although their operational capacity has diminished as a result of U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan military operations, we remain focused on defeating the group in both countries. Of note, we were encouraged to see the Pakistani military plan and execute a recent named operation in which they set up simultaneous multiple blocking positions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in order to reinforce ANDSF efforts to disrupt IS-K activities. 

We also continue to see ongoing tensions between Pakistan and neighboring India. India remains concerned about the lack of action against India-focused militants based in Pakistan and even responded militarily to terrorist attacks in India-held territory earlier this year. We assess that these types of attacks and the potential reactions, increase the likelihood for miscalculation by both countries. Furthermore, India’s public policy to "diplomatically isolate" Pakistan hinders any prospects for improved relations. This is especially troubling as a significant conventional conflict between Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear exchange, given that both are nuclear powers. Additionally, Pakistan’s increased focus on its eastern border detracts from its efforts to secure the western border with Afghanistan from incursion by Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Security along the western border will nevertheless remain a priority for Islamabad, as the Pakistani military seeks to expand border control and improve paramilitary security.

While there are challenges with respect to the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, we have endeavored to maintain a substantial level of engagement with our Pakistani military counterparts. We continue to execute a robust joint exercise program. Most recently, the Pakistani Air Force sent airmen and aircraft to participate in Exercise RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada this past summer. The Pakistani military also continues to support our efforts elsewhere in the region; most notably, the Pakistani Navy is the most consistent and longstanding participant, second only to the United States, in Combined Task Force (CTF)-150 (counter-terrorism operations) and CTF-151 (counter-piracy operations) led by U.S. Naval Forces Central (USNAVCENT). Our relationship with Pakistan remains a very important one. We look forward to continuing our engagement with the Pakistani military leadership, to include the new Chief of the Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, in the days ahead as we work together in pursuit of shared interests.

Our mil-to-mil relationship with Tajikistan is deepening despite Moscow’s enduring ties and the presence of the 201st Military Base near Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe, Russia’s largest military base outside of its borders. China has also initiated a much stronger military cooperation partnership with Tajikistan, adding further complexity to Tajikistan’s multi-faceted approach to security cooperation. Tajikistan’s long border with Afghanistan remains the nation’s top concern, as the Taliban intermittently fights for control of Afghanistan’s Kunduz province, which is less than 160 miles from Dushanbe. These border concerns remain a focus area for U.S. security cooperation as we continue to develop the Tajiks’ capacity to address violent extremism, terrorism, and narco-trafficking; enhance border security; and, confront other trans-regional threats.

Turkmenistan’s UN-recognized policy of "positive neutrality" presents a challenge with respect to U.S. engagement. Our efforts to date have focused primarily on training, including in the areas of counter-narcotics and medical services. Due to Turkmenistan’s shared border with Afghanistan, the Turkmen remain concerned about the continuing instability in Afghanistan and, separately, the potential for the return of foreign fighters. We are encouraged somewhat by Turkmenistan’s expressed interest in increased mil-to-mil engagement with the U.S. within the limits of their "positive neutrality" policy. 

We are cautiously optimistic about the possibility of Uzbekistan’s improved relations with its neighbors in the region following the first presidential succession in the nation’s 25-year history. This is a promising development given Uzbekistan’s central and strategic geographic location, in the heart of Central Asia and bordering Afghanistan. President Mirziyoyev has reaffirmed the country’s unwillingness to allow other nations to establish military bases in Uzbekistan, its restriction against aligning with foreign military or political blocs, and its self-imposed restriction against any type of expeditionary military operations. Despite these limitations, our bilateral mil-to-mil efforts are focused on helping the Uzbeks improve border security, enhance their counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and prevent the return of foreign fighters into the country, which are shared U.S. interests in the region. We remain committed to these security assistance efforts. We also are helping the Uzbek military, which is the largest military in Central Asia, to professionalize its forces through advisory support and assistance to its professional military institutions.

Required Programs, Capabilities and Resources. The security environment in the Central Region remains complex and highly volatile. To ensure we are able to effectively achieve our mandate to protect our national interests, we must be properly postured with the necessary capabilities and resources to pursue opportunities in support of our goals and objectives, and to prevail in our various endeavors throughout USCENTCOM’s 20-country area of responsibility. Below are the programs, capabilities, and resources most critical to our success.

Building Partner Capacity. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is essential to achieving our objectives in the Central Region. To improve stability in the USCENTCOM AOR and mitigate the need for costly U.S. military intervention, we must be forward-leaning and empower our partners to meet internal security challenges and work collectively to counter common threats. BPC is a lower-cost alternative to U.S. boots on the ground, has longer-term sustainability, and is necessary for interoperable, combined coalition operations. As such it represents a high return investment in the future of the Central Region. By building capacity and enabling partners to assume a larger role in providing for the stability and security of their sovereign spaces, we will enhance regional stability while still maintaining our critical access and influence in the region. Other tangible by-products achieved through our BPC efforts include enhanced interoperability, improved security for forward deployed forces and diplomatic sites, continued access and influence, and more professional regional militaries comprised of forces learning the importance of rule of law and compliance with human rights norms. Continued support of key partners engaged in the ongoing military campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria is particularly important. As important as long-term regional stability is BPC’s focus on the threat environment and shaping the region is critical to better prepare and deter and counter state and non-state aggression. Our key partners’ ability to procure U.S. weapons and equipment and increase interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces is critical to our success. Any reduction of U.S. assistance risks undermining our allies and creating a security vacuum for exploitation by state and non-state actors with counter-U.S. or violent intentions.

Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales. For decades, U.S. security assistance provided to countries including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait and Egypt, has helped create lasting partnerships and improve regional stability. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program enable countries to meet their defense needs, while also promoting U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions and enhancing interoperability between and among U.S. and coalition forces. When we provide defense systems through U.S. security assistance, we are not just providing our partners with capabilities, we are committing to a long-term relationship that includes sustainment of those capabilities. The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often require continuous collaboration between countries. This may include training and support in the use of the equipment, maintenance assistance, and, in some cases, continuing help to update and modernize the equipment throughout its life-cycle.

Nevertheless, we must better anticipate our partners’ requirements and find ways to improve our FMF and FMS programs’ processes to better meet demand in today’s high-paced global security environment. Delays in procurement and delivery can, over time, jeopardize relationships with buyer nations and the potential for future FMS and FMF transactions. It is imperative that we make the FMF and FMS processes more responsive to partner needs.

In recent years we have seen an increase in restrictions placed on assistance provided to partner nations, limiting their ability to acquire U.S. equipment based on human rights and/or political oppression of minority groups. While these are significant challenges that must be addressed, the use of FMF and FMS as a mechanism to achieve changes in behavior has questionable effectiveness and can have unintended consequences. We need to carefully balance these concerns against our desired outcomes for U.S. security assistance programs – both DoD and State-funded – to build and shape partner nations’ capability, interoperability, and self-reliance in support of broader U.S. foreign policy. We should avoid using the programs as a lever of influence or denial to our own detriment.

USCENTCOM Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Exercise Engagement Training Transformation (CE2T2) program enhances U.S. capability to support contingency operations while improving readiness and maintaining presence and access to the region. At the same time, the program indirectly increases partner nations’ operational capability; demonstrates mutual commitment to regional security; ensures an effective coalition posture; strengthens relationships; and, improves combined command, control, and communications interoperability (C3I). More importantly, in light of the fact that today’s conflicts are increasingly trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional in nature, bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises support the unity of effort requirement for coalition operations.

The USCENTCOM CE2T2 program continues to grow in complexity and relevance with expanded participation throughout the USCENTCOM AOR during FY2016 and into FY2017. Last year, the command conducted 45 USCENTCOM- and/or Component-sponsored bilateral and multi-lateral exercises with 41 partner nations and spanning seven Geographic and Functional Commands. These exercises shape the perceptions of key audiences in the USCENTCOM AOR to support U.S. strategic goals of reassuring partners and deterring aggressive and malign behavior. Exercise objectives and outcomes include maintaining key relationships while demonstrating multilateral, as well as unilateral, capabilities. They also enable increased cooperation and interoperability with our partners and help to reinforce a strong military posture in the region. This helps counter any false perception of the U.S. "abandoning" the region.

Continued, robust, and reliable funding is necessary to fully support exercises as planned. For example, insufficient resourcing of component requirements can result in curtailment or even cancellation of efforts like Exercise EAGER LION, an annual multi-lateral training event in Jordan. This sub-optimization of the USCENTCOM exercise and training program ultimately will affect U.S. Joint and Combined Force readiness and create a perceived lack of commitment to our coalition partners. Combined with BPC, FMS, and FMF, the USCENTCOM CE2T2 program also actively promotes and supports regional stability through increased partner action and capability. These engagements not only build interoperability at the highest levels of command, but the benefits derived at the lowest, tactical levels of command and logistics manifest in long-term professional and personal relationships among participating country staffs.

Information Operations. Information Operations (IO) will continue to serve as a key element in shaping the environment to reduce or avoid conflict and as a force multiplier in the information space during and after major combat and counter-insurgency operations. We have an enduring responsibility to employ IO to counter trans-regional threats. By utilizing IO as a comprehensive, long-term capability to degrade VEOs’ effectiveness and counter state-sponsored destabilizing activities across the USCENTCOM AOR, the USG helps to improve regional stability while reducing the requirement for deployed U.S. forces. The Department of Defense (DoD), in concert with other USG agencies, has developed several IO campaigns, leveraging the latest technologies, which operate in the information domain. These campaigns include counter-propaganda messaging in print media, radio, television, short message service, Internet, and social media, and take a proactive approach to coordinating these activities with the country teams and embassies in our AOR. The nature and scope of threats prevalent today in the USCENTCOM AOR necessitates a robust response, and IO is a cost-effective application of DoD resources to deter aggression, counter destabilizing behavior, and decrease the potential for kinetic operations in order to protect USG and partner nation interests in the Central Region.

Cyberspace Operations. USCENTCOM cyberspace operations are built on the foundation of cyber readiness and include both Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations and command-centric Defensive Cyberspace Operations. Our top cyberspace priority is mission assurance; the goal is to preserve freedom of maneuver in cyberspace to assure access to both U.S. and foreign assets critical to military operations. Efforts include, but are not limited to, helping to set priorities and contributing to the desired end-state of denying adversaries the ability to operate on our networks and impact our missions. We recognize the importance of maintaining a holistic approach to this evolving capability that emphasizes the need for a synchronized effort across the whole of government. While the full and proper implementation of all available USG/DoD technical defenses plays a vital role, the human element is the most important factor to protect and defend from malicious cyber activity. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will continue to adapt our network defenses to detect, deter, and better react to known or anticipated threats. 

Anti-Access Area Denial. Potential adversaries are actively investing in competitive responses that include anti-access/area denial (A2AD) systems to minimize U.S. influence and abilities. Adversaries are also pursuing "layered defenses" to directly challenge U.S. diplomacy and presence. An enemy may use combinations of kinetic (e.g., ballistic/cruise missiles, moored/floating mines, small boat swarms, submarines, aircraft, drones, irregular warfare using proxies, terrorism, WMD) and non-kinetic (e.g., GPS jamming, spoofing, cyber hacking, EMP, underground facilities, dispersal/camouflage of weapons/assets, shielding from aerial/satellite surveillance, decoys) capabilities to inhibit projection of force and/or precision strikes.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Assets. USCENTCOM holds daily requirements for over 2,800 hours of full-motion video, thousands of still images, thousands of hours of signal intelligence, and other key intelligence collection sources. These requirements do not reside only in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but span the entirety of the USCENTCOM AOR. It is the layering, synchronization, and prioritization of national, theater, and tactical ISR capabilities that enable USCENTCOM force protection of transition, stability, and combat forces. This critical capability also performs several key functions including: battlespace awareness for partner and U.S. operational commanders, as well as indications and warning to guard against strategic threats and miscalculation; identification of fixed ground networks and facilities; location and tracking of adversary operational elements and units; mapping and development of adversary command and control; interdictions of facilitation entities, suppliers, and supply routes; and, characterization and targeting of funding centers and other support nodes. Our greatest difficulties in this fight remain in the development of enemy networks, groups, cells, and nodes that fight from within the populace. There are critical airborne ISR functions that must be present to map this unconventional threat. In priority order they are: 1) full-motion video, 2) signals intelligence, and 3) geospatial intelligence. USCENTCOM’s requirements consistently outpace theater airborne ISR capacity and capability and the demand will continue to grow. We are able to address some of the shortfall through cross-CCMD and partner-nation coordination and capacity development. We also need to explore innovative ways to develop capabilities for persistent ISR through experimentation and technology maturation and demonstration projects. Additionally, we need to address the shortfalls associated with processing, exploitation, and dissemination of collected intelligence. For the foreseeable future, in the absence of additional much-needed ISR assets, maintaining operational awareness on threats, risks, regional stability, and humanitarian crises will require constant attention, creative application of ISR, hard choices on the prioritization of resources, and the determination of acceptable risk to mission and forces.

Precision Munitions. Highly accurate munitions are vital components of our kinetic strike and integrated air and missile defense capabilities, to dominate and counter our adversaries’ increasingly sophisticated networks of coastal and air defenses coupled with precision ballistic missiles. Missile interceptors, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, precision air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles, and long-range precision ground-to-ground missiles work in concert to counter the growing threats we face today. We appreciate Congress’ continued support for the procurement/replenishment, development, and forward positioning of precision and specific purpose munitions that are critical to the way we currently fight – in urban areas, with very specific rules of engagement designed to protect civilians and limit damage to infrastructure. 

Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS). The enemy Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) threat and employment in the USCENTCOM AOR is rapidly evolving. Numerous non-state actors including ISIS, al Qaida, Taliban, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Fatah al-Sham are using both commercial-off-the-shelf and military drones to conduct operations against U.S. and coalition forces. This threat has evolved from reconnaissance and surveillance missions to weaponized drone attacks resulting in battlefield casualties. State actors continue to increase the sophistication of their UAS with all countries in the USCENTCOM AOR utilizing various classes of UAS for operations. Given the evolving threat, the need for an effective Counter-UAS capability that can defeat all classes of UAS remains a top priority. To address this problem, USCENTCOM is working with various Defense agencies and Industry through the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process to develop and acquire an effective system to employ against UAS. The ability to rapidly respond to this emerging threat is critical to mission success and requires increased funding to promote innovative solutions with expedited testing and rapid acquisition.

Joint and Interagency Partners. To ensure success in the pursuit of shared goals and objectives, our Joint and Interagency Partners must also be properly postured with the necessary capabilities and resources. Below are two key partners that play a significant role in support of USCENTCOM’s mission and merit continued Congressional backing.

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) – JIDO, an element of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is an invaluable organization that is even more important as we fight by, with and through our partners with fewer resources, but more exposed U.S. personnel and equipment in the fight. Their ability to rapidly respond to emerging threats is essential to enabling our efforts to counter improvised threats (e.g., counter-facilitation, counter-tunneling, counter-UAS) and build partner capacity in support of our deployed warfighters. The expert JIDO personnel embedded within our formations at USCENTCOM’s headquarters in Tampa, forward deployed, and across the globe, provide mission-critical analytical, planning, and rapid acquisition support. Having this invaluable joint organization that can expose the broader counter-IED network, identify future disruptive threats, stay in front of technological changes, and integrate our efforts across the Interagency to rapidly implement solutions is essential to our ability to protect our forces, defeat threat networks and build partner national capacity.

Global Engagement Center – The best way to defeat an idea is to present a better, more appealing idea to vulnerable and undecided audiences. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) effectively coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes messaging to foreign audiences designed to undermine the disinformation espoused by violent extremist groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, while offering positive alternatives. The Center is focused on empowering and enabling partners, governmental and non-governmental, who are able to speak out against these groups and provide an alternative to ISIS’s nihilist vision. To that end, the Center offers services ranging from planning thematic social media campaigns to providing factual information that counters disinformation to building capacity for third parties to effectively utilize social media to research and evaluation. 

Required Authorities and Appropriations. Fluid environments require flexible authorities with sustained and timely funding to respond to changes in conditions and maintain momentum of operational forces. We sincerely appreciate Congress’ continued support for key authorities and appropriations needed for current and future operations and response to unforeseen contingencies. The required authorities and resources listed below enable USCENTCOM to accomplish its mission and stated objectives in support of U.S. national interests and the interests of our partners in the Central Region.

Iraq Train & Equip Fund (ITEF). Iraq’s ability to defeat ISIS requires professionalizing and building the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including military or other security forces associated with the Government of Iraq, such as Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local forces with a national security mission. Most notably, the ongoing Coalition Military Campaign to defeat ISIS relies on indigenous Iraqi Security Forces to conduct ground operations against the enemy and liberate ISIS controlled territory. They have risen to the task and are making progress in this ongoing endeavor. While the initial training and equipping of the ISF focused heavily on developing Iraqi Army (IA) Brigades to conduct offensive operations, future efforts will shift to sustainment of combat capability and hold forces to ensure that liberated areas remain under the control of the GoI and that these forces are able to counter remaining ISIS pockets and any other VEOs which may emerge and attempt to fill the void created by the defeat of ISIS. These hold forces will be a combination of local tribal fighters and police forces. 

Syria Train & Equip Program. Protecting the United States from terrorists operating in Syria and setting the ultimate conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in that country will require the continued training and equipping of Vetted Syria Opposition (VSO) forces. Additional recruitment, retention, resupply, and support are central to our strategy to defeat ISIS in Syria. Our revised training approach is proving successful, improving the effectiveness and lethality of the force on path to a projected strength of up to 35,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017 and growing to 40,000 in 2018. Procurement and manufacturing lead times for non-standard weapons and ammunition and delivery from various foreign vendors complicates the already complex train and equip mission, so we appreciate as much flexibility as possible in authorizing and appropriating funds for this effort. The SDF and VSOs continues to advance in defeating ISIS and holding and defending liberated areas, while also assisting local authorities in providing humanitarian and security assistance to the populace.

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). Since 2005, U.S. provision of funds executed through ASFF has provided training, equipment, infrastructure, sustainment and salaries for a generated force of up to 352,000 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). ASFF plays a critical role in enabling the ANDSF to secure Afghanistan with an effective and sustainable force that is central to the U.S. strategy to prevent a Taliban or al Qaeda resurgence, defeat VEOs, and deny safe haven for external plotting against the U.S. Homeland and U.S. and partner nation interests in the region. 

Afghanistan Aviation Transition Funding – The proposed Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) aviation transition program is critical to addressing capability gaps in Close Air Support (CAS) and lift for the ANDSF. The program is designed to address the shortfall in available aircraft and trained pilots to ensure Afghan forces have the required aviation support and maintenance pipeline to move toward self-sustainment and increased independent operations. DoD plans to achieve these results by transitioning the AAF and SMW to U.S.-manufactured rotary wing platforms. Although the availability of trained pilots remains a particular challenge for the ANDSF, recent successes are producing capable pilots and the recap plan is designed to ease the human capital burden over time. The additional capability that would be gained through the aviation transition program will provide the Afghans needed overmatch against insurgents and terrorists while improving ground forces’ effectiveness and reducing ANDSF’s casualty rates.

Coalition Support. The authorities and funding that underpin our ability to effectively conduct Coalition operations, including in support of partners whose contributions are critical, but who lack the resources to participate without our assistance, are key to our continued success. The Coalition Support Fund (CSF) provides the authority to reimburse certain Coalition partners for logistical and military support provided by that nation in connection with Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan operations. The CSF also funds the Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) which authorizes supplies, the loaning of equipment, and specialized training assistance to coalition forces. The CSF relieves the operational burden on U.S. forces and enhances the visibility of Coalition presence. This authority remains critical to our strategic approach to Coalition operations, including, but not limited to, the ongoing military campaign to defeat the terrorist organization, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and our transition in Afghanistan. The capability and interoperability that CSF funding facilitates is crucial to our bilateral relations, Coalition operations and training with partner nations, and to the success of our broader strategic and trans-regional objectives. The Global Lift and Sustain and successor authority further complements this approach by enabling us to provide transportation and life support to select Coalition partners.

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP is authorized for local commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in Afghanistan, and may be used to make condolence payments for the loss of life, injury, or property damage resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations. The NDAA for FY2017 provides authority for ex gratia payments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria for damage, personal injury, or death that is incident to U.S. combat operations. CERP funded projects directly benefit the indigenous civilian populations in Afghanistan and demonstrate the positive effects of our presence, while also providing tangible, quick mitigation when coalition actions result in casualties or property damage to civilians during the course of military operations. CERP is a proven force multiplier and a key enabler in responding to urgent humanitarian needs and promoting security. Going forward, we want to ensure commanders engaged in the Counter-ISIS missions can provide immediate, but limited, small scale humanitarian assistance to ISIS liberated areas, until national and international relief agencies can provide that support. Our responsiveness is critical to quickly stabilizing those areas in order to begin the holding phase of the campaign and to counter ISIS messaging. 

Military Construction (MILCON). USCENTCOM stewards constrained resources and maintains an expeditionary approach to posturing capabilities in theater. We leverage existing infrastructure and host nation support and funding where possible, as well as maritime posture and reach back capabilities to meet steady state and surge requirements. In some instances, MILCON is required to establish infrastructure to support forces and equipment in the execution of their missions. Of note, USCENTCOM requires support for development at Muwaffaq-Salti Air Base (MSAB), Jordan and construction of the new Consolidated Squadron Operations Facility at Al Udeid, Qatar. These two projects are essential to our contingency and steady state operations and support the Defense Strategic Guidance. The projects will support executing our priority war plans by providing critical dispersed, resilient and flexible capacity to accept both steady state and enduring joint forces, multiple aircraft types and provide critical air C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) for current and future contingencies, theater and strategic surge and maritime operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. MILCON development is critical to support the realignment of U.S. forces operating from an expeditionary approach at various contingency bases scattered across the AOR to the required enduring posture approach necessary to protect U.S. interests and to sustain key bilateral relationships.

Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM). Service Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel and capability sets remain critical force multipliers required to execute USCENTCOM’s most dangerous and critical contingency plans. The Services and Defense Agency prepositioned capacity provides a shock absorber in rapidly emerging contingencies, buys critical decision space for our national leadership, and mitigates the risk associated with the tyranny of distance when we are called upon to rapidly aggregate and reintroduce forces into the region.

The U.S. Central Command Team. The outstanding men and women who comprise the USCENTCOM Team truly are our most important assets. They continue to make tremendous contributions on behalf of our Nation and our partners and allies around the globe. We must ensure they have everything they need to do their jobs effectively, efficiently, and as safely as possible.

We also continue to benefit from the unique capability provided by our Coalition Coordination Center, which consists of more than 200 foreign military officers from nearly 60 partner nations. They, too, are important members of our USCENTOM Team and play a critical role in strengthening the partnerships between our nations.

We remain mindful of the fact that success requires that we work together, not just within the command, but also with our teammates from other Combatant Commands, our Component Commands, established combined/joint task forces, the Central Region’s 18 county teams, and various agencies and organizations throughout the USG and the Interagency. Our close collaboration with counterparts at the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Treasury, CIA, FBI, and JIDO, for example, has paid enormous dividends in the pursuit of shared national goals and objectives. We look forward to continuing to work with them and others on behalf of our Nation.

We also are incredibly grateful for the support of our families. They are highly valued members of our USCENTCOM Team and we could not do what we do without them. They make important contributions and tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support of us and on behalf of the command and a grateful Nation.

The upcoming year promises to be a busy and challenging one in the Central Region. You can be assured that the world-class team at U.S. Central Command – which includes more than 80,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Civilians stationed today throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility – is up to the task, and is highly-skilled, motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission: defend our Nation and our interests, the interests of partners and allies, and improve stability and security in that strategically important part of the world.

USCENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail!

18’ POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

13 MARCH 2018

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL COMMANDER U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Introduction Last month I walked down the main street of Raqqah, the former capital of the brutal Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Amidst the mountains of rubble, reminiscent of European cities in World War II, vegetable sellers and falafel carts have set up shop, Raqqawi citizens are coordinating reconstruction efforts, and children are preparing to return to school – evidence of the indomitable spirit of the Syrian population. Our Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and partners, in particular the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have made extraordinary progress for over three years, liberating Mosul and Raqqah—the former capitals of ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate.” Now, more than 98% of the territory in Iraq and Syria formerly held by ISIS is no longer under their control. In Afghanistan, our Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition of 39 countries is supporting an increasingly capable Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) as they destroy Taliban and ISIS safe havens, remove terrorists from the battlefield, and establish the conditions for greater Afghan governmental control. U.S. Navy vessels and the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) patrol the Gulf and Red Sea, ensuring the free flow of commerce through these strategic waterways. Every day, our military and civilian personnel, forward deployed across the region, conduct training exercises and strengthen our partners’ abilities to defend themselves from external threats and challenge violent extremism within their borders. These activities, paired with robust diplomatic efforts from our country teams also help balance against Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region. Our success over the last year is largely due to the unyielding support of our allies, tremendous cooperation with our interagency partners, provision of additional authorities, and the continued faith of the American people in our military. However, despite the great strides we have made, 2 there is much work left to do. The challenges in the region are many: terrorism, violent conflicts, massive refugee populations, economic stagnation, social upheaval, great power competition, nuclear and ballistic missile threats, humanitarian crises, and radical violent ideologies to name a few. As our country begins to shift focus to threats in other parts of the world, the CENTCOM region remains vital to United States’ security and economic interests. We will continue to ensure our nation’s resources are responsibly employed to protect the American people from terror, promote American centers of trade and prosperity, and preserve peace through strength to deter future conflicts. CENTCOM’s Challenging Environment The CENTCOM area of responsibility stretches from northeast Africa, across the Middle East, to Central and South Asia. The twenty countries within this vast region confront profound social, economic, and political upheaval while simultaneously facing grave security challenges in the form of widespread conflict, expansionist regional powers, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and destabilizing behavior from outside actors. The enduring tension between the nuclear powers of India and Pakistan remains unreconciled while fractured states like Yemen and Syria are wrestling with enormous humanitarian concerns. The generational Israeli-Palestinian conflict simmers incessantly below the surface and complicates partnerships and coordination. Iran, Russia, and China are increasingly competing to be the partner of choice – militarily, politically, and economically – with U.S. allies. Turmoil in the Central Region seldom remains contained, and regional problems quickly become global as they bleed across Combatant Command seams into Africa, Europe, Asia, and threaten the United States. Humanitarian Crises. Years of conflict in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen have caused largescale humanitarian crises, created havens for extremism, blurred national borders, and provided Iran and Russia opportunities to expand their influence in the region. Millions of refugees stress Middle Eastern 3 and European countries. The government of Iraq, in partnership with the UN, has facilitated the return of millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but sustainable returns are contingent on successful security and stability efforts. In Syria, the return of displaced persons has started but the vast majority cannot safely return to their homes until fighting has ended, IDPs feel free from Syrian regime reprisals, and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) are cleared from their roads and homes. Yemen is plagued by cholera and malnutrition, with nearly 80% of the population requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Economic Uncertainty. Economic prospects across the region remain hampered by poor economic policies and corruption, which are compounded by inadequate education and health services. This has led to stagnant economies marked by inflation, low wages, and high unemployment. Many economies in the CENTCOM region depend on oil and gas revenues, but low oil prices have challenged governments’ abilities to balance fiscal considerations with social contracts. Large state-owned sectors and bloated civil service departments are a drag on economic growth and limit opportunities for a burgeoning youth population. Corruption inhibits reform and stabilization efforts and undermines the population’s confidence in its government. Unfortunately, corruption in the Central Region is at historically high levels; according to Transparency International Corruption Index, 90% of countries in the Middle East score a failing grade, and CENTCOM includes some of the most corrupt countries in the world – Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. President Ghani is challenging persistent corruption in Afghanistan by putting reforms in motion to fight corruption in the military and government. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi is working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to implement an ambitious reform program, but the challenges are daunting. Some of the countries in the region are working to address these economic challenges; Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 program, Egypt’s 4 ambitious macroeconomic reforms, and Jordan’s concerted efforts to boost GDP growth rates and reduce unemployment are a few examples. Violent Extremism. The violent extremist ideologies of ISIS, al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other VEOs remain a threat to the United States and our allies and partners, not just in the CENTCOM region but worldwide. Although ISIS has steadily lost control over physical territory and no longer controls any major population centers in Iraq or Syria, Sunni populations remain vulnerable to identity-based recruitment into VEOs. Violent extremists have utilized online forums to spread violent interpretations of Islam to audiences across the globe. The impressionable youth in this tumultuous region, seeking community and justice, are highly susceptible to extremists’ teachings; consequently, a new generation of radicalized followers could become online citizens of a “virtual caliphate,” dedicated to the struggle against the West. Both ISIS and AQ are resilient and have proven capable of projecting propaganda and inspiring attacks throughout the region and outside of the Middle East. In Egypt, ISIS has expanded its reach into the mainland and carried out mass-casualty attacks. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continues to orchestrate high-profile attacks in Afghanistan. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to plan attacks on the homeland from the ungoverned spaces in Yemen. Proxy Warfare. The Central Region has a long history of proxy warfare, violent militias, and irregular forces operating in the “grey zone” – military competition short of war. Iran has extended its tentacles across the region through numerous proxies, including Lebanese Hizballah operating in multiple countries, hardline Iranian-backed Shia Militia Groups (SMGs) in Iraq and Syria, and Iranian support has enabled the Houthis. The result is prolonging the civil war in Yemen, threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and risking expansion of Yemen’s civil war into a regional conflict. Iran uses its 5 proxies to secure supply lines for malign activities and influence neighboring governments. Militants operating out of remote areas in Pakistan threaten Afghanistan and India. Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Regional conflicts and power imbalances drive nations to seek and acquire nuclear weapons and extend ballistic missile capabilities to secure their influence. As an example, Iran continues to develop advanced ballistic missile capabilities and also transfer them to the Houthis and to its Hizballah proxies. This will enable them to strike U.S. partners and allies, and the possibility Tehran will reinvigorate its nuclear program in the out-years of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains a potential risk. Nuclear proliferation, combined with proxy warfare, increases opportunities for miscalculation and generates a serious threat to the region and the United States. Regional Competitors. Iran remains the major threat to U.S. interests and partnerships in the Central Region. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for influence in the region exacerbates multiple security dilemmas throughout the Middle East – from Iran’s support of Houthis in Yemen, to Riyadh’s attempt to diminish Hizballah’s authority in Lebanon. Iran is also working through proxies and friendly political allies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to establish an arc of influence, or “Shia Crescent” across the Middle East. As we navigate the many challenges and relationships in our region, we partially view them through the lens of countering Iran and diminishing malign influence. We must also compete with Russia and China as they vie for access and influence in the Central Region. Russia’s presence in Syria established Moscow as a long-term player in the region, and the Kremlin is using the conflict in Syria to test and exercise new weapons and tactics, often with little regard for collateral damage or civilian casualties. An increase in Russian surface-to-air missile systems in the region threatens our access and ability to dominate the airspace. 6 On the diplomatic front, Moscow is playing the role of arsonist and firefighter – fueling the conflict in Syria between the Syrian Regime, YPG, and Turkey, then claiming to serve as an arbiter to resolve the dispute. Moscow continues to advocate for alternate diplomatic initiatives to Western-led political negotiations in Syria and Afghan-led peace processes in Afghanistan, attempting to thwart the UN’s role and limit the advance of American influence. Russia's insistence on a separate Syrian political peace process at Astana and Sochi detracts from the internationally-sanctioned UN talks in Geneva. In Afghanistan, Moscow has exaggerated the presence of the ISIS-K threat, and while the Coalition and the Afghans are the only forces actively fighting ISIS there, Russia has used familiar propaganda techniques to brand ISIS’s presence as a U.S./NATO failure. Russia is also trying to cultivate multi-dimensional ties to Iran. Though historic rivals, Moscow and Tehran share interests across the region, including an overarching desire to sideline, if not expel, the U.S. from the region. Russia and Iran are both trying to bolster a brutal regime in Syria, limit U.S. military influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and fracture the longstanding U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership. Russia also maintains significant influence in Central Asia, where the countries of the former-Soviet Union rely on Russia to varying degrees for their economic and security needs. This is problematic as Russia’s efforts could limit U.S. engagement options and provide Moscow additional levers of influence, particularly as NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan are dependent on Central Asian partners for logistical support. Since 2014, Russia has increased Eurasian integration efforts to reassert Moscow’s dominant influence along the periphery or buffer zone. Likewise, an increasingly assertive China is testing Russia’s dominance in the economic and security arenas of Central Asia but also posing challenges to U.S. influence. China seeks to capitalize on regional concerns over what it perceives as waning U.S. influence and support. Toward this end, 7 Beijing is building and strengthening trade, infrastructure, defense, and political relationships across the Middle East, Central and South Asia. China is pursuing long-term, steady economic growth that bolsters its international influence and access to energy resources. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), could serve as a stabilizing, profit-generating project in the region, but it could also improve China’s military posture. This collection of infrastructure projects already provides China with access to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is operated through a Chinese-Pakistani agreement and has the potential to increase China’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. China also recently established its first overseas military base adjacent to the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) in Djibouti. While Beijing claims both locations support peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the new military base and port allow China to project forces more permanently within the region and influence strategically valuable trade waterways. China also seeks to increase its economic and diplomatic cooperation with Iran. The lifting of UN sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) opened the path for Iran to resume membership application to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian political, economic, and security organization. This, along with the existing BRI cooperation between the two nations, increases China’s ties to Iran. China considers its relationship with the GCC states critical for its current economic needs. The Gulf States provide approximately one-third of China’s oil, and Qatar is its single largest supplier of natural gas. Like Russia, China has sought to arbitrate some conflicts in the region, offering to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While China will continue to develop its relationships with nations in the Middle East, Beijing will likely maintain its stance of avoiding a major role in ongoing conflicts. 8 North Korea plays a relatively minor role in the Central Region, but its potential export of ballistic missile and nuclear technology remains an area of concern. For decades, North Korea widely proliferated ballistic missile expertise and materials to a number of actors including Iran and Syria. North Korea also exports cheap labor to various Middle Eastern countries; remittances from these laborers are a significant source of revenue for North Korea, despite the State Department’s efforts to persuade our partners to expel these workers. Prepare – Pursue - Prevail CENTCOM’s mission is to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. We aim to accomplish this mission through our strategic approach of “Prepare, Pursue, Prevail.” This approach aligns with the recently published National Defense Strategy (NDS), which directs us to “Compete, deter, and win in conflict and reinforce all levers of national power from sustainable positions of military advantage.” It also aligns with the POTUS-approved strategies for Iraq and Iran. These strategies look to consolidate gains achieved through defeating ISIS, while neutralizing and countering Iran’s destabilizing influence, and ensuring a stable Iraq does not align with Iran and remains a productive strategic U.S. partner. Preparing in advance of crises creates decision space for leaders and allows for the responsible and effective employment of resources and forces. Effective preparation enables CENTCOM to compete with the other major actors in the region through strengthening alliances and partnerships. Pursuing opportunities ensures we seize and maintain the initiative as we meet each of the challenges in our complex region. We also retain the flexibility to effectively deter threats, preferably short of military force. We constantly seek to Prevail in conflict, winning the current fight and preparing for the next challenge. 9 CENTCOM Priorities While the CENTCOM team manages a broad range of difficult challenges on a daily basis, a significant portion of our efforts and resources are necessarily focused in three areas: supporting the Administration’s South Asia Strategy – to include Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (OFS) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan; countering VEOs in the Central Region, to include Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) in Iraq/Syria; and countering Iranian destabilizing activities across the region. Supporting the Administration’s South Asia Strategy. Since my last posture hearing, CENTCOM has begun a transition – an operational alignment and rebalancing to better address challenges, mitigate risk, and optimize resources in an ever-changing battlespace. With ISIS’s territorial control crumbling in Iraq and Syria, we have shifted our main effort to implementing the military component of the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan through OFS and NATO’s noncombat RSM, while still retaining sufficient resources to enable local security forces to prevent the reemergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The NDS directs us to deter adversaries from aggression against our vital interests and to discourage destabilizing behavior. Working “by, with, and through” the ANDSF, we have maintained constant pressure on the Taliban with the intent of removing their influence on the population and forcing them to reconcile with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Our conditions-based approach to the conflict gives hope to our Afghan partners and demoralizes the enemy. This strategy reaffirms the U.S. government’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan while supporting two complementary missions – counter-terrorism operations and security force assistance of RSM. Preventing AQ and ISIS-K from directing or 10 supporting external attacks against the United States and our allies is a vital national interest, and the RSM preserves peace through a strong network of alliances both regionally and globally. The GIRoA is making dedicated and transparent efforts to combat corruption at every level and ensure an effective Afghan fighting force. Implementation of the current GIRoA 4-Year Roadmap is improving overall ANDSF capabilities. Our method of working “by, with, and through” the ANDSF ensures we are training Afghan forces to take the lead in combat, enabling them with key assets like intelligence and logistics, and working through the GIRoA to find Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. ANDSF capability to respond to crises has greatly improved over the last few years, and they are able to prevent security setbacks from becoming cascading events; however, the ANDSF does not have the ability to prevent the insurgency from maintaining a rural presence and occasionally threatening a population center or critical ground lines of communication (GLOC). The increase in U.S. and RSM partner military personnel enables the provision of enhanced train, advise, and assist capability to the ANDSF. This will advance the ANDSF’s ability to plan and execute simultaneous offensive military operations, keeping constant pressure on the enemy. In addition to our plan for closer, more persistent advising, we are developing critical capabilities within the ANDSF to provide them clear advantages over the Taliban. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) continues to develop offensive capability, and our security cooperation funds are training maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian platforms to modern U.S. aircraft. We are also working to double the size of the Afghan Army’s Special Operations force – currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban. Simultaneously, we are targeting many of the Taliban’s revenue and support networks; illicit narcotics production and trafficking largely finances insurgent operations. The Taliban remains a resilient adversary capable of inflicting heavy ANDSF casualties, but we, shoulder to shoulder with our 11 ANDSF partners, will continue to apply military and economic pressure to force the Taliban to the negotiating table. Kabul’s uncertain political situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the ANDSF increases security nationwide and the GIRoA prepares for planned 2018 elections. GIRoA continues to suffer from a professional governmental capacity deficit, competing interests, and corruption. We are pursuing opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with Central and South Asian states to promote regional stability and to encourage them, and our NATO allies, to contribute financial and advisory support to the GIRoA. As an example, we strongly support improved Indian-Afghanistan ties as a means to advance Kabul’s economic interests and increase Afghanistan’s financial independence. As Afghanistan’s neighbor and a critical supply route for RSM operations, Pakistan presents both challenges and opportunities as we implement the new South Asia Strategy. Pakistan’s cooperation is imperative for the success of our South Asia strategy. As the President made clear in the unveiling of the strategy last August, the United States expects Pakistan to take decisive action against the Taliban and Haqqani Network leaders that operate from its territory. Taliban and Haqqani leadership and fighters continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan. Other Pakistan based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba threaten Pakistan’s neighbor, India, and carry out attacks that jeopardize regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Pakistan has made many sacrifices in the war against terrorism, including important contributions in significantly degrading AQ and combatting ISIS-K. Anti-Pakistan militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are able to conduct devastating terrorist attacks within Pakistan, killing scores of civilians and military. The Pakistani military is conducting counterterrorism operations against select terrorist groups that target the Pakistani state. Pakistan has also 12 undertaken several high profile and effective counter-insurgency operations in North Waziristan and other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) against TTP. Security along the border with Afghanistan will remain a priority in 2018 as Pakistan seeks to expand border control mechanisms and efforts to improve paramilitary security capabilities. Recently we have started to see an increase in communication, information sharing, and actions on the ground in response to our specific requests --- these are positive indicators. However, ongoing national counter-terrorism efforts against anti-Pakistan militants throughout the country have not yet translated into the definitive actions we require Pakistan to take against Afghan Taliban or Haqqani leaders. This problem is compounded by increasing cross-border terrorist attacks and fires between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which hinders both countries’ abilities to coordinate on border security. We have preserved our valuable military-to-military relationship with Pakistan and attempted to increase transparency and communication with influential military leaders, while pressing our serious concerns about Pakistan’s provision of sanctuary and support to militant and terrorist groups that target U.S. personnel and interests. Achieving long-term stability in Afghanistan and defeating the insurgency will be difficult without Pakistan’s support and assistance. Although most security assistance for Pakistan is currently suspended, since 2002 Pakistan has been among the largest recipients of U.S. provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). To date Pakistan has also been reimbursed hundreds of millions of dollars in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for counter-insurgency operations that support U.S. security objectives in the region. We use ground and air routes in Pakistan to deliver materiel to Afghanistan. However we also have options to utilize routes through the other Central Asian nations. CENTCOM continues to promote U.S. interests in the rest of the Central Asia/South Asia (CASA) sub-region, which includes the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 13 Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While our Central Asia partners continue to seek U.S. engagement, Russia, China, and Iran continue to discourage cooperation and engagement between Central Asian countries and the United States. Despite this pressure, several CASA governments continue to support the transit of supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan and engage the United States on shared interests related to access, border security, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-insurgency. Our Central Asian partners remain concerned about the long-term stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the specter of returning foreign terrorist fighters to their home countries. We are postured not only to help them address transnational threats, but also to continue to develop our military-to-military relationships in the CASA sub-region. In support of these efforts, our two major forums that promote military cooperation, the CASA Directors of Military Intelligence Conference and CASA Chiefs of Defense Conference, are developing beyond ceremonial affairs into venues that encourage free-flowing military-to-military communication and seek practical solutions to security challenges. These efforts, in addition to our operations in Afghanistan, will ensure that CENTCOM continues to support the Administration's South Asia Strategy in the CASA sub-region with a long-term, regional approach. The U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship is our most advanced military relationship in Central Asia. We are making notable progress as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense focuses on institutional reform of its Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, human resources administration, and its professional military education system. Reliance on Russian-produced equipment presents challenges to developing a more robust defense sales relationship. Despite these challenges, Kazakhstan looks to the U.S. to balance, not replace, Russian and Chinese influence through a multi-vector foreign policy, which allows more security cooperation possibilities. 14 The Kyrgyz Republic has increasingly aligned its interests with Russia and China. The U.S.Kyrgyz security relationship has declined since the closure of the Manas Transit Center and the termination of the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014. Despite the Kyrgyz armed forces’ desire to improve military-to-military cooperation with CENTCOM, Kyrgyz senior civilian leaders have shown little interest in improving military relations. Tajikistan remains a key U.S. partner in Central Asia due to its 800-mile border with Afghanistan. While U.S-Tajik relations are positive, Russia is increasingly impinging on U.S. influence and spreading inaccurate information about Afghanistan and the region. Tajikistan is Central Asia’s poorest country, and its armed forces are habitually under-funded and ill-equipped, which complicates our efforts to help the Tajiks build and sustain long-term security capacity. Moreover, the Russian forces at the 201st Military base located outside of Dushanbe loom large on the political and military landscape. The Tajik government also depends heavily on foreign assistance and on the remittances of its migrant laborers working in Russia, giving Moscow considerable leverage over the country. Despite all of these challenges, CENTCOM continues cooperation with Tajikistan focused on border security, counterterrorism, and counter-drug trafficking. Tajikistan is a major transit point for Afghan opiates; our efforts to help strengthen Afghan-Tajik border security are important to reducing the drug trade that funds the Taliban and destabilizes the region. Turkmenistan is an important nation due to its strategic geographic location between Europe and Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, as other Central Asian states, is concerned about instability in Afghanistan and thus supports international counter-VEO, counter-terrorism, and border security efforts. Currently, we are building our partnership with Turkmenistan through medical exchanges. Uzbekistan remains a key U.S. partner in Central Asia due to its strategic geographic location at the heart of Eurasia and proximity to Afghanistan. Over the past year, Uzbekistan experienced a relatively 15 smooth succession of power from the late President Karimov to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has instituted a number of reforms as Uzbekistan’s second president since independence in 1991. Our bilateral relations serve to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Russia exercises a degree of political and economic influence, yet the Uzbeks continue to pursue a strategic relationship with the U.S. Uzbekistan has been a relatively closed society, but we are now seeing positive changes within Uzbekistan that are leading to improved military-to-military relations, to include increased military professionalization and training. CENTCOM is also working to improve its military’s logistics and sustainment systems to better support previously transferred U.S. defense equipment. We also continue efforts to bolster Uzbekistan’s special operations forces. Countering Violent Extremist Organizations. Another critical objective from the NDS is to prevent terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the U.S. homeland, allies, and partners. In the past year, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE has achieved remarkable success against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The ISF and SDF are operating at their most effective levels since the operation began. Millions of IDPs have returned home and are starting to rebuild. The destruction of ISIS’ so called physical “caliphate” is imminent, but now we must consolidate gains by investing in the population that will hold this territory and keep ISIS from returning. The U.S. Strategy for Iraq contains four primary objectives: stabilize Iraq, limit Iran’s influence and its use of Iraq to shape the Middle East, achieve a stable Iraq economy, and sustain an enduring relationship with the ISF. We must now look to how we effectively resource these objectives along with the President’s objectives in Syria. The Coalition’s campaign to defeat ISIS has had considerable success. Coalition airstrikes have killed hundreds of ISIS leadership figures and facilitators in Iraq and Syria, which has disrupted ISIS’ command and control network; degraded its use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS); 16 reduced its ability to conduct research and development, procurement, and administration; and denied sources of funding for terrorist activities. These losses have undermined ISIS’ ability to conduct attacks throughout the region and the world. With the loss of terrain and the liberation of the population, ISIS can no longer generate funding through extortion and taxation. Additionally, airstrikes and ground operations have crippled and seized hydrocarbon generating facilities and facilitation routes that moved and supplied ISIS fighters and supported illicit oil sales. We have also degraded ISIS media operations; the most recent version of their monthly online terror magazine “Rumiyah” was last published in September 2017. In Iraq, the ISF fought a vicious, urban battle to liberate Mosul, with ISIS providing stiff resistance using tunnels, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and unmanned aerial systems. The liberation of Mosul provided the ISF with the momentum that led to the quick liberation of Tal Afar and Hawijah. Our partnership with the ISF is an excellent example of the successful application of the “by, with, and through” approach. Using a minimal number of U.S. and Coalition advisors, we enabled the ISF with robust communications, logistics, intelligence, and precision fires. Iraqi forces led from the front in each operation, and their success elevated their legitimacy with the population. There remain enduring political and cultural challenges in Iraq. Reconstruction, discontent with corruption and any delay of rebuilding efforts as well as the Kurdistan stand-off could fuel future instability. ISIS’ reversion to an underground insurgency will remove the greatest unifying factor among Iraq’s competing factions and may reignite unresolved grievances. In the post-ISIS period, the GoI will be challenged to rebuild Sunni areas while balancing competing security demands, enacting government reforms, and managing tensions among Iraq’s political factions. The KRG remains a strategic partner and their negotiations with Baghdad for a peaceful settlement are critical to ensure the disputed territories are not further complicated by intra-Iraq divisions. 17 In Syria, the fight against ISIS has been complicated by the multiple countries involved in the conflict, many of whom have widely divergent interests. Syrian President Bashar al Assad remains in power, and, due to military support from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), is attempting to bring all of Syria under regime control. In 2017, the regime made significant territorial gains in central and eastern Syria, culminating in reducing opposition enclaves in western Syria and seizing urban centers from ISIS along the western bank of the Euphrates River from ISIS. Nevertheless, the Assad regime has insufficient forces to adequately secure recaptured territory and often faces insurgent counterattacks behind its lines. The regime is highly dependent on billions of dollars in external Iranian and Russian economic and military support, the cost of which press both Moscow and Tehran to seek an end to the conflict. The intervention of the Coalition and regional powers in the Syrian conflict has blocked Assad’s ability to recapture major portions of northern Syria, and entrenched opposition fighters and VEOs across Syria continue to challenge regime control. Diplomatic efforts to establish deescalation zones were most successful in a deal negotiated between Russia, the U.S., and Jordan in southwest Syria. Russian and Iranian-led Astana talks have been far less successful, and Russian bombardment of the Astana agreed de-escalation zone in East Ghouta calls into question Moscow’s sincerity in guaranteeing the security of these areas. There has been some success, often under UN auspices, to negotiate on humanitarian issues, but Syrian regime recalcitrance to allow aid deliveries is probably driven by Assad’s choice to use starvation as a weapon of war. Assad’s reluctance to negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow’s reluctance to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges lie ahead in forging a political resolution to the conflict. For the Coalition, the SDF’s liberation of ISIS’ capital Raqqah in October 2017 was a significant turning point in the conflict. The SDF, which is composed of local Sunni Arabs and 18 Kurds, has been a valuable partner in the fight against ISIS, and they sacrificed greatly to liberate large portions of their country. Simultaneous operations by the SDF in Syria and the ISF and PMF in Iraq effectively isolated ISIS remnants in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) and along the Syrian side of the Iraq-Syria border where both forces are currently conducting operations to kill or capture all remaining ISIS fighters. Pro-Regime Forces (PRF) and Russia also continue to operate in the MERV as they isolate ISIS fighters south of the Euphrates River, though Assad’s decision to prematurely withdraw his forces has likely given valuable breathing room to ISIS on the western side of the river. With PRF operating in close proximity to Coalition-backed forces in the MERV, de-confliction measures are vital, and we have worked closely with Russia to prevent accidental strikes and to ensure the safety of the various forces on an increasingly complex battlefield. The Coalition does not seek to fight the Syrian regime, Russian or pro-regime forces partnered with them. While the deconfliction efforts have been largely effective, the Coalition recently demonstrated its commitment to defend U.S. and partner forces operating in Syria by striking PRF that conducted an unprovoked attack on SDF and Coalition forces. And we will continue to do so, as necessary. Though our partnership with the SDF is critical to defeating ISIS in Syria, it has created challenges with our NATO ally Turkey, who views the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) elements within the SDF as analogous to the PKK terrorist group. U.S. Special Operations forces have been working with vetted elements of the SDF for several years to defeat ISIS. Our assistance to the SDF has been focused on this goal, and we have included safeguards and transparency measures to ensure it does not physically threaten Turkey. In January, Turkey began air strikes and ground incursions into the predominantly Kurdish enclave of Afrin, where CENTCOM has no presence or direct relationships in northwest Syria, in an attempt to, according to the Government of Turkey, “remove the terrorist threat 19 from its border.” Though we have no relationship with YPG fighters in Afrin, who previously cooperated with Russia and the regime, these operations directly impact our ability to affect a lasting defeat against ISIS through the SDF. Many fighters in the SDF have familial ties to the Kurds in Afrin, and they are now forced to choose between completing operations against ISIS fighters in the MERV and assisting their fellow Kurds in northern Syria. Our alliance with Turkey is paramount, and we will continue to assist the Turkish military in countering the PKK and other VEOs that threaten their border, but we must continue to urge restraint as their actions have clearly increased risk to our campaign to defeat ISIS. Amidst the visible damage caused by the Syrian civil war, the country has also witnessed a far less-publicized change: democratic organizations in the form of local civil councils have assembled in places previously controlled by ISIS. These councils are providing the necessary basic functions of governance and starting to rebuild their war-torn communities. These ad-hoc democratic organizations come in various forms and engage in a range of activities from providing the most basic services to rallying the population against the re-emergence of VEOs. For example, in the cities of Manbij and Raqqah, local councils ran civic campaigns against ISIS in concert with more moderate rebel groups, providing a two-pronged strategy that ultimately prevented ISIS from regaining a foothold in these areas. In other parts of Syria, councils have developed a more sophisticated capacity and are building roads, repairing sewage lines, and holding local elections. As Secretary of State Tillerson has said, “Interim local political arrangements that give voice to all groups and ethnicities supportive of Syria’s broader political transition must emerge with international support.” Any interim arrangements must be truly representative and must not threaten any of Syria’s neighboring states. Similarly, the voices of Syrians from these regions must be heard 20 in Geneva and in the broader discussion about Syria’s future.” The key to the success of these groups is their ability to maintain legitimacy among the populace. Although these local councils have made great strides, they can only provide aid and assistance to the population at the pace at which they receive it. As we enable local solutions to local problems, supporting these local councils with our full range of Department of Defense, interagency, and Coalition capabilities will help them maintain popular support and set conditions for enduring, stable governance. A significant challenge we face as we complete the defeat of ISIS is the repatriation of hundreds of foreign fighters to their home countries. The SDF and ISF are both holding several hundred fighters from a number of different countries in prisons or temporary detention facilities, with no clear process for prosecution or repatriation. The longer these fighters remain in detention together, the greater danger they pose as they form new connections, share lessons learned, and prepare to re-establish networks upon their release or escape. This urgent problem requires a concerted international effort involving law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic agreements. Yemen is another area where VEOs pose a threat to the homeland. The civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead a coalition supporting Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and despite attempts to reestablish itself in Aden, some elements of the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) remain in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Houthi forces control Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, and are undeterred in their efforts to retain key territory and attack the Saudi coalition. The civil war has severely affected Yemen’s population, with nearly 80% of the population requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Similarly, its economy has been devastated by insecurity, extremely high unemployment (35%) and near cessation of its petroleum industry. Neither the Houthis nor the exiled Hadi government has the ability to govern effectively. In December 2017, the relationship between previously aligned Houthis and former 21 President Ali Abdullah Salih disintegrated and culminated with Salih’s assassination by his former allies. It is unclear if the Saudi-backed Hadi faction can capitalize on these events, and Salih’s forces have splintered, adding continued chaos. Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue to maintain a presence in Yemen and are focused on attacks against ROYG, the Saudi coalition, and Houthi targets. Since mid-2014, ISISYemen has leveraged the chaotic security situation to expand its capabilities and conduct intermittent attacks against Saudi coalition and Yemeni security targets in Aden. AQAP still aspires to threaten Western interests with high-profile attacks, although U.S. and Saudi coalition strikes have removed successive levels of leadership and logistics support, critically damaging their network. Our Emirati partners have also played a key role in countering the threat from AQAP and ISIS-Yemen in southern Yemen. The conflict in Yemen has opened opportunities for Iran, which continues to provide support to the Houthis with the aim of building a proxy to pressure the Saudi-led coalition and expand its sphere of influence. This support enabled the Houthis to launch missiles at Saudi Arabian and Emirati cities and target ships in the Bab al Mandab and Red Sea on multiple occasions in the last year, threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader regional conflict. CENTCOM is partnering with the Saudi-led coalition to help maintain a favorable regional balance. Our goal is to ensure that nations in close proximity to Yemen are able to secure their borders and safeguard their populations while negotiations lead to a cessation of hostilities between Houthis and the ROYG. Saudi Arabia has announced that it is working to facilitate the movement of humanitarian assistance, food, and fuel by opening ground and air avenues from Saudi Arabia into Yemen, utilizing additional ports, and partnering with NGOs to provide humanitarian and medical assistance. 22 The Levant, which includes the countries of, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon – and Iraq and Egypt remain an active area for CENTCOM theater security cooperation and partnership due to instability stemming from the Syrian Civil War, the rise of ISIS, and malign Iranian influence. Though the scourge of ISIS is receding, Levantine countries remain under threat of attack, as seen in Egypt where ISIS-Sinai continues to carry out barbaric attacks against civilians and Egyptian security forces, including the November murder of over 300 citizens in prayer at a mosque in northern Sinai. U.S. assistance to our partners in the Levant has enabled improved border security in Lebanon and Jordan. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) demonstrated this kinetically in August – expertly routing ISIS fighters on their eastern border during Operation Dawn of the Hills. In Jordan, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) remain a dedicated partner, providing access, basing, and overflight essential to furthering U.S. interests in the region – we must ensure we do not take them for granted. Though the GOJ and the JAF have successfully handled security concerns and domestic stability challenges, regional turmoil and persistently low economic growth rates have led to rising unemployment and high national debt. Additionally, Jordan currently hosts approximately 660,000 UNregistered Syrian refugees and 63,000 Iraqi refugees, straining government resources, services, and infrastructure. Despite this strain, the GOJ recently facilitated critical humanitarian support to the Rukban IDP camp on the Syrian side of the border. Continued commitment to funding Title 10 programs, in addition to FMF and economic and humanitarian assistance, enables Jordan to mitigate its humanitarian and economic difficulties, while remaining a capable partner in coalition efforts. The JAF is also contributing to stabilization efforts in OIR, including reopening the Turaybil / Karama border crossing with Iraq in August 2017, a key step in normalizing relations and restoring trade between the two countries. 23 Lebanon is critical to our national security interests and exemplifies our challenges in the Middle East. Wedged between a key friend in the region, Israel, and a corridor of Iranian influence from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon has managed to remain relatively stable in a region embroiled in conflict. However, Lebanon faces a stagnant economy, a Syrian refugee crisis, and the growing influence of Hizballah, which holds a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions due to their strategic political alliances, omnipresent threat of violence, strength as a social service provider, and financial support from Iran. Furthermore, the possibility of an Israel-Hizballah conflict is a constant threat to the stability of Lebanon and security of Israel. Our effort to strengthen the Lebanese security forces, especially the LAF, as the country’s only legitimate security provider is a critical aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and security. With successful operations like Dawn of the Hills, the Lebanese people are realizing more and more that the LAF, their country’s most trusted and respected institution, is increasingly capable of protecting them from external threats. The United States is the LAF’s top security assistance partner, and our consistent, long-term commitment and training efforts, in addition to the more than $1.7 billion in security assistance provided since 2006, have successfully modernized and strengthened the LAF as a fighting force. U.S. Special Operations military and civilian personnel have forged a strong relationship with the LAF and enhanced their capabilities, making them a capable partner in our regional counter-terrorism campaign. During the most recent military operations against ISIS, U.S. military personnel assisted the LAF in planning and conducting combined arms maneuver, aerial reconnaissance, and integrated fires. Since our security assistance began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplary track-record for adhering to regular and enhanced end-use monitoring protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred equipment to Hizballah. Nonetheless, we are concerned about Hizballah’s efforts to infiltrate Lebanon’s security 24 institutions and have made clear that any cooperation with Hizballah will risk our continued cooperation and assistance. On the western edge of the CENTCOM area of responsibility, Egypt remains an anchor of U.S. interests in the region given its strategic location, demographic heft, religious and cultural influence, and its enduring peace treaty with Israel. Egypt is an essential partner in countering the flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists transiting from Libya through Egypt into the Central Region. Egypt supports our overflight requests, ensures Suez Canal transit, and shares our commitment to defeat ISIS. The cornerstone of this relationship is our security assistance partnership. In one example of our intensifying joint efforts, in January 2018, we celebrated the successful signing of the bilateral Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CIS MOA), crowning over thirty years of effort to enhance security and counterterrorism cooperation. ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct daily attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and security services, causing hundreds of casualties, while other extremist organizations have carried out attacks on the mainland. The United States commitment to continuing to support Egypt in this fight against terrorism, in bringing security for the Egyptian people, is steadfast. Until now, the EAF has contained most of the violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula; however, without a comprehensive whole of government strategy to defeat ISIS-Sinai, the threat will persist and grow. The United States is committed to working with Egypt to develop a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions that give rise to extremist elements, while defeating the threats that plague Egypt and the region. Through our partnership efforts, we have observed improvement in the security of Egyptian maritime and land borders. The EAF has shown some success stemming the flow of fighters and illicit material into Israel and the Central Region. We will look to strengthen our security cooperation 25 partnership through continued engagement and with development of their counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy and capabilities, including the prioritization of FMF toward appropriate defense articles and training. In FY16 and FY 17, Congress appropriated up to $1.3 billion in FMF and $1.8 million in IMET. As a sign of our continued support of Egypt’s efforts, the President requested Congress continue to provide $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt in FY 2018, despite the increasingly constrained budget environment. Moreover, the United States and Egypt have elevated the strategic nature of the assistance relationship through mechanisms such as our Military Cooperation Committee and Defense Resourcing Conferences. Through these means we help Egypt plan for its security needs on a long-term basis. Countering Iranian Expansionism. Countering the Iranian regime’s malign influence in the region is a key component of our efforts to defend allies from military aggression, bolster our partners against coercion, and share responsibilities for the common defense. Our relationships with the GCC countries play a key role in this effort. Iran is generating instability across the region, and the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) continues to increase in strength, enhancing its capacity to threaten U.S. and partner nation interests. Concurrently, the Iranian regime continues to maintain longstanding criticisms that the United States is a source of instability in the Middle East and cannot be trusted. While the International Atomic Energy Agency reports that it continues to monitor and verify Tehran’s implementation of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, Iran continues to express frustration with the degree and pace of sanctions relief under the JCPOA and has publicly criticized U.S. statements regarding continued participation in the JCPOA. Iran seeks expanded economic, and in some cases diplomatic, engagement with the International Community to achieve what it views as the full benefits of sanctions relief afforded under the deal. The United States is upholding its JPCOA commitments 26 and has made clear that Iran’s economic troubles stem not from issues related to JCPOA implementation, but from internal economic mismanagement, a weak banking sector, and widespread corruption, among other factors. Over the past year, Iran has focused its regional efforts primarily on operations in Syria and Iraq to expand its influence in the region and secure supply routes to Hizballah to threaten Israel. Iran has provided increasingly sophisticated maritime and missile attack capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, Iran continues smaller-scale support to other groups such as Bahraini Shia militants, Gaza militants, and the Afghan Taliban. It remains wary of U.S. and coalition intentions throughout the region, and continues to engage Western nations in the “grey zone,” rather than through direct conflict. Iran will continue to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East while seeking to expand diplomatic and economic relations with a wide range of nations. Leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) have taken advantage of surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct action, intelligence, influence building, terrorism, and cyber operations against the U.S. and our partner nations. By supporting proxies in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and against the Saudi coalition in Yemen, Tehran seeks to gain lasting influence and indebted allies in each country. The conflict in Syria has also proven the ITN’s expeditionary capacity; fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon wage war there solely at Iran’s behest. After the current conflicts abate, the ITN will undoubtedly turn its attention to other adversaries; future flashpoints could occur wherever there is a U.S. or allied presence. Iran continues to acquire and develop increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military conflict. The expansion of Iran’s military capabilities over the last decade enables Tehran to threaten international trade and regional stability throughout the Gulf and beyond. Production of advanced military equipment and threats to the free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz are intended 27 to challenge the U.S. enduring presence in the region. Iran’s military is composed of approximately 700,000 personnel divided into two separate militaries: the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which both continue to improve. Iran’s ground forces are improving their ability to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external threats. Iran has also advertised the development of quick reaction forces, consisting of armor, artillery, and heliborne assets that can deploy within four hours. Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten – or be able to threaten - strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and oil platforms. With little warning, Iran could quickly close the Strait of Hormuz using stockpiles of naval mines and disrupt key maritime chokepoints throughout the region. Iranian surface to air missiles (SAMs) along its littoral pose a significant threat to U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) assets operating in international airspace. During 2017, Iran’s capabilities improved with the deployment of advanced S-300 long-range SAM systems provided by Russia. Additionally, Tehran continues to increase its strategic power projection capability with its expanding ballistic missile force. Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle East, which can range 1,200 miles and reach key targets in the region. Iran is continuing to increase the range, precision, and lethality of these missile systems. Tehran relies on these systems to deter adversaries and provide a reliable retaliatory capability against neighbors and U.S. forces. Iran intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia, threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten strategically important maritime transit routes in the Bab al Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf. On a positive note, over the past year, we have seen an overall reduction in unprofessional Iranian actions toward U.S. and coalition vessels; such interactions decreased by 36% from 2016 to 2017. 28 To counter Iranian expansionism and destabilizing activities, CENTCOM will deter conventional Iranian aggression, bolster our network of allies and partners, and compete for influence throughout the region. Our forces maintain a high level of readiness at bases across the region and consistently patrol the waterways – this persistent presence deters Iranian conventional military attacks against our allies and protects international sea lanes. By improving our Arab partners’ capacity to defend themselves and encouraging them to work together as a coalition, we also create a bulwark against Iranian aggression and proxy warfare. Our efforts to compete to be the partner of choice for our Gulf and Levant partners further weakens Iranian threat networks and limits Tehran’s malign political, economic, and military influence. This is especially crucial in Iraq, where Baghdad must work with Iran as a neighboring state, but limit Tehran’s manipulation and infiltration of political parties and government institutions. We must continue to be a reliable partner to the ISF to build their capacity to provide internal security and protect their borders. Ongoing stabilization efforts that strengthen Iraqi social and economic institutions will also impede Iran’s ability to negatively influence our Iraqi partner. On the Arabian Peninsula, GCC states are among the United States’ best partners in the region and a counter-balance to Iran. The virtually unhindered access, basing, and overflight approvals from our Gulf partners, as well as their contributions of troops and airlift have been critical to the success of Defeat-ISIS operations over the past year. The GCC also represents the most promising baseline effort for promoting collective defense initiatives, including joint counter-terrorism and ballistic missile defense. As they look to the United States for military equipment, training, and assistance, it is essential we seek opportunities to include GCC partners in our combined efforts to defeat regional threats posed by extremism and Iran’s burgeoning influence. However, the most significant complicating factor in the unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity is the still-unresolved rift between Saudi Arabia, UAE, 29 Bahrain, and Egypt with Qatar. While efforts to reduce the impact on military-to-military relationships among the Gulf States have been largely successful, the rift continues to present challenges in the political sphere. Within the GCC, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is undergoing potentially far-reaching changes in social, economic, and security spheres under the banner of Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan, which includes wide ranging fiscal and cultural liberalization. This could alter the dynamics of the Saudi economy. King Salman’s appointment of his son Mohammed bin Salman as the Crown Prince, the purported anti-corruption campaign, and recent Saudi efforts to influence Lebanon have exacerbated an environment of uncertainty in the kingdom’s future. Saudi Arabia remains embroiled in the conflict in Yemen, which appears to be at an impasse in terms of a political or diplomatic solution with the Houthis. To assist with the military aspects of the conflict, we have increased the number of advisors to the Saudi military over the past year to help improve command and control and formalize targeting processes. These additional training and advisory efforts will help mitigate incidents of avoidable civilian casualties in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates’ strategic location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage terrorist organizations, and ambition to be at the forefront of military innovation makes them a valuable partner. The UAE was among the first countries to join the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. Although its military role tapered off when its resources shifted to Yemen in March 2015, Abu Dhabi remains active in pursuing many of the Coalition's lines of effort, including counter-ISIS messaging, stabilization, countering ISIS financing, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. Bahrain hosts CENTCOM’s naval component and CMF and has publicly supported the Defeat-ISIS effort, including allowing U.S. forces to conduct counter-ISIS strikes from its territory. In Yemen, Bahrain’s air, land, and sea forces participated in Saudi-led coalition 30 operations against AQAP and the Houthis; these deployments have improved the overall readiness of the Bahrain Defense Force. We continue to make strides in our collaborative efforts to enhance the Bahraini Coast Guard’s capacity and expand Bahrain’s role in countering piracy and violent extremism in the region’s maritime domain. Internally, Bahrain is dealing with a domestic economy negatively impacted by low oil prices, political discord, and a persistent, low-level threat from Iranian-backed militant groups. We continue to provide appropriate assistance to help it address security threats. Prior restrictions on FMS to Bahrain created tension in the bilateral relationship; recent movement on key FMS cases, however, has provided renewed strength in military and political ties with Bahrain. We continue to reassure our Bahraini counterparts that we remain committed to our partnership, while also encouraging them to respect freedom of expression and pursue dialogue with the nonviolent political opposition. The Government of Kuwait continues to provide a critical environment within the Central Region for access, basing, and overflight in support of U.S. and coalition operations and hosts the forward headquarters of CENTCOM’s army component, U.S. Army Central Command. Kuwait is also CENTCOM’s primary logistics gateway for movement into and out of the region. Over the last 20 years Qatar has provided the U.S. with invaluable regional access through basing and freedom of movement for U.S. forces at Camp As-Sayliyah and Al Udeid Air Base – home to the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command Central Forward, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. Qatar hosts approximately 10,000 U.S. service members, and aircraft launched from Al Udeid Air Base support operations throughout the region. While the rift has had little direct impact on U.S. operations, it has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar’s freedom of movement in the region through the closure of land borders and air space. 31 Additionally, it has impacted Qatar’s participation in Gulf state-hosted multilateral exercises and eroded coalition building efforts. It has also proven to be a distraction from Saudi-led operations in Yemen. In a concerning development, the rift has pushed Qatar to become more reliant on Iran and less connected to the GCC. Despite its small size, Qatar has contributed to coalition operations throughout the region, including against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other regional coalitions. Qatar is currently the second largest FMS customer in the world with $25 billion dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass $40 billion dollars in the next five years with additional FMS purchases. Qatar’s efforts to expand its military both in size and capacity have resulted in increased bilateral military engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Armed Forces. This gives the United States an invaluable opportunity to make a positive impact on the military development of a key partner in a turbulent region. The Sultanate of Oman’s relationship with the United States remains strong, and Oman continues to play a constructive role in regional diplomatic issues, including serving as an interlocutor for the U.S. in dealing with Yemen, Iran, and the GCC. However, unless the government successfully makes policy changes to constrain government spending and attract foreign investment, Muscat will likely face an economic crisis in the next few years. Oman’s strategic location provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency capabilities; it provides important access in the form of over 5,000 aircraft overflights, 600 aircraft landings, and 80 port calls annually. The Omani military also participates in numerous bilateral exercises and training events on a yearly basis. Required Programs, Capabilities, and Resources 32 In order to ensure we can effectively execute the NDS and protect our national interests, we must be properly postured, alongside our interagency partners, with the necessary policies, capabilities, and resources to address the challenges and capitalize on the opportunities mentioned above. To this end, CENTCOM requires specific means in the form of programs, capabilities, and resources. We sincerely appreciate Congress’ continued support for fiscal authorities and appropriations required to support ongoing theater operations, as well as the increased responsiveness of the USG in tackling the challenges inherent to the Central Region’s complex environment. Building Partner Capacity (BPC). The Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Combatant Commanders Initiatives Fund (CCIF), Coalition Support Fund (CSF), and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) have been key enablers to the battlefield successes the Coalition achieved in disrupting and dismantling ISIS and the Taliban. Your approval and increase in ASFF funding to support Afghan Aviation modernization allowed the ANDSF to begin closing their gaps in aerial fires and lift capability and reduced their reliance on U.S. and Coalition forces, while also making them more lethal against the Taliban and ISIS-K. In Syria, CTEF-procured equipment and supplies provided to the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) like the SDF have been instrumental to their success against ISIS. We will continue to use Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and other humanitarian and civic assistance funding to improve conditions and access for other U.S. federal and international aid organizations’ follow-on missions. These authorities must respond in a timely manner to environmental and operational challenges. We continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements, coalition and interagency capabilities, and the conditions on the ground. In Iraq, the success of the ISF in dismantling the physical caliphate and the fragmentation of the ISIS hybrid-conventional force over the past year is a validation of our Coalition’s BPC effort. As we 33 reduced major combat operations, the authorities granted to the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) were expanded to cover critical sustainment efforts. These authorities allow OSC-I to work with all ISF that are posturing to battle a potential insurgency and secure their border with Syria. OSC-I is currently executing programs to enhance professionalization of the ISF along with prudent implementation and oversight of FMF. In FY18, OSC-I will leverage $42 million in authorities to transform the ISF into a sustainable, affordable, and effective force through security sector reform and security cooperation efforts. CENTCOM efforts to implement and focus BPC initiatives yielded increased capabilities to support security cooperation and partner nation goals. The Section 333 authority also authorizes funds to be available for two fiscal years and program sustainment for up to five years, allowing for execution of long-lead time programs without cross-fiscal year constraints and improved program maintenance, training, and sustainment support. The CENTCOM Exercise and Training Program continues to be one of the most cost effective and efficient tools to conduct security cooperation engagement with partner nations throughout the region. Every exercise, including the planning process, provides an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the region, strengthen partnerships, promote cooperation among our partners, conduct key leader engagements, and sustain and improve both joint and combined readiness. The program continued to grow in complexity and relevance with extended participation throughout the CENTCOM region during FY17 and into FY18. CENTCOM executed 53 bilateral and multilateral exercises during FY17 with 42 partner nations, spanning seven Combatant and Functional Commands. This enhanced U.S. Joint Force capability supports theater-wide contingency operations and sustains U.S. presence and access in the region. Other program impacts include improving partner nation interoperability through 34 military-to-military engagement, integrating staff planning, executing Joint and Combined operations, developing coalition warfare, and refining complementary partner warfare capabilities given conflicts that are increasingly trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional in nature. However, continued force reductions in the area of responsibility, as well as the increased operational use of forces remaining in theater, threaten the viability of the CENTCOM Joint Exercise Program. Exercises like EAGER LION – the largest CENTCOM exercise – are routinely affected by reductions in participating forces or threatened with cancellation due to competing requirements for operational forces. Mitigation is limited with current exercise program funding levels that provide restricted air/surface options for movement of out-of-theater (CONUS) based forces to participate in exercises. Forces and Equipment: The Key to Interoperability. With the greater focus on operations “by, with, and through” our partners to accomplish common objectives, interoperability is increasingly important, and our BPC and FMS programs remain instrumental to this process. The "total package" approach with which we pursue equipment support and long-term sustainment ensures that maintenance support and training are a part of the FMS plan from the outset. However, due to political considerations, cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China. When our partners go elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our ability to incorporate their contributions into theater efforts. CENTCOM must also remain prepared for major unforeseen contingencies and crises; prepositioned war reserve materiel is a critical equipment enabler as we posture to address emerging and unforeseen threats. The tyranny of distance between our service depots and the Central Region requires ready, prepositioned capability sets that can rapidly integrate with deploying forces for contingency 35 response. These capability sets provide the necessary shock absorber and help us preserve decision space for the national leadership at the front-end of emerging contingencies. Congressional support for the services' regeneration and reset of prepositioned war reserve materiel remains essential to our operational depth and resiliency. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). We are also working to counter the adaptive threats from enemy networks and adversary states in the form of emerging missile and unmanned aircraft technologies. CENTCOM continues to employ IAMD and Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) resources to provide the best possible defense design to the theater. Threat missile systems continue to improve in accuracy, giving them the ability to selectively target CENTCOM’s critical assets. Current IAMD resources remain vital to helping CENTCOM maintain acceptable levels of risk without creating additional demand on the force. Providing IAMD protection to deployed U.S. forces and our critical infrastructure is crucial to mission success and provides a visible deterrence to regional aggression. Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment to partners and provides flexibility to respond to contingencies. Partner nations continue to field missile defense systems that are technologically interoperable with U.S.-based defense systems. Several partner nations have also expressed interest in working together with the U.S. to address the growing CUAS problem set. We must work with our partners to integrate the systems into one comprehensive network that enables better interaction, flexibility, and increased levels of protection against all potential adversarial air and missile threats. Several of the GCC countries have expressed a desire to integrate their missile and CUAS defense systems with U.S. IAMD systems. The U.S. Patriot force in the GCC is an important warfighting capability and a visible symbol of U.S. partnership, resolve, and deterrence and is 36 linked to bi-lateral defense agreements. Integration of these systems would increase duration and level of protection provided by the defense design against the spectrum of threats in theater. Critical Munitions. We appreciate continued Congressional support for the procurement and development of precision and specific purpose munitions, which are essential to defeat the threats to our national interests. Multiple factors increase demand on worldwide precision munitions stock levels, to include readiness to address threats from China and Russia, enduring combat operations, investment in our “by, with, through” approach, our directive to minimize collateral damage, and the drawdown in munitions funding prior to OIR. Projected expenditures coupled with partner requests for precision munitions show a system under stress down to the industrial level. Saudi Arabia, in particular, continues to request precision munitions to assist in reducing the threat from Iranian-supported Houthi forces in Yemen in the most precise manner possible. We have implemented controls for existing and projected requirements to ensure we can meet our current commitments while staying ready to meet future operational needs. We also continue to work across the Department on process improvements to provide a more precise demand signal to the Services and the industrial base and enable multi-year investment in this critical commodity area. Congressional support for base budget, production, and forward positioning of critical preferred precision and specific purpose munitions is vital to the future success of military operations. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets. Competition with China and Russia are increasing demands across the theater for ISR assets. In addition to continued ISR requirements to enable our partners in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, counter-Iran operations in Yemen, the Bab al Mandeb, and the Gulf place substantial ISR demands on already severely limited resources. We also anticipate additional requirements to assist Egypt in their counter-ISIS operations in the Sinai 37 The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) enterprise is also stressed by continuous operations; shortfalls of PED for collected intelligence will continue in the foreseeable future, necessitating an increased focus on automation and development of new PED tools, including tools to exploit publically available information. Funding for organizations such as the National Media Exploitation Center is also critical to our ability to handle the volume of captured enemy material. In order to partially mitigate these ISR shortfalls, CENTCOM is working closely with the Services, Joint Staff, Combat Support Agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the interagency to acquire contract ISR solutions, incorporate non-traditional ISR (such as that collected from strike assets), and improve efficiency and asset de-confliction. Our Coalition partners are also assisting with ISR collection and PED, but this support is limited by national policies regarding deployed force levels and manner of employment as well as resource shortages. Further, partners are generally challenged to address many of CENTCOM’s requirements, such as those where multi-discipline, low-observable, or strike-capable assets are required. All of these factors combine to substantially increase operational risk in those areas that will not receive adequate ISR coverage due to decreased capacity. Information Operations/Strategic Communications. The operational information environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace; our adversaries are not limited by geographic boundaries as they increase global radicalization and recruitment online. Russia and Iran are also waging strategic communications campaigns to cloud perceptions of U.S. success in Syria and Iraq and to call into question our commitment to key partners in the region. Offensive Information Operations (OIO) capabilities developed and refined over the last two years provide CENTCOM and the Department of Defense with the best “high impact/low cost” investment to deter aggression, 38 counter destabilizing behavior, and decrease the potential for direct action operations requirements. CENTCOM combines actions and information by employing assets ranging from print, radio, television, and the internet to conduct robust, synchronized information operations in order to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp our adversary’s decision making. These efforts also directly support both the Iran and Iraq strategies that specifically call for integrated strategic communications campaigns. The ISIS problem set has enabled the Department of Defense to closely collaborate with other U.S. government agencies, Coalition partners, and regional allies to coordinate and synchronize messaging strategies. We are building on our combined experiences to create a broad, long-term, whole-ofgovernment approach that amplifies our efforts toward conflict prevention. We also routinely work with Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to improve interoperability, share lessons learned, and ultimately develop a collaborative strategy to counter violent extremism – our regional partners will play the largest role in shaping their own futures. As we work to address the propaganda that terrorist organizations use to recruit new followers, we must also address the serious threat that state-sponsored disinformation poses to U.S. national security. Amidst these trends in the information environment, it is more critical than ever that the U.S. government has a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to strategic communication that supports and harmonizes with our military efforts. In this vein, the Department of Defense works closely with the Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC), and we appreciate that Congress has expanded its mandate to synchronize and coordinate the federal government's efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter these harmful propaganda and disinformation efforts. Recognizing that information operations will continue to be a force multiplier, we must ensure organizations like the GEC can compete and win in the information environment. 39 Cyber Operations/Cybersecurity. All of the traditional threats within the Central Region are exacerbated by several challenges in the cyberspace domain. The global nature of cyberspace means it has no legal boundaries, challenging our legal system and ability to deter threats or respond to contingencies. We have an adaptive enemy who has proven creative in the information environment. Based on the speed of technological evolution, attackers in the cyberspace domain have an advantage over defenders. Worse, friendly capabilities can be co-opted by adversaries at a scale and ease greater than in other domains. Consequently, small groups can exercise state-like powers, while a state actor can have tremendous impact. Defenders must expend a disproportionate amount of resources to protect multiple avenues of attack on many different networks and resources. Integrated Operations with Interagency Partners. Whole of government solutions are critical to resolving the complex problems in the Central Region, and we strive to balance our own authorities and resources with our interagency partners’ unique capabilities, expertise, and authorities. Our embassy country teams across the region are doing an incredible and critical job providing nuanced information, recommendations, and support for military operations, and senior embassy leadership is integral to facilitating our access to senior foreign leadership. We strive to ensure that our military activities in the AOR reinforce our embassy colleagues’ diplomatic engagements in order to mutually advance national security priorities. The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been invaluable partners from the inception of combat operations in Iraq and Syria to efforts focused on consolidating hard fought gains. As Secretary Tillerson mentioned in his recent remarks at Stanford, “The United States has had diplomats on the ground in affected areas working with the UN, our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and various NGOs. We will continue to devote personnel and resources to 40 stabilization efforts.” In partnership with USAID, CENTCOM has been heavily involved in the conduct of foreign humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations across the region. Steady-state foreign humanitarian assistance activities are a key security cooperation tool that enhance our BPC efforts and improve Department of Defense visibility, access, and influence while addressing critical humanitarian needs. We request your support of the Administration’s annual OHDACA funding request to allow us to continue these important engagement activities. Counterdrug-funded train and equip programs have become increasingly important in the CENTCOM AOR. We work with our interagency partners in the region to reduce drug trafficking. This is most evident in the Central Asian states, where a large part of CENTCOM’s security cooperation activities provide counter-narcotics support. We routinely send additional manpower to embassies in the region to assist them in executing counter-drug programs that include infrastructure improvements, communications equipment, and training in the latest technology such as scanners and ground sensors. Together this builds an effective capability to stem the flow of illicit trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons. For example, the Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC) in Bahrain continues to facilitate the maritime interdiction of heroin and weapons emanating from the Makran Coast of Pakistan, by providing intelligence support to Allied naval partners. We are also working closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide counter-threat finance, counter-facilitation, and counter-procurement support to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s reinvigorated counter-threat finance cell. Continued linguist support and law enforcement training for Afghan DEA mentored units is critical to receiving time-sensitive information from the DEA-sponsored judicial wire intercept program. We will also participate in the Department of Treasury-led Terrorist Financing Targeting Cell in Saudi Arabia. This initiative is part of a larger Saudi41 led GCC effort to counter violent extremism in the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the Central Region. In the past year, we have also seen the effective expansion of our Department of Defense Rewards program, which allows for our IA partners to incentivize sources that deliver information, at great risk, that result in increased force protection or counter-terrorism kinetic strikes. A key component of our working relationship with the IA is the exchange of personnel; representatives from eight U.S. government departments and agencies reside within the CENTCOM Headquarters, a majority co-located in our Operations Directorate’s Interagency Action Group (IAG). We sincerely appreciate the provision of high-quality personnel to support CENTCOM operations. Reciprocally, we have embedded personnel within the headquarters of several USG partners. These embeds provide support to the gaining organizations and facilitate collaboration on mutually supportive IA objectives. Embeds also allow us to maintain visibility and coordinate activities across our “seams” with EUCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM. Coalition Partners. A unique characteristic of CENTCOM remains the presence of 49 nations at our headquarters in Tampa. Over the last 15 years, the composition, task, and purpose of the national representation has changed based on security trends, ongoing operations, and our partner engagement strategy. Each nation is represented by a Senior National Representative, and most nations have additional officers that regularly synchronize with their counterparts in the Command staff, creating an integrated, coalition-centric approach to our operations. Many nations consider counter-VEO operations a focal point for their efforts. We capitalize on this extraordinary access to our partners to facilitate information sharing, interoperability, operational support, and force generation. Our co-location with SOCOM in Tampa also enables us 42 to capitalize on economies of scale and synergies between our respective commands and coalition partners. In spite of the longevity of the Coalition, the current environment of fiscal austerity may inhibit our ability to sustain it at an optimal level of performance. Additionally, the lack of national-level intelligence sharing agreements often hinders the timely and comprehensive communication of information. Our classified networks are largely unavailable to our partner nations and inhibit our ability to integrate operations, often requiring costly and labor-intensive solutions to overcome. However, utilizing a coalition-centric approach necessitates a paradigm shift and a deliberate acceptance of risk in order to foster an environment of reciprocal information sharing. We have an opportunity to sustain momentum in the global campaign against ISIS and other VEOs while continuing to refine the whole-of-coalition approach. Opposition to violent extremism provides unique alignment of national interests and can increase trust, understanding, and cooperation on other critical issues. If we can sustain an enduring coalition, we will be able to deal with persistent conflict in the region and be postured for response when necessary. Our lessons learned can inform departmental and national strategies for attaining increased levels of integration with our partners. Conclusion Given the many forces driving change and uncertainty in the region, U.S. commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important now than ever. Recent experience has shown that a precipitous withdrawal of support, before conditions for stabilization have been set, can lead to catastrophic results. We have also learned that a modest commitment of resources, applied steadily and consistently over time, and in a predictable fashion, can assist our partners in managing change, adjusting to new threats, and building their own capacity to act. This has the additional benefit of lessening our own requirements in future contingencies and building our reputation as a reliable partner. 43 Working “by, with, and through” our allies and partners allows us to multiply the effect of relatively modest commitments to ensure this crucial and truly “central” region never again requires a mass deployment of U.S. forces. We will retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect the homeland from terrorist attack, preserve a favorable regional balance of power, and achieve our strategic objectives and interests found in our national strategies. CENTCOM remains the only geographic Combatant Command executing active combat operations. In the last year, we have made great strides toward defeating ISIS. This year we will shift our focus to the South Asia Strategy in order to push OFS toward a successful conclusion, while consolidating the gains we have made against ISIS, supporting our political and security objectives in the Gulf and Levant, and countering Iran. We must continue to degrade and destroy VEOs that threaten the safety of our citizens and partners by pursuing ISIS across the Central Region. We will continue to counter expansionist regional powers and inappropriate nuclear ambitions by developing strong allies and building peace through strength. We remain mindful that ours is a team effort and that success in the complex Central Region requires that we work together. This applies not just within the command but with our fellow Combatant Commands, our Component Commands, our established combined/joint task forces, the Central Region’s 18 country teams, and the agencies and organizations of the U.S. government which have continued unwavering support over the almost two decades of persistent conflict. Our deliberate and close relationships with the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Joint Improvised Explosive Devise Defeat Organization have paid enormous dividends in the pursuit of shared national goals and objectives. We look forward to 44 continuing to work with them and others on behalf of our nation. Further, we continue to benefit from our allies in the region, who support the CENTCOM headquarters with more than 200 foreign military officers from 49 nations – all of whom are a part of the success of CENTCOM, and we are grateful for their partnership. In all of this, the outstanding men and women who comprise the United States Central Command are our finest and most precious resource. The world class CENTCOM team – which includes more than 90,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Civilians stationed throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility – is highly-skilled, motivated, and stands ready to do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission. They continue to make great sacrifices and contributions to ensure the command meets our strategic objectives and protects our nation’s interests. We must ensure they have everything they need to do their jobs as effectively and efficiently as possible. This includes ensuring a safe environment for all our personnel, regardless of their race, gender, creed, or religion. We are also keenly aware and grateful for the sacrifices made by our families. They are vital members of our team, and we could not complete our mission without them. They, too, make important contributions and tremendous sacrifices each and every day in support of us and on behalf of the Command and a grateful nation. CENTCOM: Prepare, Pursue, Prevail!

ON THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND GREAT POWER COMPETITION, 19’

5 FEBRUARY 2019

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND GREAT POWER COMPETITION: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction As 2018 came to a close, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was engaged in critical events and catalysts for change across its area of responsibility (AOR). In the final two weeks of December, CENTCOM supported the U.N. Special Envoy in the establishment of a fragile cease-fire in Yemen, and enabled the efforts of the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation through military pressure on the Taliban. We began planning for the safe, professional withdrawal under pressure of U.S. forces from Syria, while maintaining our Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) efforts and accounting for the formation of a new governmental cabinet in Iraq. We monitored and mitigated the unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces in international waters that threaten the global commons; which stood in stark contrast to the professional, mature actions of the U.S.-advised Lebanese Armed Forces as it de-escalated tensions along the border with Israel. While these events appear unconnected, they represent the swirling dynamics of the AOR – each event marking a pivotal point with the potential to impact the stability of the entire region. Since 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, CENTCOM has been charged with the responsibility of commanding multiple, often simultaneous combat missions in the Central Region. During that time, confronting terrorism and defeating violent extremist groups was the primary objective of U.S. national military power. Seventeen years later, CENTCOM is still the only geographic combatant command conducting multiple, active combat operations, but the strategic imperatives of a changing world have compelled us to rethink our priorities and assess our readiness for new challenges. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognized a return to competition between the great powers that now poses a greater long-term challenge to our nation than the violence of terrorism. We also noted that the National Security Strategy (NSS) directs that “The United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power 2 hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market,” and that “We will retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.” We at CENTCOM understand how global disorder has created a security environment more complex and volatile than we have faced in our nation’s history. This assessment demands a clear-eyed appraisal of the threats, an acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and an understanding that challenges to our national interests will largely be transregional versus regional. We approach our evolving role at CENTCOM with both humility and agility, acknowledging the priorities outlined in the NSS and NDS, and the fact that we will not be the main effort of our nation’s scarce resources in perpetuity. We must, therefore, posture ourselves as both the supported and supporting effort toward securing our national interests – many of which are still heavily impacted by activities in the CENTCOM AOR. While CENTCOM has been the primary focus of military assets for nearly two decades, we recognize maintaining an agile posture in the Central Region doesn’t necessarily require large concentrations of military personnel and equipment. Our strategic strength has never rested solely on the volume of materiel we bring to the fight, but rather on the partnerships, alliances and whole-of-government efforts no other country in the world could recreate. Looking forward, our challenge will be to secure our hard-fought gains, and those of our allies and partners, while posturing for continuing change in the Central Region. We must be ready to compete with China, Russia, and Iran as they challenge us for regional influence and threaten our vital national interests. We must continue disrupting violent extremist organizations and preventing the acquisition or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so they cannot be used against the U.S. or our allies. Regardless of the challenge or level of resources, CENTCOM is committed to defending the national interests of the U.S., and those of its partners and allies. 3 Operating Environment Resolute Support (RS). Our current military efforts in Afghanistan in support of the South Asia Strategy are conditions-based and focused on two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, U.S. forces conduct counter-terror missions against al-Qaida, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and associated groups to prevent their resurgence and ability to plan and execute external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the Resolute Support Mission, U.S. forces advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight against the Taliban. The ANDSF have demonstrated exceptional resilience through a difficult and sustained fight. The conditions-based South Asia Strategy is working. We continue to use military ways and means to achieve our end state of reconciliation, recognizing this conflict will not be resolved solely by military force. Our military and enabling missions in Afghanistan are designed to set conditions that will convince the Taliban to negotiate for a lasting peace, and allow Afghans to own the political and diplomatic solutions that will eventually bring an end to the conflict. Consistent, offensive military pressure helped bring about the first cease fires – local and national – between the Taliban and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in 17 years, illustrating the Afghan people’s weariness of war, and representing our first real opportunity for peace and reconciliation since the war began. While the Taliban continue to demonstrate the capability to mount spectacular attacks and inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the 2018 fighting season confirmed that the Taliban cannot win militarily. We recognize it will take a combination of sustained military pressure and diplomacy to bring an end to the hostilities. Our military pressure serves as an enabler to a whole-ofgovernment process, and supports diplomatic efforts led by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. 4 Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The unrelenting work of the 74-nation D-ISIS Coalition, determination and bravery of our Iraqi Security Force (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) partners, and support of multiple international governmental organizations has pushed the physical caliphate of ISIS to the verge of collapse. As a result, we are adjusting our military posture in Syria, planning and executing a deliberate, safe, and professional withdrawal of personnel and equipment while preserving sufficient power in the region to ensure that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and ensure it does not return. In Iraq, we work with the ISF to consolidate their gains, improve their security capability and help them evolve into the professional and representative force that the Iraqi people deserve. We are grateful for the partnership of the SDF throughout our D-ISIS mission. A reliable partner since 2014, the SDF suffered tens of thousands of killed and wounded, and its leadership, sacrifice, and determination to drive ISIS from SDF homelands was instrumental in the liberation of the vast majority of ISIS’ so-called physical caliphate. Of paramount importance now, the Coalition’s hard-won battlefield gains must be secured by continued interagency efforts and mobilizing the international community to prevent a return of the conditions that allowed ISIS to arise. Yemen. Conflict between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces, supported by the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC), led to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen. The U.N. noted in August 2018 that the Houthis – trained, funded and armed in part by Iran – exacerbated the crisis by restricting food and aid access to civilian populations by controlling or threatening transportation and logistical routes to the city of Ta’izz, and the Ports of Aden and Hudaydah. The impact of conflict on the country and its people is catastrophic, despite best efforts by our own U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.N. agencies and international aid organizations to mitigate humanitarian suffering. U.N.-brokered consultations in 5 Sweden in December 2018, and the resulting agreement on a prisoner exchange, ceasefire and redeployment of forces in the city and port of Hudaydah, and humanitarian access to Taiz demonstrated promising steps and a willingness on both sides to seek a negotiated settlement. Toward this end, CENTCOM supports the international diplomatic efforts and the work of U.N. Special Envoy (UNSE) Martin Griffiths to facilitate an end to the conflict, providing knowledge, advice, and serving as an interlocutor through our trusted relationships in the region to help ensure transparency, cohesion, and positive momentum. We will continue to support our regional partners developing processes and procedures to counter ballistic missiles (CBM) and counter unmanned armed aerial systems (C-UAS) to help mitigate threats to civilian populations and critical infrastructure. Iran exerts its malign influence throughout the region, through its increased – often unprofessional – activities in the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, engaging in proxy warfare through its sponsorship of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and proliferating advanced conventional weapons, including theater ballistic missiles and weaponized unmanned aerial and maritime systems. Operating in the gray zone of competition below open conflict, Iran conducts unfettered information and cyber campaigns against its adversaries and actively attempts to influence or obstruct the mechanisms of effective governance and domestic policies of several of its sovereign regional neighbors. Prolonged conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan have produced instability and largescale humanitarian crises within and beyond the CENTCOM AOR, creating millions of displaced persons, stressing fragile economies, opening space for the spread of extremism among disenfranchised peoples, and providing opportunities for adversaries to cultivate influence. Countering instability requires an alliance-based and whole-of-government approach that CENTCOM is uniquely positioned to support. The Department of State, USAID and CENTCOM are partnering to counter the influence of competitors and malign actors by addressing the drivers of instability and creating the economic, 6 political, and security conditions required to reverse these trends. To alleviate suffering, CENTCOM, in partnership with USAID, provides targeted foreign humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons using our Overseas Disaster, Humanitarian, and Civic Aid appropriated funds. Stabilization and humanitarian assistance activities provide a significant tool to reduce human suffering, promote stability, sustain fragile governmental institutions, and provide critical support countering our competitors’ gray zone activities. While we maintain a strong, cooperative presence with our regional partners in the traditional warfighting domains, there is room for improvement in cooperative ventures with our regional partners in the information and cyber domains. Our competitors do not play by the same rules as the U.S. They have developed and employed asymmetric strategies to use in the information and cyber environment to weaken the U.S. to achieve their strategic objectives. The unconstrained and unregulated nature of their capabilities puts the U.S. at a disadvantage, while great power competitors like China and Russia, as well as adversarial regimes like Iran, operationalize these strategies – including information theft, media manipulation, and cyber-attack – to strike vulnerable U.S. assets, disrupt our information systems and those of our allies, and undermine the image of the U.S. in the region and around the world. Our CENTCOM Partner Network, a secure coalition computer network, improves our capability to exchange crucial cyberspace threat intelligence and operational data with coalition and regional partners. We will pursue more opportunities to enable real-time exchanges of classified information to meet critical coalition collaboration and mission needs. The ability to dynamically share information with mission partners at the speed of relevance provides us a greater advantage against our adversaries. Across the interagency, CENTCOM pursues whole-of-government solutions to address transregional threats. CENTCOM places increased command emphasis on an organizational approach to ensure interagency integration is a high priority in all planning. For example, CENTCOM supports 7 National Security Council-convened threat finance fusion cells to counter ISIS and Iran. We also provide personnel to support interagency efforts in our Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) provides a best-in-class example of a successful, nimble, and responsive capability in support of the warfighter. CENTCOM relies heavily on the critical, life-saving training, technology, and expertise JIDO provides to safeguard U.S. and allied forces from many of the most dangerous, emerging threats on the battlefield, including improvised explosive devices; unmanned, armed aerial and maritime vehicles; and other improvised threats. JIDO’s functions are not replicated in any of the Services, demonstrate enormous value, and are worthy of continued resourcing through DTRA. Strategic Importance The CENTCOM AOR is one of the most complex, diverse regions in the world. Composed of nearly 600 million people dispersed among 20 countries, it is home to three of the world’s five major religions, is the most energy-rich region in the world, and contains three strategic maritime choke points. The Suez Canal, the Bab al Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz are major transit points for energy and trade; the ability of commerce to transit these global commons freely being vital for the global economy. Much like the rest of the world, almost 90 percent of businesses in the Central Region are small-tomedium-size enterprises. They are the key drivers of job creation, employ nearly 66 percent of the labor force, and help diversify their respective country’s economies. Contrary to popular belief, not every country in the CENTCOM AOR is rich with oil and natural gas resources, and for those that are, their economies are highly susceptible to changes in the energy market. Strong economies, vibrant commerce, low unemployment rates, and decent standards of living are “must-haves” to promote and maintain stability. Military force cannot create strong economies. It can only help provide safe, secure conditions for them to develop. 8 There are multiple drivers of instability in the region, ranging from the toxic narrative of sectarianism, to brittle political and economic systems, to disenfranchised and disillusioned peoples. While drivers of instability can be addressed and mitigated through the application of elements of national power, many have roots spanning several generations. In our strategic approach, it is important to acknowledge with a degree of humility that there are some things that are beyond our power to change. Despite those challenges, we recognize the strategic importance of the Central Region to our national interests, and four key reasons why we must remain engaged here to preserve them. First, we must not allow another attack on our homeland. The CENTCOM AOR is the world’s epicenter for terrorism and VEOs. The 9/11 attacks were based from al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan and served as a wake-up call that terrorism could be exported from anywhere in the world. Second, we cannot allow VEOs or rogue nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Our active presence in this region prevents VEOs from coming together toward that purpose and helps prevent the proliferation of WMD materials. Third, instability is contagious. It does not respect national borders and grows and spreads if left unchecked. A stable Middle East underpins a stable world. In an already volatile region, our steady commitment to our allies and partners provides a force for stability. As the President’s National Security Strategy states, we must also “work with partners to neutralize Iran’s malign activities in the region.” The fourth is the reemergence of great power competition, the main challenge highlighted in the NDS. China and Russia seek to dominate and influence not just their own geographic regions, but the Central Region as well. Just as great power competitors looked to influence energy and trade in the Middle East following the first World War, China and Russia are working very hard today to reshuffle the balance of power in the CENTCOM AOR, trying to displace the U.S from its position of influence. 9 The President’s National Security Strategy directs that the United States seeks a Middle East that is “not dominated by any power hostile to the United States.” This is the reality of our world, and of the regional and transregional challenges we have to address in CENTCOM. We recognize the U.S. is rightly shifting its resources toward Europe and East Asia to balance great power competition, but remain mindful that the CENTCOM AOR represents a geopolitical crossroads and a principal zone for that competition as well. Of the five major threats identified in the NDS, four – competition with China; competition with Russia; Iran’s rogue, malign activities; and combatting VEOs – reside or are contested on a significant scale in the CENTCOM AOR every day. Many observers, and many of our partners and allies as well, hold misperceptions of the focus on great power competition in the NDS. They view the prioritization and alignment of efforts for long-term competition with China and Russia as a wholesale shift in emphasis away from the Middle East and Central Asia regions. However, that view fails to account for the global context of the NDS and how great power competition is not isolated to Europe or Asia, but often takes place in other strategically important regions like the CENTCOM AOR. Currently, CENTCOM is conducting or supporting military operations with Coalition partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and limited counter-terror operations in Yemen. We represent a U.S. presence with military basing and support in seven countries, have bilateral or multilateral military engagements with nearly a dozen countries, and security cooperation agreements with 16 countries. Across much of the AOR, however, where there is a U.S. presence, there is almost always an existing or developing presence by China, Russia, or both. China uses its “One Belt – One Road” initiative as an economic lever to provide access and influence across the Central Region. China invested in Suez Canal development, the port of Haifa in Israel, and Jordan to provide access, relationships and leverage on the other side of the continent. In the 10 United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary tool, and while many “One Belt – One Road” projects do not pose direct threats to U.S. national interests, burgeoning Chinese economic power could support and mask longer-term military and political objectives. Russia is focusing increasing attention to the Middle East, in part due to its geographical proximity, but also to reestablish its image as an influential global power. Russia invests in the Suez Canal development and is a co-member with China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia has increased its engagement with and investment in Egypt, including construction of a 48 megawatt nuclear power plant in El Dabba, as well as development of a major trade and investment zone in east Port Said. Russia conducts bilateral and multilateral military exercises and provides economic and security support in more than half a dozen countries in the Central and South Asia (CASA) region, most of whom were part of the former Soviet Union and who remain reliant on Russia for their economic and security needs. Russia seeks to increase its own influence while limiting the influence of others, monopolize energy transit and pipeline routes, and provide a buffer zone against NATO enlargement. In Syria, Russia is establishing a permanent military and economic presence, with the goal of dominating infrastructure and energy commerce there in the coming years. We also note the important role that nuclear deterrence plays within U.S. strategy, as the number one priority mission of the Department of Defense. It backstops all U.S. military operations and 11 diplomacy across the globe. A robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps ensure competition with Russia and China, regardless of where it originates, does not escalate to large-scale war. The U.S. is able to exercise a great deal of control over its own economy because we exercise a great deal of political, military, and economic power around the world. Where we lose that power and influence, our competitors gain – and we will be more vulnerable at home because of it. Less than 100 years ago the Middle East puzzle came together with the U.S. influencing key pieces. Today, the puzzle is being remade and China and Russia are seeking new strategic pieces. We must recognize our old pieces may no longer fit, and stay engaged and agile enough to maintain our position as the dominant influence once this new puzzle comes together. In the CASA region, for example, our partner nations lie in close proximity to or share borders with Russia or China. We must realistically acknowledge this tyranny of distance, but continue to engage and compete in innovative ways that help build partnerships, grow our influence, and serve as a balance to the other great powers. The bottom line is simple: If left unchecked, the expanding global reach of China’s economic and military initiatives, as well as Russia’s objective to weaken or subvert Western security structures in the CENTCOM AOR will pose a significant challenge to U.S. prosperity, security, and regional stability. As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Central Region remains a global supplier of energy, as long as we have allies and partners to whom we are committed, the U.S. cannot afford to cede our role as the dominant regional power. Without a continued strong presence and consistent engagement in the region, we risk our ability to secure the global commons, weaken our network of allies and partners necessary to eliminate potential safe havens for jihadist terrorists, and diminish our ability to maintain a stable global energy market. 12 Strategic Approach CENTCOM’s mission is to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. Our strategic approach is founded in three principles: Prepare, Pursue, and Prevail. This approach drives our thinking, gives direction and intent to every level in the command, provides capabilities to our commanders, and creates decision space for military and civilian leadership. Each aspect of our approach enables the next, and collectively contributes to the successful achievement of our goals and objectives. CENTCOM uses these aspects as the cornerstone to advance our operational approach of “by, with, and through.” We prepare by forming enduring coalitions, cultivating relationships with partners and allies, and maintaining security, basing, and overflight agreements, or paving the way for those agreements to be established. It means we deepen our interoperability and expand our regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning with our partners, so we can increase their capabilities and our collective capabilities to operate more effectively in a joint and combined environment. We communicate the winning narrative of a free and open international order, national sovereignty, individual freedom and dignity, and the rule of law. We foster meaningful, sustainable, two-way relationships with people who share common interests and common values instead of engaging in the transactional relationships and predatory economic practices of our great power competitors. The alliances and partnerships we forge, rooted in mutual respect, reduce the price we pay for our position of leadership, and provide significant asymmetrical advantages over our geopolitical rivals. These aspects of preparation are crucial, and perhaps even more important than maintaining a large military footprint in the region. While personnel and equipment can be surged in a time of crisis, one cannot surge partnerships, trust, understanding, agreements, and commitment. 13 Pursuing opportunities means we are proactive, always alert for chances to seize the initiative and dictate events on favorable terms. Regardless of whether we are investigating a new partnership or considering a different operational approach, pursuing those openings requires empowerment at the lowest levels, transparency, flat communications, understanding and trust. Surrounding circumstances and shortened decision cycles for action may induce greater risk, which we must underwrite and manage through strong feedback loops between all levels of leadership, including our interagency partners and allies. Not every opportunity pans out, but an opportunity not explored is a potential advantage lost. Prevailing takes on a meaning different than raising a banner or marching in a victory parade. It entails consolidating our gains, securing and stabilizing what we and our partners have fought for. We recognize there are no easy victories to be had in the CENTCOM AOR as ours is a region of historical, protracted struggle. In CENTCOM, prevailing means retaining flexibility and decision space for our leaders, preserving our national interests and those of our allies and partners, and maintaining a favorable balance of power for the U.S. We operationalize this principle using a “by, with, and through” approach. We conduct operations primarily by indigenous partner forces, with enabling support from the U.S. and our coalition partners, working through U.S. and international authorities and partner agreements. While not yet a doctrine, a strategy, or a formal military program, it is a proven, successful, operational approach that pursues culturally acceptable and durable solutions. It is a way of conducting military activities and operations with reduced direct combat employment of U.S. forces, while developing and supporting partner capacity and participation. While indigenous forces may not conduct operations according to U.S. pace and doctrine, they take ownership of the fight. Their wins are not only theirs, but ours as well; and fighting for those wins builds legitimacy and resiliency. Currently, CENTCOM successfully applies the “by, with and through” operational approach in Operation Inherent Resolve, assisting our partners to 14 defeat ISIS; in Yemen, using a multilayered Arab/U.S. approach to counter VEOs; and with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission to defeat VEOs and pressure the Taliban in Afghanistan. This approach is not limited to combat operations, however, as CENTCOM fulfills many peacetime objectives working “by, with, and through” other partner nations. Employing a “by, with, and through” operational strategy supports the objectives and intent of the NSS and NDS – promoting regional stability and security, defeating terrorist threats to the U.S., and ensuring that common domains remain free and open – while addressing these challenges through a resource-sustainable approach, including strengthening the indigenous capacities of, and improving interoperability with, our regional partners and allies. While this approach provides CENTCOM the ability to do “more with less,” our ability to act decisively in the region becomes more contingent upon the full commitment of regional partners. We must therefore ensure transparent and contextual communication across our own government, and among our allies and partners. If we mistakenly or inadvertently signal we are “pulling back” or “refocusing” priorities to address great power competition elsewhere in the world, we risk undermining our trust and credibility with long-standing partners here. Regional Overview – Central and South Asia Afghanistan remains home to numerous terrorist organizations that threaten our interests. ISIS-K, in particular, maintains both the intent and the capability to inspire, direct, and conduct external operations, and if left unchecked, will continue to grow as a threat to our homeland. In support of the South Asia Strategy, Afghanistan became CENTCOM’s main effort. U.S. support for the mission in Afghanistan evolved into a “by, with and through” operational approach as recognition of the need for domestic legitimacy and ownership increased. This ultimately strengthens the GIRoA’s negotiating position toward reconciliation and reintegration. 15 Key Challenges: Years of conflict in Afghanistan have caused large-scale humanitarian crises exacerbated by porous national borders, and provided Iran, Russia, and China opportunities to expand their influence in the region. Russia has attempted to challenge U.S. influence in Afghanistan under the false pretense of supporting the Taliban’s fight against ISIS-K, while Iran continues to use the Taliban to secure its own interests and to counter the ANDSF’s attempts to improve security conditions across the country. Militants operating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to threaten Afghan stability as well as stoke tensions between Pakistan and India. We look to regional actors such as Pakistan to cease behavior undermining regional stability and play constructive roles in achieving peace in Afghanistan as well as the whole of South Asia. Kabul’s uncertain political situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the GIRoA prepares for the 2019 presidential elections, and continues to suffer from weak institutions and a political environment marked by a lack of unity on core issues. Key Opportunities: The potential for a political settlement in Afghanistan is promising. In June, following GIRoA’s call for a national ceasefire over Eid al Fitr, the Taliban responded with their own ceasefire, giving Afghans a glimpse of a future without conflict. October’s parliamentary elections were the first run entirely by Afghans, with only limited logistical and security support from the Coalition. Despite Taliban and ISIS-K threats against voters and polling centers, the ANDSF oversaw a significant reduction in violence compared to previous election periods, with over 4 million Afghans participating in the parliamentary elections. Applying lessons learned will be critical to enabling successful presidential elections in 2019. The Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriation has enabled us to increase the combat capabilities in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Our security cooperation funds are used for procuring aircraft, training aircrews and maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian platforms to modern U.S. aircraft. We are assisting the ANDSF in doubling the size of the Afghan Army’s Special Operations Force, 16 currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban and terrorist organizations. In an effort to promote responsible development, we closely monitor ANDSF capability growth to ensure it is necessary, affordable, and sustainable. We continue to pursue opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with CASA nations to promote regional stability and encourage them, and our NATO allies, to contribute financial and advisory support to the GIRoA. 2019 Prognosis: The South Asia Strategy is working. While the Taliban continue to demonstrate resilience and the capability to inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the Coalition’s sustained military, diplomatic, and social pressure will be instrumental in convincing the Taliban that reconciliation is the only path forward. Pakistan presents the U.S. with challenges and opportunities in the execution of our South Asia Strategy. As a state possessing nuclear weapons that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and U.S. geopolitical interests, Pakistan will always be a country of importance to the U.S. However, Pakistan’s actions are often a source of frustration to U.S. regional efforts in Afghanistan. Our posture with Pakistan involves supporting our colleagues at the Department of State as they pursue a diplomatic solution with Islamabad to end the conflict in Afghanistan while ensuring that Pakistan’s equities are acknowledged and addressed in any future agreement. Key Challenges: Pakistan has not taken concrete actions against the safe havens of VEOs inside its borders. Similarly, VEOs located in Afghanistan conduct attacks inside Pakistan. This cross-border instability and violence generates tension along both sides of the border. The suspension of U.S. security assistance funds to Pakistan remains in place. Meanwhile, some U.S. Pakistan military cooperation activities have continued, demonstrating the importance of military cooperation, despite challenges in the bilateral relationship. 17 Key Opportunities: Pakistan has taken positive steps to assist SRAR Ambassador Khalilzad in support of Afghanistan reconciliation by facilitating talks with the Taliban but has avoided taking any concrete or irreversible steps such as arresting or expelling Taliban leaders who do not cooperate with reconciliation efforts. With our strategic focus on reconciliation and regional security, Pakistan has a unique opportunity to make good on its promises of support to U.S. efforts focused on finding a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan conflict. If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, the U.S. will have opportunity and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region is the most important mutual priority for the U.S. and Pakistan. 2019 Prognosis: A peaceful resolution in Afghanistan and improved cross-border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan would strengthen the opportunity for mutual trade and increased economic flows not only between them, but also potentially with India and the Central Asian states. China is already partnering with Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a central piece of China’s “One Belt – One Road” initiative. Central and South Asia cooperation between the U.S. and China offers opportunities for peaceful dialogue and a chance for the U.S. to balance China’s economic rise and reinforce its commitment to global norms for the benefit all. Uzbekistan and U.S. partnerships continue to improve, and we are increasingly optimistic that the government of Uzbekistan is promoting a constructive foreign policy, improving relations with its neighbors and becoming more involved in multilateral exchanges and exercises. Uzbekistan is fully supportive of our South Asia Strategy and a constructive partner in the Afghanistan peace process. Given its large population, strong security forces, central location, and a shared border with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s willingness to partner with us and its neighbors can help promote stability in the region. 18 Key Challenges: Russia remains the dominant power in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan must balance cooperation with the U.S. carefully to avoid actions Moscow deems provocative. As we strengthen our partnership with Uzbekistan we must respect this balance, mindful of Uzbekistan’s absorptive capacity. Key Opportunities: Uzbekistan is hosting the Central and South Asian armed forces Chief of Staff conference in February, demonstrating its growing role as a regional leader. Our mil-to-mil efforts are focused on improving border security capacity, enhancing counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and assisting the Uzbeks with the potential return of domestic terrorist fighters returning from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The Uzbeks expressed interest in diversifying their military equipment and provided lists of U.S. systems and equipment they are interested in purchasing. This interest represents a unique opportunity to off-ramp Uzbekistan from Russian equipment and deepen our relationship as we negotiate increased air and land access through the Northern Access corridor. 2019 Prognosis: Uzbekistan will continue efforts to increase its capacity, using U.S. security assistance to maintain a balance between Russian and Chinese influences and to boost its professionalism in the areas of border security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and defense institution building. U.S. security assistance will help maintain and potentially enhance access in support of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Tajikistan remains a target of both Russian and Chinese overtures. We continue to build our military relationship with Tajikistan, even as Moscow deepens its influence and increases its military posture at its base outside the capital. China’s increased security cooperation, focused on border security, is coupled with an aggressive economic lending program. China seeks to minimize instability along their shared border, in its eastern provinces, and protect its economic investment in Tajikistan. Key Challenges: The Government of Tajikistan is concerned with stability in northern Afghanistan and security along the mountainous, 800-mile Afghan border. The inability to secure their border 19 encourages smuggling and has a destabilizing effect on both Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These border concerns provide a strong nexus of mutual interests and we support development of Tajik counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and border security capabilities. We are also assisting Tajikistan to counter trans-national threats that impact both Tajikistan and the broader Central Asia region. Key Opportunities: Tajikistan is eager for U.S. assistance and its modest funding for security services presents an opportunity for CENTCOM to help Tajikistan develop its capabilities and relationships to balance Russian influence. Exercise REGIONAL COOPERATION, a multilateral exercise Tajikistan expressed interest hosting in August 2019, will address border security and counter terror issues. Moving forward, CENTCOM will assist Tajikistan’s efforts to counter violent extremism and emphasize the need for building stronger defense institutions. 2019 Prognosis: Economic investment and border security will continue to characterize China’s relationship with Tajikistan. It is likely that both Russia and China will continue to exaggerate the terrorist threat to further entrench and justify their respective security relationships with Tajikistan. Russia will seek to continue to safeguard what it considers its “sphere of influence” in the region and China will continue to take actions it deems necessary to secure its border. U.S. security assistance for Tajikistan can provide a counter to this great power competition by enabling the Tajiks to maintain their border integrity with Afghanistan while supporting regional stability. Kazakhstan and U.S. relations continue to be the most mature and forward-thinking in Central Asia, although Russia’s proximity influences Kazakhstan’s posture. Kazakhstan remains the most significant Central Asian contributor to Afghan stability, engaging in trade, providing electrical power, donating money to the ANDSF fund, providing educational opportunities, supporting programs for Afghan women, and offering technical support and services to the Afghans. 20 Key Challenges: Kazakhstan, like most CASA nations, must carefully balance cooperation with the U.S. to avoid actions Russia interprets as threatening. As we strengthen our partnership with Kazakhstan, we must respect this balance. The U.S. should continue assisting the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense as it focuses on the necessary institutional reforms of its non-commissioned officer corps, training management, human resources administration, and its professional military education system. As we look to off-ramp Central Asian countries from Russian defense equipment, the higher price of U.S. systems will remain a challenge for nations like Kazakhstan. Key Opportunities: Kazakhstan has expressed interest in working with the U.S. to improve its logistical, medical, and engineering branches. We will also continue our engagement with the Kazakhstani Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) training center to improve Kazakhstani PKO capabilities and foster regional integration by opening the center to Kazakhstan’s neighbors. Exercise STEPPE EAGLE, an annual trilateral peacekeeping exercise sponsored by the U.S., United Kingdom and Kazakhstan, has expanded to include Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In November 2018, with U.S. assistance, Kazakhstan deployed a company-level unit to Lebanon on a U.N. peacekeeping operations mission – a first for any CASA nation. 2019 Prognosis: Kazakhstan will continue to use U.S. security assistance to balance Russian and Chinese influences. U.S. security assistance enables access for sustainment of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Maintaining mil-to-mil programs, with a focus on defense institution building and professional military education, will position us to maintain our comparative advantage with a country situated on the doorsteps of Russia and China. The Kyrgyz Republic and U.S.’s strained bilateral relations impede security cooperation that would otherwise further military our objectives in Central Asia. 21 Key Challenges: The lack of a status of forces agreement with the Kyrgyz Republic severely limits CENTCOM’s level of engagement. Until steps are taken to extend diplomatic protections for U.S. military operating in the Kyrgyz Republic, mil-mil exchanges and training are suspended. Key Opportunities: The Office of Military Cooperation in Bishkek and the Montana National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership Program remain postured to renew programs aimed at developing military capabilities specifically in the areas of Field Medicine and Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance as soon as political conditions permit. 2019 Prognosis: Any U.S. security assistance for the Kyrgyz Republic will help the Kyrgyz to maintain their national sovereignty in the face of Russian and Chinese jockeying for influence. Turkmenistan has a U.N.-recognized policy of “positive neutrality” by which the government balances the demands of the regional powers by not taking sides in international conflict and not entering into alliances or economic organizations, necessitating a subtle and agile approach to Security Cooperation to be successful. Key Challenges: A struggling economy, a rigid political system, and the Turkmen policy of positive neutrality largely limits international cooperation and Turkmenistan’s security services. Key Opportunities: We have focused our efforts on English language training, medical engagements and the development of Special Forces with Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense (MOD). We are encouraged by MOD’s increased participation in our exchanges and conferences. Turkmenistan has expressed interest in enhancing its disaster response capability and border security, providing additional opportunities for CENTCOM. 2019 Prognosis: Turkmenistan remains concerned with the instability in Afghanistan and the potential for the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, therefore assistance will focus on enhancing border 22 security. Maintaining a small, consistent security cooperation portfolio in Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian and Chinese influence. Regional Overview – Greater Levant Iraq’s mil-to-mil relationship with the U.S. is as strong as it has ever been, and Iraq has both the potential and desire to become a formidable ally in combatting terrorism. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is conducting programs to enhance professionalization of the ISF, coupled with prudent implementation and oversight of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Transforming OSC-I into a permanent Title 22 Security Cooperation Office is key. Our authority for OSC-I to conduct training activities with ISF is more important than ever in the evolution of an ISF that is effective, inclusive, sustainable, affordable, and cements our long-term bilateral partnership. Key Challenges: Reform of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to achieve the goal of “One ISF” remains a challenge. Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are officially part of the ISF, however, the forces are comprised of disparate groups, some of which are not totally responsive to the direction of the Government of Iraq (GoI), the worst of which are affiliated with Shia militia groups directed by Iran. Iraq’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) is largely treated as a less-than-equal organization by the government. While some tensions between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad have eased, challenges with revenue sharing, disputed territory and control of oil resources remain problematic. It is critical the ISF consolidate its gains against ISIS and evolve from a war footing to a steady state, which must be effective, affordable, and protect Iraqi people and their infrastructure from terrorism. As ISIS continues to build a clandestine insurgency, the GoI must form an effective cabinet and government entities to manage the country and improve economic resilience and quality of life for its people. This includes meeting the needs of Iraq’s youthful population who demand better economic opportunities, access to essential services, and an end to endemic corruption in the GoI. Failure by the 23 newly formed government to address the basic needs of Iraqi citizens may facilitate the reemergence of ISIS or other VEOs, which capitalize on public dissatisfaction to increase their support. Iran’s meddling in the selection of Iraqi cabinet members, notably the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior, has prevented the GoI from addressing pressing national security issues Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, through OSC-I, is working with our Iraqi partners to re-integrate the GoI with its Arab neighbors. These efforts have paid dividends in reinitiating cooperation between Iraq and countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Qatar; illustrated by the reopening of shared borders. OSC-I can leverage its authorities to support the ISF’s evolution into an effective, sustainable, and affordable force through mil-to-mil relations, security sector reform, security cooperation, while coordinating broad-based reform with regional partners. Key objectives include the further professionalization of the ISF, rebalancing the ISF’s force structure to meet future threats, and reforming the ISF’s human resources and professional military education systems with increased emphasis on force design, force management, and policy development. 2019 Prognosis: Iraq’s May 2018 elections resulted in the formation of a new, generally representative government. Newly elected Prime Minister Abd al-Mahdi vowed to improve public services and prioritize reconstruction of areas devastated by the conflict with ISIS. It is likely that Iraq will retool its budget to focus on Government goals however, Iraq must also rebuild its security forces, which are exhausted by four years of operations against ISIS. Syria’s President Bashar al Assad remains in power with the military support of Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). Despite significant advances, the Syrian regime has insufficient forces to adequately secure recaptured territory. The U.S. withdrawal from Syria represents the most dynamic shift in the environment since ISIS lost its ability to govern major population centers and fight as a conventional force and could trigger a renewed race for influence, control, and for some, survival. 24 Turkey’s strong national security concerns in Syria and standing as a NATO ally further complicates the battlespace. Israel’s legitimate concerns about Iran’s increasingly provocative actions in Syria, particularly the transshipment of advanced weapons systems into and through Syria, are driving increasingly forward leaning Israeli military actions. If the major actors and their proxies become embroiled in a competition for influence in Syria, this may create space for ISIS remnants or other terrorist groups to reform or reconstitute. Because the regime was incapable or unwilling to fight ISIS, the responsibility for D-ISIS fighting has been borne by the Coalition and our partnered force, the SDF, whose bravery and determination have been crucial to rolling back ISIS. The intervention of the Coalition in the Syrian conflict blocked Assad’s ability to recapture all of northern Syria. As the U.S. executes a safe, professional withdrawal, we seek to help negotiate a secure future for the people of northeast Syria liberated from ISIS and our partners in the D-ISIS fight. The international humanitarian community has achieved some success, but the Syrian regime’s resistance to allow aid deliveries is largely driven by Assad’s use of starvation as a weapon of war. As a result, there are more than 13 million Syrians who require humanitarian assistance, including 5.7 million internally displaced persons and 5.7 million refugees in neighboring countries. While U.S. humanitarian assistance reaches four million people throughout Syria monthly, security concerns and access constraints limit the reach of aid in some locations. Vulnerable populations in Syria will continue to require humanitarian aid until parties to the conflict reach a political solution. Key Challenges: The civil war, combined with ISIS occupation and the subsequent fight to displace and destroy ISIS has led to vast destruction of infrastructure, degradation of government, lack of basic services, and other humanitarian challenges. Assad’s reluctance to negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow’s reluctance to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges ahead in forging a political resolution to the conflict and ending this humanitarian crisis. A political resolution is 25 key to the lasting defeat of ISIS, because unless fundamental drivers of domestic instability are addressed, conditions will remain for a resurgence of ISIS, or ISIS-like VEOs. While CENTCOM’s “by, with, and through” partnership with the SDF has been critical to the defeat of ISIS, it has created friction with Turkey, which views the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) elements within the SDF as a terrorist group. Our assistance to the SDF focuses on defeating ISIS, as we have simultaneously sought to include measures to reassure our Turkish allies. In October 2018 the U.S. and Turkey began conducting combined joint patrols in key locations. CENTCOM will continue to assist the Turkish military in countering VEOs that threaten their border, maintaining our emphasis on the D-ISIS campaign. The repatriation of ISIS foreign fighters to their home countries to face justice remains a challenge. Both SDF and Iraqi forces are holding hundreds of foreign fighters in prisons or temporary detention facilities, with no single process for prosecution or repatriation. This requires a concerted international effort involving law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy. Key Opportunities: The conflict in Syria has led to an increased demand from our regional allies and partners for improved border security as well as improved domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. CENTCOM is able to manage the development of these capabilities which supports our objectives of promoting stability and countering VEOs in the region. The U.S. withdrawal provides an opportunity to reset our relationship with our Turkish allies as well as an opportunity for us to focus on reinforcing Iraq’s consolidation of its gains against ISIS. A strong, enduring partnership with Iraq will serve as stabilizing factor, helping mitigate concerns about long-term U.S. intentions in the region. Jordan is one of our most committed partners in the Middle East and one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in the region. We must be careful to not to take their partnership for granted. Jordan’s civilian and military leadership exemplifies professionalism and modernization within a region in crisis. 26 Jordan is the only country in the Levant to provide a platform for operations, in addition to unhindered access and overflight essential to U.S. interests. The Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) are a key contributor to the D-ISIS Coalition and OIR and is a major contributor to efforts to stabilize the region. Continued support to the Government of Jordan (GOJ) and the JAF is critical to ongoing D-ISIS efforts, and preventing the spread of instability in the region. Key Challenges: Jordan currently hosts over 750,000 registered refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, straining government resources, services, and infrastructure. The GOJ and the JAF have effectively balanced legitimate security concerns with the humanitarian imperative to care for these refugees, despite the strain on Jordan’s resources. Simultaneously, regional turmoil, falling remittances, and declining tourism have led to rising unemployment and high national debt creating a volatile environment that threatens political stability. Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, in conjunction with interagency partners, uses Section 333 and other Title 10 funds provided by Congress to build partner capacity and capability in Jordan. These funds and activities are in addition to the total assistance budget of $1.275 billion annually from the State Department, as agreed upon with the Government of Jordan, that includes at least $750 million dollars in Economic Support Funds and $350 million dollars in FMF. In August 2019, Jordan will host nearly two dozen countries, including regional and NATO partners, for exercise EAGER LION, focusing on counter-terror, border security and humanitarian assistance missions. 2019 Prognosis: Jordan will face domestic pressure to move towards normalized relations and trade with Syria, but also seeks to avoid the risk of triggering the extensive U.S. sanctions on Syria. Russia will likely seek to capitalize on its role as a Syrian intermediary to increase its influence in Jordan and the region. Both domestic and external VEOs will remain a security threat, but continued funding from 27 Title 10 programs, in addition to FMF and economic support, will enable Jordan to develop critical capabilities and remain a key contributor to coalition efforts. Egypt lies on the western edge of the CENTCOM area of responsibility, an anchor state for the region. The country is an important strategic partner whose location, size, enduring peace treaty with Israel, control of the Suez Canal, and moderate religious and cultural Pan-Arab influences are significant elements that support regional stability. Egypt is geographically positioned to counter the flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists transiting from Libya through Egypt into the Central Region. The U.S.-Egypt security relationship is resilient and growing, exemplified by Egypt’s formal request to participate in the National Guard State Partnership Program. Egypt supports our overflight requests, provides Suez Canal access affording short notice transits, and trains and deploys peacekeeping troops worldwide. In the spirit of our strong mil-to-mil partnership, in September 2018 we held a joint Defense Resourcing Conference to increase the orientation of U.S. security assistance to Egypt toward a counter-terrorism and sustainment focus. Key Challenges: ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) to bolster its influence over the local populace through intimidation. The EAF has contained most of the violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula and has begun to address societal and economic reforms to defeat ISIS-Sinai and prevent its spread to the Nile Valley. Key Opportunities: Through our collaborative approach with the EAF we continue to see improvement in the security of their maritime and land borders. The EAF have improved their efforts to stem the flow of fighters and illicit material transiting from Libya through Egypt into Israel and the Central Region. Mindful of the complex environment of the Sinai, we continue our support to the Multinational Force and Observers in order to ensure the safety of these forces, allowing this crucial mission in support of the 1979 peace treaty to continue. We see the beginnings of improved 28 interoperability between the EAF, U.S., and other partner nations, exemplified in more Egyptian participation in multi-lateral exercises and strategic forums including exercise BRIGHT STAR 2018, the second joint military exercise held since 2009. Egypt has expressed plans to broaden its participation in coalition operations and has signed the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, allowing Egypt improved access to interoperability enabling acquisitions. We look to strengthen our security cooperation partnership through continued engagement and FMS programs. 2019 Prognosis: Our military assistance ensures that the U.S. remains a military partner of choice and counters Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in the region. U.S. government aid and support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership. CENTCOM will continue to support the EAF’s efforts in the Sinai, and assist them with implementing a whole of government strategy that addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions that give rise to extremist elements. Lebanon is a multi-confessional democracy that occupies a pivotal geostrategic position in terms of U.S. national security interests. Wedged between a key ally in the region, Israel, and a corridor of Iranian influence running from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon has managed to remain relatively stable. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s manipulation of the Lebanese political process thwarts needed reforms while exacerbating sectarian tensions inside Lebanon. Key Challenges: Lebanon faces a confluence of problems. The stagnant economy is worsened by regional conflict and exacerbated by the fact that nearly a quarter of the total population are refugees. Additionally, both Russia and China are increasing their efforts to gain access and influence in the country because of its key location on the Mediterranean and proximity to Syria. Hezbollah holds political clout which gives it a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions, fields an armed militia that does not act on the behest of an elected government and builds popular support by acting as a social service provider – all undermining the role of the legitimate Lebanese government and armed forces. 29 Hezbollah has also engaged in provocative actions with Israel, risking unpredictable escalatory actions that threaten Israeli security and could undermine Lebanon’s stability. Through its Hezbollah proxy, Iran continues to meddle in Lebanon’s internal affairs. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to drive ISIS from all Lebanese territory in 2017, the threat from remnants of ISIS and other extremists crossing into Lebanon from Syria remains present. Key Opportunities: Our efforts to strengthen the LAF are a critical aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and security. The U.S. is the LAF’s top security assistance partner. Our modest, consistent, long-term commitment and investments has led to the LAF becoming a successfully modernized, legitimate fighting force. The LAF is innovative, professional, and have proven their capabilities to protect the Lebanese people from internal and external threats through successful counterVEO operations. It established itself as the most trusted and respected institution in the country, undercutting Hezbollah’s claim that its armed militia is necessary to protect Lebanon, while providing a mature, apolitical, stabilizing influence. The even-handed, professional response of the LAF, assisted by the professional mediation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, was key in de-escalating the Israeli counter-tunnel operation in December 2018. 2019 Prognosis: Successful, consistent partnership with the LAF forms the backbone of U.S. influence in Lebanon, providing a bulwark against growing Russian and Chinese interest in the country, a reliable partner capable of fighting and defeating remnants of ISIS and other extremist groups attempting to regroup in Lebanon. The LAF has the potential to eventually form a deterrent to increased Iranian activity, and a vital counterbalance to Hezbollah influence. While Lebanese security and sovereignty is enhanced every day through our robust relationship with the LAF, Hezbollah continues to risk the stability and security of Lebanon by maintaining an armed militia and advanced weapons outside the authority of the State. 30 Regional Overview – Central Gulf Iran’s unpredictable and reckless behavior remains a threat to our partners, global commerce, and U.S. vital interests in the Middle East. While supporting the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iran foments instability and chaos in the region through the proliferation of advanced weapon technology and a destabilizing ideology. To conceal its culpability, the Iranian regime masks its malign activities through proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran Threat Network (ITN) in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran is also attempting to build ground lines of communication through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon to support its proxy Hezbollah. Iran has gained influence within Iraq’s armed forces with the formalization of the Popular Mobilization Forces, and also exerted influence in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, oftentimes affecting established sovereign governance. Key Challenges: Iran’s military is composed of approximately 700,000 personnel, the largest in the region. Both of its military arms, the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are improving their abilities to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external threats. Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten – or be able to threaten - strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. With little warning, Iran could impede commercial traffic in these key maritime chokepoints. Iran seeks to gain hegemonic influence through the resulting chaos of its proxies and the threat of force. Iranian surface to air missiles pose a significant threat to U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets operating in international airspace. Iran also has the region’s largest ballistic missile force, which continues to increase in capability, range, and lethality. In November 2018, Iran demonstrated its ballistic missile capability, striking ISIS targets in Syria and Kurdish militant targets in Iraq. Key Opportunities: Since the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent re-imposition of pre-JCPOA nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has sought to 31 demonstrate its resolve and counter U.S. pressure while trying to mitigate the impact of sanctions. However, longstanding vulnerabilities in Tehran’s fiscal policy are reducing its ability to alleviate the impact of U.S. sanctions and Iran’s already fragile domestic economy will likely further decline. While Iran’s strategy is to sow chaos through its malign activities, CENTCOM will continue to develop means of maintaining order to combat Iran’s chaos. Our mil-to-mil relationships help build local credibility in many partner nations, while bi- and multilateral efforts – such as maritime exercises and developing integrated ballistic defense – with our regional partners helps create baffles to stifle Iranian ambitions. 2019 Prognosis: Iran will continue to seek to expand its political influence and military presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and to threaten international trade and regional stability throughout the Central Region. Leaders in the IRGC–Qods Force will continue to use surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct action, intelligence, influence building, terrorism, and cyber operations against the U.S. and our partner nations. Iran intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia, threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten strategic maritime transit routes. Iran will continue to acquire and develop increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military conflict, and seek to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals throughout the region. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) suffered challenges to its international reputation over the past year but remains a key strategic partner. The ambitious reform agenda set forth by Mohammed bin Salman is meant to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy and encourage foreign direct investment. To date, however, these reforms have met with mixed success. Key Challenges: The conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya have challenged Saudi Arabia’s partners in the region, beset by malign influence driven by experienced and well-funded Iranian proxies. The Gulf Rift, pitting KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar, complicates unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity. The ballistic missile threat and armed UASs emanating from Yemeni territory 32 continue to pose a significant risk, as the Houthi’s consider civil infrastructure as legitimate military targets. High-profile civilian casualty incidents on behalf of the Coalition in Yemen and international backlash resulting from the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Kashoggi have damaged Saudi Arabia’s international standing. Key Opportunities: The Yemen conflict provided lessons learned on military operations and tactics, adding greater urgency to institutional defense transformation efforts. We continue to share our own experiences and processes in an effort to improve Saudi Arabia’s operational performance and reduce civilian casualties. CENTCOM’s security cooperation with Saudi Arabia remains a critical link in our efforts to strengthen partners in the region and meet current and future challenges. The work of U.S. advisors is essential to the success of our mission, and Saudi Arabia underwrites the lion’s share of their presence. Helping build Saudi Arabia’s security forces reflects our commitment to increase partner capacity, sustain effective defense institutions, increase professionalism, interoperability, and capability in order to deter aggression in the region and protect critical infrastructure. 2019 Prognosis: Saudi Arabia plays an important role ensuring regional stability. Despite recent strains, the U.S. – Saudi Arabia security relationship is resilient and this strategic partnership with the Kingdom is a foundational point of CENTCOM's ability to execute our national defense strategy. Our ongoing relationship with the Kingdom regarding regional basing and access, interoperability, freedom of movement – exemplified by Saudi support for CENTCOM’s expansion of the Trans-Arabian Network as a primary distribution route across the Arabian Peninsula - remains critical, and our defense institution-building endeavors represents the operationalization of our “by, with, and through” approach. Yemen is beset by strife and riven with internal fractures. The civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead the coalition supporting the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). While some elements of the ROYG are 33 reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis retain control over Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, and other key territory, and the civil war has severely affected Yemen’s population, with nearly three quarters percent requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Similarly, Yemen’s economy has been devastated by rising food and fuel prices, lack of a regular salary, the depreciation of the Yemeni Rial. Neither the Houthis nor the ROYG are able to effectively govern within the areas they control. Key Challenges: Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue to maintain a presence in Yemen and focus on attacks against ROYG, SLC, and Houthi targets. The conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for Iran, which continues to provide support to the Houthis aimed at building a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC and expand Iranian regional influence. This support enables Houthis to launch missiles at its neighbors and target ships in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea; threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader regional conflict. The prolonged conflict deepened the humanitarian crisis, and much of the population faces severe food shortages, a cholera epidemic and other outbreaks of disease. Key Opportunities: Following years of fighting, security sector reconstitution will be a priority, and any peace agreement will require functioning, unified Yemeni security forces in which both the ROYG and Houthis work together to maintain Yemen’s stability. Leveraging existing mil-to-mil ties with the ROYG and a supportive relationship with the UNSE, CENTCOM is positioning itself to provide the necessary assistance to conduct security cooperation in Yemen while continuing not to engage in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis. The Yemeni Coast Guard resumed control of six ports from the SLC in late 2018, with training provided through the Department of State’s Export Controls and Related Border Security program. Implementing the existing 505 agreement with Yemen will allow CENTCOM to significantly deepen and broaden assistance and training opportunities. 34 2019 Prognosis: The U.S. and ROYG will continue to maintain a nascent but increasingly productive mil-to-mil relationship with the goal of enabling Yemeni security forces to secure national borders, defeat VEOs, and respond to existing and emerging threats in order to provide an environment that facilitates the reconstruction of a stable economy and reconstitution of Yemen’s government institutions and civil functions. Kuwait is a key strategic partner for regional security, indispensable facilitator of the D-ISIS campaign, multinational partner on U.N. Security Council, and linchpin of the region in humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic stability. The Government of Kuwait provides tremendous support for U.S. and Coalition operations. Kuwait hosts the fourth largest presence of U.S. troops overseas – including CENTCOM’s army component, U.S. Army Central. The U.S. military presence is viewed as essential to the defense of Kuwait, and Kuwait reimburses the U.S. for its presence. Key Challenges: Given the large military U.S. presence in Kuwait, the implementation of the NDS, the evolution of missions in Syria and Afghanistan, and the unknown of potential missions to come, we must ensure we maintain flexibility and clear communications with our strategic Kuwaiti partner. Key Opportunities: Vigilant to numerous regional threats, Kuwait sought resolution to the Gulf Rift dispute, while promoting a regional response to the crises emanating from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Kuwait continues to play an important role for Iraq’s future. Kuwait hosted the International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq last February, raising $30 billion toward Iraq’s reconstruction – including $2 billion dollars in Kuwaiti loans and investments. 2019 Prognosis: Kuwait remains a key partner, combat support and logistical hub, and enabler for CENTCOM. Our strong mil-mil relationships with the Kuwaiti military underscores our commitment to the defense of Kuwait. This will also allow U.S. access to Kuwait ranges and training facilities and 35 enable the U.S. to realign to the NDS, while simultaneously providing flexibility to surge forces into Kuwait as needed to preserve regional stability and U.S. interests. Bahrain is a strong security partner and a major non-NATO ally. The Government of Bahrain (GOB) has welcomed the broader effort to confront Iran's destabilization activities in the region. Bahrain is a strong partner in countering threat financing, especially helping curtail Iran's efforts to circumvent financial sanctions. Bahrain has also been part of the GCC-wide effort to rebuild ties with Iraq and provide a counterweight to Iran's influence. Bahrain’s strong partnership with the U.S. is most evident by its hosting of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the only operating U.S. naval base in the Central Region, and multiple U.S. command and control facilities located at the Naval Support Activity in Bahrain. Key Challenges: Changes in oil prices have posed a formidable challenge to Bahrain's economy, as over 75 percent of government revenue comes from hydrocarbon sales. Despite the GOB’s attempts to shore up its fiscal position by cutting public spending and increasing non-oil revenues, the country continues to confront significant annual fiscal deficits and will consequently continue to rely on its neighbors to provide financial lifelines. Key Opportunities: Bahrain’s access, basing, and overflight support to U.S. and Coalition forces in the region are essential to our force posture. Its contribution to regional security, maritime patrols, intelligence sharing, counter-mine, and counter-piracy efforts are an integral part of the region’s overall security. Bahrain continues to pursue military modernization initiatives that will result in a Bahrain Defense Force more able to contribute to and lead regional coalition military operations. Bahraini Land Force, SOF, and Air Force support to the SLC campaign in Yemen is providing Bahraini forces with experience in expeditionary operations, while ongoing efforts to improve the BDF’s capabilities will enable Bahrain to play a more critical role in regional security. 2019 Prognosis: The mil-to-mil relationship between Bahrain and the U.S. remains strong. 36 Qatar is a critical partner in the Arabian Peninsula, providing CENTCOM with invaluable regional access, and hosting approximately 10,000 U.S. service members and aircraft, and is home to the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Special Operations Command Central Forward Headquarters, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. The access, basing, and overflight that Qatar provides would be costly to replicate anywhere else in the region. The Gulf Rift has a detrimental effect on joint training and interoperability between the U.S. and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. Qatar's recent withdrawal from OPEC and lower-level attendance at the December 2018 GCC Summit indicate Qatar is pursuing economic and political policies more independent of Saudi Arabia. Key Challenges: While the Gulf Rift had little direct impact on CENTCOM operations, it has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar’s freedom of movement through the closure of land borders and air space. It impacted Qatar’s participation in GCC-hosted multilateral exercises, eroded coalition building efforts, and increased Qatari reliance on Iran to overcome the economic and commercial shipping constraints – specifically, Qatar relies heavily on Iranian land, sea, and airspace for transshipment of foodstuffs. Key Opportunities: The Gulf Rift reaffirmed Qatar’s commitment to make the U.S. its primary defense partner. While Qatar has one of the smallest militaries in the region, it is also, per capita, the richest country in the world. Despite its relatively small size, Qatar has been a major contributor to coalition operations throughout the region and against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other regional coalitions. Qatar is the second largest FMS customer in the world with $26 billion dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass $40 billion dollars in the next five years with additional FMS purchases. This investment demonstrates a clear desire to partner exclusively with U.S. and NATO allies and become a reliable contributor to coalition operations. 37 2019 Prognosis: Qatar’s efforts to expand their military both in size and capacity will result in increased bilateral military engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Armed Forces. This will give the U.S. an opportunity to make a positive impact on the military development of a key partner in a turbulent region. Qatar will continue to play a vital and necessary role in the region and has spent nearly $9 billion dollars on U.S.-led Coalition basing infrastructure. United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the U.S.’ staunchest partners and non-NATO allies in the Central Region. The UAE’s strategic location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage VEOs, proven expeditionary capabilities of its military, and drive to be at the forefront of military innovations makes them an ideal partner. The UAE has repeatedly supported U.S. objectives in both Syria and Afghanistan and has taken a leading role in the fight against terrorism – being among the first countries to join the D-ISIS coalition. It remains active in pursuing many of the coalition's lines of effort, including D-ISIS messaging, stabilization, and assisting in stemming the flow of foreign fighters. Key Challenges: Yemen is the UAE's top near-term security concern. The UAE sees the Huthis as Iranian proxies, paving the way for a new and unwelcome Iranian role in southern Arabia and in the seas surrounding the peninsula. The UAE is a key partner in the SLC in Yemen, conducting offensive operations in cooperation with Yemeni forces around Hudaydah since May 2018. Key Opportunities: The U.S. and UAE cooperate under a strong bilateral framework to prevent and respond to conflicts and crises, and the UAE has clearly indicated a desire to forge even stronger military relationships with the U.S. The UAE is active in an operational partnership to disrupt terrorist networks and reduce terrorist attacks and is the only member of the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen to expand its military objectives to include counter-terrorism alongside the U.S. Robust training and exercise programs with the UAE increase the level and quality of cooperation between our nations. The 38 UAE also provides substantial access and is willing to burden-share the costs of basing and infrastructure. 2019 Prognosis: The UAE expressed a desire to strengthen our relationship through a nine-point Defense Cooperation Roadmap, which supports our NDS through increased burden sharing in its own defense. A continued robust exercise and engagement program will strengthen our military-to-military relationships, and UAE’s purchase of U.S. produced weapon systems will help secure interoperability with U.S. units. We expect the UAE to continue their partnership to U.S. efforts in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, in addition to supporting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Oman is a bastion of stability in the Central Region. The long-standing relationship between the U.S. and Oman, based on shared security and stability interests, remains strong – each service chief of the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces a graduate of U.S. military schools via our International Military Education and Training program. Oman serves as an interlocutor with other GCC members, factions in Yemen, and Iran. Oman faces some political and economic uncertainty due to the eventual leadership transition from Sultan Qaboos, and the continued budgetary dependence on limited hydrocarbon revenues to fuel Omani development and employment. Key Challenges: Oman’s economy continues to experience recurring fiscal deficits, growing unemployment, and stagnant growth. Economic diversification is increasingly seen as a national security priority for Oman, as reliance on the hydrocarbon sector and a growing population result in rising unemployment, growing debt, and a diminishing capacity to pay for the costly security apparatus that keeps Oman safe and secure. Progress toward achieving the goal of diversification has been slow. This economic insecurity combined with an untested succession plan to follow Sultan Qaboos’ decades of stable rule represent significant challenges. 39 Key Opportunities: Oman’s strategic location, outside of the maritime chokepoints of the Bab el Mandeb and Straits of Hormuz, provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency capabilities. The U.S. and Oman have shared interests in allowing increased Untied States access to Oman’s military and commercial ports and bases as the country looks to modernize its infrastructure and diversify from an oil-based economy. 2019 Prognosis: A stronger economy in the Sultanate of Oman will ensure a politically stable country with adequate employment opportunities for its citizens. The U.S. and Oman will continue to maintain a strong mil-to-mil relationship and Oman will provide crucial access in the form of thousands of aircraft overflights, landings, and dozens of port-calls in Oman. Negotiations for enhanced access to Duqm port offer the prospect of deeper military cooperation. Oman will participate in numerous bilateral exercises and training events with U.S. Forces. Oman will continue to develop an FMS portfolio that already includes over $2.7B in open FMS cases, though Omani budgetary constraints may significantly slow new acquisitions in coming years. Conclusion Maintaining our competitive advantage in the Central Region relies on more than simply overmatching those who would challenge us with a higher volume of forces and equipment. CENTCOM’s strategic approach has never relied on physical overmatch, but on our people, our strategic partnerships, and the ability to creatively leverage our combined capabilities to achieve our mission. As we operate more and more in the gray zone of competition short of combat, our people and partnerships – based on foundations of respect, trust, and shared values – will continue to be our source of strategic strength and key to maintaining our edge in the region. The CENTCOM team – our component commands, our combined and joint task forces, our country teams, and all of our interagency partners – more than 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong, is 40 the engine that drives everything we do toward securing our national interests. They represent America’s greatest treasure. In an era of austerity and change when we consistently ask our people to do more with less, the service and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in support of their nation is both humbling and inspirational. For nearly 18 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM AOR, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians have answered the call with an unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the families who support them. We could not accomplish what we do without all of them and they deserve the very best capabilities and support we can provide them, from weapons and communications systems, to healthcare and housing. As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its current missions and evolves to face new challenges, we appreciate the efforts of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, the interagency, and especially members of Congress and their staffs, who work tirelessly to provide our people everything they need to accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy, fulfilling lives in continued service to our nation.

20’, POSTURE STATEMENT

POSTURE STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 10 MARCH 2020

When United States Central Command (CENTCOM) formed in the 1980s, the U.S. military trained and equipped to fight high-end warfare against the Soviet Union under conditions of limited communications and the routine employment of nuclear weapons. Times changed; the wall fell.

The U.S. welcomed change in Russia while retooling heavy conventional forces to fight an 18-year protracted global counterterror campaign.

Simultaneously the Islamic Republic of Iran, emerging from its 1979 revolution, embarked on a deliberate and extended campaign of terror and violence across the Middle East, directly engaging or sponsoring partners in a 40year- long struggle against the U.S. and our allies.

Today the rise, fall, and rise again of Russia; the continuing asymmetric campaign of violence and coercion by Iran; and the emergence of China as our pre-eminent economic and military power competitor signal that while the nature of war is unchanging, the character of war has evolved. CENTCOM acknowledges our nation does not have the luxury of a single strategic focus.

The Joint Force must posture globally with the ability to balance multiple priorities and tasks, from combat with peer competitors to expeditionary counterterrorism operations, understanding that the nation’s top defense priority must relentlessly focus on adversarial great powers that possess the power and means to destroy our country. While Iran lacks the capability to destroy us, its regime’s hatred of the U.S and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber reach, and depth and breadth of its terror networks clearly position it as a priority, although clearly and inarguably not the main one.

The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the U.S. to work with partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon and neutralize Iranian malign activity. While this is only one aspect of the NDS, it is directive for the Department of Defense and a key task for both CENTCOM and EUCOM.

The current U.S. policy of maximum pressure against Iran is supported by the deterrence provided by our U.S. force presence, which helps to stabilize the region and acts as a counterbalance against the Iranian regime’s overt and covert military responses. The ramifications of this policy have led to direct and indirect Iranian military threats and actions against U.S. interests in the region, and similar threats to U.S. national security interests globally. Iran’s lack of effective economic or diplomatic levers to counter the U.S. maximum pressure campaign has caused it to resort to pursuing overt and covert military options against the U.S. and our partners. The Iranian regime’s strategy seeks to undermine international and regional support for U.S. policies with attacks and threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners and allies. CENTCOM plans and executes missions across its area of responsibility (AOR), but embraces a global planning perspective supporting national objectives and the execution of global military campaigns. Adjustments in U.S. global force posture to support the NDS compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR. We recognize significant future conflicts will be trans-regional, cutting across multiple global combatant commands, and involving multiple domains. The ongoing global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) provides a stark example of this threat. As CENTCOM approaches its missions, acknowledging priorities outlined in the NDS, we also remain keenly aware that our adversaries in the region retain a willingness to contest our actions. Iran’s regime is not a peer competitor to the U.S., but it does possess the ability to negatively affect global commerce, trade, and the world’s energy supply. These malign actions, while not posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, significantly threaten our national interests abroad, those of our allies and partners, and negatively affects the U.S. military’s long-term posture as we react to immediate threats. During my year in command, I have observed multiple Congressional engagements to the CENTCOM AOR. Your oversight, partnership and advocacy, based on first- hand knowledge, lays the foundation for enduring success.

CENTCOM Priorities Deterring Iran. The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime’s quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threats to the United States and its regional partners have been consistent elements of its policy for decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing activities in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is CENTCOM’s top priority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran decides to be a responsible member of the international community, CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain military deterrence with Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic and diplomatic maximum pressure campaign. Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked U.S. interests dozens of times and conducted scores of unmanned aerial system (UAS) reconnaissance flights near U.S. and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases. The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks by Houthi forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to attack Israel, supported the Assad regime’s brutal conflict against its own people, and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS attack in September against Saudi oil facilities that destabilized international energy markets. In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. This statesponsored missile attack, in response to the U.S. killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold compared to previous “greyzone” attacks and may set a lower bar for future actions by the regime.

While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence exists indicating the Iranian regime’s desire to continue malign operations that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations, and threaten freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies, and the global economy.

CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to apply diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force must be postured to deter Iran from using the military element of power to counter our actions. While our steady-state posture does not require offensive forces in theater to achieve overmatch or unintentionally provoke Iran’s regime, our presence sends a clear and unambiguous signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend partners and U.S. national interests. This exemplifies the concept of deterrence.

Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent. Deterrence can be contested – Iran’s regime retains the ability to interfere with our efforts to deter.

Historically, Iran has never doubted the U.S. capability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing on deniable, hard to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata’ib Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly demonstrated U.S. will. Our posture – the bases, forces, and activities that we undertake – maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability. Reduction of U.S. forces in the AOR combined with a perception of U.S. disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the U.S. was no longer committed to defending our national interests in the region. That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that crested in January 2020.

In order to maintain the contested deterrence our recent military actions have re-established, Iran’s regime must continue to see the U.S. has enough forward-deployed forces for a credible military capability, that we are willing to employ that capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction, and any decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome. Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to maintain.

CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously, scattered across the breadth and depth of the region, all in areas suffused with Iranian-backed forces continuing their decades-long struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and maintaining deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of forces required to fight in full-scale conflict: the failure of deterrence. CENTCOM’s objective is therefore to posture forces with operational depth in the region to achieve a sustained state of deterrence against Iran’s regime without undue provocation, and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats while the U.S. maximum pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of deterrence is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). While presence can fluctuate based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR is necessary to identify subtle changes that shape posture and ensure we align our presence appropriately. Negotiated Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan.

All wars must have a political end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan represents the best option for bringing the 18-year-long fight in Afghanistan to a favorable conclusion, while meeting long-term U.S. security requirements. CENTCOM efforts support the U.S. South Asia Strategy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our overriding national interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a counterterrorism platform under any of the multiple political eventualities that may take shape. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan continues to examine efficiencies in force structure to reduce our military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterterrorism pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the future. We also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces develop and refine their force generation processes for campaign sustainability. Without continued pressure, groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) will regain the ability to mount or sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Funding, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, Coalition Support Fund, and others have remained paramount during this transition.

Maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq. Similar to Afghanistan, most of the U.S. intelligence community predicts that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the U.S. to neutralize it without a capable, partnered ground force. Syria remains a dynamic situation with multiple parties and agendas involved. T

he Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are seeing this play out in northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian, and Iranian campaign of violence has escalated since December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons, innumerable people injured or killed, with many more in critical need of assistance, and dangerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian regime.

We likewise see the Assad regime continuing its use of chemical weapons in blatant violation of its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention – deterring this use in the future remains a CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, U.S. and Coalition forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve assist with ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding energy sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation. Moving forward, we must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and our D-ISIS partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while maintaining deconfliction with Russia, which, along with the Assad regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission in various ways.

Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing networks; assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security forces; and extending its influence in rural areas throughout eastern Syria and Iraq. Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is key human and geographic terrain. We remain in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq (GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS.

Hindering our ability to work with the ISF toward this objective are rogue elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces more beholden to Iran’s regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but to undermine existing security and threaten U.S. and Coalition forces partnered with the GoI. Given ISIS’ demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus from the D-ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not mean the absence of ISIS.

The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external assistance. Countering the UAS Threat. In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air dominance across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to counter the growing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive and easy to proliferate, UASs provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and partner facilities, providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale, critical infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while affording deniability and a disproportionately high return on investment. CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and enable U.S. forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed by UASs, coupled with our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to counter them is the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM AOR since the rise of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Just as the IED threat galvanized operational, industrial and scientific communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching a juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat. Your support and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our success in the Great Power Competition. Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees. The manipulation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to gain a political, military, or economic advantage is not historically uncommon. However, in vast swaths of Syria and Iraq the systematic indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations who are hostages to the receipt of ISIS ideology is an alarming development with potentially generational implications.

There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for hard-core ISIS believers. This radicalized population currently numbers in the thousands and preys on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and refugee populations already highly susceptible to extremist indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps, the more likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military solution for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for stability and security necessary for these populations to return to their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees presents a challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term stabilization can take root. Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF detention facilities in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist fighters (FTFs).

While CENTCOM and our coalition partners are working to address and mitigate security challenges at the facilities, this serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solution. The United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure. Ultimately, the best way to alleviate this problem is to reduce the numbers of detainees through repatriation. The ISIS detainee and IDP populations represent more than 60 nations. While some countries have made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution requires a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This problem will not go away by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by the international community working together to accept its shared responsibilities. As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-radicalization and repatriation of FTFs. They are international problems requiring international solutions. The longer these conditions persist; the IDP population becomes more and more ensconced in ISIS philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists.

Action now by the international community is imperative to protect our homeland and our allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with the potential to spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction of the physical caliphate we and our allies and partners have worked so hard to accomplish. Your support to increase Special Immigrant Visas in Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much appreciated by me, our troops, and our partners.

Basing and Posture in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) Fragile security environments across the AOR reflect a variety of contributing factors, including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt governance, and exploitation by VEOs which have clearly indicated their desire and intent to attack the homeland, U.S. interests abroad, and the interests of our partners and allies. At the same time, the AOR is growing increasingly crowded with external nation-states, such as a resurgent Russia and expansionist China, pursuing their own interests and attempting to shift historical alliances. These dynamics necessitate that CENTCOM explore options with regional partners to posture itself in depth across our AOR to create efficiencies, and increase strategic depth, resiliency and operational agility. With the enactment of the FY20 NDAA, Section 1263, I look forward to the posture review and reporting back to Congress with the findings. Over the past year, CENTCOM has re-evaluated its posture, taking action to close, consolidate, or in some cases expand some of its air, land, and sea bases; as well as access, basing, and overflight rights with our partners. Some of these actions represent immediate, near- term adjustments for survivability and to improve our deterrence capabilities – like the buildup of Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Other decisions are driven by long term efforts to achieve cost savings, and increase interoperability or partner burden sharing – like the establishment of CENTCOM Forward-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This forward deployed element assesses requirements and integrates U.S. forces into an international collective defense effort. The Western Sustainment Network is a newly-created logistics system extending from the Red Sea and Mediterranean Ports to the Arabian Gulf, designed to mitigate the potential impact of chokepoint closures at the Bab Al Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz.

To build sustainment depth over the last year, CENTCOM has increased deployment and redeployment traffic across the Arabian Peninsula, shipped ammunition to Kuwait from the Red Sea, negotiated movement of materiel and supplies across borders affected by the Gulf Rift, and developed the port of Duqm in Oman. Developing this operational depth enhances protection of critical infrastructure while providing reduced cost options for deployment and obviating the need to transit potentially contested maritime chokepoints. This network increases our agility, enables Dynamic Force Employment, and reduces deployment timelines in the event of a contingency, thereby reducing risk and providing additional strategic options. Taken together, the result is a tailored, responsive basing network, connected by dependable lines of communication with AOR-wide reach, supported by prepositioned equipment and supplies to facilitate the rapid movement and employment, of U.S., allied, and partner forces. Armed with the knowledge that resources are at a premium, and a pragmatic appreciation that each country is working through its own challenges with economic and social reforms, CENTCOM supports initiatives that approach defense from a cooperative perspective. This is the only practical way to approach the problem. The reality on the ground is that every partner country cannot afford to have their own Patriot battalion, nor should they; just like every U.S. combatant commander cannot retain their own heel-to-toe carrier strike group. The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which achieved initial operating capability in November 2019 and full operating capability in January 2020, provides an instructive example of this kind of regional cooperative effort. Participating nations include the U.S., U.K., Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, working together to support freedom of navigation and maritime domain awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and assist in attribution of malign actions in these vital waters.

The vessels and aircraft of IMSC member nations provide vigilance, surveillance, and assurance, supporting the free flow of commerce through the critical choke points of the region. In the air domain, CENTCOM operates in an environment where our partners possess and operate the majority of air and ballistic missile defense capabilities in the theater. This compels CENTCOM to lead efforts to establish a framework to coalesce and optimize each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nation’s individual ballistic missile defense capabilities into a regional, integrated air and missile defense construct to defend against the shared threat posed by Iran and the proxies it controls. Our GCC partners contribute to interoperability through purchase and use of Patriot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and the development of the GCC Ballistic Missile Early Warning System – a collective system of systems across the Arabian Peninsula designed to establish an effective early warning and supporting architecture to benefit all GCC Partners. The Link-16 system provides a combined, integrated air picture through a shared network of sensors and systems across the AOR to receive, populate, and share information among partners. CENTCOM builds confidence and proficiency among our partners through combined, distributive IAMD exercises that leverage virtual and simulated technologies to bridge the geographic distances across the region.

As we work with our partners along collaborative lines of effort to safeguard our mutual interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger together, and our strategic strength has never rested on the volume of materiel we bring to the fight, but the partnerships and whole- of-government efforts no other country in the world can match. Key to building and maintaining these partnerships in the region is the enduring authorization, funding, and combined employment of the Department of State’s (State) security assistance (SA) and DoD security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) programs. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the Department of State’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, with our partners’ capabilities, interoperability, and burden sharing. Foreign Military Sales in CENTCOM totaled nearly $23 billion in 2019, accounting for more than 42 percent of all FMS globally. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) cultivates relationships and improves interoperability with six nations across the CENTCOM AOR currently, with more considering entry. CENTCOM supports the execution of over $2 billion annually in SA funds, consisting of $1.7 billion in Department of State Foreign Military Financing to obtain articles, services, or training; $265 million in Department of Defense Section 333 funds authorizing the U.S. to help partner nations build capacity; $17 million in Department of State International Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve interoperability and establish relationships with future leaders; $4 million for the Counter Threat and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program; and $3.6 million for the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). Taken together, these State and DoD programs help maintain U.S. influence, improve our posture and interoperability with partners, and create opportunities to advance U.S. objectives. The State IMET, and DoD WIF and SPP programs in particular often yield a far greater return on investment compared to the resources allocated against them.

On average, over 5,500 students receive U.S. military education and training through our SA and SC programs annually. Conclusion The U.S. must posture itself globally to contend with an array of security challenges detailed in the NDS. While Iran represents but one of those national security challenges, deterring the Iranian regime is the primary security challenge for CENTCOM and critical for ensuring the Department can focus on near peer competition rather than an expansion of conflict in the Middle East. The rapid escalation from grey-zone conflict to open, kinetic strikes between the U.S. and Iran in January of this year underscores the immediacy of this threat, and the need for vigilance paired with the proper capabilities on hand necessary to deter the Iranian regime. Readiness and capabilities allocated toward this mission are supportive of the NDS not only with regard to Iran, but also in the context of supporting great power competition as it manifests itself in the Middle East. As the U.S. reorients itself globally, our leadership, presence, and demonstration of commitment to our allies and partners in the region are crucial, now more than ever. We have an opportunity at this moment in history to establish the foundations of collective, effective collaborative security apparatuses throughout the region with the U.S. serving not as the core member, but a contributing member in a burden-sharing construct.

For more than 37 years, the men and women of CENTCOM – about 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong today – have devoted themselves to securing U.S. national interests in the Middle East that help protect the homeland. They operate in real time, against real enemies. Across 18 years of extended combat operations, the missions they have executed yielded tangible results. The steadfastness and sacrifice of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, Civilians – and their respective families – is both humbling and inspirational. Public support for our mission, troops, and families is precious and not taken for granted. Your communication with your constituents is key in maintaining public support that serves as the bedrock and fosters morale, enabling the mission going forward. As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its ongoing missions, we appreciate the efforts of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and thank the members of Congress and their staffs, without whose consistent and timely support we would be unable to accomplish our mission.

‘21, just different i suppose?

April 20, 2021

House Armed Services Committee Hearing National Security Challenges And U.S. Military Activities In The Greater Middle East And Africa

WITNESSES: MS. AMANDA DORY, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL KENNETH MCKENZIE JR., USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND GENERAL STEPHEN TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND SMITH: This is the full committee hearing on "National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa." We have with us Ms. Amanda Dory, who is the acting undersecretary of defense for policy; General Kenneth McKenzie, who is the commander of U.S. Central Command; and General Stephen Townsend, who is the commander of U.S. African Command. As always, this is a hybrid hearing, so I will read the instructions for how to conduct a hybrid hearing, so we are all on the same page. Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen for the purpose of identity verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and voting. Those members must continue to use the software platform's function while in attendance, unless they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that render them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff for assistance. Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the room and via the television internet feeds. Members participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking. Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep the software platform video function on the entire time they attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding, but if members depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the software platform entirely and rejoin it if they return. Members may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues only. Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding. Thank you. As mentioned, we are here today to hear from our Central Command and African Command commanders. And there is, to put it mildly, a lot going on in both of your areas of responsibility. And we look forward to getting an update on those challenges. You know, certainly the counterterrorism challenge has been central for a very long time in the region, as we've dealt with ISIS in the Middle East, you know, between Iraq and Syria and elsewhere, and then various affiliates of many different groups, including ISIS and Al Qaida throughout Africa. I think educating members on exactly what's going on with the fights there will be very important, because, you know, some of that is not on the front pages. But I know, for instance, what's going on in the Sahel in West Africa is very concerning. We are working with our partners in the European Command -- sorry, with our partners in Europe who have interests there, as well. I'm very interested to hear how that is going and what we can do to be supportive of that. But also, as is previewed by the slides that General Townsend has passed out for us, both of these areas of responsibility are also part of the larger great power competition. I think that is very important to understand that both Russia and China are particularly active in Africa, also obviously active in the Middle East. You know, how does our military play a role in those parts of the world with dealing with the great power competition that we're facing from both China and Russia? We'll be very interested to hear that. And then, of course, there is the big issue of the moment, and that is the president's decision to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan and NATO's corresponding decision to also withdraw their troops by September. I think this is the right decision. There was no easy, good decision here. There was no win-win-win, where everything was going to be fine no matter what we did. Afghanistan is a very difficult part of the world. But when you look at the maps in front of us, when you look at just these two areas of responsibility, much less the concerns that we have elsewhere in the world -- certainly in Asia, but increasingly in Latin America, as we see the difficulties down there spilling across to our border, we come to understand that the level of investment in Afghanistan does not meet where it currently falls in our national security objectives. We have accomplished much of what we set out to accomplish in terms of degrading Al Qaida. Certainly, we killed Osama bin Laden and we have significantly reduced the ability of terrorist groups to operate out of that region. And at between $14 billion and $20 billion a year, I don't think that investment is justified at this point. And I think the president made the right decision in terms of what our current defense priorities are. That is not to say that we're going to cease to have interests in the Afghanistan region. We will. But there are other, better ways to meet those interests that are more cost-effective. 2 And the final point I would make on this is, you know, we've been in a bit of a lull in terms of U.S. casualties over the course of the last year, since the preliminary -- well, peace agreement is an overstatement. But the preliminary understanding was reached with the Taliban whereby they have not been attacking us. As we know, that expires on May 1st, and at some point after that, we would be back into a hot war and we would once again be losing U.S. servicemembers' lives in Afghanistan. Given the commitment and given where we're at in our national security needs, I think the president made the right call. The risk of staying outweighs the benefit at this point, but we will want to hear the details from General McKenzie and Ms. Dory on how we plan to execute that, what the risks are, and how we're going to mitigate those risks. With that, I just want to thank our witnesses again for being here, for their service. And I will turn it over to Mr. Rogers for his opening statement. ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses and express my appreciation for their service and their time to prepare for this hearing. In both AFRICOM and CENTCOM, we've made progress in combatting terrorists, but they're not completely gone. Adding to the problem, many groups have spread out, making them more difficult to locate. General Townsend, as we discussed last week, maintaining pressure on these terrorist networks remains vitally important. But spending in AFRICOM comprises only 0.3 percent of our defense budget. Spreading those resources even further is the increased presence of Russia and China on the continent. Russia is entering into a disturbing number of arms sales and strategic agreements with African nations. China is using its Belt and Road Initiative to extract African natural resources. The Chinese Communist Party is also building its first overseas military base on the strategically import Horn of Africa. Alarmingly, it's only a few miles away from our own base. Given the increased role China and Russia are playing in Africa, and its geostrategic importance, it's imperative that we continue to make investments there. I look forward to hearing from General Townsend about how we can maximize diplomatic and military efforts to eliminate terrorist footholds and counter Russia and China's global ambitions in Africa. In CENTCOM, General McKenzie is facing tremendous challenges from hardened terrorists and nations bent on our destruction. President Biden's decision to unconditionally withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021, will only complicate matters. I am very concerned the Taliban will overrun the democratically elected government soon after we withdraw. When that happens, what assurance do we have that Afghanistan will not become another breeding ground for terrorists? I've yet to hear how the president intends to conduct counterterrorism operations without any U.S. troops in 3 the region. There had better be a plan for that, and I expect the administration to explain it to us as soon as possible. I'm also very concerned with the ongoing the destabilizing actions of Iran. The ayatollah continues to fund and equip terrorists targeting American troops. His cronies are prolonging a civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria. And his regime is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. We absolutely cannot allow that to happen. And I am not convinced that re-entering JCPOA will stop them. I look forward to hearing more about the administration's plan for ending the ayatollah's quest for nuclear weapons and how they intend to deal with the rest of the regime's destabilizing actions. Finally, I want to express my deep frustration with the defense budget proposed by President Biden. Cutting defense spending below the rate of inflation will mean combatant commanders like General Townsend and General McKenzie will not have the resources and capabilities they need to do their jobs. I look forward to working with both Republicans and Democrats on this committee to pass a defense budget that adequately supports our servicemen and women. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. SMITH: Thank you. Ms. Dory, you're recognized for your opening statement. DORY: Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers. Can you hear me OK? SMITH: I believe so, yes. DORY: OK, very good. Thank you. And distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on our defense policy in the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility alongside their commanders, General McKenzie and General Townsend, today. I'd also like to express my appreciation for the strong support Congress provides the Department of Defense. As a career civilian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I've seen firsthand how the executive and legislative branches work together to ensure our armed forces have the resources and authorities required to deter and, if necessary, defeat any foe. Secretary Austin has emphasized the need to match resources to strategy, strategy to policy, and policy to the will of the American people. The president's interim national security strategic guidance speaks to that approach by prioritizing the security of the 4 American people, expansion of economic prosperity and opportunity, and the defense of our democratic values. This requires Department of Defense to defend our people and economy, deter and prevent adversaries from threatening the United States, our allies and partners, and support whole-of-government efforts to lead a stable and open international system. An early priority for the secretary is to match our resources to strategy by right-sizing our posture investments. To that end, at the president's direction, the department is undertaking a global posture review to balance operational requirements, risk, readiness, and international commitments. In Africa and the Middle East, DOD plays a supporting role to broader U.S. government efforts in an acknowledgement that military force is not the answer to the challenges in these regions. Our policy objective is to increase stability and secure our interests by working by, with, and through our re-invigorated networks of allies and partners. Africa is a continent ripe with opportunities and challenges. In Africa, the interim national security guidance directs us to continue building our partnerships and to work toward bringing an end to the deadliest conflicts while preventing the onset of new ones. It also directs to assist African nations to combat the threats posed by climate change and violent extremism. Undergirded by the investments and tools you have afforded the department for building partnership capacity, and in close cooperation with our diplomatic and development colleagues, the resulting partnerships enable us to support conflict resolution efforts, combat the threats posed by violent extremism, improve defense institutions, and strengthen democratic norms and the rule of law. These modest investments play an outsized role in Africa and the department's objectives across the continent. In the Middle East, DOD works to deter Iranian aggression, disrupt Al Qaida networks, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and protect vital interests such as freedom of navigation. We've made progress toward achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS and transition the focus of Operation Inherent Resolve to advising, equipping, and assisting partner forces to enable them to manage the ISIS threat independently. The State Department is leading diplomatic efforts to bring Iran's nuclear program back into compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while DOD focuses on deterring and defending against Iranian threats. In Yemen, we ended support to Saudi-led offensive operations, but continue to demonstrate our commitment to the defense of Saudi Arabia by providing limited non-combat support to help our partners defend our territory from Houthi attacks. In Afghanistan, our mission has been preventing terrorist groups from using the country to threaten the interests and security of the United States, our allies and 5 partners. After two decades of U.S. and NATO military involvement in Afghanistan, we have accomplished that mission, and President Biden has decided to draw down the remaining U.S. troops from Afghanistan. In closing, I'm confident in the department's capacity to contend with the range of dynamic challenges facing the United States in Africa and in the Middle East. We retain many advantages, including our economic power, dynamism, democratic values, military capabilities, and global alliances. Thank you to the members of the committee for your continued support, and I look forward to discussing the topics further in the rest of the hearing. Thank you. SMITH: Thank you. General McKenzie? MCKENZIE: Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I appear before you proudly representing the 70,000 men and women of the United States Central Command. It's a great pleasure to be with you here today. It's my duty to testify, of course, but I have to say it's also a privilege to address this body and all the greater honor to do so sitting beside the acting secretary of defense, Ms. Dory, and the commander of U.S. Africa Command, General Steve Townsend. Since my last testimony, the region has continued to evolve, and it remains as dynamic as ever. With the president's announcement last week, we are focused on working closely with the Afghan government and our NATO allies to responsibly conclude Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. This is my main effort at present, but it's not my only responsibility. My private sector addresses our other missions in detail. The United States and our NATO allies sent forces to Afghanistan nearly 20 years ago, and the president has judged that now is the appropriate time to redeploy and reposition these forces so that they're better arrayed to deter adversaries and respond to threats globally, including those in the Central Command region. Our singular purpose in Afghanistan has been to ensure that Al Qaida and other violent extremist organizations could never again plot, prepare, and perpetrate attacks against the United States and our allies from the refuge of that country. The campaign has evolved considerably over the years, from active combat operations with U.S. and NATO forces in the lead to advisory efforts designed to enhance the Afghan national defense and security forces' ability to conduct their own campaigns against violent extremist organizations. That there has not been another 9/11 is not an accident. It is the cumulative product of these efforts. We will now conclude our Afghanistan-based advise and support mission. We are further planning now for continued counterterrorism operations from within the region, 6 ensuring that the violent extremist organizations fighting for their existence in the hinterlands of Afghanistan remain under persistent surveillance and pressure. Ever since 12 September 2001, when our allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we have done everything in Afghanistan within a partnership framework, and that will not change in the months ahead. We are planning collaboratively with our interagency and international partners and we'll take all measures to ensure the safe and orderly withdrawal of all of our forces and those of our partners from Afghanistan. This includes positioning significant combat power to guard against the possibility that the Taliban decision to interfere in any way with our orderly redeployment. I'd now like to briefly summarize some other challenges in the region. While Iran has itself avoided state-on-state attacks on U.S. forces, since last January, strikes on the Al Asad and Erbil air bases, it continues to menace regional partners and the free flow of commerce through the use of proxies and the proliferation of armed unmanned aerial systems and other munitions. Its pursuit of regional hegemony remains the greatest source of instability across the Middle East. In Iraq and Syria, the campaign to eliminate the threat posed by ISIS has entered a new phase. In Iraq, we are engaged in a strategic dialogue with the Iraqi government to determine the nature of our security relationship. ISIS's so-called physical caliphate is no more, but its toxic ideology lives on. The problem is especially acute in communities ravaged by conflict and at sprawling camps for displaced persons, where ISIS preys upon vulnerable populations. What has accelerated in the last year is the influence of China and Russia, which each in their own way are attempting to subvert the rules-based international order and to gain strategic influence in the Middle East. China's activity in the region takes the form of economic investment, arm sales, and other overtures. Russia has made an 18th century power play in Syria, propping up the murderous Assad regime. The Middle East remains key terrain, and I believe China and Russia will continue to expand their efforts to improve their position in the region and diminish U.S. standing wherever possible. The CENTCOM area of responsibility is the most cyber-contested theater in the world. It is also the proving ground for the proliferation and employment of unmanned weaponized systems, many emanating from Iran. This difficult and complex operational environment provides units inside CENTCOM opportunities to operate and to conduct realistic training within an environment that exists nowhere else in the world. I can state as a matter of fact that the units and ships assigned to CENTCOM are as ready as any in the joint force. The weeks and months ahead will see us execute a very complicated and demanding military operation to withdraw U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan. This 7 is presently the main effort of my command, and we have tools necessary to accomplish the task. With that, I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, sir. SMITH: Thank you very much. General Townsend? TOWNSEND: Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. It's a privilege to represent America's exceptional mean and women at U.S. Africa Command who are dedicated to securing U.S. interests' and preserving our strategic options on the African continent. This morning, I'm accompanied by one of my key staff advisers, Air Force Colonel Jacqueline Breeden. I'm also here this morning with my colleagues and friends, Ms. Amanda Dory, our acting undersecretary of defense for policy, and General Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM commander, to discuss our shared challenges and opportunities in our areas of responsibility and the high return the American people get for their defense investments around the globe. Historically, America has not been penalized for underestimating the importance of Africa. Today, we can no longer afford to underestimate the economic opportunity and strategic consequence Africa embodies and which competitors, like China and Russia, recognize. Africa is the crossroads of the globe. The recent blockage of the Suez Canal not only demonstrated the importance of critical sea lines of communication flowing through the Mediterranean and Red Seas, but also around the Cape of Good Hope. Violent extremist organizations, competitor activities, and fragile states are among some of the threats to U.S. interests. Beyond geography, global population growth is largely African. By 2050, one in four people on the planet will live in Africa. Rapidly growing markets, 60 percent of the Earth's arable land, and vast, untapped resources including strategic rare earth minerals provide tremendous economic potential. Thirteen of the world's 25 fastest growing economies are in Africa. Africa's tremendous opportunities are offset by significant challenges, including climate change, food shortages, poverty, ungoverned spaces, historic grievances, and other factors that make the continent also home to 14 of the world's 20 most fragile countries. Our strategic competitors are very active in Africa. China has invested heavily in their second continent, or as some think-tanks call it, China's fourth or fifth island chain. 8 Russia seeks to exploit instability and fragility for their own gain and at U.S. expense. Iran is also increasingly active on the continent. African-based VEOs, like Al Qaida, their affiliate, Al-Shabaab, and ISIS thrive in the continent's ungoverned spaces. They provide the greatest threat to many of our African partners and aspire to kill Americans in Africa, as well as here at home. Across this diverse continent, U.S. AFRICOM operates with 0.3 percent of the DOD's budget and 0.3 percent of DOD's manpower. This tiny investment pays enormous dividends, as just under 6,000 servicemembers, civilians, and contractors work with our partners, both interagency and foreign, to counter malign actors and transnational threats, respond to crises, and strengthen security forces to advance U.S. interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. AFRICOM works every day to protect America's security and advance our access and influence. We do this arm in arm with the U.S. interagency and through coordinated action with allies and partners. What AFRICOM accomplishes with a few people and a few dollars on a continent three-and-a-half times the size of the continental United States is a bargain for the American taxpayer and a low-cost insurance policy for America. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, thanks for your continued support to our armed forces. I look forward to your questions. SMITH: Thank you all very much. I think something you said very interesting there about Africa and our investment there and DOD's investment there is a lot of bang for the buck. And as I look around the world, I think with the multiple challenges that we have, that's sort of key to how we approach them is, you know, how can we make a difference and cover all the areas we cover? And that -- I know SOCOM has been very involved in that, being present in countries, building partner capacity, working with other allies. Can you expand upon that a little bit and how that plays out in Africa as you deal with all the various challenges that are spread out across the continent? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Chairman. So, first of all, everything we do is through partners. America's military is not really in the lead for anything in Africa. We work first with our African partners. We work secondarily through other partners like Europeans, notably in West Africa the French, for example, but many countries, actually. So everything we do -- and our interagency partners, of course. So everything we do is through partners. You mentioned, Chairman, U.S. Special Operations Command. A lot of the troops who have boots on the ground in Africa are U.S. special operating forces. Not all of them. There are plenty of general purpose forces there, as well. 9 So we don't try to be all things to all people. We try to focus our efforts in priority areas. There are 53 countries in my area of operation. We don't have -- we don't try to win in all 53 countries. But we do try to focus our efforts where it matters the most for America's security. SMITH: And now I'll ask you a question that's probably impossible to answer at this point, but I'm curious what you think. As we pull out of Afghanistan, I mean, the budget in Afghanistan last year was $14 billion, 3,500 troops. A lot of what we've been doing has been about the rotations that are involved in sending our forces into Afghanistan. With that extra money and those extra forces, have you guys, you know, within the Pentagon started to think about, how do we then distribute them? Do we bring them all home? Are there places in Africa or elsewhere where you could shore up your efforts? How do you see a benefit coming from, you know, reducing that expenditure by that amount? And, General McKenzie, it's your AOR as a starting point, so I'd be curious what your thoughts are. And I know this is probably early on, but curious where you see that going. MCKENZIE: Sir, I think there -- as our forces come out and we're able to re-posture, I think, first of all, we have to look at what we define as the pacing threats for the department. And I think we look to China. We look to Russia. And we have to look at those areas. I think some of the forces are going to remain in Central Command, because we are going to look at offshore over the horizon options, and that's going to require us to do some things. Nothing on the scale of the expenditures that you're seeing now in Afghanistan, of course, but we will still need to do some things there, as well. But I think broadly, it's going to be a significant lever for the department to apply against what I agree are the most significant challenges that we face today. SMITH: Thank you. I appreciate that. With that, I will recognize Mr. Wilson, who I believe is with us virtually. WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. And I'm really grateful. General McKenzie, a question. I believe the U.S.-Israel relationship is of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy. Given that Israel has now been moved under the purview of CENTCOM, I want to ensure that our cooperation with Israel continues to be a priority. 10 In moving Israel to CENTCOM, it's important that we not undermine the cooperation Israel has in Europe, particularly with NATO. The question would be, how are we ensuring this move does not undermine agreements and understandings that currently exist? MCKENZIE: Sir, that's a great question about Israel. So today, Israel does most of its operational business with U.S. Central Command. Their threats typically emanate from the east. Nonetheless, they have broad, enduring cultural and other ties to the Europeans and to NATO. So as part of the direction I've received from the secretary of defense, over the next several months, we will work a careful plan to integrate Israel into the Central Command AOR, while preserving their unique nature and their unique ties back into Western Europe. So we think we have a good plan to do that. But in many ways, the movement into the Central Command AOR simply reflects an operational fact that's been in existence for some time. We work closely with them every day. Now we'll have not a divided responsibility for it, but rather a single responsibility for it. But I would tell you that I will still be in very close touch with General Todd Wolters and U.S. European Command as we go forward. And I think that is an important relationship, as you note, but also it's going to be important for Israel to have the opportunities to develop normalized relationships with Arab nations. And that's one of the key things that will accrue from having them in the Central Command AOR. WILSON: Well, thank you very much. And I appreciate that assurance to our friends of Israel. Secretary Dory, the U.S. defensive expeditionary operations are naval by network of American bases and facilities hosted and allied in partner countries, particularly in Afghanistan. Presuming that the withdrawal of all forces results in the loss of control of Bagram and Kandahar air bases, how does that complicate our ability to reenter Afghanistan to combat resurgent terrorist groups, as we had to do in Iraq? What number of U.S. forces will be required to reenter Afghanistan without control of existing infrastructure? The attacks of 9/11 by Osama bin Laden were from a cave in Afghanistan in 2001. What assurance does the president have that future attacks will not come from caves of Afghanistan against the American public? DORY: Congressman, thank you for the question about what our future posture will look like with respect to Afghanistan following the force drawdown. What I can say at this point is that work is underway to adapt to the adjusting security environment and consider how to continue to apply pressure with respect to potential CT threats emanating from Afghanistan. 11 So looking throughout the region, in terms of over the horizon opportunities, of course, the surveillance intelligence component of that is fundamental to ensuring the type of scenario that you just laid out would not persist in the future with respect to individuals in caves who would threaten the U.S. homeland. What I can say from the decision process that the president led with his national security team is that there was consideration of a range of scenarios for the future of Afghanistan and our ability to continue to apply pressure, but the commitment is that there will not be threats emanating from Afghanistan against the U.S. homeland looking ahead into the future. WILSON: And additionally, Secretary, over the last several years in the conflict in Syria, Iran has entrenched itself deeply within Syrian territory. It has bases, factories, weapons storage facilities. These pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region, including our alliance with Israel, as well as safety of the Syrian people, who often are being used as human shields. Does the U.S. continue to support the freedom of action for Israel to address Iranian threats emanating from Syria? DORY: Congressman, our commitment to Israel remains ironclad. I think we have seen through the secretary's initial visit to Israel last week and in the dialogues that have been conducted with Israel already in this administration, including a rejuvenated effort led by the national security adviser, that the relationship remains robust and close, that there is a strong level of dialogue and commitment to one another. WILSON: Thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Langevin is recognized for five minutes. LANGEVIN: Very good. Do you hear me OK, Mr. Chairman? SMITH: Yes, we got you. We'll turn your volume a little bit here, but you're good. Go ahead. LANGEVIN: Very good. Thank you. Well, good morning. And I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. So we've heard entities like Special Operations Command say that counter-VEO is a form of great power competition. General Townsend, do you believe that that statement is true? And if so, why? TOWNSEND: Thank you, Congressman. I absolutely believe that statement is true. In fact, we say that often in Africa. And here's why. 12 So what is -- we don't use the term great power competition. Our partners don't really like to hear that term, so we use global power competition in Africa. What's the purpose of global power competition but to expand America's access and influence? So how do you get that? You get that by helping a partner with a problem that they have. And one of the significant problems that many of our African partners have is the scourge of terrorism. So by doing counter-VEO or counterterrorist operations, supporting our African partners, we are gaining access and influence by doing that. Absolutely, in Africa, counterterrorism operations are a way of global power competition. LANGEVIN: Thank you. I personally also agree with that statement. I think it's important that we look at this holistically, because terrorism is not going away any time soon, in my view. But what other forms of great power competition happen in Africa, or global competition, as you talk about it? And what role does the military play as China in particular makes diplomatic and economic inroads there? TOWNSEND: So China and Russia are very active in Africa. Russia is very active with arms sales, but most of their activity on the continent I judge to be self-interested and exploitative in nature. And I think though they may be a threat today, I think they are less of a threat tomorrow. China, however, is of great concern. They are literally everywhere on the continent. They're placing a lot of bets down. They're spending a lot of money. We know they use debt trap diplomacy, coercion with corrupt politicians. They build a lot of critical infrastructure, and they -- so most of their competition is through economic means, building infrastructure and trapping African countries in bad loans that give the Chinese access to that infrastructure after they build it. They're also -- you know, their first overseas military base, their only one, is in Africa, and they have just expanded that by adding a significant pier that can support even their aircraft carriers in the future. Around the continent, they're looking for other basing opportunities. They're also doing cooperation in the intelligence realm that concerns me significantly. I would say that they have offered training and arms sales. Frequently that winds up working out OK for us, because their quality of their equipment that they sell frequently is inferior and the Africans wind up being disappointed with both the equipment they get from China and the training they get from China. But China is a learning organization, under the concern for the future. LANGEVIN: Thank you, General. 13 Let me turn to General McKenzie, if I could. General McKenzie, in your testimony, you list great power competition as your third priority behind containing Iranian influence and the VEO operations. What does great power competition look like in your AOR? And what is your timeframe for shifting your priorities to great power competition? MCKENZIE: Sir, so we see with Russia disruptive activities. You know, they've seized a foothold in Syria that allows them to pursue an age-old dream of a warm water port in the eastern Mediterranean and basing in the eastern Mediterranean, which also allows them lily pad to go into Africa. So Russia is generally opportunistic. Weapons sales, as General Townsend noted. China is, as in Africa, playing a much deeper and a longer game, and it is principally an economic effort, although we believe they do aspire at some point to have basing in the theater, but that's still ahead of them. But right now, we see China as principally economic. SMITH: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Turner is recognized for five minutes. TURNER: Thank you. Ms. Dory, as Mr. Langevin just mentioned, General McKenzie has in his comments, the importance of deterring Iran, looking to how do we strengthen our allies, and the importance of intelligence to be able to respond to their malign activities. In your statement, throughout, you reference the malign activities that Iran has done and has performed that is obviously of grave concern. Other than the entering back into the JCPOA, which is a flawed agreement of which they've currently breached, what else do we need to be doing to deter Iran? DORY: Thank you, Congressman. I would start off by saying the president has chosen to lead with respect to diplomacy when it comes to JCPOA and the nuclear file. That leaves an important role for DOD with respect to deterring malign activity in the other range of activities Iran engages in. And so there's a very important role for the department to continue with respect to the range of allies and partners in the region, to backstop them, to have forces on the ground working to advise, train, and assist with the different partners. Each partnership has its own character and quality, but the combination of the force presence, the ability to provide the president with options in the event those are required, those are the fundamental roles of the department at this point. TURNER: General McKenzie, you mentioned ISR in the tools that are necessary to be able to deter Iran, specifically citing the MQ-9. I know that you know that there is pressure on the committee for the purposes of diminishing the role of MQ-9 and other deployable ISR. 14 I thought you might want to take an opportunity to give a commercial for the importance of that tool as you look to deterring Iran. MCKENZIE: Well, sir, let me begin by saying I recognize that there is a global demand for ISR. And also we need to move beyond the MQ-9 system, which is the backbone system for U.S. Central Command. The future is going to demand bigger, better, different kinds of ISR, more sophisticated than what we've got now. However, right now, for me, the MQ-9 is a very good platform. And what we have found that particularly against Iran, they do not like their activities to be exposed. In the summer of 2019, we believe we stopped several imminent attack streams from ships at sea simply by positioning MQ-9s overhead so they could hear them operating. I'm confident of that. The intelligence is very clear on that. So the intelligence, first of all, the platform, first of all, allows us to gather intelligence, but, second, we have an observed and reported upon deterring effect on Iran by simply manipulating those platforms. So I use them, but I am not insensitive to the future of this platform and the fact we've got to make some adjustments globally. TURNER: Great. In your comments, you emphasize our need to work with our allies. Certainly in working with those allies, we need to be strengthening their capabilities. The Trump administration had entered into a transaction to provide the F35 to UAE. The Biden administration has confirmed its interest in continuing to do so. Could you speak for a moment about how important it is for us to have advanced tools and equipment like the F-35, and certainly weapons systems, in the hands of our allies that join with us in trying to deter Iran? MCKENZIE: So one of the key aspects to deterring Iran is an international community that is devoted to that deterrence. Iran has no friends. So what we have is lots of friends, friends across the region and friends across the globe, as well. But one of the things for supporting our friends in the region is to give them the best capability that we can afford to give them, consistent with the other requirements, such as reassurance of Israel, which is always in my mind when I give advice on these deals, but it is not a CENTCOM decision. But I think that is a good capability and it will stand us in good stead with our friends in UAE. TURNER: Thank you, General. I yield back. SMITH: Mr. Larsen is recognized for five minutes. LARSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chair. 15 General Townsend, I don't know if I need an answer. This won't be a -- it'll be a comment, really, on this issue that Mr. Langevin brought up about CT and global power competition. My concern with your answer is a concern I've expressed to SOCOM. It's just that sometimes it should only be a CT mission and not creep into something else. And sometimes it should start out as a global power competition mission and not be necessarily based in a CT mission. That may not be the case for everywhere on the continent of Africa for you. But do you -- I guess I do have a question. Do you have an example where a SOCOM mission that's operating under AFRICOM is just a global power competition mission? TOWNSEND: Yes, Congressman. I'd prefer to discuss that in the closed session. LARSEN: Yes or no is fine with me. And you said yes, and I appreciate that. I just want to make the point that sometimes they're related and sometimes they're not. And I don't need to -- I don't want to keep hearing CT is GPC, because it sounds like an excuse to keep CT all the time, and sometimes it's not appropriate, and sometimes it is. And we're just trying to -- I'm trying to get SOCOM to think through this a little bit more than I think I'm getting the impression that they are. So I've been clear to SOCOM folks about that, as well, so -- to stay on the continent, actually specific countries, and, Secretary Dory, 20 years ago, it was all Afghanistan, all the time, when I got here. Just in the last three weeks, I wouldn't have heard this 20 years ago. I've heard from Ugandan constituents -- they're from -- their country of origin is Uganda. I've heard from constituents from Tigray -- I think I've got that pronounced correctly, I don't want to be disrespectful -- about the respective problems in those countries. Wouldn't have heard that 20 years ago. My district's changing. The country's changing. We are a nation of immigrants and new immigrants. So can you -- on those two areas, can you give us -- give this committee or give me an update, something I can tell my constituents who are both concerned about the elections in Uganda and my other constituents who are concerned about how their families are being treated in northern Ethiopia? DORY: Thank you, Congressman. In that period of time, I previously served as the deputy assistant secretary for Africa. So for some of us, those were areas we were working even before the recent renaissance, if you will. In terms of Uganda, what I would say there is the U.S. government is very concerned at this point in terms of the quality, or lack thereof, of the election, the repression against the other candidates who contested the election, and the actions of the security services in Uganda in terms of repressing participation by citizens and their concerns in governance. 16 So messages in particular via the State Department are robust with respect to our concerns. We do recognize the positive role that Uganda has played with respect to the Amazon mission in Somalia over many, many years on the one hand, but that does not counterbalance the concerns in terms of the repression that's underway in Uganda proper. Similarly with respect to Ethiopia and Tigray... LARSEN: Tigray. DORY: ... intense concerns on the part of the U.S. government with respect to the conflict underway there and concerns that it's fundamental to have a negotiated settlement to the conflict at this point. You have participation by regional players in addition to the different groups within Ethiopia, and the way forward is through dialogue, and that's something that our embassy on the ground and the State Department are leaning into robustly. LARSEN: Thank you. General Townsend, back to you, can you comment on Mozambique and -- in the last 45 seconds, if -- how you assess what's happening in northern Mozambique? And what does that mean for decisions and advice you're providing to the department? TOWNSEND: Over the last two years, ISIS Mozambique has been an increasing threat in northern Mozambique, in the Cabo Delgado province. As you saw a couple of weeks ago, they launched a 7- to 10-day siege on the town of Palma. It's not clear to me if they're actually more than just local groups flying an ISIS flag of convenience, but ISIS core has claimed them as their own. My view is that African partners need to do more and European partners need to do more before the United States does more there. LARSEN: OK, thank you. SMITH: Thank you. Ranking Member is recognized. ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKenzie, in your 2020 posture statement, you noted that without sustained pressure levied against ISIS had the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria. I'm interested in your thoughts in your 2021 posture statement about that, as well as ISIS blossoming under a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after we leave. 17 MCKENZIE: Sir, in Iraq and Syria, we have completed the physical destruction of what was the so-called ISIS caliphate. ISIS remnants still remain in Syria and some in Iraq, as well. They find it difficult, if not impossible, to hold ground. They can still conduct small-scale terror attacks, and they do that. But largely in Iraq and Syria, in Iraq, the Iraqi security forces are generally able to handle that problem. We are not patrolling with the Iraqis on the ground. The Iraqis are doing it. Now, we provide them enabling support. We provide them high-level advice and assist. But generally the Iraqis are doing that themselves. In Syria, sort of the same thing. Our SDF partners there are conducting those operations with our back in the rear advice and support for them. So those operations are continuing. Now, the future in Iraq and Syria is not going to be bloodless. They're going -- ISIS is not going to go away. It's going to remain. But our objective there is to enable local security forces that we have trained and enabled to be able to handle the problem at a local level without significant external assistance from either us or our European allies. The other component of that is you want to prevent those elements from being able to develop global connective tissue to reach out to other entities. And that is not only a physical fight on the ground there, but also a fight in cyber. And we conduct it in all those domains. So that's the way I read the picture right now. Continued pressure is still necessary. The trends are moving the right way, and the strategic dialogue with our Iraqi partners is just one example of that moving forward. As we go forward, we'll be able to look to re-examine the posture we have in Iraq, and that will be something we'll take a look at here in the future with our Iraqi partners. In Afghanistan, as you noted, the principal reason that we see that ISIS and Al Qaida have been so significantly degraded has been the significant CT pressure that we have been to put on them over the past several years. ISIS is very small in Afghanistan. Probably several hundred fighters. ISISK, a little bigger, but still disaggregated. They have not been able to hold ground successfully in the east. They look to reassert themselves if they can. But it's a -- but pressure is the important component of that. And I see that I'm out of time there. ROGERS: But so if we're gone, and the coalition forces are gone, and Taliban does take a more prominent role in Afghanistan, is it a concern of yours that they may increase their presence without us there to push back? 18 MCKENZIE: Sir, the Taliban has undertaken to agree to not allow that to happen. With the Taliban, I've learned to not listen to what they say, but rather to watch what they do, so we will watch closely what they do. ROGERS: Great. General Townsend, given the massive size of your AOR, I'd like to hear more about your additional -- any additional resources or capabilities you need, particularly in the southern part of the continent and the western part, to carry out your mission? Are you adequately resourced in that part of the continent? TOWNSEND: Ranking Member, as you noted, Africa is three-and-a-half times the size of the continental United States and we have about 6,000 total troops spread over that area. We don't have a significant footprint from about the equator south. And I'm not sure that we need that. I would say that our force posture is under review as part of this global posture review, so I don't really want to get ahead of my civilian leaders on describing what we might need or might not need. However, there are some perennial things that are always on the razor's edge of, are we going to get that or are we not going to get that? One of them is the ISR that General McKenzie has already mentioned. We -- the simple fact of the matter is, we do not have enough to do what we assess we need to do in Africa. I realize there's pressure on it across the entire department. And then our warfighter recovery network, which is providing timely casualty evacuation and medical care to our troops, that's a fairly -- we do most of that through contracted. We don't actually need to put pressure on low-density, high-demand units, like military medevac and personnel recovery assets. We can do most of our work through contracted sources. That takes money. And we're always waiting to get that money to make sure our troops have what they need. Those are probably two things right off the top of my head. ROGERS: All right, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. SMITH: Mr. Courtney is recognized for five minutes. COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, General McKenzie, thank you for reminding us just a moment ago that there actually was an agreement in place that the sitting government of this country entered into in the last administration, and in many respects the announcement that President Biden made was really to try and make that agreement more logistically executable so that we're not in a situation like Saigon 1975. So Ms. Dory sort of alluded a moment ago to the fact that we are still going to retain over the horizon capability to make sure that a counterterrorism effort can continue and 19 protect the homeland. Can you describe just a little bit more detail what that looks like? Because that is, I think, the real heartburn that I certainly pick up from my constituents about the decision. Is it going to be at sea? Is it going to be in neighboring countries where we, again, have the ability to deploy assets to, again, respond to a terrorist threat? MCKENZIE: Sir, I'm actually conducted detailed planning by the direction of the secretary to look at those options right now. And I will report back to him by the end of the month with some alternatives. But I can broadly state, if you leave Afghanistan and you want to go back in to conduct these kinds of operations, there are three things you need to do. You need to find the target. You need to fix the target. And you need to be able to finish the target. So those three things -- the first two require heavy intelligence support. And if you're out of the country and you don't have the ecosystem that we have there now, it will be harder to do that. It is not impossible to do that. It will just be harder to do it. You will have to base your overhead ISR from no longer within Afghanistan, where an MQ-9 can take off and be over its target in a matter of minutes, to perhaps much further away. We will look at all the countries in the region. Our diplomats will reach out and we'll talk about places where we could base those resources. Some of them may be very far away and then there will be a significant bill for those types of resources, because you'd have to cycle a lot of them in and out. That is all doable, however. So there are ways to get to the find and the fix part. The fix part is very important, though, because if we're going to strike something, we're going to strike it in concert with the law of armed conflict and the American way of war. We're going to minimize collateral damage. We're going to make sure we have a precise target and that we're going to be able to control what happens there. It's difficult to do that at range. It is not impossible to do that at range. And so you have a variety of ways that you could actually strike the target if you chose to do that. You could do it with long-range precision fires. You could do it with manned raids. All of those are inherently dangerous, but you could still do it. You could do it with manned aircraft. There are problems with all three of those options, but there's also opportunities with all three of those options. So I don't want to make light of it. I don't want to put on rose-colored glasses and say it's going to be easy to do. I can tell you that the U.S. military can do just about everything, and we're examining this problem with all of our resources right now to find a way to do it, you know, in the most intelligent, risk-free manner that we can. COURTNEY: Well, thank you for that answer. And again, I think it is important to remember that we're not in the same mindset we were at the time of 9/11. I mean, I think, you know, certainly it sounds like, again, you're very focused in terms of making 20 sure that a threat like what occurred back then is going to be planned for and, again, addressed as the case may be. General Townsend, in the last NDAA, there probably were at least two or three provisions regarding critical minerals and rare earth minerals, which -- I've been on this committee a while. That was pretty unique. But again, I think from a security standpoint, I think there is now a pretty widespread recognition that China has been very methodical and successful in terms of cornering the market in terms of critical minerals in Africa. I think it's clearly a part of the world that they've succeeded at that. Again, your map on economic activity I realize was kind of a global view, but is that something that AFRICOM is watching and at least being able to help -- if nothing else, educate us back here about the fact that, you know, we've got to pay attention to this, because they have a stranglehold -- let's face it -- in terms of things like antimony and cobalt, lithium, all these minerals that go into everything from our cellphones to platforms that we need for our national defense? TOWNSEND: Congressman, you said it great. So the Russians are looking -- to me, they're looking at exploiting and short-term gain. The Chinese have a much longer-term view that's more concerning to me. And so they are not only mining rare earth minerals in Africa for their own use, they are cornering the market on these concerns in Africa to have them under control for a rainy day in the future. That should be of concern to us. As you look at the list of rare earth minerals, and you named a few of them, a couple others, tantalum, I was just looking at this yesterday... SMITH: I'm sorry, General. I do apologize. Gentleman's time is expired. We'll try to get to other folks here. TOWNSEND: Sure. SMITH: Mr. Lamborn is recognized for five minutes. LAMBORN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm concerned because as Robert Gates said famously regarding when Joe Biden was a senator and then vice president, he seemed to be on the wrong side of foreign policy decisions at almost every turn. You could go back to the '80s, when the nuclear freeze was being discussed, and that would have frozen a permanent advantage into Russia's favor, Soviet Union's favor, to as vice president promoting the withdrawal of troops out of Iraq that let ISIS come to the fore, or counseling against the strike against Osama bin Laden. And on and on and on. And I'm just concerned that we're seeing this bad decision-making today with Afghanistan and Iran. So on Afghanistan, General McKenzie, are you able to tell us 21 whether or not you advised the president to unilaterally withdraw by September 11th all U.S. forces? Or are you able to not -- are you not able to discuss that? MCKENZIE: Sir, I can tell you that I had multiple opportunities to have a detailed conversation with the president and give my advice. He heard my advice. I'm not going to be able to share it with you here this morning, sir. LAMBORN: OK. Regarding the Taliban -- we've talked a little bit about that. The ranking member had some questions. Are they a reliable partner in negotiations? MCKENZIE: I have grave doubts about the Taliban's reliability. I have expressed those publicly going back for a long period of time. But we need to see what they're going to do here. The fact of the matter is, if -- let's say we leave -- if they want any form of future international recognition for Afghanistan, if they want any form of international support, they're going to have to keep to the agreements that they've made. We will be able to observe that and see it very clearly and directly whether or not they're able to do it. LAMBORN: Well, I am happy to hear that we're going to be watching them closely, but my concern is that we've been watching them closely and they've been pretty much uniformly unreliable. Ms. Dory, I'd like to ask you about Iran. Recently, they made the announcement that they were going to upgrade their highly enriched uranium to 60 percent. And that pretty much goes against everything that we want them to be doing or peace-loving people in the world want them to be doing. So what is the Biden administration going to do about that? DORY: Congressman, I think what we see with that announcement is playing out -- in terms of the public nature of the announcement is the jockeying for leverage with respect to the negotiations that are underway in Vienna right now. So it's important what is happening in public. It's also important what's happening behind closed doors and whether we're getting closer through the talks that are underway to a resumption of compliance on the part of Iran with the agreement. LAMBORN: Would you agree that upgrading their HEU to 60 percent is unacceptable? DORY: Absolutely. LAMBORN: And how close does that get them to weapons-grade capable HEU, highly enriched uranium? 22 DORY: Congressman, it puts them farther along that path. You know, 90 percent level and above is where you would need to be in terms of weapons-grade uranium. LAMBORN: OK. Well, I've just got a lot of concerns. Like you, General McKenzie, I'm going to be watching closely. Oh, I do have one last question for you, General McKenzie, my last minute. And this is a concern I have that where we're not taking advantage of a capability that we have. We have purchased some Iron Dome batteries from Israel. And we know that these are highly capable units shooting down incoming rockets and missiles. Are there places in CENTCOM where we could be using these Iron Dome batteries? And my understanding is we're not using them at all. I hope I'm wrong on that, but if we're not using them at all, aren't there places where they could be put to good use? MCKENZIE: Sir, I prefer to talk that a little more directly in the closed session a little bit later this afternoon. But I will just tell you this. We look globally at the management of our air defense assets. CENTCOM has requirements. There are other places in the world that have requirements, as well, and we just need to bear that in mind. And I go in and fight for the resources for CENTCOM, but there are, in fact, other places in the world that need air defense assets, as well. And so I just -- I do recognize that. LAMBORN: OK, well, let's continue that discussion later today. MCKENZIE: Yes, sir. LAMBORN: Thank you all for being here. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Garamendi is recognized for five minutes. GARAMENDI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McKenzie, is it true that President Trump reduced the number of troops from 10,000 to 2,500 via a tweet last year and then via another tweet decided that we would leave by May, early May, all troops out of Afghanistan? MCKENZIE: Sir, I believe he tweeted it, but my orders came through the chain of command resultantly from the president to the secretary, written orders. And in the Department of Defense, we move troops based on execute orders. So he may have tweeted that at the beginning. I'm not exactly aware of the time when he did or didn't do it, but the chain of command, which the president sits at the top of, is what directs us to move forces. 23 GARAMENDI: OK. So it was President Trump that said all troops would be out by May of this year. MCKENZIE: Conditions-based. GARAMENDI: Conditions-based, OK. Just a slight clarification there of the way in which we now find ourselves with troops leaving in September. My question is to the countries surrounding Afghanistan, what is your assessment -- Ms. Dory first and then General McKenzie -- about the role of the surrounding countries, Pakistan, India, China, Russia, others? How are they going to respond to the departure of NATO and U.S. troops? DORY: Congressman, I think you'll see an array of hedging behaviors as the U.S. and coalition forces begin to depart and as we focus in on a diplomatic first presence in the country. You'll see behaviors in terms of -- already we see it with Pakistan, where Pakistan is applying pressure to an extent with respect to the Taliban out of concern for the impact on Pakistan should civil war break out again and refugee flows affect their country. I think that same dynamic is true with the other neighbors, as well, where each is looking at the situation now to assess for themselves what are the risks, what are the threats, and how will we posture ourselves going forward. GARAMENDI: General? MCKENZIE: Sir, I think Ms. Dory captured it pretty clearly. I think the country that's going to be the most affected, frankly, is going to be Pakistan, because of the possibility of unconstrained refugee flow, because of the possibility of renewed terrorist attacks in Pakistan that could ramp-up as a result of this. All of those things are certainly very possible. I think we should also -- the countries to the north of Afghanistan will also be concerned. Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, those countries up there, because they're going to be worried about refugee flow and the flow of fighters perhaps to the north, as well. So I think all of them -- we'll see what happens when we leave. They'll look at how we posture after we go. And then they'll have to decide, you know, the way they're going to go forward with that, it's going to be -- they're going to face some very tough choices, though. GARAMENDI: So they may or may not be encouraging or engaging in what could be a civil war? Just don't know? 24 MCKENZIE: I think they will all be keenly aware of the probable -- should a civil war occur, they'll be very aware of the population flow, the violence that will certainly spill over from Afghanistan if that's the case. GARAMENDI: Thank you. Let's turn to Africa, General Townsend. Climate change, the Sahel, how is climate change likely to affect at least the Sahel area, and if we have time, beyond? TOWNSEND: Well, first of all, I think AFRICOM's role is to support the State Department and USAID in this area of climate change. But we see clear evidence of that on the African continent. And probably -- you mentioned the Sahel -- the biggest issue we see there is water shortages and desertification of the farmland there. And that spreading southward of the Sahara Desert is probably one of our biggest concerns, and that sparks all kinds of conflict between herders and farmers, for example. I think the ways the Department of Defense is looking at a lot of ways -- we've been charged by the president and secretary of defense to look at ways we can contribute to helping mitigate the climate change problem. Some of those ways are with unique energy solutions, and those kind of projects are starting to unfold in Africa. GARAMENDI: Thank you very much. I yield back. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Wittman is recognized for five minutes. WITTMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. General McKenzie, I'd like to begin with you. You know, there's a concern that I have about the tension between our service branch chiefs and our combatant commanders. As your demand signal is before you with the global force management allocation plan, generating readiness today, and the service branch chiefs' focus on making sure that there's not only readiness today, but there's modernization and we'll call it revitalization for meeting the future demand signal. Let me ask, to begin here, when we look at the GFMAP today, and we see in many circumstances the increased number of RFFs, requests for forces, does that reflect that the continuity of what's happening is changing? Or is the GFMAP maybe a little bit outdated and we need to look at that? Give me your perspective on where that dynamic is today, from your thoughts. MCKENZIE: Certainly, sir, thank you. So my last job before I was the commander of U.S. Central Command, I was the director of the Joint Staff. And before that, I was the J5 of the U.S. Joint Staff. So I was at the very core of the GFMAP process. I would consider myself an expert on the GFMAP process. 25 And so there is always going to be a natural tension between those who raise and maintain forces and those who employ forces. That is natural. It goes back as long as we've had joint chiefs and combatant commanders. So that's just -- that's just a natural byproduct of that. It is not new. And those tensions are adjudicated by really only one person, and that is the secretary of defense, and the process to do that adjudication is actually quite good. Now the GFMAP is actually a design for the future. And like any design for the future, it's based on a set of assumptions. The GFMAP is as good as the assumptions that were made. I would argue that over the last couple of years the GFMAP has not completely incorporated the rise of Iran in the White House's thinking and importance. So there were a lot of tensions as a result of that. Should tension with Iran go down or should we adopt a new policy, then you could have a GFMAP that would be more aligned to that. But again, the key thing is, the GFMAP is simply a plan. Any plan is based on assumptions. If the assumptions change, you have to change the plan. So I am not particularly -- when I was the director, I wasn't particularly concerned by it. Now that I'm a COCOM, I'm not particularly concerned by it. I ask for forces I need based on the tasks I'm given. It is the secretary advised by the Joint Staff and by his civilian leadership in the department to determine if they can fix that by either changing the tasks they've given me, giving me more forces, or accepting the risk. And then that's a risk that we all know and understand. So I would argue, frankly, the process works pretty good. We might not like the answers from the process, but it's a pretty good process. WITTMAN: Sure. That's a constant dynamic is mitigating risk today versus risk in the future. How much risk do we take today to make sure we mitigate in the future? Unfortunately, it seems like history looks at us in a not so kind way and that many times we've not estimated well what the future risk is and we focus too much on what's in front of us today. So hopefully as we look at what's out there -- and I'm glad you mentioned the dynamic element of the environment and how we're looking at that future versus today in generation of force and readiness. So, thanks. General Townsend, let me point to you. I know that your AOR you see that Russia is looking to increase influence there. You see their effort in the agreement with Sudan for essentially putting a naval base there for the next 25 years. My concern is, is, again, you see the Chinese presence in Djibouti. Now you see Russian presence in Sudan. You see them trying to expand their influence in those areas. Are there concerns that this development or this placement of hardware there could go to other areas? Could it go to areas like South Sudan and areas in -- the Tigray 26 region of Ethiopia? Are we going to see an expansion of Russian influence in that area? What are your perspectives in what we see with Russian activity? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. I am concerned about what Russia's doing on the continent. First, their influence in Libya, that seems to be maybe trending in a positive direction. Next concern I have, as you just pointed out, is Sudan and their efforts to place a naval base there. That project has been a little fraught with some friction for them, but they seem to be trying to push that forward. First of all, I would say that there are two types of naval bases. So here I am, an Army infantryman talking about naval bases. But my naval component commander has educated me America. There's two types. The one type where you can stop and get gas and groceries. That's useful for port calls and steaming around the world, but for war, you need a militarily useful naval base and the ability to rearm and repair ships. So it's not clear to me that -- they're just on the ground stages of trying to get an agreement solidified to get -- so we've got some time to work this. WITTMAN: Very good. TOWNSEND: I am concerned about what they're doing. And you mentioned that they connect all the way... SMITH: I'm sorry. TOWNSEND: Russian activity connects all the way to the Central African Republic. SMITH: I apologize, General. Gentleman's time has expired. My bad. Mr. Brown is recognized. BROWN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Is that my echo? Hmm. SMITH: You're good. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, can you come back to me? And maybe tech can help me with this? Or am I OK? SMITH: We're hearing you just fine. Are you hearing an echo? BROWN: Yeah, I'm hearing an echo. Are you? SMITH: No, we got you loud and clear. We're OK. 27 BROWN: OK. Could I just ask then that my clock be reset to five minutes? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SMITH: Absolutely. We'll reset and start now. Go ahead. BROWN: Thank you. I appreciate it. And thank you to our panelists. General Townsend, a question for you. Acting Deputy Assistant Security of Defense for Africa Affairs Mr. Meyers recently said that U.S. engagement with the nations of the continent is crucial for peace, democracy, and development. Could you describe what additional security resources, military assistance, and capabilities that you need to mitigate the risks and support the various diplomatic, disaster assistance, and humanitarian efforts across the continent? TOWNSEND: Thanks. Thanks, Congressman. I would like to defer my conversation about -- my answer about forces as we are engaging in this global posture review and I haven't presented our plans yet or recommendations yet to the secretary of defense about forces. But other capabilities, I'd like to address. Those are foreign military sales, foreign military financing, Section 333 support, IMET. Those types of security assistance are absolutely vital to our ability to get our mission accomplished in Africa. And AFRICOM has seen significant reductions in those types of security assistance over the last couple of years. And one of them, IMET, is of great concern, but also 333 funding. So it's those types of things that I am willing to talk about now, short of actually talking about forces. Over. BROWN: Thank you. Can you describe how terrorists and extremist activity interferes with the humanitarian missions and how it stalls economic development across the continent? I witnessed that on a CODEL. I spoke with, you know, representatives from USAID and the embassy. They said they just can't do their work in a secure enough environment because of terrorist and extremist activities. Can you share a little bit -- put a little bit of meat on that bone? TOWNSEND: Sure, Congressman. Thank you. So there's a symbiotic relationship between those three D's -- diplomacy, development, and defense -- and one of the ways we assist those two other D's in getting their work done is providing a secure environment. So our work with the security forces of an African country is critical to allowing USAID do development work and the Department of State do their diplomatic work. And that symbiotic relationship is very evident in Africa. And because of generally, you know, 28 security and status of the security environment there, the Department of Defense's assistance is regularly needed. Over. BROWN: Thank you. And just -- in what little time we have left, for General McKenzie and General Townsend, if you could take 30 seconds or so each, can you please describe the programs and initiatives within your command that you use to foster a culture of inclusion, diversity, and equity within our ranks in your command? General McKenzie? TOWNSEND: Yeah, go ahead, Frank. MCKENZIE: Yeah, sir. So there are a variety of programs, but I would say what is absolutely most important is what leaders do by -- if you go into the front office of a leader, who's in the outer office? Who do leaders pick as principal staff officers? Who -- people see those things. And while the programs are very important and we have a variety of those programs that are underway, I think for a high-level leader, the most important thing you have to do is act, because I think that's what actually people see. And I'll pause there, sir. BROWN: General Townsend? TOWNSEND: I think General McKenzie said it very well. The only thing I might add is, at AFRICOM, we have a gender adviser on our staff to help us with that. But that gets back to what General McKenzie said. It's about what leaders do. BROWN: And I agree with you on that -- people that you have in place and the commitment of leaders to diversity, equity inclusion are extremely important. I will point out that in the F.Y. '21 NDAA, this committee, along with our colleagues in the Senate, collectively Congress directed the secretary of defense to establish a mentor program, among many other things we're asked him to do regarding diversity and equity inclusion, but a mentor program to encourage greater diversity among more career fields and throughout the rank structure. So I know you're doing a lot of good things. We're probably going to want you to do -- step it up even a little bit more. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Scott is recognized. SCOTT: Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Townsend, thank you for your support of CODEL Panetta in August of '19. Mr. Brown, Mr. Panetta, Mr. Hudson and I had a great trip, learned a lot, and could not have learned what we did had it not been for your support at that time. 29 We visited the U.N. mission at Mali. And many of the people in the meeting that we had discussed China's activity and expressed concerns that China's activity was going to lead to civil war in many of the countries on the continent of Africa. Yesterday -- I'm sorry, last week, Admiral Faller, head of SOUTHCOM, testified -- and I'll quote him -- our interagency partners in the United States (inaudible) the FBI and others that Chinese money laundering is the number-one underwriting source for transnational criminal organizations. In your testimony, you mentioned on page 12 that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by the Communist Chinese is the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that will further drive instability in West Africa. And obviously, food crisis and instability have historically led to civil wars. My question for you is, how do we stop this activity from China, short of absolute war? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. I think the solution there is competition, right? We want to compete before war comes. And competition is a forever task, because you're always trying to stay short of war. So with China, we have to compete. And we don't have to compete with them in all 53 countries of the AFRICOM AOR equally, but we have to pick and choose where we're going to compete. And one of the ways we do that is just simply by calling out their activity on the continent. You mentioned illegal fishing. And they are probably -- my assessment is they're probably the number-one offender in illegal fishing. And it's commercial, but we all know that China has a command economy. So calling that out has helped us a lot. Another example is helping countries avoid getting into bad deals with China. And this is an example where our Department of State does something -- I'm aware of it -- but we offer a free service to evaluate the contracts of any of our African partners before they enter, sign a contract with China or Chinese entity. The U.S. embassy will review that contract and point out the inconsistencies and the potential pitfalls in that contract and advise the African partners so they can make smart decisions. SCOTT: General, I appreciate your question. I will tell you, I also think we need the support of corporate America and the American consumer in that, while I recognize that our manufacturing base has become contingent upon Asia, there are a lot of other countries that share our interests and share our values outside of China, and it bothers me when I walk into a store to buy a power tool that virtually every power tool that's available on the shelves in America is manufactured in China. And so we've got to have some help from corporate America to source our products from countries outside of China. 30 One of the other things I want to mention is that on that CODEL we got to witness the ODA missions and the training missions. And this is something that, Ms. Dory, may be more for you. But we bring these young men in from Africa. They're 18 or so. They have at best a middle school, 6th, 7th, 8th grade education. We have them on site for 24 months, 7 days a week. And they leave with that 7th or 8th grade education after we've trained them to fight. And my concern is that without an education that they become the people that -- you know, leave and their ability to fight is their greatest asset. So I would encourage you to work with your counterparts -- this is more of a State Department mission. And then maybe more of a mission for the French in the area. But while we have those young men on our bases, our bases where we're training them, I do think it would be worthwhile to look at what it would take to educate those men and try to move them from that middle school education closer to a high school graduate education. With that said, I look forward to the classified hearing. My time is up. Thank you all for everything you do for our country. SMITH: Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Crow is recognized. CROW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for coming in here today. My first question is to Ms. Dory. Ms. Dory, last NDAA process, this Congress passed a provision, section 1215, that would ensure that any administration -- at that time, the Trump administration -- would actually engage with Congress on the issue of Afghanistan. Specifically, 1215 requires that the administration make assessments regarding the impeding of counterterrorism missions -- because we saw what happened with the insurgence of ISIS after our withdrawal in Iraq. It talks about the risk posed to U.S. personnel, because these are obviously the men and women that we represent in our communities. It talks about the issue of Afghanistan becoming a terrorist safe haven and the assessments that are required there. And of course the impact on our partners, allies, and the humanitarian conditions on the ground, because we have made substantial investments in capacity-building, investments in humanitarian aid, and the men and women and children and vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. So with that said, and the fact that this is America's war and not any one administration's war, and it is federal law that the administration provide that assessment to Congress in advance of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, is it the administration's intent to comply with that law and provide those assessments to the United States Congress? 31 DORY: Congressman, it's my understanding that the administration will comply with the law. My understanding, further, the briefings that will be provided later today are a down payment in some respects with respect to section 1215. CROW: Well, just as you know, I don't expect a briefing would satisfy those requirements. And when I say comply with the law, the last administration, the Trump administration, basically provided a certification invoking an emergency to bypass the intent of the law and not actually provide those assessments. And we would expect this administration to comply in good faith with the intent of that law, and that is have written and comprehensive assessments. Can you provide any insight into which approach the administration is going to take here? DORY: Congressman, all I can say right now, based on just the evolving nature of the decision-making process, so the decision just happened, and we're now moving into implementation, but I fully expect compliance with the law in a manner that's intended by the Congress. CROW: OK. Thanks, Ms. Dory. General McKenzie, over to you. One of my biggest concerns is force protection. Obviously, retrograde operations are some of the riskiest things we do. You had testified earlier as to a surge of combat power into Afghanistan to set the conditions for the withdrawal. But I'm gravely concerned as our footprint gets smaller, what the QRF capacity looks like in the event the security situation dissolves much faster than our assessments might indicate. Can you speak to what forces, regional forces would be available and how we're going to ensure that the last remaining units in Afghanistan have assistance available to them? MCKENZIE: Sir, I'd prefer to talk to specific tactical details in the closed session this afternoon, but I'll be happy to do that in that session. I would tell you that I spent a lot of time looking at force protection in Afghanistan. The withdrawal such as we are doing is based of three components. One is the equipment extraction, what you're going to do with it. The other is turning over the bases and the infrastructure. And the third and the most important is the force protection itself for our forces. General Miller and I talk every day about force protection in Afghanistan. And I'm confident that we will have the forces necessary to protect our forces should the Taliban decide to begin attacking us on 1 May or at any other date. And I'll be happy to provide the details to you in a classified forum. 32 CROW: Thank you. Look forward to having that discussion this afternoon. And General Townsend, very briefly, I represent one of the nation's largest communities of Ethiopians -- in Ethiopian diaspora. And I'm extremely concerned for the security situation, particularly the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project. Could you provide some insight as to our efforts to ensure that that project does not result in regional armed conflict? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. With the remaining 30 seconds, I might want to give some to Ms. Dory on this. We're watching the situation with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and we're trying to keep people informed. I think this is mostly a diplomatic-led effort. And I'll turn it over to Ms. Dory there. DORY: I agree fully with General Townsend. There is a big diplomatic push at this point with respect to the gird concerns. CROW: OK. Thank you to all of you. Appreciate the testimony very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. SMITH: Thank you. I want to make sure members know -- I did not announce this upfront -- we have a hard stop at 1:30 for this portion. And then we'll be reconvening at 3:00 in this room, actually, for the classified hearing. So I want to emphasize that point, because normally we do it in the CVC, but the CVC is occupied today by extended discussions about Afghanistan. So 1:30, hard stop, and then 3:00 back here for that. I will be departing shortly and turning the committee over to the capable hands of Mr. Larsen to go over and do one of the CVC briefings. But just want to make sure everyone had that scheduling update. And with that, Mr. DesJarlais is recognized. DESJARLAIS: Thank you, Chairman Smith. General McKenzie, which state actor in your area of responsibility do you believe to be the United States' greatest geostrategic foe? MCKENZIE: I consider Iran to be the greatest threat to regional stability in the Middle East. DESJARLAIS: And with Israel moving from EUCOM to CENTCOM later this year, do you believe that they will be your closest partner in the AOR? 33 MCKENZIE: We have a lot of close partners in the AOR. Israel will certainly join a line of dependable friendships and partnerships that we have in the region. We have a unique and old relationship with Israel. But I wouldn't further characterize it. DESJARLAIS: OK. When you have the political leadership of our greatest foe in the region, Iran, threatening our closest ally, Israel, and stating that its mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to erase Israel from the map of the region, do you believe that one of our top priorities should be keeping a nuclear war out of Iran's hands? MCKENZIE: I believe the president has stated that is a high priority. I also believe that one of the things Central Command does on a daily basis is deter Iran from acting against us and against our partners and friends in the region. DESJARLAIS: OK. If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, what do you believe would be the response from some of our allies in the region? And do you believe such a move could have the potential to set off an arms race? MCKENZIE: I would prefer not to speculate about future contingencies. I can tell you that it would be very concerning to us if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon and it was able to possess a nuclear weapon. And it is the aim of United States' policy to prevent that condition from occurring. DESJARLAIS: OK. You'd mentioned in your opening statement that as a result of the challenges faced with UAS detection and interdiction, that the United States is for the first time since the Korean War operating without complete air superiority. What would we -- what should we be doing to address this gap in our capabilities and retain the advantage against Iranian forces? MCKENZIE: Sir, I think the -- I think, first of all, the Department of Defense has moved up very aggressively to address this problem. The Army is the executive agent for close-in protection against these small UAS systems that are most concerning to me. But I think we still have a ways to go to get on the right side of the curve with this, because right now you can go out and buy one at Walmart or some other location. You can weaponize it very readily. Sometimes it is very difficult for us to detect them until it's too late. We have a variety of systems that we're testing now in a free market of competition to find the best and most integrated capabilities. We are not there yet, and it remains a very concerning priority of mine. DESJARLAIS: OK. Can you spell out the implications of China's 25-year agreement with Iran, which includes expanding military cooperation? MCKENZIE: Sure, so, you know, China has had an existing military agreement with Iran for a period of time. I'm not certain that this is going to produce anything new or 34 different. Again, we'll watch to see what it does with oil exports, and I'm probably not the best person to talk about that right now, but a number of sanctions could still come in place against Chinese companies should they elect to do business with Iran. So again, I'm probably not the best guy to give you an answer on that, sir. DESJARLAIS: OK. The annual threat assessment issued earlier this month by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, they highlighted Iraq as the key battleground for Iran's influence this year and during the next several years. Do you agree with this assessment? MCKENZIE: I completely agree with that. And I would go further to say that the year 2020, Iran's plan was to, again, through political action, the ejection of the United States from the region and principally from Iraq, they failed in doing that. And as a result, we're beginning to see attacks ramp up from their Shia groups in the region, and I think that's going to continue. DESJARLAIS: OK, so you kind of partly answered that. But what would be the net effect if the U.S. were to draw down or completely withdraw troops from Iraq? MCKENZIE: Well, that move is not contemplated. If there's -- one of the good news stories in the region is, I believe we have a good relationship with the government of Iraq. This recently completed strategic dialogue is going to provide a framework for us to decide what our forces are going to look like going forward. So I don't think there's a -- I don't see us withdrawing completely from Iraq in the future. DESJARLAIS: OK, well, thank you, General, both generals, for your service, and Ms. Dory. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Carbajal? CARBAJAL: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all the witnesses here today. Ms. Dory, I welcome this administration's decision to strategically withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. I must say, though, that the difference between this administration and the previous administration is that it seems that we're doing it with our allies, and we're doing it in close coordination and collaboration, instead of hearing about a tweet and our commanders not really being in the loop. So I appreciate that. But still the question that stays as a significant issue is, well, what is our plan? That was my criticism before with the previous administration, and that's I think what we're all looking to better understand. What is the plan as we leave Afghanistan? 35 So if you could answer that. And then help me understand what President Biden meant when he said we'll reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in the region to prevent reemergence of terrorism. Can you elaborate on that statement? DORY: Thank you, Congressman. This administration has reinvigorated a focus on alliances and partnerships. And I think you see it in the work that has been underway to support taking a decision with respect to the future of the U.S. force posture in Afghanistan, so the intensive engagement that we saw most recently with NATO and coalition partners with respect to the decision to draw down in Afghanistan. In the very near term, there is detailed planning underway, as you heard General McKenzie refer to a few moments ago, with respect to how the force drawdown will proceed in conjunction with allies and partners, separate planning underway with respect to what the counterterrorism footprint will look like going forward, given the focus in Afghanistan, the primary vital interest that has sustained us over time being to ensure that there are no attacks emanating from Afghanistan with respect to the U.S. homeland. And we'll have -- in the classified briefings later today, we'll be able to get into that in a lot more detail. CARBAJAL: OK. Does that include what our footprint will look like moving forward? DORY: Well, I think what we understand is from here into September that we'll -- we will not have U.S. combat forces -- U.S. or coalition combat forces there. And we will transition to a diplomatically oriented footprint with the U.S. embassy. CARBAJAL: Thank you. Can you provide us with an update on where the intraAfghan peace talks are at, at this point? DORY: I think Ambassador Khalilzad will be one of the panelists in the briefings later this afternoon and will be well postured to give a just fresh update on those talks. CARBAJAL: Great. Thank you. General McKenzie, in your testimony, you comment that CENTCOM is committed to working with interagency partners to develop mechanisms that ensure continued oversight of and accountability of the Afghanistan security forces fund. What oversight tools do we currently use that will be important to continue after the withdrawal? How will our oversight adapt to having a limited presence on the ground? MCKENZIE: The principal tool that we use to manage the oversight of the disbursement of those funds and the proper use of it are the people on the ground that see what happens to it and monitor that. As we draw down, that's going to become our principal challenge. How do we do that from a remote location? 36 A lot will depend on the size of the U.S. embassy that remains. And we have not finally determined that. And that's something that we're talking about planning right now. The smaller the embassy is, the more difficult it will become to manage the ASFF as we go forward. We're keenly aware of that. That is right at the centerpiece of our planning. And we're working very closely with the Department of State to make those determinations. CARBAJAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I yield back. LARSEN: Thank you, Representative Carbajal. The chair now recognizes Representative Gaetz from Florida for five minutes. GAETZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about Chad, General Townsend. It appears in the last several hours the president of Chad was killed, engaged in front line fighting against rebels who had based in Libya and had crossed the border. What do you know currently about the situation in Chad? And particularly any change to the counterterrorism cooperation that we've been able to rely on from that government? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. As you know, it's sort of a breaking news story. As I walked in here this morning, we learned about the reported and confirmed death of President Deby. He's a retired general. And he has in the past gone to the front where there was action. And we don't know exactly how he got killed, but the report is he was killed in action up there, facing off with a column of rebels that are not terrorists, they're not ISIS, they're not Al Qaida. They are anti -- they were actually anti-regime in Chad. They were based in southern Libya. They mounted up in several hundred vehicles and they transited a long way across the Chadian Desert towards the south. The Chadian government forces started engaged them. They were supported by the French. We observed this and then -- it looked like that the column had made the decision to withdraw. This has happened before. They were about to withdraw, we think. And then the news of the President Deby's death became known. It's unclear what this means for our relationship there. His son, President Deby's son, former intel chief, has been appointed as the interim president. We expect that he -- he is inclined towards good relationships with France and the United States. We think that will continue. There could be some potential for violence, and we are working closely with our country team there. Our embassy did a precautionary drawdown of personnel to a minimum staff. And we also have some 37 military folks there working with the French and the embassy, so we're watching this very closely to keep Americans safe while this becomes a little more clear. GAETZ: Yeah, it seems tactically significant that these rebels were able to base in southern Libya, that they were able to traverse such a distance, and then execute this mission. It might suggest that the situation in Libya is getting worse, as well, with a failed state following the Gadhafi regime. With this transition council that has President Deby's son now in some position of leadership -- I guess the position of leadership in the country -- what do we expect from the French? I know that they were very supportive of the regime. Is there anything that we would expect as a change from -- regarding their involvement with the country? TOWNSEND: On your point about the situation in Libya, we know that the Chadian government had been supportive and there were also factions in Chad that supported various factions in Libya. Regarding the future with this interim president, the son of President Deby, the interim President Deby, right now, I anticipate that I will -- he will be favorable to good relations with France. And France, I anticipate, will continue to do what they've been doing up to this point, supporting the government of Chad. But I have to be honest with you, this is breaking news and it's not clear. GAETZ: Yeah, it sort of seems when a president who took power through a military coup then dies in a battle against political rebels, not religious extremists, and then gives rise to his son being selected by the national council, that it's not the strongest case for emerging democracy in Africa. It seems to suggest more of a move toward authoritarianism and I think that's something we should all watch carefully. I thank the chairman and I yield back. LARSEN: Thank you. Chair recognizes Representative Slotkin of Michigan for five minutes. SLOTKIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Happy to see all three of you here, some of our really foremost experts on the Middle East and Africa that we have in our government. My questions are going to be primarily for General McKenzie on Afghanistan. You know, I think for the most part, most of us feel -- at least I feel from my constituents that they want to be out of Afghanistan. We have fathers who are sending off their sons to fight in the same war they fought in. But what holds people back is this fear that the exact reason we went in -- you know, threat of terrorist attacks against our homeland and our allies -- could creep back up 38 again. So help us understand -- I understand we'll talk more of the classified stuff in a separate session, but General McKenzie, help reassure my constituents that by pulling out we won't be doing right -- going right back in because we have a threat that impacts us here in the homeland. MCKENZIE: Thanks. Thanks, ma'am, for that. And I appreciate the concern of your constituents. Like them, I've sent my son twice to Afghanistan, so I'm very much aware of those concerns. As we've talked a little bit before, we're going to go to zero in Afghanistan. That means there will be no U.S. forces on the ground there. We will use a variety of means to monitor Al Qaida and ISIS in Afghanistan. The intelligence will decline. The director of national intelligence -- or CIA director has said that. But we will see be able to see into Afghanistan. There still will be ways to do that. Much of that will depend on the embassy platform that remains, and that is yet undetermined, but that will be helpful if we maintain an embassy there. But we're going to be able to continue to look into Afghanistan. And I think the president's been very clear. We're not going to reenter to reoccupy Afghanistan under any conceivable circumstances. What we will retain the ability to do is to find and fix those people who plan attacks against us that we can detect. And then, when appropriate, we will be able to strike them. I don't want to make that sound easy, because it's not easy. It's going to be extremely difficult to do it. But it is not impossible to do it. SLOTKIN: So I'm deeply impacted by our experience in Iraq, as someone who grew up as an Iraq specialist and who didn't agree with the decision to go to zero in Iraq, and then watched in the years after we had pulled out how difficult it was to get Washington to pay attention to what was then a growing threat of ISIS. We couldn't get the intelligence support. We couldn't get the overhead imagery support. We couldn't get the attention of folks when we saw things creeping back in the wrong direction. Please help me understand how this will be different. MCKENZIE: Well, speaking to the future, I don't know. But I will certainly be a relentless advocate to keep the focus on Afghanistan. We are going to shift assets out of Central Command. That's a given. That's going to happen. At the same time, we need to balance against what we know, the known aspiration of these groups to launch attacks against the United States. That hasn't gone away. And it's there right now. They're depressed. They have very little ability to do that. Certainly, it's possible that they could reestablish themselves in the future. It's also possible the Taliban will do some of the things that they've said they're going to do. I'll just watch that very closely to see that it happens. 39 I think that is a reasonable concern. And I share that concern, frankly. SLOTKIN: And I know that, you know, we've learned in the past 20 years that our best attempts in these wars is through coalitions, through alliances, doing things with partners and allies. So I'm heartened that we're having the conversation with them, but is there anything planning on the regional security architecture, a formal plan with our allies and partners to have a conversation not just about how to end the war, but how to contain the situation after the war has ended? MCKENZIE: So I'd defer to Ms. Dory for some of that. But I would say what's been very impressive to me has been the complete and comprehensive degree of consultation that went into this decision and the execution of this decision, both with our NATO partners, our other coalition partners on the ground, and, in fact, regional partners. So I think that sets the stage for some form of regional architecture, but I'd defer to Ms. Dory for further comments on that. SLOTKIN: I'll go to Ms. Dory in just a second. But just to finish out, you're one of our most seasoned, experienced four-star generals with experience on the ground in the Middle East, tour after tour. Do you feel confident that the American people will stay safe and not be attacked again emanating out of Afghanistan? MCKENZIE: The key thing that's different in 2021 from 2001 is not only what's going on in the theater, but our ability to harden the country here, the steps we've taken here to protect ourselves. It's a very different country in terms of ability to enter and operate in the United States than it was in the fall of 2001. So we work very hard to ensure that attacks aren't going to come from Afghanistan or from Africa or from any other place. It begins on the ground there, but there's also a broad in-depth defense that is in place that was not in place before. SLOTKIN: And in my last remaining 20 seconds, do you know of any discussions with the Afghanis about -- with the Afghans, excuse me -- on a status-of-forces agreement or a diplomatic security agreement for our embassy? MCKENZIE: I know that's actively being worked now, but I don't have any details beyond that. SLOTKIN: Thank you, General. Appreciate it. I yield back. LARSEN: Thank you, Representative. Chair recognized Representative Waltz of Florida for five minutes. Representative Waltz? 40 WALTZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Want (inaudible) OK? LARSEN: You're good. WALTZ: All right, thank you. General, I just want to pick up on Ms. Slotkin's questions. I certainly share her concerns. And it was good to spend some time with you a few weeks ago. Can you talk to me about -- or Ms. Dory -- what basing agreements do we have from any of the 'Stans? Tajikistan, we're -- obviously, we no longer -- where we have no basing, Kyrgyzstan, where we no longer have Manas, Uzbekistan, where we no longer have K2 -- what agreements do we have with any of the neighboring countries to be able to base our forces and conduct lethal strikes or even surveillance back into Afghanistan? Do we have any currently? MCKENZIE: At this time, we have none of those agreements in place. WALTZ: General, do you think it would have been optimal to have those agreements before we announced to the world that we're going to zero in a few months? MCKENZIE: I can't speak to that. I would tell you that right now we're engaged in a significant effort to evaluate where we want to put potential CT forces, where they'd be best optimized from geography, and also the diplomatic angle of it as we go forward. WALTZ: I think it's -- we need to be clear with the American people that when the military goes, our intelligence assets go, the agency -- the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies are dependent on that military backbone and basing, and also our contracts and our contractors go, with estimates of 15,000 to 20,000 currently there, providing logistics, maintenance, and other critical support to the Afghan security forces. What's the plan for the continuing presence of those critical contract support services? MCKENZIE: So right now, most of the contractors are going to leave. Certainly, the U.S. contractors are going to leave. We'll try to develop ways to do distant contracting where we can. Clearly, there are going to be some things that we're not going to be able to do anymore as the contractors leave, and I don't want to minimize that. WALTZ: And it's important for everyone to understand that those contractors are providing maintenance, for example, for the Black Hawks that we've provided to the Afghan security forces, to the limited close air support capabilities that they have, and again, critical logistic and advisory functions. All of that's going to be gone in the next few months. 41 And both -- a number of reports, both think-tank, intelligence community, and even the Afghans themselves have cast real doubt on the ability of the Afghan security forces to continue to hold without that support. So I fear, to add on to Ms. Slotkin's questions, if the Taliban does take over or we do even have a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban, we'll now be reliant on them for any basing overflight or any type of authorities that we need to go after Al Qaida, assuming that they'll give them. Is that -- do I have that wrong? MCKENZIE: Sir, that's a lot of future hypotheticals that I'm probably not the best person to talk about. I would tell you right now, though, there's still the possibility of inter-Afghan dialogue. That could still continue. We could all have our own assessment about the probability of that reaching success, but that still continues. WALTZ: Well, but, General, but I want to be clear with everyone that it is not a hypothetical that the State Department has introduced a draft power-sharing agreement into the dialogue, where the Afghan government would dissolve as it currently stands and share power with the Taliban. So I don't think it's a leap to say we would then have to negotiate them for any ability to return and go after Al Qaida. But my question is, what military -- so assume they have the will to turn on and conduct operations against Al Qaida, what military capability does the Taliban have that a 300,000-man Afghan Army and 42 coalition nations have struggled in terms of containing Al Qaida -- what military capabilities do the Afghans have? MCKENZIE: So the Afghans would have significant residual capability. It would depend on if the nation is whole, if the nation is fractured, if there's a civil war. There are a variety of future contingents that would directly affect the ability of the Afghan -- whatever -- whoever's leading the Afghan government and whatever state it is, their ability to actually concentrate combat power. Some of those scenarios you've outlined, it would be a fractured state. They would not be able to do it. Other scenarios, they might be able to do it. WALTZ: Thank you, General. And just in the time I have remaining, would Bagram air base be valuable to you, being where it's located geographically, west of China, south of Russia, east of Iran? MCKENZIE: Bagram is key terrain... WALTZ: In great power contingencies? MCKENZIE: Bagram is key terrain tactically in Afghanistan, operationally and strategically. It's the definition of key terrain. 42 WALTZ: And it's notable that we're about to just give that away with nothing in return. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. LARSEN: Gentleman's time expired. The chair recognizes Representative Houlahan of Pennsylvania for five minutes. HOULAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions first to General McKenzie and General Townsend have to do with China, which has obviously significantly invested in Pakistan and parts of Africa as part of their Belt and Road Initiative. And I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit, if you have any concerns about them in terms of national security and the region, and also if you might be able to tell us if you have heard any whisperings of the fact that they are maybe interested in sending peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan, if we, indeed, do leave the region? MCKENZIE: I'll begin briefly just to talk about the Central Command before handing over to General Townsend. So we see China operating in Central Command principally from an economic perspective. They offer a number of apparently seductive and attractive infrastructure and other development loans and projects to countries in the region, which then have -- on the back end of that are not such -- don't appear to be such a good deal after all. They want access to the region. They would I think eventually want to seek naval basing in the region because they do import a significant amount of their hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz and out of the region. But for now, for the short term to the medium term, it is principally economic engagement going forward. And you're right. We see it in Pakistan, but also in some of the gulf states. It is significantly concerning to me. They are playing a very long game. And they're playing it with vast amounts of resources. HOULAHAN: And, sir, do you see any concerns or significant concerns as a result of that? MCKENZIE: I am very concerned about where we're going to be in a few years with China in the region. I believe that some of the nation-states in the region are also waking up to this and are becoming aware of it, because they see what's happening in Africa. They see what's happening in South America and other parts of the globe. And as you know, there are nations in the region that actually do have significant resourcing themselves so they don't need to fall into the debt trap with China. Others are susceptible to that predatory diplomacy. 43 HOULAHAN: And, General Townsend, do you have anything, as well? TOWNSEND: I'd say our concerns are very similar to those expressed by General McKenzie. I don't know if you received the placemats. We handed out placemats here in the room, and I was told we distributed them electronically, as well. One of them is... LARSEN: General, we do have those placemats. TOWNSEND: Thank you. What China is doing in Africa. And that kind of gives you an idea. I think the only thing I'd add to what General McKenzie said is, they very much have intent to establish additional overseas bases in Africa. Whether that be on the Atlantic coast of Africa or the Indian Ocean coast of Africa, they're working hard to establish naval bases and/or air bases. And that is of great concern to AFRICOM. HOULAHAN: And sir, with regard to a potential build-up of China, do you anticipate, General Townsend, with the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, that we might increase our troops in AFRICOM, given that they, as we know, is a constant threat of extremism. How will we possibly do that if, indeed, that is our plan, do you think? TOWNSEND: Congresswoman, I don't -- as an economy of force effort for the Department of Defense, I don't anticipate significant uplift of resources to AFRICOM, despite the drawdown in Afghanistan. So I'm not anticipating that. But we're going to undergo this global posture review and we're going to work through all those questions. HOULAHAN: I look forward to that. I do have concerns. I know I'm not alone in sharing those concerns with that particular part of the world. Africa seems to be a rising opportunity for terrorists to land there, in the absence of other places around the world that they could land. And I just want to make sure that we're keeping our eye on the region. I appreciate your time, gentlemen. And I'll yield back. LARSEN: Thank you, Representative. The chair now recognizes Representative Bice of Oklahoma for five minutes. BICE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General -- I'm sorry, thank you for being here this afternoon. My first question revolves around China and Russia and their continued reach into the AFRICOM region. One of the things that I have learned in my very short time here is that rare earth minerals are becoming a very big concern, and the Chinese and Russians are tapping into the African region to try to mine those. Is the DOD taking any steps to facilitate access to those rare earth minerals for domestic use? 44 TOWNSEND: Thanks for your question, Congresswoman. On the topic of rare earth minerals, both countries, as you've pointed out, are seeking to exploit those on the African continent. The Russians are sort of near-term exploiters, and the Chinese are more strategic exploiters, in my view. They're very carefully seeking out mineral deposits that they want to lock down for the future. The Department of Defense is supporting the USAID and the Department of State in this effort. We don't have a particular effort directed at securing rare earth minerals on the DOD side. But we are supporting our interagency partners in that regard. BICE: Do you feel like that's being effective? TOWNSEND: I know that it has the energy of this administration. It's a great concern to this administration. I think it's a legitimate concern. BICE: Pivoting just a bit here, you know, we've also heard a lot about technology and the use of technology across the region. How are CENTCOM and AFRICOM addressing the emerging threat of drones and drone swarm tactics? TOWNSEND: I'll... BICE: And that can really sort of apply to -- yeah, CENTCOM or AFRICOM. TOWNSEND: Sure, I'll answer it and hand it off to General McKenzie. My first encounter with drone delivered munitions was in the Battle of Mosul in Iraq two or three years ago. So this is an area of great concern to us. We haven't seen significant employment of weaponized drones in Africa yet, but we are working very hard to be ready for that and to head that off. The Department of Defense, as General McKenzie explained earlier, the Department of Defense has a great program focused on that threat. I am concerned about the small armed drones, as well as the larger one-way attack drones that we've seen employed in the region. So I think we're focused on it and we're employing as much technology as we can to prepare for that. General McKenzie? MCKENZIE: Thanks. So small, commercially available drones are one of the most persistent and dangerous threats that we see in the Central Command AOR. I am very concerned about it. We have ways to deal with larger land attack cruise missiles. They're equally -- they're concerning, but we can deal with them as an air defense problem. It's a lot harder to deal with something that's small, perhaps commercially offthe-shelf bought, modified. And we're on the wrong side of the cost imposition curve when it comes to these systems. So we're -- a lot of great work is being done in the department. We are not there yet. 45 BICE: And that sort of leads to my next question, which was the factors that are limiting your ability to deploy counter-UAS systems within CENTCOM and AFRICOM. MCKENZIE: So within CENTCOM, there are a variety of systems out there. I'd take any system and employ it immediately. What we -- where we need to go is an integrated system, because the system -- an integrated system would give you early warning of launch perhaps through a variety of means. It would give you an idea of where they're coming and their altitude. Then it would give you an ability to engage them kinetically and non-kinetically. We do not yet have a single system that can do all that. What we have are a variety of systems that all do part of this. And that's part of the problem. We're not integrated. So we push very hard to get an integrated system, but one that is not delivered late, behind need. That's the problem when you push for an integrated system. BICE: Ms. Dory, do you have any comments on that? DORY: I would just add to that, Congresswoman, that the issue of counter-UAS is something not just within the department at this point, but has a profile in terms of the interagency discussions on how to deter and defeat that threat. So within the Department of Defense, there is the joint effort underway that the generals have referred to, but there's also a broader whole-of-government approach that has recently initiated. Thank you. BICE: Well, thank you, Ms. Dory, General McKenzie, and General Townsend for your time. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. LARSEN: Thank you. Before I go to the next questioner, I do want to just stop and as well thank General McKenzie for his hospitality a few weeks ago at CENTCOM. I appreciate that. And I did not take that opportunity earlier. I wanted to thank you for that. The chair now recognizes Representative Luria of Virginia for five minutes. LURIA: Well, thank you, gentlemen and Ms. Dory, for your testimony today. I'd like to first address the issue with General McKenzie of mine warfare in the CENTCOM AOR. Iranian mining capability is obviously a vulnerability for U.S. and allied military forces within the region, as well as for commercial shipping and free trade. And the Navy plans to soon decommission its remaining four MCM platforms stationed in the gulf in Bahrain. And as we know, the material condition and capabilities that these aging MCMs have been severely degrade over time. However, the Navy's planned replacement of mine warfare capability through the mission modules on the LCS class of ships is neither fully developed, nor has it been successfully deployed from the LCS. 46 However, testing of the MCM suite of platforms on -- on platforms of opportunity, such as provided by allied navies, in 2019, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's Mounts Bay successfully tested this, and then the ESB-4, Hershel "Woody" Williams, also in 2019, proved successful. And these AGWA (ph) capabilities are not resident in the CENTCOM AOR, which is going to leave a significant gap in MCM capability once these ships are decommissioned. As a combatant commander, are you confident in the current and future mine warfare capabilities provided by the Navy in your AOR? . MCKENZIE: Thank you for the question. I am very concerned about Iranian mine warfare capabilities. I think it's one of their great asymmetric weapons, and they employ it in two areas, up in the Strait of Hormuz... LARSEN: General McKenzie, I'm sorry. Could you just get that microphone pointed right at your chin? MCKENZIE: Sure. How's that? Better? LARSEN: Yeah, a little better, yeah. MCKENZIE: I am very concerned about Iranian mine warfare capabilities. It's a significant asymmetric threat that they possess. And they possess it not only up in the Strait of Hormuz, which is where we always think about it, but also down in the Bab-elMandeb in the Red Sea. Their ability to deploy a wide variety of thousands of mines is very concerning to me. Right now, we have a very limited mine warfare capability in the theater. Our ships, as you have noted, and the ships of our British partners are also about all we have, if we had to sweep and open the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital international passage, and it would take us an extended amount of time to do it with the resources that we have now. I, too, have noted the LCS and the problems that have attended it as a possible minesweeping variant. Regardless, it's not going to be available in a reasonable amount of time for me in my requirements in U.S. Central Command. So I would share your concerns. We talk about this all the time. This is an area of Iranian capability that remains vexing and concerning to me. LURIA: So, General, since there was a successful test of these new advanced mine warfare capabilities using the TESV platform (ph), which is something that's already deployed in your theater, would that be a valuable addition in the CENTCOM AOR, if we were able to leverage that capability on the TESV (ph)? 47 MCKENZIE: CENTCOM would be happy to leverage any capability that's out there right now, given the significant gap between our available resources and the scope and scale of the problem. LURIA: OK, thank you. And in the time remaining, General Townsend, I wanted to focus as some of my colleagues already have in the rapidly expanding Chinese influence on the African continent. We've already referenced the strategic location of the Chinese overseas base in Djibouti, adjacent to Bab-el-Mandeb and the entrance to the Red Sea. But more than a strategic positioning from their maritime perspective, I wanted to focus on some of the infrastructure and transportation investments that they're making, reaching into Ethiopia. It appears that the Chinese, who inarguably want to grow their position on the world stage and in Africa, are engaging in their own version of modernday colonialism in the African continent, as they venture to find cheaper labor markets and use infrastructure debt to leverage -- as a leverage tool. Can you comment on the domestic and regional impact of the Chinese economic expansion into Ethiopia? And then maybe a little bit of the time remaining on how the recent unrest in the Tigray has changed any Chinese activity in the area? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congresswoman. So the -- you mentioned Chinese, an example of their investments on the African continent. Transportation infrastructure is certainly one of those. Sea ports, airports, and rail lines, in particular. And you see that with Ethiopia with rail lines running to the Red Sea from the country. You see that in Kenya, as well. In some places, these investments have worked out OK. I don't -- I haven't seen any of them that have worked out really well, as the Chinese had hoped they would. Regarding your question about Tigray, we haven't -- I haven't seen a connection to Tigray and China. LARSEN: Representative's time has expired. LURIA: OK. LARSEN: Thank you. Chair now recognizes Representative Franklin from Florida for five minutes. FRANKLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in the interest of time, I do have a couple of questions for General McKenzie. First, following up on Representative Waltz's dialogue earlier regarding basing in the region and the changes we're now going to face with Afghanistan, not being there with a physical presence on the ground, I think back to 48 just after 9/11, I was in Bahrain. We were planning some of those initial strikes into Afghanistan. The challenge we had was long distances to make those happen. And we had carrier pilots that were flying 8- to 10-hour missions with multiple refuelings to get there. That's obviously going to be a challenge, if we find ourselves having to go back in, in that kind of scale in the future. But in your testimony, you had mentioned pursuing opportunities to enhance expeditionary basing in less vulnerable areas of the AOR. Could you expand a little bit on those and where they may stand? MCKENZIE: Certainly. When we talk about that, I am primarily talking about the Iran problem and the fact that our bases now, such as Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Manama, Bahrain, as you noted, have the virtue of being close to the area you might want to fight. They also have the problem of being very close to the Iranians. So what we would seek to do is examine alternatives further to the west in the Arabian Peninsula that would make it more difficult for the Iranians to target our bases there. It would increase the range. Many of their weapons would not actually have the range to reach out there and get to those bases. The problem would be the tanker bill that's associated with that. On the other hand, if the tanker can survive out to the west, it's probably better than it being close where it can be struck. So there's a tradeoff that we make. And we look to our partners to help us on this with these bases. And we'd never look to base permanently there. Rather, you'd like to have the ability to go in there, as you noted, in an expeditionary manner, in a time of crisis or in a time of war, just to make it harder for an opponent to threaten the force. FRANKLIN: Great, thank you. Switching gears to the displaced persons camps in northeast Syria, particularly Al Hawl, I guess from your testimony, General, we talked about 61,000 people there, 94 percent women and children, two-thirds under 18. I mean, in addition to the obvious humanitarian crisis, I know there's a big problem with radicalization of a lot of these children. So this I guess would be a question for you, General McKenzie, and also Ms. Dory, what's the way ahead in that? How do we fix this problem? I know a lot of the countries that these people are coming from don't want them back. What's the end game for this? MCKENZIE: Sure, so I'll defer to Ms. Dory here in just a minute, but I will say it is not a military problem, but it will manifest itself in 5 to 10 years as a military problem unless we solve it now, because these children are going to grow up radicalized and we're going to see them on battlefields fighting us. 49 So it is an international problem. It requires repatriation. It requires nations to step up to the plate, claim their citizens, bring them home, reintegrate them back into their communities. And it demands de-radicalization, which is extremely difficult to do. It is best done and practiced by nations in the region who have a cultural affinity for the people that are largely in these camps. It is a tough problem. Our diplomats, Department of State, USAID, and a lot of NGOs are working at this very hard. It is one of the most pressing problems we have in the CENTCOM region right now. And with that, I'll defer to Ms. Dory for anything she'd like to add. DORY: I think General McKenzie put it beautifully. It's not a military problem. It is an interagency issue. And it's a question of political will in terms of host nations for the individuals who are in the camps. FRANKLIN: So what pressure do we have that we can apply to get these folks to step up and accept these people? We can't leave them there in the desert forever. DORY: I think it depends on which countries you're talking about and the state of the dialogue with them, what forms of dialogue and leverage we have at our disposal to encourage stepping up to that responsibility. FRANKLIN: OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. LARSEN: Thank you, Representative Franklin. The chair recognizes Representative Strickland. Before you go, Strickland, just the next questioner will be Representative Veasey. So, Representative Strickland of Washington state, you're recognized for five minutes. STRICKLAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Townsend, you noted in your testimony that AFRICOM supported U.S. efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43 countries, including the delivery of nearly $500 million in medical supplies. The United States is often at its best when it leads in crises, as it did during the Ebola crisis. Can you tell me please how AFRICOM is working alongside whole-of-government efforts to respond to COVID-19, and specifically have we along with USG started to develop a plan to distribute vaccines for COVID to partners on the continent? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you saw in the testimony there, there have been significant Department of Defense efforts, but those are small in 50 comparison to the U.S. government's COVID assistance on the African continent that's been led primarily by the USAID and the Department of State. So there are some military or DOD capabilities that we have employed to the maximum extent possible, things like medical supplies and mobile field hospitals that are being fielded to military partners that are being used by those partner countries to treat COVID. So that's all been part of the larger U.S. government response. And it's a small part compared to what the State Department and USAID have done. On your question about vaccines, I'll defer to Ms. Dory, but the U.S. government is going to provide eventually vaccines internationally and in Africa, but we're making sure we've taken care of the American population first. We have been asked for input to provide that input to the Department of Defense and the government for decisions about where vaccines might go first. Ms. Dory? DORY: Thank you, General Townsend. Just to add on that, that with the state of vaccination at home in a much better place than it has been, plans are underway with respect to how the U.S. government will be able to help overseas. Our AID colleagues and State Department colleagues are at the forefront of those efforts, and I think we'll see the results of those in coming months. STRICKLAND: Great, thank you. And then one more question. Ms. Dory, we'll stay with you. The prior administration chose to close U.S. defense attache offices in several West African countries. Defense attache perform a vital role in representing the U.S. military and removing them can send the wrong message to host governments about the importance that we put on the relationship and how much we value it. As you review the decisions of the prior administration, can you tell me about the status of these defense attache offices? DORY: Congresswoman, I'd be glad to. And I can imagine General Townsend might like to add onto this, as well. Defense attaches are fundamental to the way the Department of Defense does business in the interagency context on the ground in our missions across the world. We have the continued challenges, as we see in every other type of personnel category, of supply and demand, and insufficient supply relative to demand has led to some difficult decisions with respect to how we're represented in different countries and whether individual attaches are responsible for more than one country at a time. I'd very much like to see sufficient attaches to go around. General Townsend? 51 TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you heard, Congresswoman, the last administration did make a decision to close six defense attache offices on the African continent. Some of those were hub that did several smaller countries, as well. That decision was overturned, actually, before the end of the -- by the acting Secretary of Defense Miller before the administration ended. I suspect it may get reviewed during this global posture review. The problem is, between the initial decision to close those offices, we had a personnel assignment cycle go by, so no backfills were identified. So now that the decision was overturned, we have -- we're going to probably have a gap, potentially of a year or two, in some of those defense attache offices. Anyway, that's the current state of that. And Ms. Dory covered very well the importance of defense attache offices in Africa. STRICKLAND: Great. Thank you both of you. I yield back my time, Mr. Chair. LARSEN: Thank you, Representative Strickland. The chair now recognizes Representative Veasey of Texas for five minutes. VEASEY: Mr. Chair, thank you very much. General Townsend, you testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2020 and warned that VEOs were expanding at a very rapid rate across West Africa, noting that substantive external assistance from Western partners was critical to help our African partners make progress to contain these VEOs. At the end of September 2020, AFRICOM reported that VEOs in the Sahel were neither degraded nor contained and that VEOs in West Africa continued to expand geographically, conduct attacks, and threaten people that are partners in the region. What do you believe were the driving factors behind the lack of progress over the past year? And how can we better leverage USG resources, specifically in Nigeria, where violence threatens the prosperity of Africa's largest democracy, and making sure that we keep Nigeria as stable as possible, because they're so important for the entire continent, quite frankly? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. You're right. In my last testimony, I said that the VEO threat in West Africa was expanding. I don't know if I used the analogy then, but it's appropriate, like a wildfire, coming south from Mali and Niger towards Burkina Faso and the littoral states. And I believe the reason for that is that the international efforts there by the African partners and foreign partners were both insufficient and uncoordinated. They might 52 actually be sufficient if they were better coordinated but it was impossible to tell, because they were uncoordinated. Now, that advance has not progressed at the speed that I feared it would a year ago. That advance is still north along the northern borders of the littoral states, which we have a great deal of concern about. I think that's partly because -- a number of factors. One of them, though, is the European partners led by the French have initiated a couple of things to try to improve the coordination between all the international efforts that are going in there. They're also doing much more effective advise and assist operations. Partnership for West Africa is one of these things to increase coordination. Task Force Takuba is an advise and assist organization the French have stood up. They have asked for European partners to join in that effort. They have joined in that effort. And it's starting to be more effective. So I think they've done some work to improve the coordination of the international effort. That has slowed that spread some. That said, that forest fire is dancing along the northern borders of all those littoral states. And I'm of the view that we need to do -- I would like -- for once, I'd like to do something to prevent a fire, prevent those littoral states from getting fully engulfed like Mali is, for example. And I think there are some fairly low impact things that could be done there in the littoral states that might do fire prevention there. So I think a fire break across the Sahel, which largely is with resources we have there now, mostly African and European, and then some fire prevention efforts in the littoral states. VEASEY: Let me also ask you, several years ago, myself and Representative Panetta and Mr. Scott from Georgia, we visited Camp Lemonnier and several countries there in Africa. And one of the areas of concern was exactly where the Chinese base was being built. I know that there was -- strategically where it was at seemed to be a very good location for the Chinese and what they're trying to do to expand, you know, their naval operations and their presence in the continent. With the Chinese and the fact that, you know, they don't care about human rights violations, corruption. You know, they'll fly prime ministers and presidents from the continent over to China and put them up at nice houses. What can we do to counter that as, you know -- as more and more countries in Africa seek to be able to, you know, come into the -- continue to grow economically and prosper, as they want to, like any other nation does? TOWNSEND: Congressman, the African nations are not blind to what the Chinese are up to. They have fallen prey to some of these debt trap diplomacy traps. But they're not blind to it. They can see it. They believe they can -- many of them believe they can 53 manage it. And I think that's probably the biggest thing we can do is, help them try to manage their interactions with the Chinese on the continent. LARSEN: I thank the gentleman. Next up will be Representative Panetta, followed by Representative Speier. And so Representative Panetta from California is recognized for five minutes. PANETTA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen and ma'am, thank you for obviously your service, your time, your preparation, and for being here today, and your answers to our questions. As my colleague just mentioned, we did a CODEL -- I forget when that was, maybe 2018, summer of 2018, where we had -- and we were -- definitely had one of the top CODELs I've been on, in that we were based in Djibouti and obviously flew C-130s all around. One of the bases we went to was Manda Bay. And obviously, subsequent to that, you're very familiar with the attack that occurred in Manda Bay. Unfortunately, not just because of the attack, but unfortunately, we're trying to get the review of what happened in regards to the initial investigation, because of, obviously -- I've been there, and obviously the tragedy that happened as well. But what's going on with the report? I know it's been 15 months since the attack took place. And I know that Secretary Austin has ordered now another review of it. Can you give us some insight as to what's going on with that report and when do you think we're going to get this report as to what the heck happened there? TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman. Your visit was in summer of 2019, not 2018. It was my first CODEL after I took command at AFRICOM. PANETTA: No, that was a different one. This was to Manda Bay. Manda Bay was before. We went to West Africa after that, another excellent CODEL facilitated by you, General. And I appreciate that. But before that, we were in -- we went to the east side of Africa. That was the west side of Africa. TOWNSEND: Thanks, Congressman, for the correction. So Manda Bay report. So first of all, let me reassure you and the other members that all the steps that have been needed to take corrective, immediate corrective action have been taken long ago. Not only did we take those steps at Manda Bay, we took that report and applied those lessons learned at every base across Africa. Now, to answer your specific question about the status of the report, AFRICOM concluded its investigation in December of last year. Of course, the timing of that, trying to get that through the Department of Defense and released, became problematic because it was overlaid on top of the change of administration. The new secretary of 54 defense came in, he received this report. He didn't have all the depth of background on it, and so I think very rightfully said, OK, thanks, AFRICOM, I think I'd like to have a separate look at this. And AFRICOM supports that separate look. So the secretary of defense has appointed a disinterested four-star from the Army to look at the report of the investigation and give him advice on it. This is also necessary because many of the fixes pertain to other services and other COCOMs. So they weren't all within -- all the recommendations of the findings weren't within AFRICOM's purview to see through, so the secretary of defense has to do that. So that's the current status of it. I think he gave the Army a target of 90 days to report out. And I think that's the current situation. PANETTA: Good, outstanding. Great, thank you for that very thorough answer, General. I appreciate that. Now going to the summer of 2019, when I did -- when we did the CODEL to West Africa, which, once again, we completely appreciate you facilitating that, let me read you something that really kind of summarizes what I came away with. An article in the Economist last month, two months ago, basically talked about France's challenge there in that area. And it said basically France is challenged, it's faced by others who have recently fought insurgencies in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It is that of trying to improve security, which is almost impossible to do without development, and also drive development, which cannot happen without better security. I think, you know, that was the impression I had coming away from that trip to West Africa. My question to you is, is how do we get out of that catch 22? What can we do? Obviously, you gave an excellent answer to my colleague, Marc Veasey, about coordination and cooperation. Is there anything else that we can do in order to provide security and development as we go forward, especially in the Sahel? TOWNSEND: Congressman, I'd say that the thing that's probably the easiest to solve is the security challenges, but they can't be solved without better development, as you pointed out, and better governance. That is the root of all of this. And as we've seen that from Afghanistan to Africa, the root cause is poor governance, insufficient development, which needs a secure environment to proceed. And I think probably... LARSEN: The gentleman's time has expired. I'm sorry, General. You'll have to finish up for the record. TOWNSEND: Thanks. The international efforts are really focused on security, unfortunately. 55 LARSEN: Great, thank you. PANETTA: Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LARSEN: The chair recognizes Representative Speier from California for five minutes. SPEIER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your great service. General McKenzie, let me start with you. I'm very concerned that the May deadline is upon us, and I don't know that we have any assurances that the Taliban will not start attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Can you provide us any consolidation regarding that? MCKENZIE: I can tell you that we're prepared for those attacks should they occur and we'll be able to defend ourselves. SPEIER: But we don't have any subsequent agreement then, it appears? MCKENZIE: We have no agreement on that past 1 May. And I'm not concern what decision-making is going on inside the Taliban pursuant to what actions they might or might not take. We're ready for whatever they choose to do. SPEIER: And do we have any intention to maintain defense contractors in Afghanistan after we depart? MCKENZIE: Everyone will leave. All U.S. defense contractors will leave as part of the withdrawal. SPEIER: All right. I think that kind of answers my questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. LARSEN: Representative yields back. Just a moment for everyone. I'm just checking with staff on other members. OK, it looks like we're all good. So I want to thank the panel for coming today. We'll, I think, adjourn -- or recess until 3:00 p.m. and meet back here at 3:00 p.m. for a classified portion of the hearing. It'll give you all some time to have some lunch. So appreciate your patience with us and answers to our questions. Very much appreciate that. With that, we will stand in recess until 3:00 p.m. We will adjourn until 3:00 p.m. I apologize. END SPEAKERS: 56 REP. ADAM SMITH, D-WASH., CHAIRMAN REP. JIM LANGEVIN, D-R.I. REP. RICK LARSEN, D-WASH. REP. JIM COOPER, D-TENN. REP. JOE COURTNEY, D-CONN. REP. JOHN GARAMENDI, D-CALIF. REP. JACKIE SPEIER, D-CALIF. REP. DONALD NORCROSS, D-N.J. REP. RUBEN GALLEGO, D-ARIZ. REP. SETH MOULTON, D-MASS. REP. RO KHANNA, D-CALIF. REP. SALUD CARBAJAL, D-CALIF. REP. ANTHONY G. BROWN, D-MD. REP. JASON CROW, D-COLO. REP. VERONICA ESCOBAR, D-TEXAS REP. JARED GOLDEN, D-MAINE REP. CHRISSY HOULAHAN, D-PA. REP. WILLIAM KEATING, D-MASS. REP. ANDY KIM, D-N.J. REP. ELAINE LURIA, D-VA. REP. MIKIE SHERRILL, D-N.J. REP. ELISSA SLOTKIN, D-MICH. REP. FILEMON VELA, D-TEXAS 57 58 REP. JOE MORELLE, D-N.Y. REP. KAI KAHELE, D-HAWAII REP. SARA JACOBS, D-CALIF. REP. STEPHANIE MURPHY, D-FLA. REP. JIMMY PANETTA, D-CALIF. REP. MARC VEASEY, D-TEXAS REP. MARILYN STRICKLAND, D-WASH. REP. MIKE D. ROGERS, R-ALA., RANKING MEMBER REP. JOE WILSON, R-S.C. REP. MICHAEL R. TURNER, R-OHIO REP. DOUG LAMBORN, R-COLO REP. ROB WITTMAN, R-VA. REP. VICKY HARTZLER, R-MO. REP. AUSTIN SCOTT, R-GA. REP. MO BROOKS, R-ALA. REP. SAM GRAVES, R-MO. REP. ELISE STEFANIK, R-N.Y. REP. SCOTT DESJARLAIS, R-TENN. REP. TRENT KELLY, R-MISS. REP. MATT GAETZ, R-FLA. REP. MIKE GALLAGHER, R-WIS. REP. DON BACON, R-NEB. REP. JIM BANKS, R-IND. REP. LIZ CHENEY, R-WYO. REP. MICHAEL WALTZ, R-FLA. REP. JACK BERGMAN, R-MICH. REP. STEPHANIE BICE, R-OKLA. REP. JERRY CARL, R-ALA. REP. MIKE JOHNSON, R-LA. REP. PAT FALLON, R-TEXAS REP. SCOTT FRANKLIN, R-FLA. REP. MARK GREEN, R-TENN. REP. RONNY L. JACKSON, R-TEXAS REP. LISA MCCLAIN, R-MICH. REP. BLAKE MOORE, R-UTAH 5

POSTURE STATEMENT ‘22

15th of MARCH, 2022

POSTURE STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Introduction For over twenty years, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has demanded a greater share of the Department of Defense's resources and attention—and those of the United States as a whole—than it claimed in the first twenty years of its existence. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 brought terror to American shores on a scale unknown since 1941 and transfixed the nation. The United States subsequently reoriented its defense establishment to confront the exigent threat of violent extremism, which had metastasized from within the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). In 2001, a “global war on terror” began in Afghanistan and expanded to Iraq in 2003 following a campaign to liberate that country. For a generation of Americans, the very name “CENTCOM” has been virtually synonymous with the military operations in these two countries. Indeed, with the recent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and conclusion of U.S. combat operations and the transition to an advise, assist, and enable mission in Iraq, many Americans may assume that CENTCOM’s very reasons for being have drawn to a close. That could not be further from the truth. In fact, the proximate causes for the establishment of CENTCOM nearly forty years ago were the ascendance of a destabilizing, virulently anti-American regime in Iran and naked Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan. More fundamentally, its establishment reflected a clear-eyed recognition by the Carter and Reagan administrations of the geostrategic importance of the broader Middle East. Spanning more than 4.6 million square miles and, with last year’s addition of Israel, encompassing twenty-one countries, the CENTCOM AOR of today has for millennia been a geographic and geopolitical crossroads and site of cooperation, competition, and conflict. In the modern age, the sea lines of communication that pass through the Strait of Hormuz (SOH), Bab al Mandeb (BAM), and Suez Canal are more essential than ever for enabling global commerce, facilitating transportation of more than 20 percent of the world’s and over 40 percent of China’s energy supply. Rich in cultural heritage but with unevenly distributed natural resources, the region is also beset by internal conflict and instability. It encompasses the geographic origins and spiritual centers for many of the world’s largest religious populations, with active fault lines bisecting political and ethnic boundaries. Fabulous wealth in some resource-rich countries contrasts starkly with abject poverty and the absence of essential services in others. Inequity within societies gave wind to the 2011 “Arab Spring,” which largely failed to address grievances that still fester. Ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen and the collapse of legitimate governance in Afghanistan have undermined stability throughout and beyond the region and given rise to humanitarian, refugee, and potential environmental crises. The conclusion of active combat operations in Afghanistan and transition to an advise, assist, and enable mission in Iraq provided an opportunity to reassess and adjust the United States’ military posture in the region. Yet CENTCOM’s core mission, to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional stability in support of enduring U.S. interests, remains virtually unchanged from the day of its establishment, and just as relevant now as then. The foundational challenges that CENTCOM was designed to confront—the destabilizing influence of Iran and strategic competition—are more salient now than ever. Meanwhile, a twenty-one-year campaign against violent extremist organizations (VEOs) has prevented further attacks on the American homeland but has not eradicated a potent threat that yet lurks in the un-governed and under-governed corners of the CENTCOM AOR. Within the Central Region, the United States faces four of the five named threats identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS): Iran, China, Russia, and VEOs. Among these are a potential antagonist in any interstate, Middle Eastern conflict—Iran—and the most immediate threat to the American homeland—VEOs. These remain, therefore, CENTCOM’s first and second priorities, respectively. And while we might prefer otherwise, the fact remains that China and Russia have made the CENTCOM region a primary theater of strategic competition, fostering predatory economic ties while seeking regional influence and assured access. Competing in this arena constitutes CENTCOM’s third strategic priority. Despite these continuities, inevitable and appropriate adjustments to American posture in the region are prone to misinterpretation by American partners and adversaries alike. Suspecting that the United States is eager to put the last twenty-one years—and the region as a whole—behind it, partners are hedging, and competitors are exploiting the opportunity to gain influence. From its inception, CENTCOM has been responsible for the stability and security of an “economy of force” theater—one that offered valuable returns on modest, prudent investments designed to secure and stabilize a region with outsized influence on global commerce and energy supply, and in which VEOs have proliferated and expanded globally over the past generation. Even in the midst of global competition, the Interim National Security Guidance recognizes the importance of these investments, but the impulse to compensate for a perceived overinvestment in the region these past twenty-one years bears inherent risks. Most importantly, acting on this misperception threatens to undermine the confidence of partners in the region, compromising our ability to leverage longstanding relationships and wield influence as we have historically: with a light-yet-responsive touch and with a small footprint that can rapidly expand as circumstances demand. CENTCOM plays an integral role in reassuring these partners and allies of the U.S. commitment to regional stability and to advancing shared interests, including by participating in operations and exercises throughout the region. Israel’s shift from the EUCOM to CENTCOM AOR opens the doors to numerous strategic opportunities—including by enabling CENTCOM to more closely align our regional partners against common threats, such as those posed by Tehran. The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to Israel’s security and to supporting Israel’s right to defend itself, and CENTCOM will continue to support the expansion of Israel’s military ties with regional counterparts through training, joint exercises, and other defense cooperation efforts. The normalization agreements between Israel and the Gulf are historic, and they follow in the footsteps of the peace treaties signed by Egypt in 1979 and Jordan fifteen years later. Both Egypt and Jordan remain strategic partners. Egypt maintains a strong defense relationship with the United States on counter-terrorism (CT) and maritime and border security efforts, and provides critical access, overflight, and Suez Canal transit for U.S. forces. Our decades-long partnership enables us to work with Egypt on areas of disagreement while continuing to address challenges throughout the Middle East and Africa together. Jordan is likewise one of our most committed partners in the Middle East, as well as being a key partner in the Defeat-ISIS coalition. The close partnership with Jordan is essential to U.S. operations across the region. Maintaining our influence and safeguarding American interests requires a whole-of government approach and the agile deployment of limited resources to blunt challenges and seize opportunities as they emerge. But it further demands a demonstrable commitment to regional partners, upon whom security in the CENTCOM AOR must ultimately depend. Iran The greatest single day-to-day threat to regional security and stability remains Iran, which challenges the United States and its allies by pursuing regional hegemony, breaching its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments, and posing a conventional threat to partner nations while facilitating and conducting coercive and malign activities. With the largest military in the Middle East, Iran has developed and amassed sophisticated ballistic missile forces and is at the cutting edge in the development of aerial and maritime unmanned systems. With their potent offensive capabilities, these weapon systems enable Iran to threaten its neighbors and menace the free flow of commerce throughout the region, negatively affecting global trade and the world’s energy supply. Over the past year, Iran used these weapons to attack and seize merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and northern Arabian Sea. Iran views the United States as its greatest enduring threat and obstacle to regional hegemony; it continues a multi-faceted approach to remove U.S. forces from the region while avoiding escalation into a major conflict. Though it has not conducted direct attacks on U.S. forces since January 2020, Iran continues to threaten current and former U.S. officials and enable its proxies to conduct implausibly deniable attacks on deployed U.S. forces. The risk of miscalculation and escalation remains high because of Iran’s strategic calculation that it can simultaneously and discretely engage in diplomacy with and a proxy campaign against the United States. Moreover, Iran’s command and control of its proxy and affiliated militias has changed following the 2020 death of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, which may create challenges for Tehran’s ability to govern the initiation and escalation of violence directed at U.S. and Coalition Forces. Iran continues to violate sanctions and embargos, proliferate weapons to its network of proxies and affiliates, terrorize mariners, and seize shipping in international waters. While Iran is not currently pursuing nuclear weapons, it has developed ballistic missiles that could be configured to deliver them and has conducted numerous launches to test those missile systems. These actions continue to demonstrate Iran’s defiance and willingness to undermine international norms with threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners and allies. Iranian Activities in Iraq In Iraq, Iranian-Aligned Militia Groups (IAMG) increased attacks throughout the first half of 2021, targeting U.S. forces with unmanned aerial systems (UASs) for the first time. In early July, IAMGs paused such attacks in the hope that the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue and forthcoming Iraqi elections would eject American forces through political and diplomatic means. As it became clear that Iran-aligned Shia groups had performed poorly in the October election, IAMGs directed violence against fellow Iraqis, further undermining those groups’ standing and influence. When the Strategic Dialogue yielded only the end of an American combat mission rather than a withdrawal, IAMG leaders threatened a resumption of attacks on any Americans remaining in Iraq beyond 2021. In early January 2022, IAMGs briefly surged attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria but have since largely restrained operations against U.S. forces—likely due to sensitivities related to the formation of the new Iraqi government. Coalition forces remained postured to respond should the IAMGs become more aggressive. The danger posed by IAMGs has not passed. As a coalition government forms in Iraq, IAMGs continue to evaluate their options and marshal—with covert Iranian assistance—the means of resuming complex UAS and rocket attacks against their fellow Iraqis, as well as U.S. and Coalition forces. Regardless of who forms the government, IAMGs are likely to continue sectarian, criminal, and anti-U.S. activities that destabilize Iraq. Iranian Activities in Syria and Lebanon In Syria, Iran and its proxies have been less restrained in attacks against Combined Joint Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR). Here, Iran supports the Assad regime with the aim of maintaining the “Axis of Resistance” alliance against Israel, a sworn enemy of Tehran’s revolutionary government. Notwithstanding their common support for the Assad regime, Iran competes with Russia for economic opportunities and long-term influence in Syria. Ultimately, Iran desires a permanent presence in Syria, pursuing economic opportunities to recoup significant wartime investment, increased local militia influence to maintain security, and increased soft power to gain influence over the population. To this end, Iran seeks to expand its already well-established position along the Middle Euphrates River Valley by converting local Sunnis to Shi’ism, recruiting Sunni tribal members into IAMGs, and colonizing the area with Iranian irregular forces and their families. Iran will continue to use Syrian (and likely Iraqi) territory as a critical hub and resupply route for maintaining its campaign against Israel. CENTCOM supports Israel’s right to defend itself from threats posed by Iran and Iranian proxies. Iran will also remain focused on supporting Lebanese Hizballah, whose illegal weapons stockpiles exceed those of most legitimate partner militaries in the region. Hizballah has consistently undermined the legitimate Lebanese Armed Forces, a steadfast partner of the United States that acts in the interests of the Lebanese people, works to maintain Lebanese stability, and remains the most trusted government institution in Lebanon. Iran likely has decreasing tolerance for continued U.S. presence in Syria, especially as pro Assad regime forces gain more control over the country. Accordingly, Iran and its proxies and affiliates are increasing their capabilities and planning to target U.S. and partner interests, as evidenced by multiple indirect fire attacks against U.S.-associated bases with increasingly capable systems that have evolved from typical, commercial off-the-shelf UAS models to more advanced platforms resembling improvised cruise missiles with increased speed, range, accuracy, electronic warfarehardening, and explosive payload capacity. More troubling, increased proliferation of this advanced technology has enabled mass production of components that can be easily transported, assembled, and launched from remote locations with little to no support infrastructure. Such capabilities make it easier for non-state actors and proxy forces to acquire and employ this technology on a much larger scale at great stand-off ranges. Iranian Activities in Yemen The least restrained and most destabilizing of all of Iran’s affiliates in the region are the Houthis of Yemen. Aside from being active combatants in that country’s seven-year-old civil war, they are also engaged in a near-daily long-range fires conflict with Saudi Arabia. Wielding the most advanced UASs and ballistic and cruise missiles Iran can design, build, and smuggle into Yemen, the Houthis have targeted Saudi Arabia’s largest cities and its critical oil infrastructure. Recently, the Houthis have raised the stakes further by using the same high-end Iranian weapons to target the United Arab Emirates, including the air base at Al Dhafra that U.S. forces share with our Emirati partners. Additional concerning indicators of Houthi contempt for international norms include the November 2021 breaching of the former U.S. embassy compound in Sana’a, the detention of local Yemeni staff of the U.S. embassy, and the escalating frequency of abductions, armed robberies, and carjackings in the parts of Yemen controlled by the Houthis. Over the past year, Iran has continued to provide Houthi forces with advanced conventional weapons (UASs, theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned surface vehicles) and related technology. The proliferation of small and medium-sized UASs and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles to the Houthis presents the most complex and consequential threat to U.S., partner, and allied forces. In 2021, the Houthis conducted over 325 cross-border attacks with UASs and missiles. Since the start of 2022, the Houthis have conducted at least 45 cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE with attacks that simultaneously threaten U.S. personnel based in the region and international maritime interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman. Over the past year, the Houthis made incremental advances toward the petroleum-rich city of Marib and reclaimed the areas surrounding the Port of Hudaydah following the withdrawal of Republic of Yemen Government aligned forces. Likely emboldened by territorial gains in western and central Yemen, as well as perceived declining U.S. support to the Saudi-led Coalition, the Houthis accompanied their campaign to capture Marib with near-daily cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia using UASs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. In response to recent gains by the Emirati-sponsored Giants Brigades south of Marib, the Houthis expanded their missile and UAS attacks to targets in the United Arab Emirates—including civilian targets, as well as military targets at Al Dhafra Air Base, home to a substantial contingent of U.S. forces. Air defense fires by both Emirati and American batteries—including the first successful combat Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) engagements in history—defeated this complex Houthi attack. It nevertheless demonstrated that the Houthis are prepared to further escalate this conflict using whatever means the Iranians put at their disposal, even at the risk of inflicting mass civilian casualties and threatening American forces. The recent attacks on the UAE fit the broader pattern of Iran-enabled Houthi missile and UAS attacks on the Arabian Peninsula, targeting both military and civilian targets, endangering civilian life, and risking global economic disruption should the Houthis successfully strike major oil infrastructure or economic hubs. Although the United States provides information and defensive assistance to Saudi and Emirati armed forces, it does not provide offensive military support. CENTCOM continues to support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. Countering the Iranian Threat Deterring Iran and its threat network depends on capabilities that provide a credible threat of a robust and timely response to Iranian aggression paired with flexible deterrent and response options that impose high costs on Iran, thereby altering its decision calculus. Accordingly, current CENTCOM planning is based on clear and unambiguous signaling to Iran and its threat network. It also makes a virtue out of the necessity to disperse forces threatened by Iranian missiles and UASs. Distributing forces more broadly outside of the most significant Iranian threat ranges not only enhances survivability but also demonstrates an increased capability to rapidly mass combat effects using dynamic force employment (DFE), agile combat employment (ACE), and bomber task force (BTF) missions. A distributed approach lowers costs, improves defensive posture, and makes it more difficult for adversaries to mass effects against U.S. and coalition assets. In addition, this approach demonstrates the flexibility, global reach, and responsiveness of U.S. forces. At the same time, the United States must demonstrate to our allies and partners that ours is a credible, dependable force in the region, and enable these allies and partners to contribute more effectively to their own defense. In this regard, the greatest threat to the region’s security—Iran’s missile force—is also a catalyst for increased cooperation in the form of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). While this requires a willingness on the part of regional partners to share intelligence more fully and quickly than they have to date, it does not require the introduction of foreign forces onto the soil of neighboring nations. Similarly, greater cooperation in the air domain promises greater integration and deterrent effect without provoking friction that has historically worked against collective defense in the region. This is especially true in the case of Israel, which joined the CENTCOM AOR in 2021 and has already participated in a number of multilateral exercises and fora that would have been inconceivable before the normalization agreements signed between Israel and Gulf countries in 2020. Aside from their obvious value to readiness and interoperability, regional exercises incorporating DFE, ACE, and BTF demonstrate allies’ and partners’ will and readiness to respond to Iranian aggression, thereby enhancing deterrence. Additionally, exercises provide platforms to inject strategic communications and highlight Iranian malign activities, engendering unity and signaling resolve among allies and partners. For the return on investment, such exercises are invaluable. Unfortunately, COVID and reduced budgets for exercises impinged upon CENTCOM and its components’ ability to even maintain (let alone expand) existing exercises, despite a regional appetite to do so. CENTCOM is also hindered in its ability to achieve effective, economical collective security by delays in foreign military sales (FMS) to allies and partners, which—combined with reductions in American capabilities across the region—contributes to the perception of a wavering United States commitment to the security and stability of the CENTCOM AOR and the individual countries therein. This has provided a false narrative and an opening for America’s strategic competitors in the region and undermines deterrence of Iran. Countering this impression requires credible assurance and demonstrations of America’s commitment to regional security and our partnerships. This commitment includes a recognition of the importance of our security assistance enterprise and our defense industry being capable of efficiently supporting our partners’ defensive needs. Moreover, CENTCOM’s posture, in terms of forces, footprints, agreements, authorities, and resources must allow us the flexibility to compete with our adversaries below the level of armed conflict, leaving no doubt that U.S. combat power can rapidly flow into the region when required and that Iran will suffer grave costs for their aggressive actions. Countering Violent Extremist Organizations While Iran remains the greatest threat to the security of the Central Region itself, ISIS, Al Qaeda (AQ), and other VEOs operating in the region will remain the most likely and proximate threat to the security of the United States and that of our citizens and interests at home and abroad. ISIS and AQ are seeking to exploit a reduction of U.S. CT efforts in Afghanistan to reinvigorate their adherents and increase their ability to plot and direct external attacks. While CENTCOM and the Global Coalition to Defeat-ISIS have had extraordinary success against these VEOs, the underlying conditions that led to their growth—civil war, poor governance, a youth bulge, and scarce resources and opportunities—remain unchanged. If left unmonitored and unchecked, a resurgence of VEO capabilities could manifest with new attacks on the United States and the homelands of our allies. While VEOs have a presence in virtually every country in the AOR, CENTCOM’s primary CT focus remains on those organizations with the ambition and varying capabilities to plot and conduct external operations against the United States and our allies. These VEOs principally reside in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Yemen U.S. unilateral and partner-supported CT operations have disrupted and degraded Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), rendering it ineffective and unable to conduct operations outside of Yemen. However, the group maintains aspirations to attack the U.S. homeland, with AQAP senior leadership threatening attacks against the United States as recently as October 2021. ISIS-Yemen remains an active threat group as well, although with fewer capabilities and adherents compared with AQAP. The United States retains a small, tailorable CT footprint in Yemen, supported by a regional CT headquarters that enables regional partner CT forces to monitor and disrupt these VEOs. Afghanistan ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) poses a moderate to high threat to the Taliban and civilians in Afghanistan, and this threat has the potential to grow in the coming months and years. As the economic situation and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan worsen, with food security continuing to deteriorate, vulnerable populations will potentially become increasingly susceptible to ISIS-K recruitment. ISIS-K continues targeting the Taliban, Shia populations, urban centers, and targets of opportunity and is attempting to expand from its historic eastern Afghanistan operating areas, as evidenced by its claims of high-profile attacks from Kunduz in the north to Kandahar in the south. ISIS-K likely will remain capable of conducting high-profile attacks throughout Afghanistan, seeking to increase recruitment, expand its operating area, and challenge the Taliban’s control. Absent sustained CT pressure, ISIS-K may gain strength and be emboldened to expand its operations and target neighboring countries—as evidenced by recent attacks against Shia civilians in Pakistan. The Department of Defense assesses ISIS-K could establish an external attack capability against the United States and our allies in twelve to eighteen months, but possibly sooner if the group experiences unanticipated gains in Afghanistan. In the near-term, AQ will most likely continue to maintain a low-profile under pressure from the Taliban, which seeks international legitimacy. Given its long-standing ties with the Taliban and Haqqani Network, CENTCOM assesses some AQ elements have limited freedom of movement in Afghanistan. AQ likely still aspires to recruit and train, and if successful, restore an external attack capability against the United States and our allies in twelve to twenty-four months. Following the August 2021 Taliban takeover of Kabul, on-the-ground CT efforts against Afghanistan-based VEOs fell largely to the Taliban. Since taking Kabul, the Taliban have prioritized internal security and begun taking steps to combat ISIS-K’s ability to attack the regime in the near-term, and to reconstitute in the long-term. As 2022 unfolds, the Taliban’s so called “Ministry of Interior” (MOI) and “General Directorate of Intelligence” (GDI) likely will synchronize efforts to combat ISIS-K’s urban attack cells, while focusing on developing intelligence networks to weaken ISIS-K’s historic support zones in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban’s restraints and actions against other regional VEOs have been markedly less aggressive. For the United States, conducting CT operations in Afghanistan from “over the horizon” remains difficult, but not impossible. The loss of collection following the withdrawal of U.S. forces has exacerbated gaps in our intelligence. This limits the intelligence community’s ability to provide indications and warning of VEO threats from Afghanistan. Also limited is the United States’ ability to fix and finish those threats we are able to find. The resultant reductions in consistent CT pressure potentially could enable VEO groups to pose increased threats to the United States and our allies, assuming the Taliban is unwilling or unable to do so itself. Presently, CENTCOM relies on the Operation ENDURING SENTINEL Over-the-Horizon Counter Terrorism (OTH-CT) Task Force and a finite number of UAS sorties to develop and potentially strike terrorist targets in Afghanistan. Additional opportunities for enhanced cooperation present themselves among the Central Asian States and Pakistan. Due to pressure from Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China), membership in its Collective Security Treaty Organization, and varied willingness to engage with the new Taliban government, the Central Asian States are measured in their support for counterterrorism cooperation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, they remain concerned about the risk of extremist spillover from Afghanistan and will likely seek out a limited and measured expansion in U.S. security cooperation engagements while continuing to strike a balance in regional dynamics with all partners. Already, partners in Central Asia value several U.S. security cooperation activities, including support for border security activities, basic peacekeeping skills development, and Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing. Moreover, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which all border Afghanistan, hold military exercises and receive training from U.S. advisors. Working across the whole-of-government with our interagency partners, as well as international partners and allies, to mitigate the growing humanitarian and economic crises will also be a critical component of effectively countering the growth of VEOs in Afghanistan. Iraq and Syria The threat posed by ISIS has been severely degraded in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, its enduring defeat has not been completely achieved. Through the combined efforts of Coalition forces under the command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and our partners in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), ISIS has lost territorial control and operates mostly in under-governed areas or disputed areas such as the Syrian desert or along the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL) in Iraq. Deliberate targeting of leaders and facilitation networks has reduced ISIS’s capability to conduct large-scale attacks and compelled them to rely foremost on uncoordinated, small-scale hit and-run engagements. Meanwhile, they seek to reconstitute forces and plan for more complex mass casualty-producing attacks, the most recent example being the January 2022 attack at the detention facility in Hasakah, Syria. Iraq Despite significant progress in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, ISIS-Iraq remains a credible threat to the stability of the Iraqi government, as well as to U.S. and Coalition forces and interests in the country. ISIS-Iraq maintains the limited ability to target bases housing U.S. and Coalition forces both in the Kurdistan region and Baghdad. ISIS-Iraq is also capable of targeting supply lines, as well as U.S. and Coalition forces while in transit during training and enabling operations across the country. Improved Iraqi security in Baghdad has diminished ISIS-Iraq’s opportunities for high-profile attacks there, but it has demonstrated the intent to conduct small suicide and improvised explosive device (IED) operations against soft targets. Moreover, ISIS-Iraq continues its efforts to destabilize the ethno-sectarian environment, potentially embroiling our Iraqi partners and Coalition forces in a rapidly deteriorating security environment with little warning. Consistent CT pressure likely resulted in key leader losses, reduced access to resources and materiel, and an inability to infiltrate urban areas. These challenges almost certainly contributed to an overall decline in attacks from 119 per month in 2020 to 97 per month in 2021. Nevertheless, ISIS Iraq remains a credible threat. ISIS-Iraq uses complex attacks and subverts authority to grow its influence and expand its insurgency and ISIS-Iraq remains operationally active in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad Din—specifically along the KCL. ISIS-Iraq relies on rural safe havens to mitigate CT pressure, and as a staging point for operations against civilian and military targets. In late 2021, ISIS Iraq initiated a series of seemingly coordinated attacks against Kurdish interests causing dozens of casualties in Irbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces as ISIS-Iraq continues efforts to stoke sectarian and ethnic conflict. In early December 2021, CJTF-OIR, in cooperation with the Government of Iraq, completed the transition to an advise, assist, and enable mission. Preceding this transition was the restructuring of the force to an irreducible minimum of requisite personnel and equipment, all residing on consolidated joint bases with Iraqi forces. Coalition Force advisors in the Military Advisory Group Iraq (MAG-I) and Military Advisory Group-North (MAG-N) are working closely with their ISF and Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) counterparts in operational-level planning and battle tracking of unilateral Iraqi operations against ISIS. Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant (SOJTF-L) contributes to this effort at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels by partnering with Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS). Critical to this effort are the intelligence collection and fusion, logistics, and joint strike support that we provide to Iraqi-planned, led, and executed operations to defeat ISIS. Coalition Forces provide in-extremis assistance with ISR, and joint strike capabilities when required, at the request of the Government of Iraq. Finally, CJTF-OIR’s Directorate of Military Assistance manages the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), which divests materiel and financial support to the ISF and KSF. These efforts provide support to ISF and KSF counter-ISIS operations and serve as the basis for a future military-to-military relationship between the United States and Iraq. The ISF and KSF have conducted larger joint operations, demonstrating tangible progress, as well as a fundamental understanding of intelligence collection and joint fires to support more complex operations spanning multiple provinces. CJTF-OIR is committed to its advise, assist, and enable mission, helping Iraqi forces develop operational structures and processes of sustainment, maintenance, and command/control mechanisms at echelon that are necessary for maintaining force structure and operational tempo. Essential to CJTF-OIR’s advisory mission is the relationship with NATO Mission Iraq (NMI)—an important initiative both for the contributions it is poised to make and for the signal it sends about our global allies’ commitment to the long-term stability of Iraq. NMI provides advisory support to the ISF at the ministerial level, focusing on institutional advice in areas such as doctrine development, budgeting, sustainment processes, and personnel management. NMI’s efforts are key to maintaining the operational capability of the ISF in the mid- to long-term. The NMI and OIR missions are separate but complementary, and there must continue to be a symbiotic relationship between the two as they progress. Work is ongoing to understand where gaps and crossovers exist between NMI and OIR so they can be addressed as these missions both continue to evolve. Syria ISIS remains a significant threat in Syria, despite the drop in the group’s total claimed attacks since July 2021. The group continues to target the Assad Regime, the SDF, and local populations primarily in Homs and Dayr az Zawr provinces. These attacks are typically small-scale and rudimentary, employing small arms fire, IEDs, assassinations, and hit-and-run ambushes on security forces. A notable exception is ISIS’s recent concerted effort to liberate detainees from the largest detention center in Hasakah. ISIS’s ability to project power further has been degraded by persistent pressure from the SDF and CJTF-OIR, and was further reduced with the February 2022 death of the so-called “amir” of ISIS, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. Nevertheless, increased conflict between the SDF and the Assad regime or Turkey—which views the SDF as inextricably linked to the YPG, a group Ankara considers a terrorist organization—would likely provide ISIS the respite it needs to recover from recent losses and expand its influence, and recent events at Hasakah demonstrate that its will is unbroken. The SDF have continued to demonstrate the resolve and capability to maintain continuous pressure on ISIS in northern Syria. They have remained the only reliable and effective partner in Syria and continue to improve in their capability to prevent the resurgence of ISIS in the Eastern Syrian Security Area (ESSA). The nature of the operations executed in northeastern Syria are different than those conducted in Iraq. The SDF control an area of Syria in which they are opposed not only by ISIS but also by the Assad regime, the regime’s Russian and Iranian backers, and Turkey or its proxies. Thus, despite the SDF’s ability to conduct operations without direct oversight from Coalition Forces, they remain susceptible to external pressures and dependent upon SOJTF-Levant for ISR, fires, and intelligence support for complex missions. Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund Throughout 2022, our partner forces in Iraq and Syria will continue to benefit from a range of financial and materiel support provided through the CTEF, which provided $726.9 million of critical assistance in 2021. CTEF continues to play a vital role in Counter-ISIS operations within Iraq and Syria, resulting in tremendous operational success while minimizing U.S. presence in the AOR. CTEF is a critical tool by which the Coalition enables the ISF, KSF, and SDF to meet operational requirements necessary to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS and set conditions for continued stabilization of the region. Drawing on the lessons from the last twenty one years, CJTF-OIR has, over the last six months, tailored ISF divestments to address ISF sustainment, maintenance, and communications requirements. In Syria, CTEF expenditures for partner forces remain focused on maintaining the necessary level of capability to target ISIS cells, keep ISIS fighters securely and humanely detained until they receive due process or are repatriated to their countries of origin, and sustain vetted partners in Syria at the level required to counter the ISIS threat and help maintain security and stability in the region. For these reasons, any rapid reduction of CTEF appropriations risks a reversal of gains made in the security sector, the reemergence of ISIS and other VEOs, and the future stability of the region. Given the unique circumstances of Iraq and Syria, where our most reliable partners depend upon us for essential support in various capacities, CTEF provides a flexible, responsive mechanism for addressing emergent requirements and capitalizing on opportunities. As such, CTEF is essential to continued progress in the D-ISIS fight. Detainees The limited repatriation of ISIS detainees and displaced persons in northeast Syria remains the biggest impediment to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS. While there has been modest progress on repatriating and resettling some of these displaced persons and some detained ISIS fighters, more needs to be done. Military force cannot resolve this festering problem, which, if not addressed by the international community, will eventually form the core of the next round of violent Islamic extremism in the region and beyond. Presently, more than ten thousand ISIS fighters are detained in repurposed detention facilities throughout northeast Syria. These facilities are guarded by a force of makeshift SDF guards, mustered from the local population with limited training. The SDF guard force remains capable of responding to external threats against the facilities, but there remains a constant threat from internal riots and coordinated action with ISIS cells at large, as evidenced by recent events at the detention center in Hasakah. Working with the SDF and Joint Operations Center-Iraq, CJTF-OIR has facilitated the transfer of hundreds of Iraqi nationals from SDF-controlled detention facilities to Iraq— but there is still more work to be done, as several thousand Iraqi ISIS fighters remain in makeshift detention facilities in Syria. CJTF-OIR has also leveraged CTEF funding to upgrade facilities and has worked to train and pay SDF guards to mitigate the threat posed by the detained ISIS fighters. Yet these measures serve only as a temporary solution until a more viable long-term one can be found. Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees Another challenge in the AOR is that of large-scale displacement as a result of protracted conflicts in the region. Of Syria’s pre-war population of approximately 20 million, over 6 million are IDPs and more than 13 million throughout the country need humanitarian assistance. Another 6 million sought refuge in other countries. Russia and the Syrian regime have consistently limited efforts by the UN and other organizations to provide sufficient humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in Syria, causing unnecessary suffering. The UN has identified Syria as a hotspot for acute food insecurity, with millions depending on humanitarian organizations to deliver essential aid to areas outside of regime control. Especially challenging is the displaced persons camp at Al Hol in northeast Syria. Al Hol, which began as an Iraqi refugee camp in the early 1990s and originally hosted about ten thousand people, swelled to a population of over seventy thousand after the fall of Baghuz when ISIS lost its last remaining territory. The camp, which currently holds approximately fifty-seven thousand people, predominantly women and children, comprises a complex mix of Iraqis Syrians, and third-country nationals; both the victims of ISIS and families of ISIS live in relatively close proximity to one another. The camp remains a challenge to security forces and humanitarian providers alike due to recurring violence against camp residents, NGO workers, camp administrators, and suspected coalition collaborators. In March 2021, the SDF conducted a security operation in response to the uptick in assassinations within the camp. Assassinations decreased following this sweep but continued throughout 2021, underscoring ISIS’s resilient influence and the ongoing challenge of properly managing security. Some women living in Al Hol camp are perpetrators of violence, while many residents, including the tens of thousands of children, remain victims and extremely vulnerable. ISIS affiliated women often act as Hisba, or religious police, keeping a keen eye on activities in the camp, while preying upon vulnerable camp residents through violence and intimidation. They often focus on radicalizing other residents, primarily children, through propaganda and fear to ensure the second generation of the organization. Some of these children are being radicalized in the camp and are later smuggled out to be trained as future fighters and suicide bombers in ISIS camps in ungoverned locations in Syria. In addition to providing humanitarian assistance inside camps like Al Hol, USAID and State Department-sponsored humanitarian aid and stabilization programs in Syrian communities have attempted to fulfill the need for basic services, maintain stability, and facilitate the peaceful return of displaced Syrians to their areas of origin. In the interim, extremist elements will continue efforts to exploit the lack of a viable, internationally-supported solution to the Syrian conflict to build popular support and contribute to the reconstitution of ISIS and affiliates. The only viable solution to Al Hol is a political one, whereby nations repatriate and reintegrate their citizens and relieve the burden on the SDF. Other displaced persons in the AOR pose logistical and economic challenges. Following the largest airborne non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in history, which delivered over 124,000 Americans, third-country nationals, and at-risk Afghans to safety, many Afghans have already begun new, promising lives in the United States. Others remain at transit facilities in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, awaiting onward resettlement. To aid in this effort, CENTCOM facilitated the establishment and support of several temporary safe havens and transportation “lily pad” sites utilizing $140 million of the emergency Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds provided by Congress in July 2021. Meanwhile, the United States continues to relocate Afghan allies, which will require at least two of these locations to be fully operational for the remainder of the fiscal year. Planning continues for expanded efforts at the Camp As Saliyah transit site in Qatar, and initial indications are that this effort could continue well past originally estimated end dates. Coordination with interagency partners for the hand-off of resourcing and contracting for this effort is challenged by gaps in various departments’ and agencies’ operational authorities and funding. For other countries that have hosted the region’s refugees—among them Jordan, Lebanon, and Pakistan—the economic strain imposed on the host country systems can further exacerbate fiscal challenges and undermine stability. A final crisis of displaced persons within the AOR is, unfortunately, largely beyond CENTCOM’s ability to influence or alleviate. Over the past year, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen has remained severe, with over 16 million Yemenis subject to food insecurity and 4 million internally displaced by conflict. The World Health Organization reports only 50 percent of Yemen’s medical facilities remain functional, and those that are open lack sufficient medical staff, equipment, or basic medicines, leaving Yemenis vulnerable to COVID-19, cholera, diphtheria, malaria, and other diseases. Yemen will remain dependent on external aid to address these critical needs. The ongoing conflict raises additional difficulties for aid workers attempting to transit to and within the country, while the Houthis also tax and abscond with humanitarian aid supplies to support their war effort. The humanitarian crisis will remain a challenge in Yemen for years to come, even after any settlement of the internal conflict, and Yemen will remain reliant on external aid to address issues such as food insecurity and healthcare shortfalls. Additionally, a structural failure of the FSO Safer, a permanently-moored oil tanker off the coast of Ras Isa, could quickly compound many issues in Yemen, almost certainly disrupting maritime traffic transiting the Red Sea and potentially causing an environmental disaster. Safeguarding Civilian Life While CENTCOM strives daily to alleviate the suffering of those displaced or harmed by conflict in the region, we also recognize that combat operations can also inflict harm on civilian life and infrastructure. CENTCOM is absolutely committed to safeguarding civilian life throughout its area of operations, and across the range of military operations. Further, CENTCOM and each of its subordinate headquarters takes very seriously our legal, moral, and ethical obligations to abide by the law of armed conflict, and we recognize that respect for the sanctity and dignity of human life is inherent in our mission to ensure the security and stability of the region. Moreover, we recognize that the United States’ legitimacy as the leader and guarantor of a liberal, rules-based international order depends on our demonstrated commitment to protecting innocent life. As the Secretary of Defense has recently acknowledged, we can and must do better in minimizing and responding to harm to civilian populations resulting from our operations. We remain committed to reviewing and improving our tactics, techniques, and procedures and fully support the Secretary of Defense-directed development of an overarching Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP). CENTCOM has already implemented preliminary changes to its method of tracking and reporting allegations of civilian casualties. Process improvements include the establishment of a civilian casualty working group, increased interagency coordination to improve deconfliction processes, and the resumption of publication of monthly CIVCAS reports by CJTF-OIR. This working group will provide additional oversight of the reporting and investigation chain that was previously conducted predominantly outside of the combatant command headquarters. CENTCOM appreciates the opportunity to contribute to the CHMRAP and will swiftly implement and fully support the Secretary’s direction. Although CENTCOM is fully committed to the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict and U.S. policies that in many cases far exceed what international law requires, we cannot offer guarantees against the unintended loss of civilian life in the future. Our adversaries in the AOR do not merely lack our regard for innocent life—they deliberately abuse and jeopardize it with a goal of protecting themselves and using civilian casualties to conduct information operations against the United States. Moreover, U.S. forces, which often operate in complex, hostile environments, always retain the inherent right of self-defense. In the fog and friction of combat, individuals and their commanders must sometimes make difficult decisions—literally with life or-death consequences—under intense pressure and with sometimes imperfect information. Hesitation can cost lives, as can well-intended action. When an allegation of civilian casualties occurs, CENTCOM and its subordinate headquarters will report it to Defense Department leadership, acknowledge it, investigate it, and take whatever action is appropriate to ensure accountability and improve CIVCAS prevention and mitigation measures. CENTCOM did so in the wake of the MQ9 strike in Kabul on 29 August 2021. Our commitment to minimizing the risk to civilian life was further demonstrated in the recent raid that resulted in the death of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. Rather than target him with an airstrike, we accepted increased risk to U.S. forces by launching a raid, expressly planned to separate noncombatants in the objective area from the ISIS leader and his subordinates. Notwithstanding the regrettable loss of noncombatant lives when the terrorist or one of his wives detonated an explosive on the third floor of his residence, U.S. forces took extraordinary measures to clear the objective area of civilians, and in so doing protected no fewer than ten of them from harm. This is a standard of care for civilian life that is virtually unprecedented in the history of armed conflict, and it is one that CENTCOM will continue to uphold into the future. Strategic Competition As the historical and enduring crossroads for overland and maritime trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa and home to half of the world’s proven oil reserves, the CENTCOM AOR constitutes geostrategic “key terrain” and a potentially decisive theater for strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Within the AOR, an expansionist PRC and a resurgent Russia seek to shift alliances and gain influence, seeking leverage through tools such as state-sponsored investment, to achieve assured access and key resources to support their national objectives. The PRC and Russia have tailored their regional approaches to suit their specific goals and have expanded military cooperation with many regional countries through both arms sales and exercises. The PRC has expanded its presence through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), COVID- 19 diplomacy, debt-trap infrastructure investments, and the proliferation of 5G technology that will provide opportunities for political coercion and military exploitation. Similarly, Russia has reinforced its enduring military and economic presence in Syria, expanded its economic presence in and defense relationship with Egypt, and seeks to increase influence over regional energy resources and transit routes. In Central Asia, proximity to the PRC and Russia and a relatively minor U.S. presence mean every interaction between the U.S. and Central Asian states holds significance for our regional CT and strategic competition policy priorities. Ultimately, the PRC and Russia seek to expand their influence and subvert the international rules based order at the expense of U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners. The PRC and Russia also engage Iran to further their own interests while working against those of the United States. Both the PRC and Russia hope to position themselves as key economic partners for Iran, anticipating sanctions relief and priority access to development contracts and markets. In October 2021, Iran announced it would sign a strategic partnership with Russia similar to the agreement Tehran signed with Beijing in March 2021. For the PRC, the agreement ensured a reliable energy supply, hedging against any U.S. attempts to block other sources of oil. Moscow, meanwhile, advocated for a reinstatement of the JCPOA while helping Iran develop military capabilities that enable its destabilizing regional activities. Ultimately, neither the PRC nor Russia will align itself so closely with Iran that it jeopardizes its ability to court other economic and military partners in the region, but both will continue to use Iran as a useful foil against the West, reaping economic benefits as they do so. Yet the geography and political contours of the region do not overwhelmingly favor the PRC or Russia. To the contrary, the bisection of the Eurasian landmass by the Central Region provides key terrain and a dominant position for the United States to strategically compete with the PRC and Russia through a range of security cooperation ventures, including border security, counternarcotics, CT, and defense institution building. Because of these relationships, the United States remains the “partner of choice” for most countries in the region in comparison to Russia or the PRC. While we must compete to retain this favorable position, it remains ours to lose. In Central Asia, where proximity does afford Russia and the PRC certain advantages, many nations are interested in closer relations with the West and share CT concerns with the United States, presenting opportunities to find and cultivate common ground. The People’s Republic of China The PRC, which is the world’s largest importer of oil, currently imports roughly 46 percent of its crude oil and 36 percent of its natural gas from the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to cultivate trade relationships, infrastructure development projects (on which it depends to absorb its excess industrial capacity), economic investment, and comprehensive partnerships among the region’s states. The PRC continues to expand influence in the Arabian Gulf and Northern Arabian Sea is supported through port development and investment programs such as those in in Gwadar, Pakistan, and with the United Arab Emirates, which are central to the PRC’s regional strategy. Throughout the past year, the PRC has engaged with nearly every country in the AOR, using trade, the BRI, COVID-19 diplomacy, and other humanitarian assistance to support its strategic objectives and expand its influence. The PRC particularly enhanced its cooperation and influence with Iran by securing a twenty-five-year economic agreement, dampening the effects of international sanctions and providing the Iranian regime an economic lifeline. The PRC also initiated the accession process for Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while adding Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as dialogue partners. Additionally, the PRC advanced its status as an arms supplier to the region, providing military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and the UAE, at discount prices and without preconditions, attempting to supplant the U.S. as a “partner of choice.” Aside from foreign military sales that can displace our U.S. security assistance relationships, the PRC conducts multilateral military exercises in the region and is postured for further collaboration. The People’s Liberation Army Navy maintains a constant presence and is active in the region, conducting a wide range of peacetime operations to protect the PRC’s maritime trade, assets, and personnel. This presence includes the Naval Escort Task Force, which operates in the Gulf of Aden and uses Djibouti as a sustainment hub. From there, the PRC can quickly project naval power into the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandeb strait, and the Gulf of Aden. Russia Over the past year, Russia has sought to portray itself as a regional powerbroker and reliable partner on the global stage while also attempting to undermine U.S. positions and relations in the CENTCOM AOR. Russia maintains a largely opportunistic approach to its engagement with countries in the Middle East while viewing its influence in the Central Asia region as vital to its national security interests. Moscow responded to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan by pressuring Central Asian states to refuse support from the U.S. and reinforcing its own position as the area’s primary security partner through military exercises and advocating for the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Additionally, Russia has solidified its military presence in Syria, where it asserts its position in international fora to increase its influence in the region and pressure the United States to withdraw. Russia has demonstrated the ability to project forces, test weapon systems, and routinely interfere with Coalition D-ISIS operations. To date this has included the exploitation of the space environment, electronic warfare, GPS jamming, and the use of private military companies. Since 2015, Russian armed forces have conducted kinetic actions in Syria at the behest of the Assad regime. Russia has further developed forces and footprints capable of sustaining extra-territorial military operations. One example is the Russian naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus, for which Russia recently signed a forty-nine-year lease and announced plans to invest $500 million in port development. This base allows up to eleven nuclear-powered Russian Black Sea warships to repair and replenish in the Mediterranean Sea without having to return to home port through the Turkish Dardanelles and Bosporus straits, and it has facilitated increased naval activity in the Red Sea. Russia also developed an airfield to accommodate Russian bombers and expand its operational capacity in the region. From its Syrian footprints, the Russians are ideally placed to disrupt NATO operations in the Middle East and present a potential hedge against NATO’s southern flank. To improve its economic situation, Russia leveraged its relationship with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) to gain favorable market conditions for oil and gas sales over the last year. Russia’s interests in Iraq are primarily in the fuel and energy sector, including exploration and infrastructure development. Russia has several energy companies operating in Iraq, including Lukoil, Gazprom, Neft, and Bashneft, for investments worth over $10 billion. Russia also continues marketing its advanced weapons systems for export to CENTCOM AOR countries. This marketing occurs in an environment in which many of our partners are looking for systems that support their national security requirements, including the threat posed by Iran. As with the PRC, the speed of Russian arms sales is appealing to partners—and does not come with American accountability demands for end-use monitoring and human rights assurances, such as Leahy vetting. While it is too early to grasp the full consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the CENTCOM AOR, our partners there are already feeling the initial adverse effects. Challenging humanitarian conditions across the CENTCOM AOR have already led to sustained displacement, undermined trust between governance structures and communities, and created space for our adversaries to exploit the human suffering of vulnerable populations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has the potential to exacerbate these dynamics due to disruptions in wheat exports to the Middle East, strain on financial institutions, and rising fuel prices with global implications. Russia is the world’s largest exporter of wheat, and Ukraine is the world’s fifth largest, together accounting for 28.9 percent of global wheat exports. Countries across the AOR depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat to varying degrees, and reporting out of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon indicates price hikes of staple food items ranging between 30 and 50 percent since the Russian invasion began. Governments are attempting to ease the negative impacts on their citizens by increasing domestic production or pursuing imports from alternative markets, but these efforts will not fully address growing food insecurity, especially in import-dependent and cash-strapped countries such as Lebanon and Yemen. Competing Strategically The PRC and Russia have shown that they are willing to work together toward common regional objectives: mutually supporting Iran, vetoing United Nations Security Council resolutions against Syria, and offering limited humanitarian assistance where it furthers their interests. Due to the geostrategic importance of the Central Region, allies, partners, and competitors will attempt to increase their influence in the CENTCOM AOR, especially if they perceive a wavering U.S. commitment to the region. The global economic environment induces regional partners to seriously consider Chinese and Russian offers of capital, investment, technology, infrastructure, and equipment to realize their national long-term economic and defense goals. At the tactical level, security cooperation and building partner capacity will remain central tenets of our military instrument of national power. The PRC and Russia currently lack the capability and capacity to conduct robust security cooperation activities, despite their desire to do so—but we should not assume this will continue to be true over the longer term. When given a choice, our Middle Eastern partners have traditionally preferred alternatives presented by the United States and our allies. These alternatives must be viable, substantive, and timely if they are to ward off our strategic competitors. Meanwhile, the United States and our allies can capitalize on our unique ability to build and lead international coalitions of like-minded nations. Multilateral security organizations such as the Combined Maritime Forces, the International Maritime Security Construct, and the forthcoming Red Sea Maritime Security Initiative serve as bulwarks against Chinese and Russian grey-zone operations and a deterrent to aggression in the region. By demonstrating international resolve and solidarity, we at once instill confidence in the international rules-based order and reduce the burden of doing so with like-minded partners. Yet as we seek to limit the day-to-day deployments of U.S. assets to the region, we must retain the flexibility to rapidly deploy forces and other resources throughout the depth of the AOR. Increasing port, airfield, and basing access expands our regional influence and enhances our partnerships while also building resiliency and survivability in the case of regional or global conflict. It also allows us to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief more quickly and effectively than our competitors, demonstrating the values, commitment, and capability that have made us the partner of choice in the region and beyond. Taking Care of Our People Command Values Improving diversity and inclusion in our force is an operational imperative to meet the demands of strategic competition. We must take deliberate action to build a joint force of men and women of all ethnicities, races, backgrounds, and beliefs. CENTCOM established a Diversity and Inclusion office responsible for advising the command on all matters relating to discrimination and institutional biases, as well as barriers to diversity and inclusion across the CENTCOM portfolio. This office is currently working on our Human Capital and Talent Management strategy to meet the demands of strategic competition. While diversity enhances and strengthens the command, sexual assault and extremism within the ranks erode the very bonds of trust that make CENTCOM and the broader Joint Force the most capable military organizations in the world. CENTCOM is fully committed to the prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Over the past several years, we have improved our command climate and prevention efforts in each of these areas. The feedback we have received from several command-wide surveys shows our efforts have increased trust, credibility, and awareness. Our command climate results show that both our military and civilian personnel feel comfortable not only coming forward and reporting any concerns, but also that they trust we will action it appropriately. Extremist ideologies conflict directly with our obligations to our country and the American public. Every service member and DoD civilian took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. Extremism desecrates that solemn obligation and erodes the trust and confidence the American people have in the military as an institution. CENTCOM conducted virtual training modules featuring subject matter experts and presentations by our most senior leaders and facilitated small-group discussions to build awareness and help prevent actions associated with extremist behaviors that go against the fundamental principles of our profession. This dialogue with our servicemembers and DoD civilians will continue, as will CENTCOM’s commitment to respecting the rights and dignity of the American citizens who embody our force and constitute our greatest strength. Operating in a command free of discrimination, hate, and harassment while accomplishing our mission is paramount to our success. COVID-19 Across the AOR, CENTCOM rapidly responded to the COVID-19 threat, implementing both nonpharmaceutical and pharmaceutical interventions, obtaining and disseminating personal protective equipment, and adapting newly-developed treatment guidelines to an austere deployed environment. Despite the pandemic, military operations and medical support for combat and noncombat casualties remain fully mission capable. Extensive public health measures, host nation partnerships, and robust medical support across the AOR resulted in zero COVID-19- related service member deaths. As of 17 February 2022, over 15,773 cases of COVID-19 were identified, resulting in 297 personnel medically evacuated from theater. Over the past three months there has been a decline in active cases with an average active case count of thirty-five. While many events were cancelled or postponed due to COVID-19, partners successfully executed larger, multinational exercises such as BRIGHT STAR, IMX, and EAGER LION. Anticipatory public health measures and effective implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination program detailed below led to dramatic reductions in daily active cases and theater medical evacuation. CENTCOM continues working closely with the Joint Staff, Defense Health Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency to identify requirements for COVID-19 vaccines and newly developed medications. CENTCOM prioritized forward-deployed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria for early vaccine delivery and voluntary inoculation efforts. In March 2021, CENTCOM significantly expanded vaccine distribution throughout the AOR with the intent to provide COVID-19 vaccines for all DOD personnel, dependents, and contractors willing to receive it to provide maximal force health protection. Following full licensure and OSD-directed mandatory vaccination, CENTCOM overcame ultra-cold storage and shipping challenges to provide the Pfizer vaccine more broadly across the AOR, achieving full vaccination rate of 97 percent among U.S. military personnel and civilians. Refinement of theater deployment physical standards for all personnel helped reduce the impact to U.S., Coalition, and partner-nation civilians. Continued entry of COVID-19 infected personnel, finite quantities of on-hand testing consumables, limited quarantine and hospital capacity in theater, and irregular resupply obstacles were effectively mitigated, leading to outbreak prevention and containment. Individuals must now be fully vaccinated as a theater entry requirement, which will minimize COVID-19 mission impact moving forward. Booster shots are readily available and encouraged for all deployed personnel. At the CENTCOM headquarters, relaxing restrictions on travel and movement in both the AOR and the United States renewed face-to-face key leader engagements and regular personnel rotations throughout much of 2021. CENTCOM was able to remove previously implemented teleworking procedures, with on-site staffing returning to 100 percent in June 2021. Effective public health measures and implementation of mandatory vaccination has provided long-term solutions to enable safe operations in the headquarters (both in Tampa and forward) and continuous support to forwarddeployed formations. Conclusion CENTCOM will continue to play an important role in commanding and directing a multitude of operations, activities, and investments across the region that maintain freedom of navigation, bolster our allies and partners against coercion, share in the region’s common defense, and strive for regional stability. Maintaining a sufficient and sustainable level of presence in the Central Region will enable us to deter Iranian aggression, while providing the capability to compete with the PRC and Russia and disrupt VEOs. It also will provide us the ability to influence and help secure three of the world’s five most vital transit choke points, ensuring free flow of navigation, resources, and commerce. Moving forward, how we establish our limited enduring presence will be closely watched by both our regional and global partners, with nations making their own decisions about our reliability in the long term. A tailored presence supported by an over-the-horizon capability will enable flexibility, responsiveness, and act as a strategic shock absorber and backstop to our allies and partners in times of crisis. It is vital to match aspirations with resources to ensure successful strategy execution in the Central Region. Ultimately, CENTCOM must operate forward, retain appropriate manning, and remain operationally ready in order to meet an uncertain, unstable future and support whatever policies our civilian leadership direct. The necessary oversight and deep support from Congress critically enable our continued success.

‘23 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON POSTURE OF USCENTCOM

MARCH 16, 2023

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON POSTURE OF USCENTCOM AND USAFRICOM IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FY24 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION: A LANDSCAPE OF INCREASING COMPLEXITY In 1983, US Central Command was formed to serve as a hedge against the expansionist goals of Iran – then in the nascent days of its new anti-American regime – and to serve American interests in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asia amidst strategic competition with the Soviet Union. On November 14th 1982, Caspar Weinberger, the 15th Secretary of Defense, who oversaw the creation of CENTCOM, said: “the central region is among the most important regions in the world as far as we’re concerned and as far as the free world is concerned.” The Senate Armed Services Committee’s January 17, 1982 legislation authorizing this new command explained that “US Central Command, alongside local and regional forces, will be America’s security guarantor in the world’s central region.” Forty years later, while much of geopolitics and policy has transformed, the security landscape of this part of the world remains largely unchanged. In many important ways, the region’s most vexing problems have grown more complex. Now, as then, the world’s geographically central region remains critical to American security interests, global trade, global energy, and global security. Today, more than a third of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal and more than a quarter of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. The region is home to almost 50% of the world’s known oil reserves and more than 40% of the world’s national gas. This part of the world produces 37 percent of the world's oil, 18 percent of its gas, and houses four of the world’s top five OPEC oil producers: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The central region remains among the most important regions in the world. A disruption in the maritime choke points flowing through the Middle East or the spread of instability throughout the region could threaten vital national interests and hold the global economy at risk. Four decades after revolutionary students overran the American embassy, Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, some capable of striking the entire Middle East and Levant. The Iranian regime now holds the largest and most capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle force in the region. The advancement of Iranian military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region; in fact, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of today is unrecognizable from just five years ago. Even more concerning, Iran has advanced its nuclear program such that Tehran can now produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than 14 days. In addition, the regime invests heavily in information operations, including broadcasting, coordinated inauthentic activity, and cyber-attacks. Alongside the state threat posed by Iran, violent extremist groups continue to threaten the security and stability of the region. For example, ISIS, long past its 2014 pinnacle of capability, remains able to conduct operations within the region with a desire to strike beyond the Middle East. Though degraded, the group’s vile ideology remains unconstrained. In Afghanistan, the reduction in collection, analytical resources, and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance assets means our campaign against Al Qaeda and ISIS Khorasan is challenged; while we can see the broad contours of attack planning, we lack the granularity to see the complete threat picture. ISIS-Khorasan has increased attacks in the region and desires to export those attacks beyond Afghanistan to include the US homeland and our interests abroad. The group also seeks to expand its operational presence and influence regionally and beyond. We are addressing this through the development of innovative Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms and increasing additional collection methods to build out a more fulsome threat picture. While Afghanistan’s security situation deteriorates, the United States has a moral obligation to safely extract the tens of thousands of Special Immigrant Visa holders, many of whom aided US troops as interpreters, translators, and advisors during our longest war. Meanwhile, strategic competition in the central region has grown more urgent over the past 40 years. Only now, the Soviet Union is replaced with Russia and the People’s Republic of China, both of whom seek to undermine American interests in the region. Russia looks to aggressively expand its foothold of influence in the region amidst its war in Ukraine. Moscow leverages its military presence by propping up Syria to garner influence in the Middle East. The People’s Republic of China aggressively expands its diplomatic, informational, economic, and military outreach in this part of the world. These challenges and complexities, combined with the opportunities offered by our partnerships in the region, form the basis of CENTCOM’s three strategic priorities. II. CENTCOM STRATEGIC PRIORITIES: DETER, COUNTER, COMPETE Strategic Priority 1: Deter Iran Deterring Iran is arguably more urgent than at any time in CENTCOM’s history due to Iran’s cuttingedge missile and UAV capability as well as its uranium enrichment program. As it was at the time of CENTCOM’s formation, Iran is the most destabilizing actor in the region. Today, Iran is undeterred from its malign activities, which include conventional threats to neighbors, support to violent proxy groups that spread chaos and instability throughout the region, and support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The evolution of the Iranian threat – the primary threat against which this command was born –is a story that runs the full timeline of CENTCOM history. Early in the Iran-Iraq war, the regime realized its armed forces could never fully recover from the crippling losses suffered during that ruinous conflict. Instead, to develop an asymmetric advantage against regional militaries, the regime invested in precision missiles with extended reach. It now commands an imposing measure of missile capability it uses to coerce, intimidate, and bully its neighbors. Tehran has also manufactured increasingly sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The regime now commands an arsenal of drone systems, ranging from small, short-range systems to modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to long-range One-Way Attack platforms. They are building larger drones that can fly further with increasingly deadly payloads. Until the United States helped secure the Yemen truce, Iran was regularly using Yemen as a testing ground for these weapons, threatening both U.S. partners and tens of thousands of Americans in the Gulf. Meanwhile, Tehran continues to furnish weapons, support, and direction to proxies across the region who engage in acts of terror and undermine local governments, all advancing Iranian interests. The proxy forces are more emboldened and dangerous through the increased proliferation of these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which allow them to target US and partner interests with increased speed, range, accuracy, and explosive capacity. This story grows more foreboding. Today, Iran continues to enrich and stockpile uranium far above what is needed for commercial use. Increasingly more centrifuges are the advanced IRN-6 models, capable of enriching uranium far faster and more efficiently than Iran’s first-generation centrifuges. The regime is now stockpiling highly enriched uranium under the guise of commercial use. The International Atomic Energy Agency report released on February 28th on Iran’s enrichment program reveals that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% has grown substantially in less than three months and that Iran now has sufficient nuclear material for manufacture of several nuclear explosive devices. The region is increasingly worried about a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran also puts itself increasingly further outside of international norms; Tehran continues to ignore United Nations Security Council resolutions, violate sanctions and embargos, proliferate weapons to its network of proxies and affiliates, and attack shipping vessels in international waters. The regime continues the brutal beatdown of the rights of its citizenry, crushing dissent, protest, and human rights. Iranian-aligned groups routinely strike at American troops and our partners in Iraq and Syria. Recently, Iran’s advanced weapons are seen on the battlefield of Ukraine alongside their Russian partners. Iran often aligns information operations with or in support of Russia. An internationally isolated Iran has clearly thrown in its lot with an also isolated Russia. Strategic Priority 2: Counter Violent Extremist Organizations While Iran poses the most ominous threat to the central region, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asian States also represent a danger to security and stability. The Central Command Area of Responsibility serves as the epicenter of violent extremism, with 19 of 21 top tier terrorist groups operating across the region. ISIS and Al Qaeda are the principal Sunni violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and Levant. Both groups maintain numerous affiliates pursuing local, regional, and global objectives. ISIS continues to organize attacks throughout the Middle East and must not be allowed to operate uncontested. Alongside our Syrian Democratic Forces partners, we continue to put pressure on ISIS in Syria. In Iraq, we continue to advise, assist, and enable the development of the Iraqi security forces in their fight against ISIS. We see ISIS in Iraq and Syria in three groups: 1. ISIS At Large. This is the current generation of ISIS leaders and fighters we face in Iraq and Syria today. While we have significantly degraded this group’s capability, it retains the ability to inspire, direct, organize, and lead attacks in the region and abroad. This group offers the most straightforward solution: partner with Syrian Democratic Forces and advise, enable, and assist Iraqi Security Forces until ISIS At Large is defeated. The two other groups represent far more complex problems. 2. ISIS In Detention. These are the roughly 10,000 ISIS fighters in detention facilities throughout Syria, and approximately 20,000 in detention facilities in Iraq. We rely on the Syrian Democratic Forces and our Iraqi partners to secure these sites, keeping this population off the battlefield. The Government of Iraq has sufficient infrastructure to keep these fighters in detention. The only long-term solution in Syria, however, is transfer of these detainees to the custody of their countries of origin. Last week, during my sixth visit to Syria since taking command 11 months ago, I again visited the Hasakah detention facility, which houses more than 5,000 detained ISIS fighters predominately from the terror group’s tactical defeat at the March 2019 battle in Baghuz. I observed the structural damage incurred during the January 2022 ISIS attack on the facility in which more than 1,000 ISIS fighters escaped. The vast majority were later recaptured by SDF forces. During that ten-day battle involving SDF and US forces, more than 400 ISIS fighters and 121 SDF Soldiers were killed. This population of detainees represents a looming threat to Syria, the region, and beyond. Syrian Democratic Forces leaders securing the site as well as camp administration officials described the detainee population as unrepentant and subject to further radicalization. One Syrian Democratic Forces official referred to the more than 5,000 detainees as a “ticking time bomb.” Unlike the first group, there is no military solution to this ISIS detainee population. We must support the Syrian Democratic Forces who continue to secure these sites while working with the countries of origin of these ISIS detainees to repatriate and rehabilitate or find a judicial solution. 3. The Potential Next Generation of ISIS. This, the most concerning group, includes the more than 30,000 children in the al-Hol camp for internally displaced persons and the more than 1,000 children in the al Roj camp who are in danger of ISIS indoctrination on a daily basis. Last week, while in the al Roj camp, I spoke with dozens of residents from at least 16 countries, including: Russia, Egypt, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, Canada, and the 9 United States. These residents told me that the vile ISIS ideology remains a threat throughout the camp. To a person, they all expressed a desire to return to their country of origin. During four trips to the al Hol camp in 11 months, I’ve seen first-hand that these children are prime targets for ISIS radicalization. The al-Hol camp is a flashpoint of human suffering, with more than 51,000 residents, more than 90 percent of them women and children, living in tents. These children have little meaningful education, no access to the outside world, limited hot water, and few constructive outlets to develop their potential. They are at risk of becoming casualties to an ideological war within the camps: ISIS leaders want their minds. As with the second category of ISIS, there is no military solution for this group. Our long-term goal must be the successful repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of the camp residents back into their country of origin. While progress against ISIS in Iraq and Syria continues apace, the underlying conditions that led to the group’s 2013 and 2014 expansion remain. The ruinous effects of Assad’s rule and civil war in Syria lingers, employment and educational opportunities remain scarce for many young men, and millions live in appalling conditions. ISIS’ vile ideology remains uncontained and unconstrained, and a seething hatred remains open to exploitation. Our continued, limited presence in Iraq and Syria allows us to assist the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces in maintaining pressure on ISIS to prevent the group’s resurgence to 2014 levels. The minimal U.S. troop strength in those countries allows us the ability to advise, assist, and enable partner forces with the goal of the enduring defeat of ISIS and the prevention of external attack plots against the U.S and nations throughout the region. Our support is essential to ensuring regional stability as well as protecting the homeland. In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s hold on security is maintained through ideology, continued humanitarian aid, and persistent abuse of human rights to dissuade unrest. Extremist groups see opportunity and ISIS-Khorasan grows emboldened amidst the chaos, seeking to expand its ranks and inspire, enable, or direct attacks in the region and beyond. ISIS-Khorasan is building a capability in Afghanistan from which to strike Western interests worldwide, with the ultimate goal of a strike on the American homeland. Al Qaeda remnants remain in Afghanistan. While the July 2022 death of Ayman al-Zawahiri set the group back, Al Qaeda desires to rebuild. Though this will take time, Al Qaeda remains a long-term threat to American interests and citizens as well as the homeland. Strategic Priority 3: Compete Strategically In addition to its primary role as a redoubt against the spread of Iranian-directed instability across the region, this command was established in 1983 to maintain a military advantage over the Soviet Union amidst Great Power Competition. This was, after all, in the moments after the surprising 1979 Christmas Eve Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – the first major combat operation involving Soviet troops outside of Warsaw Pact territory since the close of World War II. Today, CENTCOM’s role in Great Power Competition, clearly defined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, is more urgent and complex. Strategic Competition with PRC China’s goal to serve as the world’s leading superpower by 2049 puts this region squarely in its crosshairs. The US Central Command area of responsibility shares a 2,200-mile border with the People’s Republic of China – larger than the U.S. border with Mexico. China looks across that border and sees only opportunity for advantage in influence. Beijing’s willingness to take on higherrisk projects threatens American preferential ties and unfettered access. On its current trajectory, the increased technological and military presence serves as a growing strategic challenge to US partnerships, access, force presence, and security in the region. The People’s Republic of China aggressively expands its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region. Last week’s PRC-brokered reestablishment of relations between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia underscores the emergence of China’s diplomatic role in the region. China, dependent on the region for half of its crude oil, is also moving beyond energy-based investments to encompass physical and telecommunications infrastructure. Beijing also encourages greater military cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia, aiming to challenge our standing in the region. More than half of all the oil and more than a third of all the natural gas imported by China is supplied by countries within the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Expanding regional arms sales by Beijing provides economic opportunities, expands influence and increases People’s Republic of China interoperability in the region. China seeks to undermine American economic, commercial, and security interest in this part of the world to become the region’s leading power. And Beijing has reason for optimism here. China is often viewed by regional partners as more accommodating than the U.S., offering lower costs, favorable financing, faster delivery times and no end-use monitoring agreements. During my trips to the region and calls with regional Chiefs of Defense, I routinely hear how much faster and easier China’s foreign military sales program is than ours. While the American foreign military sales process involves multiple steps going through multiple layers of government bureaucracy, the PRC can move much faster, often making us non-competitive by comparison. Although this multi-layered process is a reflection of our form of government and U.S. law, it often has a deleterious effect on our ability to compete for the sorts of long-term relationships that the sales of major defense systems create. The Belt and Road Initiative remains a strategic lever to supplant U.S. leadership in the region under the guise of benign economic initiatives and broadening security relationships. Of the 21 countries comprising the CENTCOM area of responsibility, have Belt and Road Initiative agreements with China. Regional powers see the Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity to modernize their cities and societies to advance regional economic and social reform programs including Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Oman’s Vision 2040, Qatar’s Vision 2030, Kuwait’s Vision 2035, and Egypt’s Vision 2030. Three Belt and Road Initiative land corridors and one of the three maritime corridors transits the CENTCOM area of responsibility. As the US reduced force posture in the region, Chinese investment and influence grew steadily. Consider the following: • The eight-year period from 2013 to 2021 represented the largest investment period in the CENTCOM region in PRC history with $408.7 billion in commercial investments; • From 2015 to 2021, just as it was accelerating commercial investment, the PRC devoted $2.6 trillion in trade with CENTCOM countries; • In 2021, in Israel’s largest shipping hub, the PRC opened a new, $1.7 billion modern technological port which is significantly larger than Israel’s three international ports and supports large shipping vessels capable of carrying more than 18,000 containers; • The PRC is building and operating a container terminal in Abu Dhabi; • The 10-year, $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, begun in 2015, is the BRI flagship; • Saudi Arabia is China’s largest supplier of crude oil and with December 2022’s comprehensive strategic agreement, PRC reliance on Saudi crude is set to increase; • Huawei has 5G contracts with 19 of the 21 countries in the CENTCOM region; and • The PRC targets Iraq for influence and resources – Beijing invested $10.1 billion in BRI projects in Iraq in 2021 alone. China’s economic interests, transactional approaches and perceived lack of Chinese bias in internal and regional affairs, will continue to provide inroads in the region. Strategic Competition with Russia Today, 32 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's objectives are to weaken Western security structures in the Middle East and Central Asia and continue to challenge U.S. security interests and critical relationships in the region. The U.S. Central Command region holds a 4,750-mile border with Russia - more than six times the length of NATO’s border with Russia – through the Central Asian States. Since Catherine the Great in 1762, Russia has sought this region as part of its empire. The Kremlin has viewed the Central Asian States as its territory since the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The emphasis on ownership over Central Asia took on a fever pitch after World War II, when Stalin used the region for resource extraction and strategic depth. Putin seeks to take advantage of this proximity and history by establishing a foothold of influence leveraging longestablished relations and a perceived decline in U.S. engagement to challenge our influence in that critical part of the world. Russia retains extensive interests in Central Asia, spanning energy, military sales, counterterrorism, counter-drug efforts, and others. Today, Putin’s interests in the Middle East range from energy transit to security relationships to military sales. His overall strategy in the region remains largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine. Despite the recent damage to its reputation and influence, Russia continues apace on several fronts to preserve its influence and access in the Middle East. This includes sustaining military support in Syria that is indispensable to Assad and influential with Syria’s neighbors. Russia has more than 2,500 Russian troops in Syria, which Putin views as a base from which to project power and influence throughout the region and into Europe and Africa. Russian maritime forces maintain a permanent presence in Syria’s coastal city of Tartus. In 2019, the two countries signed a 49-year lease for rights to Tartus’ Mediterranean deep-water port. And, just as CENTCOM was formed to serve as the “security guarantor” of the world’s central region, Russia views itself as the security guarantor of the Central Asian States. However, as a result of the invasion of Ukraine, the Central Asian States increasingly view Russia as a threat to their sovereignty. III. CENTCOM’S STRATEGIC APPROACH: PEOPLE, PARTNERS, INNOVATION As it enters its fifth decade, CENTCOM requires a new Strategic Approach to guide all operations, activities, investments, and initiatives against these complex and confounding challenges. That Strategic Approach is defined by three words: People, Partners, and Innovation. People Throughout CENTCOM’s lifespan, its People have served the region, our Nation, and this command. Since our 1983 inception, our People have fought for and provided assistance to the citizens of the world’s central region. Over the course of four decades, they have displayed the grit, discipline, compassion, and empathy that the United States expects out of its military force. Today, our People – our servicemembers, civilian workforce, contractors, and supportive Families – serve as the bedrock of everything we do and how we succeed. They underpin all aspects of our strategic approach and drive us along our strategic priorities. Our People at CENTCOM are our greatest asset and our most critical resource. We hire, invest in, retain, and care for our People and their families. Partners Partners are our nation’s comparative advantage against competitors like the People’s Republic of China and Russia and serve as a barrier against the ramifications of Iran’s most destructive behavior. No nation can face the complexity described above alone. We therefore cultivate deep abiding relations with forces in the region that can serve as a hedge against threats in the region while deterring Iran from its worst, most destabilizing activity. We are in a race to integrate our partners before China and Russia can deeply penetrate the region. For China and Russia, partnerships are transactional relationships. For CENTCOM, our partnerships are based in our values and our commitment to the region. China views regional countries as possible customers and clients, while we seek partners and allies. Our values and our commitment make us the partner of choice in the region. We must always hold true to our commitments to partner forces and nations as our actions speak for us to the region. CENTCOM was formed to serve in support of and alongside Partners – the “local and regional forces” referenced by the legislation directing the formation of US Central Command. Today that focus is more urgent than ever in our 40-year history. For a period of almost 20 years, CENTCOM served as the priority resourcing requirement for the US Department of Defense. This was an anomaly in America’s national security history: the only period in which the Nation was committed to two simultaneous wars since World War II. With the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have significantly reduced our force posture in the Middle East. Without the large volume of planes, ships, and troops we had in the region just five years ago, we must integrate our partners into all security constructs to foster regional security and stability. Referring back to the Senate Armed Services Committee legislation guiding CENTCOM in 1983 – this command was established to serve as a “security guarantor of American interests in the world’s central region.” Today, we uphold that responsibility by serving as a security integrator: integrating our Partners into a framework of operations, activities, investments, and initiatives that will ensure sufficient regional security to protect our vital national interests. The kind of deep, abiding partnerships CENTCOM seeks is exemplified by the Coalition Maritime Forces, a multinational maritime partnership led by US Naval Forces Central. The Combined Maritime Forces, the world’s largest international maritime partnership, exists to uphold the rulesbased international order. Through this mutually supportive partnership, the 38 CMF participant countries counter illicit non-state actors on the high seas and promote security, stability, and prosperity across international waters. The realignment of Israel from European Command to Central Command 18 months ago has immediately and profoundly altered the nature and texture of many of CENTCOM’s partnerships for the good. Back in 1983, the boundaries of the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility excluded Israel; Secretary Weinberger and National Security Advisor William Clark were concerned that CENTCOM leaders would be challenged to build enduring, trust based relations with Arab military leaders while also partnering with the Israel Defense Force. While that concern may have been well-founded then, CENTCOM today readily partners with Arab militaries and the Israel Defense Force alike. In fact, the inclusion of Israel presents many collaborative and constructive security opportunities. Our partners of four decades largely see the same threats and have common cause with Israel Defense Forces and the Arab militaries in defending against Iran’s most destabilizing activities. Innovation Through Innovation we multiply the capability of our People and strengthen our partnerships to deter Iran, counter VEOs, and compete with China and Russia for influence across the region. Innovation will strengthen our partnerships, assist our operations, and allow us to increase progress across all efforts. In so doing, it will allow us to serve as that security integrator on behalf of regional security and stability. Innovation is not just about technology for us; it is innovation of thought, innovation of concept, innovation of process. We are building a culture of innovation and our partners are with us on this journey. For example, across all domains, through employment of systems on hand and newly acquired systems, we are building an interconnected mesh of sensors that transmit real time data. When viewed together through data integration and Artificial Intelligence platforms, this real-time data builds a clearer picture of the operating environment. Across CENTCOM, our formations use unmanned systems paired with Artificial Intelligence to give us better information faster. This allows us to employ our manned systems more efficiently and strategically and thereby achieve decision dominance. We’re able to cultivate information and use Artificial Intelligence to make decisions faster than our adversaries and use our manned systems more efficiently. The U.S. Central Command theater holds almost no assigned forces, and with the declining emphasis on defeating violent extremist organizations and the National Defense Strategy shift in primary focus to U.S. strategic competitors, our forces decreased 15% over the course of 2022 alone. CENTCOM force posture saw a reduction of 85% from its 2008 peak. With so many looming and existential threats in the region and such a strong possibility of chaos spreading and driving the region to again become a strategic distractor, we must innovate to expand our presence beyond those allocated forces. This is enabled by the creative application of technology and innovation. CENTCOM’s three innovation task forces – Task Forces 59, 99, and 39 – apply these concepts to specific domains. For example, the most advanced – Task Force 59, our maritime innovation task force – operates a fleet of unmanned vessels, both on the surface of the water and under the water. These unmanned vessels carry sensors which are collecting vast amounts of data. That data, pushed through data integration and artificial intelligence platforms, helps build a clearer picture of the operating environment. Through Task Force 59, 99, and 39 CENTCOM is rapidly improving maritime threat detection and maritime domain awareness and building an integrated, unmanned, and artificial intelligence network to achieve safer seas and stronger protection for global trade. Just this month, Task Force 59 completed a three-week International Maritime Exercise involving 7,000 personnel, 50 partner nations and organizations, 35 ships, 30 unmanned systems, and more than a dozen AI tools. The exercise, which took place in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and East African coastal regions, strengthened participants’ interoperability and command and control. More importantly, our international and regional partners are right there with us. Task Force 59 has established hubs in Bahrain and Jordan. Four months ago, Bahrain participated in a naval drill in the Gulf during which seven crewed ships from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Kingdom, and the United States teamed with unmanned systems. By the end of this year, our goal is a Task Force 59 fleet of more than 100 vessels – at least 75 from partner maritime forces – operating together, communicating together, and providing a common operating picture to all participating militaries. In addition to Task Force 59, which operates at sea in the maritime domain, we have Task Force 99, based in Qatar, operating in the air domain. Through implementation of Commercial Off-The-Shelf Technology and collaboration with industry and academia, Task Force 99 creates a technology transition ecosystem that allows increased awareness and faster decision-making and places cutting-edge tools in the hands of warfighters and decision makers. The task force’s three lines of effort (LOEs) are: increasing awareness of the air domain, accelerating the speed of the targeting cycle, and imposing dilemmas on adversaries. Task Force 99 also focuses on aerial drones complete with tailored payloads and other capabilities operating together to observe, detect, and gather data that feeds into an operations center. This increases our air domain awareness and rapidly accelerates the speed of our decision making. Task Force 99’s fleet of unmanned aircraft will impose dilemmas on our adversaries and detect and defeat threats to our systems and to our partners. Finally, we have Task Force 39, our newest innovation task force. Task Force 39 tests concepts and technology in the land domain with a heavy focus on testing new technology to defeat adversary drones. In the coming months, this task force will experiment with robotic sustainment vehicles. Through these innovation Task Forces, CENTCOM seeks to serve as the experimentation center for new drone-defeat systems, ideas, and technology, to include directed energy. At CENTCOM, we consider opportunities for innovation as limitless. They are boundless and cross all realms of possibility. CENTCOM is also accelerating the employment of Joint All Domain Command and Control solutions to combat operations to achieve vertical integration from the Joint Task Force and Components, all the way to the Joint Staff and National Command Authority. Every day, we drive Joint All Domain Command and Control capability forward to allow our People to make faster, more informed decisions in combat’s critical moments. As a data-centric warfighting headquarters, we’ve transformed our targeting process from PowerPoint slides to the employment of live data. Our goal is a Single Pane of Glass that builds better situational understanding and allows commanders to achieve decision advantage like never before. In late January and early February of this year, our headquarters led Scarlet Dragon Oasis, our Joint All Domain Command and Control live fire exercise on the eastern seaboard, the mid-Atlantic Electronic Warfare range, and across the US Central Command region. The operation successfully passed digital targeting data and mission threads between multiple commands across the United States, from Nevada to Utah to Tampa and our operations centers in South Carolina and Bahrain. From computer vision, full-motion video, and synthetic aperture radar algorithms identifying targets, to digital workflow tools improving speed and precision of targeting teams, to optimizing machine-tomachine communication flow, the exercise marked a critical step toward digital warfighting. Each of these tools, concepts, initiatives, and task forces are singularly focused on providing our People with the best tools, the most comprehensive rapid situational awareness, and the fastest and most accurate decision-making capability. This, in turn, serves a great benefit to our Partners and to the security and stability of the region. Innovation is about linking our People and our Partners with ideas and capabilities that enhance all efforts to deter Iran, counter violent extremist organizations, and compete strategically with Russia and China. People, Partners, and Innovation and the National Defense Strategy The strategic approach outlined above is heavily nested underneath the 2022 National Defense Strategy. By empowering our People, building out abiding Partnerships, and embracing Innovation, CENTCOM looks to allow the National Defense Strategy to manifest across the Joint Force. A flashpoint with Iran, a crisis in the region, a successful large-scale attack on a partner country, or an attack on the homeland by a VEO all will likely require a response, drawing resources not forecast away from higher priority theaters to the Central Command region. Therefore, a modest investment in People, Partners, and Innovation serves as a hedge against National Defense Strategy derailment. Furthermore, the Central Command region is literally and figuratively central to competition with Russia and China – a National Defense Strategy priority for all of the Joint Force. Our strategic approach aligns People, Partners, and Innovation against Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China and Russia, which the National Defense Strategy identifies as the priority across all global regions. IV. CONCLUSION: A VISION AND A PROMISE US Army General Robert Kingston saw the future. At the pinnacle of a career leading troops in heavy combat – Kingston fought in some of the heaviest fighting of both the Korean and Vietnam wars and was among the most decorated military officers of his generation – he was selected as the first commander of U.S. Central Command. A soft-spoken, battle-hardened warfighter, Kingston knew the central region from his time leading a contingency force focused on Iran during the early moments of the hostage crisis. He understood the unique set of challenges facing the new command and he knew that the answers to all of them relied on an enduring CENTCOM commitment to regional forces. In assuming responsibility for US Central Command in a ceremony on MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida on January 3rd, 1983, Kingston told the assembled crowd: “CENTCOM will require regional military forces to accomplish its mission for the Nation.” This posture statement is informed by my 14 trips to the region and the hundreds of calls, video teleconferences, and meetings with partnered Chiefs of Defense and their military component leaders in my 11 months in command. Those engagements crystallized in my mind that 40 years after Robert Kingston spoke those words, one thing is clear: CENTCOM requires regional military forces [i.e. Partners] to accomplish its mission for the Nation. So it will into the future. The challenges faced by Kingston and his staff and component leaders have only grown more complex. The threats, more capable. The competition for influence with external powers, more urgent. People, Partners, Innovation is our glidepath to deter Iran, counter VEOs, and compete strategically, allowing us to meet the challenges posed by these threats, complexities, and adversaries and ensure regional security and stability. We employ this strategic approach along a foundation of regional stability earned by American servicemembers over the course of four decades. In peace, in war, in years and years of sustained combat, in the toughest conditions faced by American servicemembers since the Vietnam War, these men and women bought time and space for American leadership and preserved our vital national interests in this critical region. From the Tanker War to the Gulf War to the Global War on Terrorism and many contingency and humanitarian assistance operations in between – CENTCOM troops have fulfilled the original promise of this command: “US Central Command, alongside local and regional forces, will be America’s security guarantor in the world’s central region.” Today’s CENTCOM servicemembers have transitioned this command to a security integrator. Those troops are the forebears of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Guardians who serve in CENTCOM today – the greatest men and women in the country, thousands of them in harm’s way as you read this, advancing American policy and representing the Nation. It is my life’s greatest honor to lead them. Armed with the right strategic approach and the right measure of resources, I know they will succeed.

THE POSTURE OF US CENTRAL COMMAND ‘24

7 March 2024

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD GENERAL MICHAEL “ERIK” KURILLA COMMANDER, US CENTRAL COMMAND BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE POSTURE OF US CENTRAL COMMAND

TWO VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CENTRAL REGION

I. INTRODUCTION

The Central Region faces its most volatile security situation in the past half century. Just a year ago, the region was on the verge of improbable and transformative progress. The strategic investments in our partners were transforming the security calculus in the region in ways unthinkable just ten years ago. The vision of an integrated and modernized region was on the precipice of actualization. The events of 7 October 2023 not only permanently changed Israel and Gaza, they also set off a series of reactions that have created the conditions for malign actors to sow instability throughout the region and beyond.

Today, a convergence of crisis and competition have enabled revisionist powers to fuel violence seeking a return to an unfortunately predictable pattern in the region’s history. Iran and its expansive network of proxies and partners saw a once-in-a generation opportunity to reshape the region to its advantage. They have accelerated their efforts to expel Western presence and neutralize our influence in the region, enabling a long-term strategic goal to further their revolution and establish regional hegemony. Iran knows that its decades-long vision of dominating the region cannot be realized if the region’s states continue to expand integration with each other and deepen partnership with the United States. ISIS and Al Qaeda, despite tremendous losses, remain committed to inflicting violence and suffering on anyone not aligned with their extremist ideology. ISIS retains the capability to threaten U.S. interests and is attempting to reconstitute in Syria. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia demonstrate that they have little capability or will to reduce regional tensions and are quick to capitalize on instability. Collectively, Iran, Russia, and the PRC are strengthening their  relationship, creating a chaotic landscape favorable for their exploitation and the spread of extremism.

However, the region is not predestined to this fate. The path of integration and partnership remains open to us if we remain committed to following it. The stable future envisioned by our National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) and shared by our partners can support broader U.S. national interests and is one worth striving to achieve. Despite Iran’s best efforts, the region is holding open its doors to security cooperation with the United States. It is modernizing at an incredible rate, seeking to shake free from the turmoil of its past, and looking towards a future of security, stability, and prosperity. Our partners in the Levant, Arabian Gulf, and Central and South Asia, remain committed to advancing the region – preferably with the United States. The degree of U.S. investment across the instruments of national power and the success of security integration in the Central Region will be decisive in determining whether its future supports U.S. national interests. Our years of continuous engagement throughout the region serve as the foundation for this investment.

U.S. Central Command’s strategic approach of People, Partners, and Innovation, codified in our Theater Strategy, reinforces the vision of a modern and integrated Central Region and supports a Whole of Government effort to secure our regional and global interests. Our strategic advantage in the region remains strong military-to-military partnerships, while our adversaries and competitors rely on parasitic and transactional relationships. We seek to integrate our partners, while Iran seeks to leverage instability to its advantage. We enable our partners to defeat violent extremists by catalyzing unified responses, while Iran threatens national sovereignty and regional stability by supporting and enabling sectarian militias. In concert with our partners, we drive innovative approaches, concepts, and technologies to address the many threats we face, developing solutions for real time decision advantage and creating strategic depth in our force posture.

USCENTCOM is clear eyed about the task before us. The shockwaves of the past year will reverberate across the Central Region for some time. Iran intends to seize on its opportunity, and it will not be easily deterred. The fight against violent extremism is not complete. The PRC and Russia will exploit instability at every turn to undermine U.S. interests and advance their own strategic positions. Beyond the region, we acknowledge there are a myriad of global challenges that require deliberate risk and resourcing decisions by our national leaders. USCENTCOM remains committed to the vision of a prosperous and integrated Central Region in which U.S. national interests are advanced.

II. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The Central Region remains vital to our national interests. USCENTCOM protects the security of the American people and supports the expansion of American economic prosperity and opportunity. We benefit from deep diplomatic ties and military-to-military relationships throughout the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), with many of the United States’ most steadfast partners resident in the region or astride it. We also have critical economic interests to protect. The Arabian Gulf contains around 800 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 2,800 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves – nearly half the world’s oil and natural gas. Twelve percent of our imported oil comes from the region, and it supplies the world with 15 million barrels per day – much of which goes to our global partners and allies through the Strait of Hormuz. Many of the resources that do not originate in the region traverse it, along shipping routes between Asia and Europe, passing through strategic chokepoints in the Bab al Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal.

There are also significant security challenges in the region. From Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions to the world’s biggest concentration of violent extremism, the security of America’s homeland, its interests, and the security of our partners are under threat from an array of actors seeking to prevent the vision of a free and prosperous Central Region from coming to fruition. We must ensure malign actors do not proliferate regional violence around the globe and to our shores. We must also be cognizant that our partners are weighing their options as they interpret signals that suggest we will reduce our commitment. Meanwhile, the burgeoning military relationship between Russia and Iran threatens to amplify their activities across multiple theaters. USCENTCOM secures U.S. national interests and addresses these destabilizing influences through three lines of effort: Deterring Iran, Countering Violent Extremist Organizations, and Competing Strategically.

Deterring Iran

For several decades, Tehran has pursued a three-pronged strategy for regional dominance: achieve a threshold nuclear weapons capability, advance and proliferate its standoff weapons arsenal, and leverage a vast proxy network to sow instability throughout the region. It is that proxy network, known as the Iranian Threat Network (ITN), that provides Iran operational reach throughout the region and enables its 5 offensive actions against our regional partners and global interests.

Iran continues to use its nuclear program for international blackmail. Last year, Iran continued to produce and stockpile highly enriched uranium well beyond what is needed for civilian purposes in hopes of gaining economic concessions from the international community. On 10 February 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced Iran had amassed a 121.5-kilogram stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, and 5,525.5 kilograms of enriched uranium overall. Should Iran decide, it could enrich enough uranium for three nuclear devices within weeks. A nuclear-armed Iran would transform the region overnight and forever, likely igniting a regional race for nuclear weapons and creating a security umbrella for its hegemonic ambitions.

Iran also projects power through its ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and other advanced conventional weapons. Over the last 12 months, Iran continued to expand its arsenal of precision guided weapon systems including ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges up to 2000km and one-way attack UAS with ranges up to 3000km. These capabilities enable Iran to strike every country in the Central Region and to range key U.S. allies as far away as Europe. Iran distributes many of these weapons to proxies in the region, presenting a high-end, multi-axis threat to U.S. forces and those of our allies and partners. Iran’s advanced weapons have been used by its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen continuously in the past five months, and they continue their illicit shipments – in violation of UN sanctions – on a daily basis. Finally, HAMAS’s barbaric attack on Israel would not have been possible without years of Iranian material and training support.

Not only does Iran actively undermine the sovereignty of neighboring states in the region by providing sophisticated lethal aid to its various militias, it also supplies countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Sudan with attack and surveillance UAS, with more customers lining up globally. Regardless of who pulls the trigger, Iran is unconcerned with ensuring its weapons are employed in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict. Iran displays its growing UAS capabilities by attacking commercial shipping, striking merchant vessels more than 1,000 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean. In fact, since 2021, Iran attacked or seized 19 merchant ships in international waters, and still illegally holds five vessels and their crews against their will in Iranian ports.

Tehran has long driven instability in the region with its proxies, but 2023 saw an unprecedented activation of virtually every facet of the ITN across the entire region. After HAMAS attacked Israel, the Houthis in Yemen targeted the global economy, Iranian Aligned Militia Groups (IAMG) waged a campaign of violence to force the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS out of Iraq and Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah’s increasingly escalatory attacks held Israel’s northern border at risk. Iran saw an opportunity to demonstrate the capabilities of its so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and manifested decades of conditioning, provisioning, and preparation. Since 7 October 2023, IAMGs like Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat al Nujaba, enabled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, have attacked Coalition Forces 71 times in Iraq, 102 times in Syria, and twice in Jordan, killing three U.S. servicemembers on 28 January 2024. The Houthis have attacked international shipping and Coalition warships over 50 times, sparking supply chain issues reminiscent of those during the COVID-19 pandemic and contributing to food aid delays in hunger-stricken Yemen.

Through the ITN, the proliferation of its ballistic missile and UAS capabilities, and the potential of nuclear breakout, Iran is executing a strategic encirclement of the region. They are emplacing forces, ideology, and weapon systems that can threaten US interests, allies, and partners from multiple vectors and at critical chokepoints with littleto-no warning. Now, more than ever, Tehran has the capability to advance its regional goals and threaten global interests. Houthi attacks threaten the free flow of 15% of the world’s commerce, while Iran itself repeatedly attacks and seizes international merchant vessels. IAMG attacks and Iranian political pressure jeopardize the hard-earned gains of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons fuels conflict on three continents. All of this is underscored by Iran’s status as a threshold nuclear state. With conditions now set, we assess Tehran perceives an opportunity to force the U.S. out of the Central Region, divide its neighbors, and take substantive steps to eradicate the state of Israel.

Opportunities for Deterring Iran

In line with the NSS and NDS, USCENTCOM leverages the United States’ unparalleled ability to integrate partners in pursuit of mutual interests. USCENTCOM’s role is gradually shifting from security guarantor to security integrator, and many of our regional partners are increasingly willing to coordinate with their neighbors to enhance the defense of their borders. Behind this trend is a growing recognition that Iran is their greatest threat. In response, we develop competitive overmatch among our partners by enhancing our collective capabilities and leveraging our network of regional security constructs. Middle East Air Defense (MEAD) is an example, as the regional integration of our partners’ air defense capabilities has helped detect and intercept the 8 unprecedented wave of missile and UAS attacks coming from the ITN.

Multinational coordination mechanisms aligned against individual domains, such as the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) help to address specific Iranian threats, like illegal ship seizures and arms smuggling. Even groups designed to counter other threats, such as the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the 41-nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) bring the world together in common cause to defend the rulesbased international order, which Iran is actively working to undermine.

We must continue to strengthen our longstanding bilateral military-to-military relationships. Just as our partners count on our support, we depend on our partners. A more effective foreign military sales (FMS) program will underwrite the trust among our partners and help bolster their capabilities relative to Iran as well as protect their own sovereignty. Beyond materiel contributions to any fighting force, our close partnerships enable access, basing, and overflight that will be critical to mission success. For example, our close relationship with Egypt allowed us unique access to expedite humanitarian aid at the outset of the Sudanese Civil War, in addition to our daily operations. Going forward, we must continue to develop the partner-enabled Western Access Network, which provides alternate routes to transport equipment and personnel throughout the USCENTCOM AOR. You cannot surge trust in crisis, and our partners must know we are there for them before we need something in return.

Risks to Deterring Iran

Iran believes it has the momentum to force a premature withdrawal of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, allowing them opportunity to expand its land bridge to the 9 Mediterranean Sea and revive the narrative of abandonment in the region. Further, the PRC and Russia would undoubtedly capitalize in the information environment by characterizing our withdrawal as a demonstration of American unreliability, hoping to drive a wedge in our global partnerships and assault a core premise of the NDS and NSS. Iran’s potential pursuit of a nuclear weapon could significantly alter our risk assessment. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a top priority with global implications. While we have not seen indications that Iran’s Supreme Leader has changed his calculus to pursue a nuclear weapon, we will continue to develop military options for the Secretary of Defense and President, should they be necessary.

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)

Five years after the fall of the territorial defeat of ISIS, the group’s extremist ideology endures. It endures in more than 5,000 fighters and operatives still at large throughout the Central Region and beyond. It endures in detention facilities, guarded by our Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners, which hold approximately 9,000 detainees. Finally, it endures in pockets of camps for displaced persons like Syria’s Al Hol, which currently holds approximately 43,000 men, women, and children. ISIS remains resolute in its quest to plunge the region into sectarian violence, impose its ideology, and eventually spread its influence globally.

Without the Global Coalition’s continued focus, ISIS resurgence remains a threat. In 2023, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) conducted 475 total ground operations and 45 total airstrikes, resulting in 164 ISIS fighters killed 10 and 619 detained. We assess our high volume of partnered operations has kept ISIS at bay; however, IAMG attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces degrade the D-ISIS campaign. Eliminating ISIS’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks requires sustained investment in Iraqi security forces, partners on the ground in Syria and a robust counterterrorism apparatus consisting of intelligence community and interagency elements.

The barrage of Iranian-sponsored attacks after 17 October 2023 forced CJTF-OIR to come off plan as we prioritized protecting our forces in Iraq and Syria. The ensuing spike in ISIS attacks demonstrates the gravity of disruptions to the international effort to permanently defeat the group. In the first two weeks of 2024, ISIS conducted 275 attacks in Iraq and Syria, the highest rate of attacks in the last two years. The Government of Iraq is rightly concerned that ISIS is taking advantage of the Global Coalition temporarily letting up due to IAMG attacks. Furthermore, Tehran is exerting incredible political pressure on Baghdad to expel the Coalition, which would all but guarantee ISIS’ return if it occurred before Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were ready to stand on their own. We would also be challenged to support our Syrian partners without a military presence in Iraq. In Syria, we saw ISIS increase intensity of activity across multiple provinces, as it enjoyed more freedom of movement due to SDF conflicts with local tribes and Turkish airstrikes that restricted SDF operations. A spate of ISIS attacks in late 2023 drove up the annual average casualties per attack to twice the rate of the previous year.

Disruptions in Syria also forced temporary delays in training security forces for detention facilities and displaced persons camps. We must ensure the SDF can sustainably hold ISIS detainees while the international community repatriates foreign 11 fighters. In addition to training guards, we assist with the maintenance and refurbishment of the detention facilities to eliminate vulnerabilities ISIS may exploit in attempts to free detainees.

We also train our partner forces in Syria, many of whom are women, to provide security at the displaced persons camps. The training is key to keeping the residents safe, enabling access for aid organizations, and preventing the spread of extremism. Nonetheless, the longer that displaced persons remain in camps like Al Hol and Al Ro, the more susceptible they are to ISIS ideology, making their reintegration into society more difficult. Alongside our partners, we continue to identify and detain ISIS facilitators operating in the camps. To prevent the next generation of ISIS, the international community must sustain the recent momentum in repatriating and reintegrating displaced persons in their home countries.

Our Central and South Asian partners repeatedly share their concern over ISIS’ pursuit of opportunity and capability to conduct external operations. The Taliban targeted some key ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) leaders in 2023, but it has shown neither the capability nor the intent to sustain adequate counterterrorism pressure. In fact, this lack of sustained pressure allowed ISIS-K to regenerate and harden their networks, creating multiple redundant nodes that direct, enable, and inspire attacks. Additionally, the Taliban has shown little interest to apply counter-terrorism pressure against the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), presenting a significant threat to stability in Pakistan’s border regions. We do not expect that dynamic to change. These groups have leveraged poor economic conditions, lax governance in 12 Afghanistan, and a sophisticated network to recruit, train, and sustain an expanding cadre of fighters.

Tragically, even as Iran undermines the Global Coalition in Iraq and Syria, ISIS-K killed 91 Iranians and injured 284 others in Kerman on 3 January 2024. This was the deadliest terror attack in Iran since 1979 and it is part of ISIS’ efforts to exploit the war in Gaza to rejuvenate its global attacks. In retaliation, Iran further destabilized the region by carrying out strikes in Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria, drawing harsh condemnation from both Pakistani and Iraqi governments and reportedly causing civilian casualties in two of these incidents.

Al Qaeda, while weakened, still enjoys safe havens in Afghanistan and Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) operates training camps, safehouses, and religious schools in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a counter-offensive against Republic of Yemen Government forces in September 2023, likely to regain access to historically supportive areas in the southern governorates. Both AQIS and AQAP continue to call for lone wolf attacks on U.S. and Western interests via their global digital reach.

Opportunities to Counter VEOs

The enduring defeat of ISIS depends not only on the repatriation and reintegration of displaced persons from camps like Al Hol and Al Roj, but the repatriation and prosecution of ISIS detainees as well, and our efforts to encourage this process gained traction in 2023. The international community repatriated 6,396 displaced persons from Syria, helping to reduce the population of Al Hol, the largest of the camps, by 18%. Iraq and 13 Syria led the way on repatriating their citizens, while nations like the Kyrgyz Republic also set the example, conducting 333 repatriations in 2023. The Government of Iraq stepped up its efforts to shorten the average stay in its rehabilitation centers, like Jeddah 1, which hold returning citizens until they can be reintegrated into society. This is also a moral imperative. In my six visits to Al Hol, I have met adolescent children who arrived in the camp as infants.

Our partners in Iraq and Syria, including Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service and the Syrian Democratic Forces, continue to demonstrate improving capability, capacity, competency, and will. In 2023, the ISF conducted five independent D-ISIS operations without Coalition assistance. Funding mechanisms like the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) are key to sustaining this progress and fully transitioning Iraq’s security to Iraqi hands.

In August 2023, the D-ISIS mission in Iraq took a major step forward when the U.S. and Iraqi governments agreed at the Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue to form a Higher Military Commission (HMC), a consultative mechanism for the Coalition’s transition. The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between Iraq and the United States, on a timeline that factors in the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements, and the capability of the ISF. CJTF-OIR, in lockstep with NATO Mission Iraq, will continue to train and develop the ISF until it is fully capable of independent operations.

In Central and South Asia, we can partner with countries like Pakistan, Tajikistan, and others to help them address the growing threat from the deteriorating security 14 situation in Afghanistan. Our partners in the region consistently cite counterterrorism as one of their highest priorities for cooperation and combined training.

Risks to Countering VEOs

Despite gains in the Counter-VEO fight, various groups in the Central Region retain the capability and will to target U.S. interests abroad in under six months with little to no warning. We assess an attack on American soil would likely take longer. The reprioritization of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, targeting expertise, and linguists contributes to gaps and seams in our ability to detect and disrupt plots, increasing freedom of movement for VEOs. This could be partially mitigated by additional assets and cooperation with our Central and South Asian partners.

Taliban pressure against ISIS-K temporarily disrupted the group’s ability to plan and conduct attacks against the Homeland and Western targets, but that pressure has been intermittent. ISIS-K and its allies retain a safe haven in Afghanistan, and they continue to develop their networks in and out of the country. Their goals do not stop there. They have called for attacks globally on anyone not aligned with their extremist ideology, and Taliban efforts to suppress the group have proven insufficient. The recent ISIS attack in Kerman, Iran demonstrates the group’s resiliency and indicates that they retain the capability and will to conduct spectacular external operations.

Safe havens like Afghanistan also increase the risk of VEOs inciting regional conflict. VEOs killed at least 2,300 Pakistanis in 2023, with TTP attacking Pakistan 881 times, the highest rate in over five years. In addition to hundreds of attacks by TTP, ISIS-K conducted at least three high profile bombings in Pakistan in 2023 and plotted to conduct 15 more attacks throughout Central Asia. The Taliban’s inability, or unwillingness, to rein in VEOs could destabilize Central and South Asia.

We must also prevent a premature Coalition departure from Iraq and Syria. If Iran and Russia were to succeed in their goal of pushing us out before our partner forces can operate independently, it is my assessment that ISIS would reconstitute the ability to seize territory within two years. The Global Coalition’s sustained presence not only helps our partners in their fight against ISIS, it also prevents the reemergence of territorial control and ensures the group does not have a safe haven in Iraq or Syria to plan global attacks. The eventual transition to a traditional security cooperation framework must be predicated on Partner Force Development and Security Sector Reform in Iraq, and continued repatriations, secure detention facilities, and a political pathway for the SDF in Syria.

Competing Strategically

Strategic competition is a contest of visions. The United States and our partners promote a vision in which the rules-based international order respects the sovereignty of nations and shared interests are advanced through the strength of partnership. The PRC, Russia, and Iran have deepened their partnership and collaboration as Iran seeks to strengthen its regional position, Russia leverages Iranian military support in Ukraine, and the PRC aims to exploit tensions in the region to afford them a position of advantage and diminishes US interests. According to public reporting, Supreme Leader Khamenei said in November 2023 that “death to America” is not just a slogan, it is a policy. The PRC and Russia increasingly contribute to Iran’s goals through direct assistance or 16 refusing to apply their own instruments of national power to discourage Iran’s malign behaviors.

For nearly eighty years, since President Roosevelt met with King Ibn Saud aboard USS QUINCY, the United States has formed a network of hard-earned security partnerships with the Central Region. These partnerships are more than just objects to be guarded from competitors like the PRC and Russia, they must be nurtured and reinforced. Our partnerships are strategic high ground and represent a core strength of the United States. This is evidenced by our rapid response to recent trade disruptions caused by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The U.S. Fifth Fleet leveraged its decadeslong relationships under CMF to bring together more than 20 nations under Operation Prosperity Guardian, which protects shipping through the critical Bab al Mandeb Strait in response to the Houthis’ indiscriminate attacks. No other nation on Earth could generate an international response so quickly, and it would not have been possible without the trust and interoperability we have fostered among our allies and partners.

Our partnerships in the Central Region will become even more valuable as the transformation toward modernization and prosperity continues. Our partners want the United States to be part of this transformation, and our competitors know this. In 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) continued to diversify its economy, exemplified by Western tourists strolling through massive shopping centers in Riyadh and ambitious megaprojects, while remaining dedicated to seeking peaceful coexistence with its neighbors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) catapulted itself to global prominence in space, sending an astronaut to the International Space Station for six months and providing the world with a new map of Mars from its Hope Spacecraft, the second probe 17 ever to successfully enter Mars orbit on its first try. Just a few months earlier, in November 2022, Qatar hosted the world’s largest sporting event, the FIFA World Cup, for the first time ever in the Central Region. American engagement has contributed to this transformation, and the Central Region of the future will remain open to those who continue to help it.

Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China

With telecommunications and physical infrastructure, diplomacy, and security cooperation, the PRC is rapidly penetrating the Central Region and feeds misperceptions of American disengagement to try to supplant the United States as the security partner of choice. In late October 2023, the PRC’s outgoing Naval Escort Task Force (NETF), which ostensibly counters piracy in the Gulf of Aden on rotational deployments since 2008, visited Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Pakistan before departing the theater. This unprecedented series of port calls was a milestone in the PRC’s nascent campaign to gain security influence and access.

The term “security partner” means something very different to the PRC than it does to the United States. The PRC offers discounted sales and rapid delivery of military equipment, and the region is learning the hidden cost associated with these quick sales. When Chinese equipment performs poorly, there is no maintenance, logistics, or training architecture in place. Furthermore, the PRC shows no desire to support the region’s security or stability with military forces. For example, the PRC’s NETF in the Gulf of Aden has done nothing in the defense of international shipping under Houthi attack, nor has it responded to the recent series of piracy events in the Somali Basin, instead solely 18 focusing on the protection of Chinese assets and interests.

Meanwhile, the PRC has also done little to rein in Iran’s destabilizing behavior since the much-touted rapprochement it brokered between Tehran and Riyadh in March 2023. Unfortunately, perhaps as evidence of the lack of depth of the arrangement and tepid commitment towards actual stability, Iran has continued its illicit activities, including continued arming of the Houthis. It is noteworthy that the PRC buys 90% of exported Iranian oil, which they could use to influence Iranian lethal aid to the Houthis if they chose to. Instead, Beijing only helps Tehran evade sanctions and accelerate its destabilization of the region. The PRC’s unwillingness, or inability, to leverage its influence has contributed to Iran’s disruption of the free flow of international commerce.

The Central Region is vital to the PRC achieving its goal of refashioning the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences and become the world’s leading power. Increased cooperation between the PRC and the Central Region advances its Belt and Road projects, strengthens bilateral relations, and helps regional countries diversify their economies. Trade between the PRC and the Central Region surpassed $436 billion in 2022, and its investments in the region under the Belt and Road continued apace in 2023, with projects in telecommunications, construction, transportation, and more.

A key element of the Belt and Road seeks to create overland shipping routes between the PRC and Europe through Central and South Asia, which could bolster regional economies but also carries risk. For example, Pakistan is the world’s third largest recipient of Chinese loans (behind Russia and Venezuela), receiving over $67 19 billion to fund the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Now, amid its ongoing economic crisis, Pakistan is vulnerable to PRC influence. We have also seen an incremental increase in Beijing’s political investment in the region. In the past two years, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, KSA, Qatar, and UAE became dialogue partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while Iran joined as a full member last year. This year, Egypt, UAE, and Iran formally joined BRICS.

We now routinely see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general officers serving as Senior Defense Officials (SDO) or Defense Attachés, whereas just a few years ago, these would have been mid-grade officers. The PRC relies on the region for its energy, importing 56% of its crude oil and 43% of natural gas from USCENTCOM AOR countries. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced last year by President Biden, along with six other countries and the European Union, offers a promising counterbalance to the PRC’s Belt and Road. USCENTCOM’s military-to-military relationships can provide critical and timely insight on projects that could be incorporated into IMEC. Time and time again, our partners tell us they would prefer to contract with U.S. or Western companies if a viable option were available. We are at risk of deterioration in our strategic relationships and losing influence to Beijing in the Central Region if we cannot effectively assist our partners with their security needs. Our partners recognize the superior quality of our military equipment but, as the advent of drone warfare has demonstrated, even a third-rate product employed rapidly and in large quantities can be effective.

We must improve our processes to 20 outperform competitors like the PRC, who has increased arms sales to the region in the last decade. We are also monitoring the potential expansion of PLA basing in the Central Region, beyond their current naval base in Djibouti and border outpost in Tajikistan. If the PRC were to secure additional PLA naval bases, it could give them the ability to hold our strategic lines of communication at risk. Even in ports where they have no intention of establishing a naval base, Chinese state-owned enterprises that own or operate terminals could give them considerable political influence to present us with logistical challenges in a future conflict.

Strategic Competition with Russia

Russia’s goals in the Central Region are different from those of the PRC, but they are no less intent on diminishing American influence in the region. Russia’s primary security interests in the region are maintaining its access in Syria, preserving its legacy Soviet status in Central Asia, and developing its military cooperation with Iran. Russia’s two largest foreign bases are in Tajikistan and Syria, both in the USCENTCOM AOR. Further demonstrating the region’s importance to Russia, Vladimir Putin’s only international visits since he launched the invasion of Ukraine – outside of the PRC, Iran, and Central Asia – were to KSA and UAE.

Over the past year the collaboration between Russia and Iran grew into a nascent military partnership. Iran has delivered at least 1,000 attack drones, and dozens of multipurpose UAS, to Russia for use in Ukraine. With Iran’s help, Russia plans to build 6,000 UAS domestically by 2025. After UN sanctions on Iran’s missile program expired 21 in October 2023, Russia now intends to purchase hundreds of Iranian ballistic missiles in the coming months, significantly increasing the risk of prolonging its war in Ukraine. In return, Russia agreed to supply Iran with its advanced Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, and training aircraft.

Our partners in Central Asia observed Russia’s unprovoked invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, and its military’s subsequent performance, raising doubts about its reliability as a security partner. Furthermore, the lack of intervention by the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite multiple Armenian requests, underscored the ineffectiveness of the alliance among the Central Asian states, many of whom are members. As a result, USCENTCOM has a generational opportunity to strengthen and expand our partnerships with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

We also have the opportunity to support U.S. European Command by coordinating across theater boundaries. When Russia uses the Central Region to evade sanctions or transport illicit war materiel, we can work with willing partners to frustrate its logistics. In addition, when we seize lethal aid that Iran smuggles to its proxies throughout the region, and when authorized by applicable law, we will work with the Interagency to transfer it to our Ukrainian partners, just as we did with 1.1 million rounds of seized rifle ammunition in October 2023. The growing military relationship between Russia and Iran is expanding to new domains. Apart from Iran’s proliferation of advanced weaponry with no export controls or end use monitoring, they are also cooperating in cyber and space. In March 2023, 22 Russia sent Iran digital surveillance software, and Tehran is seeking more assistance. As of December 2023, the two countries are reportedly on the verge of signing a new long-term comprehensive cooperation agreement covering defense, energy, and space sectors.

Russia welcomed Syria’s reinstatement into the Arab League in 2023, which boosted the status of one of its key regional partners while simultaneously ramping up pressure for the D-ISIS Coalition’s withdrawal. Syria’s reinstatement was a lifeline for Assad, who has depended on a mixture of Russian and Iranian support and funding from drug smuggling to sustain his regime. Additionally, Russia’s continued irresponsible and unprofessional behavior in Syrian airspace and on the electromagnetic spectrum needlessly raise the risk of miscalculation.

III. STRATEGIC APPROACH

USCENTCOM seizes the opportunities and mitigates the risks that arise in the Central Region through our strategic approach: People, Partners, and Innovation. My first two years in command reinforced the value of these three pillars. We’ve outlined this approach in our Theater Strategy, new Campaign Plan, and our approach to current operations. Our approach aligns with the 2022 NDS, which is a call to action to incorporate our unparalleled network of allies and partners. USCENTCOM will continue this approach as a security integrator in the region.

People

Our People – our servicemembers, civilian workforce, contractors, and supportive families – serve as the bedrock of everything we do. They are our greatest asset and our 23 most critical resource. Our goal is to instill in them a sense of accomplishment, purpose, identity, and belonging. We recognize that the top talent in the workforce, both in and out of uniform, have many options. As an actively engaged Combatant Command, we require the best, but also develop and cultivate expertise, so that the best want to work here.

We seek to attract and retain premier talent to meet our evolving needs. For example, we hired a team of experts to critically analyze our operations to ensure we do everything possible to preserve innocent life, in line with the Department’s guidance to mitigate civilian harm. We also maintain a cadre of Interagency liaisons to support a Whole of Government strategy in the region, such as our USAID team that enables us to support humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions.

Our partners see the professionalism of our Service Members as we engage with them on a daily basis and seek to emulate their example through investment in reforms across their military formations. Our Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps is the envy of all other militaries, and we are working with many of our partners across the Central Region to build world-class NCO development and education systems. In Central Asia particularly, our partners are increasingly seeking our help with NCO development, as we have done with Kazakhstan over the past 30 years. Our People are not just in our headquarters and in our subordinate commands, but across the enterprise that supports our operations, activities, and investments in the Central Region. Reductions over time, such as rank reductions in our defense attaché positions and reallocation of analytical support across the intelligence community, have a 24 cumulative effect. As necessary and logical resourcing decisions have been made to reprioritize assets against other emergent challenges, risk accumulates over time if cuts are made too quickly or deeply. Much like blocks being removed from a Jenga tower, the impact may not be obvious at first, but eventually the tower will fall.

Finally, we are committed to bringing on individuals who can help accelerate innovation in USCENTCOM. In addition to our Chief Technology Officer, last year we hired our first Chief Data Officer and an AI & Robotics Advisor, both of whom will enable our digital modernization and shift toward data-centric operations. We then initiated our Technology Residency program in January of this year. The program will bring in exceptional talent from across the industrial base throughout the year to support us on a three to six-month timeline. The Residents will partner with elements of USCENTCOM staff and components to help tackle the friction points we encounter in our experimentation, aid in our data modernization efforts, and contribute key skillsets that are not organic to the Department of Defense.

Partners

Both the NSS and NDS emphasize the importance of partnership. The trusted relationships we have built with our partners over decades give us an advantage over competitors like the PRC and Russia, and sustaining that advantage is key to our strategic approach in the Central Region. We help our partners achieve competitive overmatch versus Iran and suppress VEOs through security integration and dependable cooperation, such as timely FMS and Foreign Military Financing.

Our fight against ISIS depends on multilateral constructs like NATO Mission Iraq and 25 CJTF-OIR, and on our bilateral partnerships in Iraq and Syria. Our Coalition remains in Iraq at the invitation of the government. The Government of Iraq faces immense pressure from Iran to withdraw its invitation for Coalition presence, but they have resisted external manipulation thus far, even holding their first provincial elections in a decade in December 2023. Iraq is committed to cooperating with the United States, reforming its security sector, and realizing the full development of the ISF, which made strides in 2023. We are planning for an orderly transition to a normalized military-to-military relationship featuring traditional security cooperation. In Syria, the SDF remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, in detention facilities, in displaced persons camps, and at large – despite facing an existential threat and pressure from the Assad regime.

Our relationships with the militaries of the Levant Region helped keep HAMAS’ attack on Israel from spiraling into a wider regional conflict. We have stood side by side with Israel, ensuring it has what it needs to defend itself, deter Iran and its proxies like Lebanese Hezbollah from getting further involved, and plan for a transition to postconflict. Close coordination with our counterparts in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon allowed us to expedite the flow of humanitarian aid and facilitate safe operations for organizations like the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. Our partners in the Levant also contribute valuable forces and expertise to regional security constructs like MEAD and CMF.

Integrating the security efforts of our Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners is the linchpin of our strategy to deter Iranian aggression. GCC members are moving toward operational coordination in the defense of their territorial airspace and waters, bilaterally and via multilateral constructs like MEAD, CMF, and IMSC. Specifically, KSA is enabling interoperability by transforming its Ministry of Defense to mirror the U.S. model more 26 closely for national defense. Qatar’s Air Force contributes aircraft to our daily operations throughout the region. The UAE just completed its second company-level rotation to our Joint Readiness Training Center, with the goal of fielding a brigade completely interoperable with U.S. Forces by 2028.

Together, the GCC countries can stand strong against Iran. Still, the strategic importance of the GCC goes beyond any singular adversary. GCC countries host the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the headquarters for CJTF-OIR in Kuwait, and our theater air operations center and the largest U.S. military base in the region in Qatar. The Gulf is also home to the region’s economic power centers in KSA and UAE, and the diplomatic efforts of partners like Qatar and Oman have helped resolve multiple crises and return American citizens home safely.

In September 2023, USCENTCOM held its Central and South Asian Chiefs of Defense Conference in Uzbekistan for the first time in two years, an indication of our steadily growing relationships. Our Central Asian partners are cautiously optimistic about the prospect of increased security cooperation, especially border defense, counterterrorism, institutional capacity building, and military medicine. We are also beginning more advanced training like cybersecurity and special operations with some partners. With the region’s strategic location between Iran, Afghanistan, the PRC, and Russia, this momentum in our military-to-military relationships is invaluable to our national security but it also places constraints on our partners. We intend to continue cooperation, via programs like International Military Education and Training and the State Partnership Program, at a pace with which our Central Asian partners are individually comfortable. 27 In South Asia,

Pakistan has had a deep and multi-faceted strategic partnership with the PRC since the 1960s. Ties between the two countries deepened further in the early 2000’s as the two countries developed shared concerns about the rise of India as a regional power. Since 2015, nearly 75% of Pakistani arms imports came from the PRC, which represents 40% of Chinese arms exports, making Pakistan Beijing’s largest security customer. Nevertheless, Pakistan seeks U.S. security and economic assistance. Considering the weight that Pakistan carries throughout Asia, we must approach our relationship from the perspective of its own merits. Any security strategy in Afghanistan will require Pakistan’s help. They have invaluable expertise, access, and geographic location for countering ISIS-K, and they are willing and capable counterterrorism partners as they face persistent threats from VEOs like TTP.

Finally, our global partners provide invaluable contributions to USCENTCOM operations in support of our mutual interests. Our “Five Eyes” partners (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) share intelligence and commit forces across all three of our lines of effort. In addition, France continues to be a ready and willing military partner in defeating ISIS, countering Russia, and deterring Iranian aggressive action at sea.

Innovation

In USCENTCOM, we are not just experimenting with new technologies - we are developing innovative processes, building innovative teams while encouraging individual contributions, and responding to emerging threats in innovative ways. Importantly, our personnel use the capabilities that we are developing in real world operations today. We 28 are helping to create America’s military of the future, not waiting for it.

USCENTCOM has implemented a wide range of mechanisms and processes to drive innovation. The Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) software suite USCENTCOM employs today is drastically different from the C2 systems used in counterinsurgency operations of the past twenty years. The persistent and multidomain threat created by Iran’s ongoing proliferation of advanced weaponry to its proxies necessitates decision-making tools that enable seamless command and control functions from the tactical to the strategic level in real time. The importance of speed and a holistic approach in seeing, understanding, and acting cannot be overstated. The CJADC2 software suite we have tested, and now use daily, enabled us to thwart numerous ITN attacks. This momentum must be continued and accelerated through the Combatant Commands under the Department’s strategy. These efforts are complementary to ongoing work across the Department, and we have hosted senior officials from across the entire enterprise to share our lessons learned and help the Joint Force modernize.

Since January 2023, we have conducted a series of quarterly digital exercises, preceded by month-long software sprints, to develop the tools needed for CJADC2. CJADC2 is more than just a concept for us, it is a daily activity that we are improving with each exercise. By pairing operators with software developers, we are proving that we can use digital tools to improve our situational awareness, make our targeting more efficient and effective, improve our planning and sustainment processes, and embody true digital warfighting. Exercises like these demonstrate the value of hands-on training with live data and the centrality of robust networks in CJADC2. We nest our exercises 29 and experimentation under DoD efforts such as the Global Information Dominance Experiment series.

In addition to quarterly CJADC2 exercises, we have driven other events to encourage innovative thinking and solutions. In 2023, we continued our Innovation Oasis, a “Shark Tank” style competition open to the entire USCENTCOM enterprise. The winning ideas are rapidly introduced to the force, such as an intuitive software tool for managing force flow into theater that won last year’s competition and is already in use across the Command. This is indicative of how we look for innovative responses to our most pressing challenges.

For the counter-UAS problem, we developed a series of tailored “SANDS” exercises to address the problem’s many unique aspects, and established an integrated experimentation center in KSA where we can test the newest technology alongside our partners. Another example is cybersecurity. In 2023, we held a “Best Cyber Warrior” competition in Oman. Exercises and training events with our partners in rapidly developing fields like counter-UAS and cybersecurity are key to establishing regional competitive overmatch versus Iran. We also organized our subordinate commands to encourage innovation, with each now operating an innovation task force tailored to their unique domain. On land, Task Force 39 is experimenting with additive manufacturing, counter-UAS technologies, and unmanned logistics vehicles.

At sea, Task Force 59 has not only revolutionized how the U.S. Navy incorporates robotic and AI systems, but now contributes daily to regional maritime security, and encourages partner investments in unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles. Last 30 year we launched Operation GATEKEEPER, the largest operational employment of multinational unmanned surface vessels in the world. GATEKEEPER allows us and our partners to not only increase maritime domain awareness across 18,000 square kilometers in the North Arabian Sea, but unlike an operation with manned assets, it enables continuous presence.

In the air, Task Force 99 is testing a wide range of new technologies to expand our air superiority, including long endurance ISR platforms that can fly for days and low-cost 3D-printed UAS, some built for as little as $3,000 in eight hours. Task Force 99 is also experimenting with new tools for expeditionary aviation logistics and exploring new ways to detect and counter jamming. Our special operations innovation task force, TF 179, is developing digital and unmanned solutions for ISR, target information sharing, electronic warfare, and payload delivery. For example, TF 179 takes advantage of USSOCOM's rapid acquisition capabilities to field disposable, swarming unmanned systems that can be employed unilaterally or through a surrogate force for one-way attack, electronic warfare, or tactical ISR. IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States cannot just articulate a vision of integration and partnership for a brighter future that aligns the interests of the United States and our partners; we must match that vision with the commitment necessary to give partners the confidence to continue on that path with us. There is a narrative that the Central Region is too fraught with turmoil to be considered worthy of American investment. Twenty-plus years of 31 American military engagement in both Iraq and Afghanistan play to this narrative. But the past, while it may serve as prologue, does not predetermine the future. The vision, the hopes, and the ambitions of our partners throughout the Central Region are palpable and they are real. Equally real are those recidivist forces attempting to undermine those who seek progress, pulling them back into a past checkered with violence and disorder.

We are and should remain engaged in every corner of the Central Region, from Egypt to Kazakhstan and from Lebanon to Pakistan, strengthening our partners and securing our vital national interests. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and Coast Guardsmen are executing critical operations that contribute to the collective security of the US and our partners. They operate in harm’s way each day: whether it is an F-15 pilot flying missions in support of our Iraqi partners; the USS CARNEY patrolling the Red Sea and defeating Houthi attacks; a Patriot Battery protecting our forces and those of our partners; a Marine Task Force ready to respond to crisis; a U.S. Space Force detachment combatting adversary attempts at jamming; or a U.S. Coast Guard boarding team interdicting a shipment of Iranian weapons. The women and men of U.S. Central Command remain committed to the vision of a stable Central Region in which U.S. national interests are secure and our partners prosper.

Copyright Statement

Copyright Statement for XAWAT

© [2024] [Travis L McCracken, XAWAT]. All rights reserved.

All content, including but not limited to written works, images, graphics, designs, and other intellectual property, featured on XAWAT (www.xawat.com) is the exclusive property of, unless otherwise stated. Unauthorized reproduction, distribution, modification, or use of any content, in whole or in part, without prior written permission from the copyright owner is strictly prohibited.

How do placebos ease pain? Mouse brain study offers clues

NEWS

• 24 July 2024

How do placebos ease pain? Mouse brain study offers clues

The discovery of a brain circuit involved in the pain-relieving effect of placebos could lead to new treatments.

• By

• Miryam Naddaf

When people take a sugar pill they believe is a painkiller, it can lessen their experience of pain.

Researchers have long known about this phenomenon, called the placebo effect. But the biological mechanisms behind it have remained a mystery. Now, neuroscientists have identified brain circuits in mice that could help to explain how placebos can relieve pain.

Strong placebo response thwarts pain killer trials

In a study published today in Nature1, scientists traced the parts of the brain that were activated in mice conditioned to expect pain relief, mimicking how humans experience the placebo effect when given a pill with no active ingredients. They were surprised to see activity in the cerebellum and brainstem — parts of the brain that are typically associated with movement and coordination, rather than pain perception.

“We had no real insight into how [the placebo effect] was happening and if it was a real phenomenon,” says Clifford Woolf, a neuroscientist at the University of Harvard in Boston, Massachusetts. “I think this has helped us identify, indeed it is a real phenomenon.”

The findings might eventually lead to new ways to treat pain, says study co-author Grégory Scherrer, a neurobiologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. “We might have a completely novel type of drug.”

Pain-relief pathway

Imaging studies in people have shown that placebo pain relief is associated with activity in the brainstem and a brain region called the anterior cingulate cortex.

To investigate this further, Scherrer and his team developed an experiment to create a placebo-like expectation of pain relief in mice. Using two chambers, one with a comfortably warm floor and one with a painfully hot floor, they conditioned the animals to expect the pain of stepping on the hot floor to ease when entering the cooler chamber.

Using live imaging tools, the team identified a group of neurons that were active during the placebo experiment. These were located in the Pontine nucleus (Pn), an area in the brainstem that connects the cerebral cortex with the cerebellum, and has not previously been associated with pain.

To further understand the role of these neurons in pain relief, the authors measured the effects of blocking their activity. When their Pn neurons were inhibited, mice moving onto the hot floor were quicker to perform pain-relief behaviours such as licking their paws, rearing and jumping. Mice with activated Pn neurons took longer to lick their paws “because it’s not that painful”, says Scherrer.

Follow-up analysis of 4,932 neuron cells in the Pn revealed that 65% had opioid receptors — the same kind that are activated by powerful painkillers. The neurons with opioid receptors extended to three areas in the cerebellum, which was not previously thought to play a part in the expectation of pain relief. The researchers identified a group of Purkinje cells — the main cells in the cerebellum — that became increasingly active during the placebo experiment.

“There are almost certainly endogenous opioids that are participating in this,” says Woolf.

New targets

The research could open up new avenues for understanding how existing painkillers work and discovering new, more effective ones.

Scientists could explore how to engage the neural circuit in the brainstem and cerebellum without relying on placebo pills. Future studies might find “a way that would make it more reliable [to] activate the body’s own control mechanisms that can suppress the experience of pain”, says Woolf.

Understanding these brain circuits could also shed light on why some pain therapies, such as cognitive behavioural therapies and transcranial magnetic stimulation, actually work.

“The brain is a complicated haystack, and we’re often looking for a needle,” says Tom Wager, a neuroscientist who studies the placebo effect at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. This study “provides a new target that we can look for in human studies”.

Questions remain about what precisely activates the placebo effect in those who experience it. “What we still don’t know is, why does it occur in some individuals and not others, and why it disappears over time,” says Woolf.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-02439-w

Shining the light on progress: Canadian Photonics Fabrication Centre breaks ground on new cutting-edge expansion

Forward by Travis via 4o.

The National Research Council of Canada (NRC) has initiated a significant modernization project for its Canadian Photonics Fabrication Centre (CPFC). This project involves expanding the centre's capabilities and updating its equipment to enhance its role in research, innovation, and commercialization of photonic components. These components are vital for high-speed data transmission in fibre optic networks, particularly in data centres.

The Government of Canada allocated $90 million in Budget 2021 for this modernization, with an additional $25 million provided through the NRC's Office of Facilities Renewal Management Program. These funds aim to increase the CPFC's capacity and ensure it continues to meet both Canadian and global demand for compound semiconductor foundry services.

Key aspects of the modernization include:

1. Expansion of Facilities: A new 7,500 square-foot building is under construction, which will feature a modern clean room, a gowning room, and a wastewater collection system to minimize the environmental impact of the fabrication processes.

2. Equipment Upgrades: The centre will receive new metal organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD) reactors, enhancing its capacity for epitaxial growth with greater precision.

3. Operational Continuity: Despite the ongoing construction, the CPFC will remain operational, ensuring that there are no disruptions to its services or client deliverables.

This modernization is designed to support next-generation optical components, addressing the growing demand and ensuring the CPFC remains at the forefront of the telecommunications supply chain. The project highlights the NRC's commitment to maintaining Canada's leadership in photonics and semiconductor fabrication, providing critical infrastructure to support both national and international markets.

Access ya know…where is the cowbell?

December 21, 2023 - Ottawa, Ontario

Construction of the new CPFC building started in Ottawa on September 18, 2023.

The National Research Council of Canada (NRC) recently broke ground on a major construction project that will modernize its Canadian Photonics Fabrication Centre (CPFC) by adding capacity and capability for research, innovation and commercialization. The centre is a semiconductor fabrication facility that produces unique photonic components. These components generate, modulate, amplify and receive high-speed optical signals over fibre optic networks and are crucial for high-speed data transmission in data centres.

In Budget 2021, the Government of Canada provided $90 million to the NRC to update some of the fabrication centre's existing equipment and expand its current space. An additional $25 million was allocated through the NRC's Office of Facilities Renewal Management Program. These investments aim to increase the Canadian Photonics Fabrication Centre's capacity as Canada's only pure play compound semiconductor foundry and enhance its ability to better meet Canadian and global client demand.

As part of the modernization, the NRC is expanding the facility to improve critical processes for next-generation optical components, meet growing demand and see outdated equipment replaced to better support the telecommunications supply chain. Construction began in September 2023 on the new 7,500 square-foot building, which will include a modern clean room, a gowning room and a wastewater collection system to reduce the fabrication centre's environmental footprint. It will have the ability to host 2 new metal organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD) reactors for additional capacity for epitaxial growth with more precise control. During construction of the new facility, the fabrication centre will remain open, with no impact on operations or client deliverables.

Check back soon for more updates about the Canadian Photonics Fabrication Centre.

A 3-D rendering illustrating the new CPFC building.

Contact us

Media Relations, National Research Council of Canada
1-855-282-1637 (toll-free in Canada only)
1-613-991-1431 (elsewhere in North America)
001-613-991-1431 (international)
media@nrc-cnrc.gc.ca
Follow us on X: @NRC_CNRC

AN ESSAY ON COMBUSTION BY MRS. FULHAME

AN ESSAY
ON
COMBUSTION,
WITH A VIEW TO
A NEW ART
OF
DYING AND PAINTING.
WHEREIN THE PHLOGISTIC AND ANTIPHLOGISTIC
HYPOTHESES ARE PROVED
ERRONEOUS.

BY MRS. FULHAME.

THE FIRST AMERICAN EDITION.

PHILADELPHIA.
PRINTED AND SOLD BY JAMES HUMPHREYS,
Corner of Second and Walnut-streets.
1810.

ADVERTISEMENT

BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.

THE interesting contents of the subsequent pages, by the very ingenious Mrs. Fulhame, are assuredly deserving of more attention, than they have hitherto received; for although published so far back as the year 1794, little notice has been paid to the numerous experiments, by which she has opposed the doctrines of combustion, &c. advanced by the respective advocates of the phlogistic and antiphlogistic theories. How successfully she has executed this, must be left to the candid inquirer after truth, who, provided the end be attained, does not stop to consider from what source it is derived.

Whether it be that the pride of science, revolted at the idea of being taught by a female, I know not; but assuredly, the accomplished author of this essay, has sufficiently evinced the adequacy of her acquirements, in the promulgation of opinions subversive of a part of the highly esteemed edifice, raised by the efforts of Lavoisier and others.

That the work has hitherto remained unknown in this favoured land, where freedom of inquiry is so sedulously cherished, is matter of surprise; especially when it is known that many years past, the author was elected an honorary member of the then-existing chemical society of Philadelphia, a distinction founded on the merit of this work; yet the doctrines here advanced, appear to have been known to but few individuals, for they have never been comprised in the lectures on chemistry, which are given in various parts of the Union – nor, till lately, has the work been adverted to, in any of the numerous volumes on the science which annually appear from the British press. Truth however, at length appears likely to dissipate those mists, which, from whatever cause arising, have hitherto opposed the merited estimation of the author: in some of the late English treatises, this lady is respectfully mentioned; more particularly by the learned Dr. Thompson, in the third edition of his invalu- able System of Chemistry,1 when speaking of the reduction of the muriate of gold, whilst liquid, by some of the combustibles, but which decomposition does not happen when dry; he adds "for these very interesting facts we are indebted to the ingenious Mrs. Fulhame:" he then proceeds to mention some of her experiments, and continues "Mrs. Fulhame ascertained, that this reduction of the gold does not happen in any case unless the salt be moistened with water: when perfectly dry, it is not altered. This is not peculiar to the action of combustibles on metallic salts: it holds also, as we shall see afterwards, with respect to the metals. But it is by no means easy to see what makes water so indispensably necessary. It is not, as is commonly supposed, in order to secure the fluidity of the mixture: for Mrs. Fulhame has shewn that ether, though a liquid, has no effect in reducing gold unless water be present. She accounts very ingeniously for the phenomena, by supposing that the water is decomposed. The combustible combines with its oxygen, while its hydrogen combines with the oxygen of the gold, and reproduces water. This theory accounts very well for the phenomena; but it would require some direct proof to establish it completely."

The concession admitted in the last sentence, from so celebrated a chemist as Dr. Thompson undoubted- ly is, although in some degree counteracted by the concluding paragraph, cannot but be esteemed a strong proof of the merit of the opinions here advanced; and as a tacit avowal, of the inadequacy of the usually received explanation, in accounting for the phenomena under consideration.

Convinced by the forcible arguments and experiments of the decomposition of water being essential in all the processes here detailed, and considering the subject much simplified by the exposition given; I cannot but think the same reasoning would apply in many other cases, where some of the most active and energetic agents, are, by the present explanation, altogether thrown into the back ground. Thus, in procuring nitrogen gas from muscular flesh by means of diluted nitric acid, we are told, "that the nitric acid does not furnish the nitrogen gas is obvious, from its saturating after its action as large a quantity of alkali as before; consequently it could not have suffered any decomposition."2 That this deduction is not in the true spirit of chemical philosophy, which looks to the action of affinity, by which decomposition, and recomposition may at the same time progress, I have little hesitation in saying; and that the case adverted to is a compound, and not a simple play of affinity must be allowed, or we entirely destroy the agency of the most powerful body united, whose presence is nevertheless admitted to be essential to the process. If we suppose the nitrogen to be expelled from the flesh, by the action of the acid, which, with the water is also decomposed, we shall have a double portion of oxygen and nitrogen, which may thus combine. The oxygen of the water uniting to the nitrogen of the flesh, will produce a fresh supply of nitric acid, and whilst the nitrogen of the original acid escapes, its oxygen will unite to the liberated hydrogen of the decomposed water, to form an equal quantity. At the conclusion of this process of double affinity then, we shall have a quantity of new formed acid and water equal to the original, but in which the original elements, have changed situations. By this explanation, the acid retains the place of activity it ought to hold; and the necessity of its presence, is hereby maintained.

In like manner it has been said that sulphuric acid is not decomposed in aiding the decomposition of water with iron in procuring hydrogen gas, because it saturates as much alkali as before; but the same objections may be made to the validity of this opinion as to the former; and the process may be more reasonably explained on the principles of compound affinity. When the water is decomposed, its hydrogen escapes, but the acid is also decomposed, and whilst the oxygen of the acid oxydates the iron, the oxy- gen of the water unites with the sulphur to form a similar quantity of acid, which dissolves the oxydated iron. It would seem incredible, that in any other way, either the nitric or sulphuric acids, should be essential to the processes adverted to; and from these and other circumstances, such as, that a metal placed in dry oxygen gas does not oxydize, which ought to result, if simple affinity only was requisite; and by observing in all the late ingenious experiments of Mr. Davy, the presence of moisture appears to be essential in the decomposition of the alkalies, &c. although he mentions it, as only rendering them conductors, I cannot doubt the justice of the opinions deduced by Mrs. Fulhame from her numerous and well conducted experiments: and although it may be grating to many, to suppose a female capable of successfully opposing the opinions of some of our fathers in science; yet reflection will serve to satisfy the mind devoted to truth, that she has certainly thrown a stumbling block of no small magnitude, in the way of sentiments we have been taught to consider as sacred.

PHILADELPHIA,

February 14th, 1810.

PREFACE.

THE possibility of making cloths of gold, silver, and other metals by chymical processes, occurred to me in the year 1780; the project being mentioned to Doctor Fulhame and some friends, was deemed improbable. However, after some time, I had the satisfaction of realizing the idea in some degree by experiment.

Animated by this small success, I have from time to time ever since, prosecuted the subject as far as pecuniary circumstances would permit.

I imagined in the beginning, that a few experiments would determine the problem; but experience soon convinced me, that a very great number indeed were necessary, before such an art could be brought to any tolerable degree of perfection.

A narration of the numerous experiments, which I made with this view, would far exceed the bounds I prescribed myself in this essay; I shall therefore present the reader only with a few, selecting such as I judge most interesting, and best adapted to illustrate the subject.

Though I was, after some considerable time, able to make small bits of cloth of gold and silver, yet I did not think them worthy of public attention; but by persevering, I at length succeeded in making pieces of gold cloth, as large as my finances would admit.

Some time after this period, I found the invention was applicable to painting, and would also contribute to facilitate the study of geography; for I have applied it to some maps, the rivers of which I represented in silver, and the cities in gold. The rivers appearing as it were in silver streams, have a most pleasing effect on the sight, and relieve the eye of that painful search for the course and origin of rivers, the minutest branches of which can be splendidly represented in this way.

Notwithstanding this further success, I was dubious about the propriety of publishing this essay; I therefore shewed some specimens of these metallic stuffs to persons, whom I thought qualified to judge of them; some approved of them very much, and were pleased to say, that the invention would make an era in the arts; others thought it a pretty conceit; and others were of opinion that the stuffs had not that splendour or burnished appearance, which could entitle them to public notice.

The latter opinion had much weight with me; for it must be allowed, that the specimens which I shewed them, had not that lustre and polish necessary for shoulder-knots, lace, spangles, gold muslins, &c. that some of them had a reddish cast, bordering on the colour of copper, some a purple, mixed with gold; and that some of them were unequal in the die and seemed stained; which imperfections were owing to a partial reduction of the metal in the fibres of the silk.

But all these imperfections, except the want of that burnished lustre so necessary for gold lace, spangles, &c. I knew I could remedy; and therefore the criticism, as far it relates to them, had no great influence with me.

I am in possession of some pieces, one of which is about a yard in length, which have scarce any of these imperfections.

Moreover, that high polish of burnished gold, so necessary in spangles, lace, &c. would in my opinion, be a great imperfection in gold stuffs designed for whole suits; as a person in such a habit would look like a gilded statue.

I saw a piece of gold stuff made for the late king of Spain, which was of a purple colour, with gold wire shining through it, though rather obscurely, and it was much admired; I was so struck with its beauty, that I attempted to imitate it on a small bit of white silk; and succeeded, having produced a beautiful purple colour, with gold beaming through it.

Therefore, the want of that burnished appearance is no objection to this art; for the paler and cooler, to a certain degree, the colour of the gold is, the more lovely do these metallic cloths appear.

I made small bits of gold tiffany, which looked exceedingly beautiful; the fineness of the thread con- tributing much to that effect; and, in my opinion, such webs are inimitable by mechanical means.

Beside, though I am not able to make cloths like burnished gold, others of greater means and abilities may; for we cannot pretend to prescribe any limits to the perfection, at which chymistry and the arts may arrive.

However, I must acknowledge, that this unfavourable judgment suspended my intention of publishing this little work, until a celebrated philosopher happening, some time in October 1793, to see some of the same pieces, and indeed some of the worst, viewed the performance in a very different light.

This illustrious friend of science, not only approved of the specimens shewn him, but offered to have a memoir on the subject presented to the Royal Society: but different incidents dissuaded me from that mode of publication, and induced me to adopt the present.

I now no longer hesitated about the propriety of publishing; for, every thing considered, I judged, that though this art could never be established, which is by no means my opinion, yet the experiments themselves, upon which I attempted to found it, as they are new, and seem to throw some light on the theory of combustion, are not unworthy the attention of chymists.

Those who viewed my performance with a favourable eye were of opinion, that I should dedicate this essay to some patron of the arts; or apply for his Majesty's royal letters patent, in order to reimburse the expense necessarily incurred in this investigation, an expense so disproportionate to the fortune which supported it, that nothing but a certain fatality and the hope of reward, could induce me to persevere.

As to patrons, I have heard of such beings on the record of fame, but never saw one; on the contrary, it has been my lot to know of many whose malignant breath, as far as its deadly influence can extend, never ceases to blast the unsheltered blossoms of science. And as for a patent, had I even the means I should perhaps never attempt it; for if we may judge of the future by the past, I can safely affirm, that such an application would be vain.

Thus circumstanced, I published this essay in its present imperfect state, in order to prevent the furacious attempts of the prowling plagiary, and the insidious pretender to chymistry, from arrogating to themselves and assuming my invention in plundering silence; for there are those, who if they cannot by chymical, never fail by stratagem and mechanical means, to deprive industry of the fruits and fame of her labours.

But the British empire should not forget, that she owes her power and greatness to commerce; that she is, as it were, the hive of the arts, and should not, by the sulphureous vapour of oppression and neglect, compel her bees to swarm for protection to foreign climes, but rather permit them to roam in their native soil, and allow them, in the winter of life, to sip a little of the honey of their own industry.

The nation, whose evil genius withholds this protection, only sounds the trumpet of emigration, and must ere long lament her cities deserted, her fields brown with desolation, and herself the easy prey, and vile drudge of surrounding greatness.

I first imagined that the proper title of this performance should be, An Essay on the Art of making Cloths of Gold, Silver, and other Metals, by chymical processes; but reflecting on the imperfect state of the art, and that my experiments related not only to the reduction, but also to the calcination of me- tals and other combustible bodies, I determined to entitle it, An Essay on Combustion, with a View to a new Art of Dying and Painting, which includes every thing the experiments can extend to.

As to the style, I have endeavoured to relate the experiments in a plain and simple manner, aiming more at perspicuity than elegance.

I have adopted the French Nomenclature, as the terms of it are so framed as to prevent circumlocution, assist the memory, by pointing out the combination and state of the elements existing in each compound, as far they are known; advantages to be found in no other nomenclature.

However, the English reader must regret, that the French chymists have not preferred the terms air, and ammonia, to the less harmonious sounds, gas, and ammoniac. I took the liberty of writing the latter ammonia.

I have not related my experiments in the order in which they were made, sensible that such a narration would be tedious, and that a short extract from them would answer every purpose at present intended.

The experiments related I have endeavoured to arrange in such a manner, as mutually to illustrate each other, by contrasting the successful with those that failed, thus pointing out a general principle, which forms a chain through the whole, connects all the experiments, shews their points of coincidence and disagreement, and by this means furnishes us with data, by which I hope the art may be improved.

This arrangement also facilitates the perusal, and relieves the mind of that fatiguing attention, which must necessarily be given to an indigested mass of insulated experiments, that have no clue to connect them, but has on the other hand its disadvantages; for it throws a sameness on the work, incompatible with that variety which is often so agreeable.

My apparatus consisted chiefly of a few glass vessels for the solution of metals, and the formation of such elastic fluids as I used. The cheapest and the most simple of those described by Dr. Priestley answered my purpose.

Dr. Nooth's machine for combining carbonic acid with water, is very convenient for making small experiments with some kinds of gas, as the base of that machine serves to contain the materials, from which the gas is obtained; and the middle glass the cloth previously dipped in the metallic solution, on which the experiment is to be made.

The cloth may be suspended in this part of the machine, by means of a thread and a cork.

As this machine is useful only in experiments on a very small scale, I sometimes used tall glass cylinders, in which I suspended the subject of the experiment, by means of a thread, a cork, and a bit of cement.

This cylinder I placed over a vessel containing the materials, which produced the gas.

It is very convenient to have cylinders of different sizes, proportioned to the scale on which the experiments are to be made.

But machinery for confining elastic fluids is not always necessary, as most of the experiments may be performed in the open air.

It may appear presuming to some, that I should engage in pursuits of this nature; but averse from indolence, and having much leisure, my mind led me to this mode of amusement, which I found entertaining, and will I hope be thought inoffensive by the liberal and the learned. But censure is perhaps inevitable, for some are so ignorant, that they grow sullen and silent, and are chilled with horror at the sight of any thing that bears the semblance of learning, in whatever shape it may appear; and should the spectre appear in the shape of woman, the pangs which they suffer are truly dismal.

There are others who suffer the same torture in a still higher degree; but by virtue of an old inspiring tripod, on which ignorance, servility, or chance, has placed them, assume a dictatorship in science, and fancying their rights and prerogatives invaded, swell with rage, and are suddenly seized with a violent and irresistible desire of revenge, manifesting itself by innuendos, nods, whispers, sneers, grins, grimace, satanic smiles, and witticisms uttered sometimes in the acute, and sometimes in the nasal obtuse twang, with an affected hauteur, and contempt of the spectre; shrugs, and a variety of other contortions attending.

Sometimes the goblin, which thus agitates them lurks latent, and nothing is perceived but hollow murmurs, portending storms: sometimes the lurking fiend darts with sidelong fury at the devoted object, which if unarmed falls a victim to the grisly monster. But happily for human kind, the magic tripod drags none into its dizzy vortex, but those who are radically stupid and malicious, who are the beasts of prey destined to hunt down unprotected genius, to stain the page of biography, or to rot unnoted in the grave of oblivion.

Although the surge of deliberate malice be unavoidable, its force is often spent in froth and bubbles; for this little bark of mine has weathered out full many a storm, and stemmed the boisterous tide; and though the cargo be not rich, the dangers which may hereafter be pourtrayed on votive tablet, may serve as a beacon to future mariners.

But happen what may, I hope I shall never experience such desertion of mind, as not to hold the helm with becoming fortitude against the storm raised by ignorance, petulant arrogance, and privileged dulness.

However, were I not encouraged by the judgment of some friends, and possessed of specimens, to shew the progress made in the art, I should never perhaps venture to publish this Essay; as I am sensible it labours under many imperfections, which inaccuracy of observation and the drapery of imagination, must spread over the whole; imperfections perhaps unavoidable in such a discussion.

Finding, the experiments could not be explained on any theory hitherto advanced, I was led to form an opinion different from that of M. Lavoisier, and other great names. Persuaded that we are not to be deterred from the investigation of truth by any authority however great, and that every opinion must stand or fall by its own merits, I venture with diffidence to offer mine to the world, willing to relinquish it, as soon as a more rational appears.

November 5th, 1794.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION25CHAPTER I. Reduction of Metals by Hydrogen Gas37CHAPTER II. Reduction of Metals by Phosphorus69CHAPTER III. Reduction of Metals by Sulphur103CHAPTER IV. Reduction of Metals by Alkaline Sulphure121CHAPTER V. Reduction of Metals by Sulphurated Hydrogen Gas141CHAPTER VI. Reduction of Metals by Phosphorated Hydrogen Gas161 CHAPTER VII. Reduction of Metals by Charcoal177CHAPTER VIII. Reduction of Metals by Light199CHAPTER IX. Reduction of Metals by Acids215CHAPTER X. Oxygenation of Combustible Bodies223     Azote224     Hydrogen226     Phosphorus227     Sulphur228     Charcoal229     Metals232     Light231.232CHAPTER XI. Conclusion243Nomenclature247

INTRODUCTION.

THOUGH some of the phenomena of combustion were known from the earliest ages, yet no rational attempt to explain them was made till about the middle of the 17th century.

Before that period, it was supposed by alchymists and physicians, that sulphur was the inflammable principle, on which all the phenomena of combustion depended.

But Beccher perceiving, that sulphur did not exist in several combustible bodies, asserted it was not the principle of inflammability; which he maintained, was a different substance, common to sulphur and other combustible bodies: this principle he supposed to be of a dry nature, and called it inflammable earth.

Stahl refined this hypothesis by supposing the inflammable earth of Beccher to be pure fire, fixed in combustible bodies, and constituting an essential part of them.

According to Stahl, a combustible body is a compound, containing fixed fire, or phlogiston; and combustion is the disengagement of this phlogiston from a fixed to a free state, attended sometimes with heat and light: when these phenomena cease, the body becomes incombustible; if this calcined body be now heated with charcoal, or any other inflammable substance, capable of giving it phlogiston, or fixed fire, it returns again to the class of inflammable bodies.

This hypothesis is so simple and plausible, that, since the year 1736, it was received, though differently modified, all over Europe.

The principal objections to it are, that the existence of phlogiston cannot be demonstrated; and that it does not explain, why bodies become heavier after oxygenation, and lighter after reduction.

M. Lavoisier discovering, that the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion, is equal to the weight of the combustible substance, and that of the vital air employed, denied the existence of phlogiston, or fixed fire, in combustible bodies; though he grants the existence of combined caloric in them. He seems then to allow the existence of phlogiston, but to have changed its name to that of caloric and denied it the power of producing combustion.

However, after discovering that the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion, depended on the quantity of the air absorbed, he was led to the following beautiful hypothesis, equally simple as that of Stahl, and if ever any hypothesis deserved the name of theory, surely it is that of M. Lavoisier.

According to M. Lavoisier, "an inflammable body is nothing else but a body which has the property of decomposing vital air, and taking the base from caloric and light; that is to say the oxygene, which was united to them; and that a body ceases to be combustible when its affinity for the oxygene, is satisfied, or when it is saturated with that principle; but that it becomes again combustible, when the oxygene has been taken from it by another body, which has a stronger affinity with that principle

"When this decomposition of the air is rapid, and as it were, instantaneous, there is an appearance of flame, heat, and light; when on the contrary, the decomposition is very slow, and quietly made, the heat and light are scarcely perceptible."3

Thus all the phenomena of oxygenation, which Stahl ascribed to the disengagement of phlogiston, M. Lavoisier ascribes to the union of oxygen with combustible bodies.

And on the other hand, all the phenomena of reduction, which Stahl attributed to the union of phlogiston to calcined bodies, M. Lavoisier attributes to the separation of oxygen from the same. Combustion then, according to Stahl, is the transition of phlogiston from one body to another; and according to M. Lavoisier, 'tis nothing but the transition of oxygen from one substance to another.

Stahl supposed, that the heat and light attending combustion proceed from the burning body; but M. Lavoisier supposes, that the heat and light proceed principally, and almost entirely from the vital air.

However, this opinion of M. Lavoisier is far from being established, for Doctor Crawford has shewn, that inflammable air contains a much greater quantity of heat, than vital air does.

It is evident then, that the great advantage which M. Lavoisier's hypothesis has over that of Stahl is, that the former seems to account for the increase and decrease of weight, which bodies suffer during calcination and reduction.

Notwithstanding this brilliant discovery, which seems to account, with such ease, for the increase of weight, that bodies acquire during combustion, M. Macquer was of opinion, that M. Lavoisier's hypothesis was insufficient to explode that of Stahl, and endeavoured to remove the objection urged against the non-existence of phlogiston, by supposing it to be light; and that in every case of combustion, light and vital air mutually precipitate each other; so that according to M. Macquer, when a body is oxygenated, vital air unites to it, and disengages light; and on the other hand, when an oxygenated substance is reduced to its inflammable state, light unites to it and disengages vital air.

M. Scheel also modified the hypothesis of Stahl, by supposing that heat, light, and inflammable air, were compounds of empyreal, or vital air, and phlogiston. Light he thought, contained more phlogiston than heat did; and inflammable air more than either; he farther supposed that these compounds of vital air and phlogiston were convertible into one another, by the addition or subtraction of phlogiston; and that when a metal was reduced by them, they were decomposed; their phlogiston uniting to the substance reduced.

His idea of calcination is, that metals either attract empyreal air by means of their phlogiston, and thus form heat, or that they communicate their phlogiston to the air, and attract heat from the fire: and that, either way, there is empyreal air in the calces, which makes the overplus of their weight.4

The last modification of Stahl's hypothesis is that of M. Kirwan, who supposes that inflammable air exists in a fixed or concrete state in all combustible bodies, and is the true phlogiston of the ancient chymists; and as it can be exhibited in the form of air, its existence is no longer doubtful.

M. Kirwan supposes, that when combustible bodies are calcined, or changed into acids, they combine most commonly with fixed air, formed during the operation, by the union of their phlogiston to vital air; and sometimes to other substances, and water, which is either absorbed in specie, or formed by the union of their phlogiston to vital air, during calcination.

He supposes, that some of these are restored to their combustible state by the decomposition of their fixed air; some partly by the decomposition of their fixed air, and partly by its expulsion, and that of the other foreign bodies they had absorbed; and lastly, that some recover their combustibility by the expulsion of water, and others possibly by its decomposition in high degrees of heat. In all these reductions he supposes a simultaneous reunion of these bodies to phlogiston, or the inflammable principle.5

Though M. Kirwan's hypothesis seems to account for the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion, yet he has not proved the existence of inflammable air in a concrete state, in all combustible bodies; nor has he shewn, that fixed air is a compound of inflammable and vital air; neither has he proved, that fixed air is the acidifying principle.

All these objections have been made, with great justice to his hypothesis, by the Antiphlogistians; who also object, that M. Kirwan's account of calcination and reduction is complex, and repugnant to the simplicity of nature; "for," says M. De Four- croy,"as the author had admitted three general species of calcination, it was necessary, that he should likewise admit three kinds of reduction."6

This criticism is very just; but it will appear, that the antiphlogistic account of calcination and reduction is no less complex, erroneous and repugnant to the simplicity of nature; for when we consider the various sources, whence they derive the oxygen; which oxygenates bodies, and the long list of metallic reducers, which they suppose; it must be allowed that if simplicity be a recommendation, their hypothesis is destitute of that advantage.

Thus, according to M. Lavoisier the oxygen which oxygenates combustible bodies, is sometimes derived from vital air, sometimes from atmospheric air, sometimes from acids, sometimes from water, and sometimes from metallic oxids, &c.

On the other hand, the catalogue of substances which reduce bodies to their combustible state, is no less numerous.

"Heat," says M. De Fourcroy, "separates oxygene from some; one metal takes it from another; hydrogene, or inflammable gas, takes it from most metals, and carbon perhaps from all."7

To this list may be added phosphorus, sulphur, and compounds of these with hydrogen; also light and the electric fluid, &c. as will appear in the sequel.

But I shall endeavour to shew, that the hydrogen of water is the only substance, that restores oxygenated bodies to their combustible state; and that water is the only source of the oxygen, which oxygenates combustible bodies.

Want of simplicity is not the only defect in Mr. Lavoisier's hypothesis: for he supposes, that the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion, depends on the absorption of the oxygenous principle alone.

Thus when a bit of phosphorus, sulphur or charcoal, is burnt in vital air; the increase of weight, which these bodies acquire, he attributes entirely to oxygen, or the base of vital air.

These combustions he explains, by supposing that the phosphorus, sulphur, and charcoal, decompose oxygen gas, by absorbing its base from caloric and light, which are set free.

"There is," says M. Lavoisier, "a total absorption of vital air, or rather of the oxygene, which forms its base in the combustion of phosphorus, and the weight of the phosphoric acid obtained, is found to be rigorously equal to the weight of the phosphorus, added to that of the vital air employed in its combustion. The same agreement of weights is observed in the combustion of imflammable gas and vital air, in the combustion of charcoal,"8 &c.

His idea of calcination of metals is the same.

"We do not," says M. Lavoisier, "affirm that vital air combines with metals to form metallic calces, because this manner of enunciating would not be sufficiently accurate: but we say, when a metal is heated to a certain temperature, and when its particles are separated from each other to a certain distance by heat, and their attraction to each other is sufficiently diminished, it becomes capable of decomposing vital air, from which it seizes the base, namely oxygene, and sets the other principle, namely caloric, at liberty.

"This explanation of what passes during the calcination is not an hypothesis, but the result of facts: It is upwards of twelve years, since the proofs have been laid by one of us, before the eyes of the academy, and have been verified by a numerous commission. It was then established, that when the calcination of metals is effected beneath an inverted glass vessel, or in closed vessels containing known quantities of air, the air itself is decomposed, and the weight of the metal becomes augmented by a quantity accurately equal to that of the air absorbed. It has since been found, that when the operation was performed in very pure vital air, the whole might be absorbed.

"No supposition enters into these explanations; the whole is proved by weight and measure."9

Hence it is evident, that M. Lavoisier confounds oxygen with oxygen gas, and considers the latter as a compound of oxygen, light, and caloric.

But since the dryest oxygen gas contains a large proportion of water, as Dr. Priestley and M. Kirwan have shewn;10 and since the whole of the gas, except the caloric and light, is absorbed, it necessarily follows that the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion, depends not only on the oxygen, but also on the water, contained in vital air.

Therefore oxids are compounds of combustible bodies united to oxygen, and water.

Another great objection to M. Lavoisier's hypothesis is, that he supposes both oxygenation, and reduction, effected by a single affinity.

Thus according to him, when iron reduces a sulphate of copper, the iron does nothing more than separate the oxygen from the copper, by its superior attraction for that principle.

From this view of combustion, grounded on the most accurate experiments in chymistry, it is manifest that the antiphlogistic hypothesis does not account fully for the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion; and consequently, that it cannot be admitted as a just theory.

COMBUSTION,
&c. &c.

CHAPTER I.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
HYDROGEN GAS.

AS Hydrogen, or the base of inflammable air, seems to act an important part in the following experiments, and is, according to some chymists, pure phlogiston itself; I have therefore assigned the first chapter in this essay to hydrogen gas, this being the most simple form, in which hydrogen has hitherto been obtained.

But I had not the means of procuring this gas free of carbon, and other impurities, that it dissolves and elevates during its formation; or of excluding atmospheric air, which circumstances, I am sensible, must, in some measure, influence the result; as it cannot be supposed, that these extraneous bodies would remain inactive during the process of reduction. However, as such exactness is not in the power of every experimenter, I was under a necessity of using hydrogen gas, with the disadvantages here mentioned.

Though most of the experiments in this essay were made on a variety of white and coloured silks, I shall relate only those made on the former, as it exhibits the changes produced more distinctly, and contains less foreign matter to modify the result of experiment; and, for brevity's sake, I shall use the term silk, by which white silk is always designed.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

I poured a quantity of sulphuric ether on a solution of gold in nitro muriatic acid, and, by this means, obtained a solution of gold in ether, which I separated from the acid.

In this ethereal solution of gold, I dipped a piece of silk; after it was taken out, and the ether evaporated, it was suspended in a tall glass cylinder, placed over a vessel, containing a mixture of diluted sulphuric acid, and iron filings.

The silk thus exposed to a rapid current of hydrogen gas acquired, after some time, a purple colour, and a large spangle of gold, of an irregular figure, appeared on the upper end of the silk, and looked very brilliant.

The silk was kept exposed to the gas about four months, and frequently observed, but no other remarkable change was perceived, except that the purple colour became more intense: the experiment was now discontinued; and on taking out the silk, and examining it in the light of the sun, particles of reduced gold were observed; but they were very small, and by no means so brilliant, as that, which first appeared.

During the experiment, fresh quantities of materials for supplying hydrogen gas were occasionally added.

From the brilliant spangle of reduced gold observed in this experiment, I concluded, that there was a sufficient quantity of the metal in the fibres of the silk, could it be reduced.

This spot of reduced gold was very permanent, and adhered firmly to the silk.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

In order to determine, whether a solution of gold in ether, or one in water, were best adapted to the object of these experiments; I evaporated to dryness a solution of gold in nitro-muriatic acid, and dissolved the salt in distilled water: in this solution, I immersed a piece of silk, which, after it was dried in the air, was suspended in a glass cylinder, like the former piece, and exposed to the action of hydrogen gas about two months.

The silk after some time assumed a purple colour, and five or six specks of reduced gold, of the size of pin heads, and one much larger, were observed. Examining the silk in the sun-beams, I perceived the whole of it spangled with minute particles of reduced gold.

After many experiments with these two solutions of gold, I was led to conclude, that the solution in water answered best.

EXPERIMENT III.

SILVER.

Having dissolved some pure silver in diluted nitric acid, and evaporated some of the water by a gentle heat, I placed it in the dark to crystallize The crystals were separated from the solution, and dissolved in distilled water; to one measure of this solution, which was saturated with the nitrate of silver, ten or twelve measures of distilled water were added.

In this diluted solution, a piece of silk was dipped; after it was taken out, it was dried at the fire: the silk dried in this manner, retained its white colour; whereas, were it dried gradually in the air; and especially, were the light considerable, its white colour would be changed to a reddish brown, more or less intense, according to the quantity of light present.

Some kinds of silk, on being immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver, have some of their threads immediately coloured brown; but I often got white silk, which would retain its pure white colour, if dried at the fire, or in the dark.

The piece of silk dried, as above, was suspended in the middle glass of Dr. Nooth's machine; and in- to the lower glass were introduced a diluted solution ef sulphuric acid, and some small iron nails.

The machine was now placed in a dark closet, to exclude the action of light; after some time, the silk, thus exposed to hydrogen gas, put on a light brown colour, which gradually became deeper, until it was changed to a disagreeable black, with some mixture of brown: then very small particles of reduced silver began to appear, which increased by degrees, in number, and brightness.

The experiment was continued four months; after which time, the silk was taken out of the machine: it had a gray metallic appearance, intermixed with a considerable tinge of brown.

This experiment was repeated on another piece of silk, every circumstance being the same, except that a quantity of water was put in the middle glass of the machine, over which the silk was suspended; the intention of interposing the water in this experiment was to purify the gas.

The appearances were much the same, as in the last experiment; except that the silk became black sooner; and that some spangles of the silver were larger, and better reduced.

The specks of reduced silver were permanent, and adhered firmly to the silk.

EXPERIMENT IV.

LEAD.

In a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water I dipped a piece of silk, and dried it in the air; it was then suspended over a quantity of water in Dr. Nooth's machine, and exposed to hydrogen gas about three months.

The appearances were much the same as in the last experiment, except that the silk was not so black: the particles of reduced lead resembled silver.

Similar experiments were made in this machine on bits of silk imbued with a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water; but the appearances being much the same as those mentioned in the first and second experiments, it is unnecessary to repeat them here.

It is much easier to imagine, than express my anxiety, to discover the cause of the brilliant specks of reduced gold and silver, with which the pieces of silk in these experiments were sometimes spangled; concluding, that were the cause ascertained, it would be a considerable step towards accomplishing the object in view.

But many and diversified were the experiments I made before the circumstance, on which the spangles depended, was perceived.

At length, I found it depended on the presence of moisture; and that the spangles of reduced metal were owing to small drops of water carried up by the elastic fluid, and deposited on the silk.

The experiments, which led to this conclusion, shall be related in their proper places. I shall now proceed to recite the remainder of the experiments in this essay, conformable to the plan laid down in the preface, premising an occurrence observed in the course of them.

I sometimes found, that the production of hydrogen gas from a mixture of acid, water, and iron nails, would unexpectedly stop, which induced me to add more acid; this not succeeding, I added more water, but still no gas was formed: the proportions of acid and water were varied without effect. Thinking the mixture of acid and water unfit for the purpose, I poured it off, and repeatedly washed and agitated the nails with more water, which was also poured off; but happening inadvertently to add some of the mixture of acid and water, which I had before poured off as unfit for use, I was surprised to find the gas produced with great rapidity.

Reflecting on the cause of this odd circumstance, I concluded that it depended on a crust of superoxygenated iron, formed on the surface of the nails, which defended them from the action of the water and acid, and that this crust was removed by the agitation and washing, which enabled the diluted acid to act again on the iron.

EXPERIMENT V.

GOLD.

I immersed a bit of silk in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in distilled water, and dried it in the air; it was then placed over a cylindrical glass vessel, containing a mixture of diluted sulphuric acid and iron nails, for about half an hour; but no reduction of the metal could be observed.

I dipped another bit of silk in the same solution of gold, and exposed it, while wet to the same current of hydrogen gas, and instantly signs of reduction appeared; for the yellow colour, which the solution imparts to silk, began to change to a green, and very soon a film of reduced gold glittered on the surface opposed to the gas: shortly after, a beautiful blue spot, fringed with orange and purple, was formed on the middle of the silk. During the experiment, which lasted about half an hour, the silk was kept constantly wet with distilled water.

When experiments are made with this preparation of gold, it is necessary to evaporate the solution to dryness, before the salt be dissolved in the water; as an excess of acid prevents the reduction in a great measure. Solutions of gold in these experiments do not admit of being so largely diluted, as solutions of silver, and other metals do.

EXPERIMENT VI.

SILVER.

I immersed a piece of silk in a solution of nitrate of silver, and dried it in a dark place; it was then exposed to a current of hydrogen gas about twenty minutes; but no reduced silver appeared, the only change observable was a brown stain.

I immersed another bit of the same silk in the same solution of silver, and having exposed it, while wet, to a stream of hydrogen gas, I soon observed evident signs of reduction; the white colour of the silk was changed to a brown, which became gradually more intense; and the surface of the silk, opposed to the gas, was coated with reduced silver: various colours, as blue, purple, red, orange, and yellow, attended the reduction. These colours often change, and are succeeded by others in the progress of the reduction. The threads of the silk look like silver wire, tarnished in some parts, but of great lustre in others.

The silk was kept wet with distilled water during the experiment. When the silk happened to be too much wetted, the under surface opposed to the gas was often covered with scales of a dull blue colour: these, after the silk dries, may be brushed off, and another coat of reduced silver, which adheres firmly, but has no considerable brightness, is left behind.

These experiments on the reduction of gold, and silver, were often repeated with nearly the same result.

EXPERIMENT VII.

SILVER.

Thinking some other preparation of silver might answer better than a nitrate, I precipitated some of the latter with a solution of muriate of soda, and poured the whole on a filter; the precipitate was well washed with distilled water, and dissolved in ammonia. In this solution I immersed a piece of silk, and dried it in the air; and having exposed it to the action of hydrogen gas, I could perceive no signs of reduction, except a faint brown colour.

I dipped another bit of silk in the same solution of silver, and in order to determine if water had the power of promoting the reduction of the silver in this preparation, as it had in the former experiments, I exposed the silk, while wet, to the same current of hydrogen gas; and in a few seconds the metallic lustre was evident on the surface opposed to the current. After some little time, a blue speck and a faint trace of yellow appeared, but soon vanished.

This preparation of silver does not stain white silk so much as a nitrate does; the reduced silver was indeed very brilliant, but soon grew dull, and disappeared; a brown stain only remaining; so that it seems rather inferior to nitrate of silver, which also, after reduction, tarnishes, grows dull, and often disappears; but sometimes part of it remains permanently reduced.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

PLATINA.

With much difficulty I procured a small quantity of the ore of platina, and dissolved it in nitro muriatic acid. The solution was evaporated to dryness, and the salt was then dissolved in distilled water.

A bit of silk was dipped in part of this solution, and dried in the air; it was then exposed to a brisk current of hydrogen gas about twenty minutes, but no signs of reduction appeared.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of platina, and exposed, while wet, to the same current of hydrogen gas; in five or six minutes the platina was reduced, exhibiting a livid white metallic appearance on the surface of the silk opposed to the current. No colours attended the reduction. This solution imparts a yellowish brown colour to silk.

After some time, the whole of the metallic lustre disappeared, in proportion as the silk became dry.

The solution of platina requires more time, and a stronger current of hydrogen gas for its reduction, than solutions of silver and gold do.

EXPERIMENT IX.

MERCURY.

I immersed a bit of silk in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in distilled water, and dried it in the air: it was then exposed to a stream of hydrogen gas; but underwent no visible change.

I dipped another bit of silk in the same solution of mercury, and exposed it, while wet, to the same current of gas; the metal was soon reduced in a beautiful manner, and resembled silver.

The reduction began suddenly, with scarce any appearance of previous stain; some very faint, but at the same time transparent colours attended it: the most remarkable of these were a light orange, with a fringe of blue, and a yellow verging on a faint green. These colours soon disappeared.

After the silk was turned, I observed, that its texture was, in some parts, concealed by a thin film, which, as the reduction proceeded, was perceived to dart along the threads of the silk, gilding them in a beautiful manner, and exhibiting the texture very distinctly.

After some time, the mercury seemed to disappear, so as to render it doubtful whether any of it remained in the silk; but shaking it in the sun beams, I perceived bright atoms fly off; and rubbing the silk on a bit of blue paper, I observed shining metallic particles, which seemed to have lost their affinity of aggregation, for they did not unite.

One remarkable difference between this preparation of mercury and nitrate of silver, is, that no black or brown stain preceded, attended, or followed, the reduction of the mercury.

Mr. Scheele reduced a prussiate of mercury, dissolved in water, by adding iron filings and a small quantity of sulphuric acid to the solution.11

EXPERIMENT X.

COPPER.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper, then taken out, and dried, and exposed for a considerable time to a brisk current of hydrogen gas, but no signs of reduction could be perceived.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of copper, and exposed, while wet, to the same tapid current of hydrogen gas; the appearances were the following.

After a minute, or two, the silk assumed a faint brown colour, and, on the surface opposed to the gas, a white metallic pellicle appeared, which vanished in proportion as the silk became dry: wetting the silk again, I perceived a similar pellicle appear, which also vanished, as soon as the silk dried. If the silk be kept constantly wet, the brown colour becomes much more intense, attended with a very slight tinge of red. The margins of the silk projefting beyond the verge of the glass cylinder, and therefore not exposed to the current of the gas, retained the blue colour, which the solution imparts.

In some of these white metallic pellicles there appeared a faint brown inclining to yellow, which reflected the light, though obscurely.

After the silk dried, nothing remained, but a brown stain.

EXPERIMENT XI.

LEAD.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water; it was then dried, and exposed for some time to a stream of hydrogen gas; but underwent no perceptible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of lead, and exposed, while wet, to the same current of hydrogen gas; in a second, or two, the surface of the silk, opposed to the current, was coated with reduced lead, which looked like silver.

The reduction was accompanied with a brown stain, but by no means so intense as that, which attends the reduction of nitrate of silver.

The other side of the silk was opposed to the current of hydrogen gas, and soon acquired a metallic coat of the same brilliant appearance; exhibiting the texture of the silk, in a very striking manner.

It is remarkable, that lead exhibits no colour, but a light brown, during its reduction; whereas gold, silver, and mercury, display a great variety of colours, especially the two former.

After some time the lead reduced in this manner loses its metallic splendour considerably; and that in proportion as the silk dries.

EXPERIMENT XII.

TIN.

I dissolved some crystals of muriate of tin in distilled water; dipped a bit of silk in the solution; and dried it in the air: it was then exposed to a stream of hydrogen gas a considerable time; but no change or appearance of reduction, could be observed.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of tin, and exposed, while wet, to the same current of gas; after some little time, the reduction commenced, attended with a great variety of beauti- ful colours; as red, yellow, orange, green, and blue, variously intermixed.

The reduced tin disappears along with these colours, as the silk dries; nothing remaining but a feuille-morte colour.

The same solution of tin was also reduced by hydrogen gas, obtained from tin, and the muriatic acid.

These experiments do not succeed well with muriate of tin containing an excess of acid.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

ARSENIC.

A muriate of arsenic, which was prepared by digesting white oxid of arsenic in muriatic acid, and continuing the heat, till most of the acid evaporated, and left behind a soft mass of the consistence of tar, was dissolved in distilled water.

In this solution a bit of silk was immersed, and dried in the air: it was exposed to a brisk stream of hydrogen gas, obtained from zinc, and muriatic acid, but no reduction took place.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution, and exposed, while wet, to the same current of hydrogen gas; and instantly, the surface of the silk, opposed to the gas, was covered with a bright coat of reduced arsenic, accompanied with a yellow stain. In a short time the metallic lustre vanished, and nothing remained but the yellow stain.

M. Pelletier restored the acid of arsenic to its metallic state, by passing hydrogen gas through a solution of that acid, in twice its weight of water.12

EXPERIMENT XIV.

BISMUTH.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of Bismuth in distilled water, and exposed dry to hydrogen gas, obtained from zinc, and muriatic acid, underwent no visible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of bismuth, and placed over a languid stream of hydrogen gas; the bismuth was soon restored to its metallic form, on the surface of the silk opposed to the elastic fluid. The reduction was attended with a reddish brown stain, intermixed with a tinge of violet.

EXPERIMENT XV.

ANTIMONY.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of tartrite of antimony in distilled water, and dried in the air. It was then exposed to hydrogen gas, obtained from zinc, and muriatic acid; but suffered no visible alteration.

Another bit of silk, which was dipped in the same solution of antimony, was exposed wet to a weak stream of the gas; and, in a short time, the metallic lustre appeared, accompanied by a light yellow colour.

EXPERIMENT XVI.

IRON.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron, and dried in the air, was exposed to a strong current of hydrogen gas, obtained from iron nails and diluted sulphuric acid, but no visible change was produced on the silk.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of iron, and placed wet over the same stream of hy- drogen gas; but no reduced iron could be perceived. The silk was then immersed in a glass of clear water, and transferred a very minute metallic film to the surface of that fluid.

This experiment was repeated, with a rapid current of hydrogen gas, obtained from zinc, and muriatic acid, and, in about a minute, small films of reduced iron were visible on the surface of the silk, opposed to the gas.

The silk was then immersed in water, and transferred to its surface a large metallic pellicle; parts of which were very brilliant; but other parts were dull, and much more imperfectly reduced.

EXPERIMENT XVII.

ZINC.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a muriate of zinc largely diluted with water, and dried in the air, was exposed to a rapid current of hydrogen gas, obtained from zinc, and muriatic acid, but suffered no visible alteration.

Another piece of silk was immersed in the same solution of zinc, and exposed, while wet, to the same rapid current of hydrogen gas: in about half a minute, the metal was reduced in a very evident man- ner, on part of the silk. The silk was then dipped in a glass of clear water, and transferred a bright metallic film to its surface.

As these reductions of iron, and zinc, by hydrogen, are contrary to M. Lavoisier's table of the affinities of the oxygenous principle; I began to suspect, that the films, which were so evident, both on the silk, and the water, might be abraded, or torn from the zinc, by the muriatic acid; and elevated, and deposited on the silk by the gas.

In order to remove this doubt, I dipped a bit of the same silk in distilled water; and exposed it, while wet, to the same current of hydrogen gas, but nothing metallic could be seen on the silk; nor did it when immersed in water transfer a film, or the smallest appearance of a metal, to the surface of that fluid: and therefore, there can be no doubt of the reality of these reductions.

Dr. Priestley restored iron, and lead, to their metallic state, by heating their oxids with a burning glass in hydrogen gas.

These experiments point out an error in M. Bergman's table of elective attractions in the humid way; for he assigned the last place in that table to phlogiston, which he considered as the base of inflammable air; because he was unacquainted with any metallic reductions effected by hydrogen in the humid way.13

Having found, that water promoted, and accelerated these reductions in a very remarkable manner; I was curious to know, if alcohol, and ether, would produce the same effect. With this view, I evaporated a solution of gold in nitro-muriatic acid to dryness; when the vessel cooled, some alcohol was poured on to dissolve the salt; and immediately the vessel containing the salt, became so hot, that it could be scarcely endured by the hand; and diffused a fragrant smell, like that of ether, which, no doubt, was a species of that fluid.

EXPERIMENT XVIII.

GOLD.

In this solution of gold in alcohol, a bit of silk was dipped, and exposed to a stream of hydrogen gas, obtained from diluted sulphuric acid, and iron nails; and kept wet with alcohol: in about two minutes, the silk began to assume a brown colour, and white metallic films appeared on some parts of the surface opposed to the gas; some of these disappeared in a short time; and were succeeded by a few very small spangles of the proper colour of gold. These also soon vanished; and nothing remained but a disagreeable brown stain, intermixed with specks of a dull blue.

I sometimes found, on repeating this experiment, that no yellow films or spangles appeared; and am persuaded, that their appearance, and that of the white pellicles also, depends on the presence of water, contained in the alcohol, or the gas, and deposited on the silk.

EXPERIMENT XIX.

GOLD.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of gold in ether, and exposed to a stream of hydrogen gas, and kept wet with ether. The silk underwent no alteration for a few minutes; at length, it began to assume a faint brown colour, but no white, or yellow films appeared.

If this experiment be continued till the silk collects a sufficient quantity of water from the gas, some films will appear.

EXPERIMENT XX.

SILVER.

I procured some nitrate of silver, which had been fused in order to expel as much of its water as possible; and dissolved it in alcohol. I immersed a bit of silk in this solution, and exposed it to a stream of hydrogen gas, and kept it wet with alcohol: in a few seconds, the silk assumed a brown colour, which gradually became more intense: but no reduced silver appeared for several minutes; at length, a few metallic films appeared on part of the surface opposed to the gas.

EXPERIMENT XXI.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk was dipped in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury, and dried; it was then exposed to hydrogen gas about ten or fifteen minutes, and kept constantly wet with alcohol. The silk, during the first minutes, suffered no perceptible alteration: at length, a few small films were visible on the side of the silk opposed to the current.

EXPERIMENT XXII.

LEAD.

A bit of silk which was immersed in a solution of acetite of lead, and dried, was exposed about fifteen minutes to a stream of the gas; and kept constantly wet with alcohol; but suffered no visible change; except that a very minute film was reduced on one of its margins, which did not project beyond the verge of the glass vessel on which it was placed.

When we compare these experiments with those, in which water was used, to wet the silk, 'tis evident, that alcohol, and ether, do not promote the reduction of metals, as water does; and that the few films, which appear, when the silk is kept wet with ether or alcohol, depend entirely on water collected from the gas, or deposited by them on the silk during their evaporation.14

In order to compare the effects of hydrogen gas, obtained from water, iron nails, and muriatic acid, with that, procured from the same materials, by means of the sulphuric; I made some experiments on gold, silver, mercury, and lead, in the same man- ner, as the preceding; and the principal difference was, that the colours produced in all the pieces of silk, except that, which was dipped in acetite of lead, were much brighter, and more beautiful, than any produced, when the sulphuric acid was used.

The reduction of the lead was accompanied with its usual brown colour.

On the upper surface of a bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of gold, a green colour instantly appeared; and soon changed to a deep olive, in proportion as the reduction advanced: now examining the under surface, I saw it coated with a bright film of reduced gold, in the middle of which a blue spangle, mixed with purple, soon began to appear: I then moistened the upper surface of the silk with water; and in a few seconds, it also was coated with reduced gold.

The blue on the other side of the silk became much more intense: the piece was now turned; and on each colour I let fall a drop of water: the drop on the blue had a blue film, the drop on the purple, had a purple film, and the drop on the yellow, a film of reduced gold.

After some time, these drops of water evaporated, and the films came again in contact with the silk: some parts of which were left bare, as generally happens, when too much water is applied.

On the under surface of a bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, a coat of reduced metal was formed, with various colours, as green, blue, orange, and yellow, the beauty and brightness of which were remarkable.

In some time a muriate of silver is formed in the fibres of the silk, which on exposure to light becomes of a bluish black colour; but the whole of the silver does not undergo this change, for part of it remains in its metallic state. The colours remain a considerable time, if the silk be removed from the gas before this muriate is formed.

Hence it appears, that hydrogen gas should not be prepared with an acid, which forms an insoluble compound with the metal to be reduced.

I also found, that hydrogen gas produces different effects not only according to the difference of the acid, but also according to the difference of the metal employed to obtain it; for this gas procured from zinc or tin, and muriatic acid, did net restore gold to its proper metallic lustre, but formed on the silk, a white metalline coat like silver.

The experiments related in this chapter indicate the following conclusions.

1. Hydrogen is capable of reducing the metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere.

2. Water promotes and accelerates these reductions, in a very remarkable manner.

3. Ether and alcohol do not promote these reductions, without the aid of water.

4. A variety of colours accompanies these reductions, similar to what appears, during the calcination of metals by heat and air, and depends on the same cause; viz. the quantity of oxygen combined with the metal.

These colours have not been observed hitherto; nor indeed could they, as the metals were reduced in close vessels, and in high degrees of heat.

5. These reductions often disappear.

This is commonly owing to an imperfect and partial reduction of the metal; for the acid and water remaining in that part of the metallic solution, not reduced, re-calcines these delicate films; sometimes the disappearance of the metallic lustre depends on the nature of the metal itself; thus arsenic, lead, silver, &c. suffer some degree of calcination by water and atmospheric air.

Messrs. Bergman and Keir relate instances, in which silver after being precipitated in its metallic state, was re-calcined, and disappeared.

I first imagined, that water promoted these reductions by minutely dividing the particles of the metallic salt, and by condensing the gas, and bringing its hydrogen, and the metallic oxide, within the sphere of attraction; the hydrogen either uniting to the metallic earth and reducing it, as the Phlogistians suppose, or uniting with, and separating the oxygen of the metal, and thus restoring it to the metallic form, as the Antiphlogistians maintain.

But it is evident from the experiments related, that water does not promote these reductions solely, by minutely dividing the particles of the metallic salt; for were this the case, ether and alcohol should promote the reduction of the metallic salts, which they dissolve, since they divide their particles as minutely as water can.

Since then metallic solutions in ether, and alcohol, cannot be reduced by hydrogen gas; it follows that the above supposition concerning the mode of agency of water does not account for the reduction of metals in this way.

And indeed were it true that hydrogen condensed by water reduced metals in the manner above men- tioned, it would follow, that the reduction was effected by a single affinity, which cannot be admitted; 1st. because the existence of a single affinity in such cases has not been proved; 2dly, because a double affinity always takes place in preference to a single affinity, which is demonstrated by the following facts, transcribed from the works of Mr. Kirwan.

"If a solution of silver in the nitrous acid be thrown into a mixed solution of fixed alkali and common salt, the silver will be precipitated by the marine acid of the common salt, and not by the free alkali, contained in the liquor: for a luna cornea is found."15

"I repeated the experiment with a solution of lead, and also of mercury in the nitrous acid, and the result was similar; horn lead and marine salt of mercury were formed."16

In these experiments of Messrs. Monnet and Kirwan, 'tis evident that a double affinity takes place in preference to a single one: for the nitrous acid of these different nitrates unites with the alkali of the common salt, while the muriatic acid of the latter seizes the silver, mercury, and lead, of the nitrates, and forms muriates of silver, mercury and lead: the free alkali remaining passive in the mixture.

M. Lavoisier says, "There exists only in nature, as far as we can observe them, cases of double affinity, often triple, and others perhaps still more complicated."17

Now as water does not promote these reductions merely by dissolving, and minutely dividing, the particles of the metallic salts, and condensing the hydrogen gas; and since a double affinity takes place in preference to a single affinity; it is obvious that the water must be decomposed in these reductions in the following manner.

The hydrogen of the gas unites to the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state to the oxygen of the metal, reduces it, and forms water.

Thus what could never be effected by a single, is readily performed by a double affinity.

Hence it follows, that the hydrogen of the gas is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the metal is, at the same time, restored to its combustible state. It also follows, that the quantity of water formed is double that decomposed.

CHAPTER II.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
PHOSPHORUS.

THE next substance, of whose effects in reducing metals in the fibres of silk, I shall treat, is phosphorus, one of the most inflammable substances wc are acquainted with.

I was for some time at a loss, how to apply it to this purpose; but learning from a note of Mr. Lewis, that it is soluble in ether, I dissolved a small quantity of it in that fluid, which can be easily effected, if the ether be good. The solution is considerably promo- ted by a gentle heat, as that of the hand, and may be made in a small phial, which should be nearly filled with the ether, and accurately corked; a common cork is preferable for this purpose, to a glass stopper; and a single grain of phosphorus is sufficient for a great number of experiments.

I sometimes applied a much greater degree of heat than the above, by placing the phial in hot sand, pressing on the cork at the same time with my finger, to prevent its being forced out by the expansion of the ether, part of which is converted into an elastic fluid, and holds some phosphorus in solution: the ether soon begins to boil; the phosphorus melts, and a strong solution is obtained in a few minutes by shaking the phial. If the solution be removed to a cool place, it frequently deposits crystals.

This manner of preparing the solution is attended with some danger, for should the phial burst or the cork be extruded, the contents will be thrown out with considerable force, and that part of the phosphorus not dissolved by the ether burn with great violence.

The only objection to this preparation of phosphorus is the ether, which must necessarily modify the result, and prevent that simplicity so desirable in experiment.

But, after some observation, it was perceived, that the ether flies off and leaves the phosphorus pure, and minutely divided in the fibres of the silk; the ether, from its great volatility, first evaporates, and at the same time, produces a very considerable degree of cold, which effectually prevents the evaporation, and combustion, of the phosphorus.

After the ether evaporates, the cold ceases, and the combustion of the phosphorus commences, attended with white fumes, which continue till the whole is consumed, if no other power intervene.

Hence it is evident, that this preparation of phosphorus has a simplicity and elegance not always to be obtained.

It has also another great advantage in experiments of this kind; for it does not change in the smallest degree, the white colour of silk, during its slow combustion, which is not attended with heat sufficient to affect the most delicate colour. This property of not affecting the colour of the silk renders observation and experiment more accurate; as whatever change supervenes, must depend either on the metallic solution itself, or on the action of the phosphorus on the same. But this advantage is confined to a certain range of the thermometer; for if the heat be increased to about 86° of Fahrenheit, and the silk be dry, the phosphorus is apt to set fire to it.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

I immersed a bit of silk in a solution of gold in ether, and after the ether evaporated, dropped on it some of the solution of phosphorus, which diffused itself through the silk like a drop of oil, and formed a circumscribed spot, whose limits, as the ether evaporated, assumed a brown colour, which soon diffused itself equally over every part to which the solution of phosphorus was applied; but the parts of the silk, to which the latter did not reach, retained the yellow colour, which the solution of gold gave them.

The silk viewed by transmitted light presented the same colours, except that the limits of the brown appeared more intense, and seemed to border on a faint purple.

Examining the silk next day, I found that the whole of the brown stain acquired a faint shade of purple, which was most evident on the margins of the stain.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

I dipped a bit of silk in the solution of gold in ether, and after it was well dried, half of it was wetted with distilled water; the other half remaining dry: the solution of phosphorus was applied to both the moist and dry parts of the silk; instantly the part wetted with the water began to acquire a purple colour; and soon after the metallic splendour of the gold appeared; but that part which was kept dry acquired only a brown stain, similar to that described in the preceding experiment.

I repeated these experiments many times, and always found, that the gold was reduced only in proportion to the water applied.

Finding water promoted the reduction of gold by phosphorus, I began to form various conjectures about its mode of action; I first supposed it acted by holding the particles of the salt minutely divided, thus diminishing their attraction of cohesion, and consequently increasing their chymical attraction.

The truth of this supposition might, I thought, be decided by using ether and alcohol, instead of water, to wet the silk, avoiding aqueous moisture, as much as possible; accordingly I made the following experiments, which were frequently repeated with nearly the same result.

EXPERIMENT III.

GOLD.

A piece of silk was immersed in the solution of phosphorus; as soon as the ether evaporated, and the phosphorus began to fume, an ethereal solution of gold wns dropped on the silk, which immediately got a brown colour; the piece was kept constantly wet with ether, in some time a purple tinge appeared on parts of the silk, and shortly after small films of reduced gold appeared; the silk was now remarkably wet, and seemed to have a great power of collecting water; this I supposed was partly attracted from the air by the salt, and phosphorous acid formed during the combustion, which has a powerful attraction for water, and partly deposited in the silk by the ether during its evaporation.

In order to determine if the ether during its evaporation deposited water in the silk, I kept a bit of silk wet with ether for a few minutes, and found, that after the evaporation ceased, the silk was moist; but this humidity was not so great, as that observed in the silk, to which the ethereal solutions of phosphorus and gold were applied.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the ethereal solution of gold, and after the ether evaporated, the solution of phosphorus was applied; a brown colour was produced; the silk was kept wet with ether, and in a short time, a purple tinge appeared on parts of it; but chiefly at the margin of the stain, which gradually diffused itself over the whole.

The only difference between this and the preceding experiment on gold is the order, in which the solution of gold and phosphorus were applied to the silk, but there is a considerable difference in the result, for in this the brown and purple colours were formed much more slowly, and no particles of reduced gold appeared till after a much longer time.

EXPERIMENT IV.

GOLD.

A piece of silk was immersed in the solution of phosphorus, and when the white fumes began to rise, a solution of gold in alcohol was applied to the silk, which was, kept wet with alcohol, a brown tinge which soon changed to a purple, appeared on different parts, and in a little time after, a very small film of reduced gold was visible on a part of the margin.

In another experiment, conducted in the same manner, the reduction was more evident.

The solution of gold used in this experiment was very rich, and had a great attraction for water, for bits of silk tinged with it, could not be dried without difficulty, and after they were removed to a cool place, they very soon became moist again. This is more or less the case with solutions of gold in general.

EXPERIMENT V.

GOLD.

A bit of silk was dipped in a solution of gold in alcohol and dried, then some of the solution of phosphorus was poured on the silk, a brown and then a purple colour appeared, and in some parts a small portion of the gold was reduced, the reduction was very obscure, but became gradually more evident, in proportion as it attracted water from the air. The silk was occasionally wetted with alcohol.

This experiment was repeated, with this difference, that the silk was not kept wet with alcohol, and no reduced gold could be perceived.

EXPERIMENT VI.

GOLD.

In order to exclude water more effectually, a small phial was carefully dried by placing it in hot sand, and then corked, to prevent the access of moisture from the air; when the phial cooled, it was nearly filled with ether, and a small bit of phosphorus dropped into it, it was then corked and replaced on the hot sand, the phosphorus soon melted, and a strong solution was obtained by shaking the phial.

Into this solution a small bit of silk, which was dipped in a rich solution of gold, and carefully dried, was introduced; the silk immediately got a brown tinge, but not a particle of reduced gold could be perceived. The solution in a short time became turbid, and deposited a brown powder. The colour of the precipitate was exactly the same, as that which the silk acquired. The experiment was continued about three months, and carefully observed, but no other change could be perceived; at the end of this time the silk was taken out of the phial, and the solution of phosphorus was found capable of reducing gold and silver by the aid of water.

EXPERIMENT VII.

GOLD.

In order to contrast the effects of water with those of ether, and alcohol, more fully, a piece of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water, and dried in the air about twelve hours; during which time the yellow tinge, the solution of gold gave the silk, remained unchanged: the solution of phosphorus was then applied; a brown stain appeared, the ether soon evaporated; the phosphorus began to fume; and the silk acquired a purple colour; but not a particle of reduced gold could be perceived. The purple tinge in this bit of silk was much more intense, and more equal, than in the pieces, in which ether and alcohol were used.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

GOLD.

I dipped a piece of silk in the solution of phosphorus, when the ether evaporated, and the phosphorus began to fume, a solution of gold in water was applied; instantly the silk was covered with a splendid coat of reduced gold.

Nothing can be more striking than this experiment, which was repeated times without number, or demonstrates the necessity of water in these reductions in a more convincing manner.

This piece, viewed by transmitted light, had a purple colour with a considerable tinge of blue; and the margin of the reduced gold was fringed with purple.

EXPERIMENT IX.

GOLD.

Thinking the phosphorus applied in the form of vapour through the medium of water might be more effectual than a solution of it in ether, I immersed a small bit of silk in an aqueous solution of gold, and suffered it to dry a little; it was then suspended in a phial over a little water, into which a small bit of phosphorus was previously introduced: the phial was then corked, and placed on hot sand: the phosphorus began to melt, and ascend in white vapours, which, as soon as they reached the lower end of the silk, gave it a brown tinge, succeeded by a purple; and the gold began to assume its metallic splendour: in a short time these appearances were evident over the whole silk.

The following propositions are deducible from these experiments.

1. Water does not promote the reduction of gold merely by dissolving, and minutely dividing, the particles of the salt, and thus diminishing their attraction of cohesion, and consequently increasing their chymical attraction, as I first supposed; for were this the case, ether and alcohol, which equally dissolve and divide the salt, should produce the same effect.

2. Ether and alcohol do not promote these reductions without the aid of water; for it is evident from the experiments related, that the few particles of reduced gold which appear when they are employed, depend entirely on the quantity of water which they leave in the silk during their evaporation, and that attracted from the air by the solution of gold, and by the phosphorus during its combustion, both of which have a strong attraction for water.

3. Phosphorus does not reduce gold by giving the metallic earth phlogiston, as the Phlogistians suppose; for were this opinion true, a solution of gold in ether, or alcohol, should be reduced by the phosphorus as effectually as a solution of gold in water is.

4. Phosphorus does not reduce gold, by combining with, and separating, the oxygen of the gold, as the Antiphlogistians assert; for were this the case, the particles of the phosphorus so attenuated by the ether, should reduce a solution of gold in ether, or alcohol, as well as a solution of gold in water, since the impediment opposed by the attraction of cohesion is equally removed in both cases.

I shall conclude these remarks on the reduction of gold with the following experiment, which often amused me.

EXPERIMENT X.

GOLD.

A small bit of silk was immersed in a solution of gold in ether, and dried; then the solution of phosphorus was applied, which changed the yellow colour of the silk to a brown: when the phosphorus began to fume, I placed the silk on the palm of my hand, and breathed on it a considerable time; a purple tinge gradually succeeded the brown, and in some little time after, the metallic lustre of the gold began to appear.

The same experiment succeeds with a solution of gold in alcohol.

Another bit of silk, treated in the same manner, was placed over the vapour of warm water for some time; the same appearances took place, and particles of reduced gold were evident in the silk.

If the water, whence the vapour arises, be too hot, the heat retards, and sometimes prevents, the reduction, by volatilizing the phosphorus.

EXPERIMENT XI.

SILVER.

I dipped a bit of silk in a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol, and dried it in the air: then some of the solution of phosphorus was applied, which produced a brown stain, whose margin, after a few minutes exposure to the air, acquired a livid white appearance, caused by a partial and imperfect reduction of the silver.

This, however, would not be taken by a person unacquainted with experiments of this kind for reduced silver.

EXPERIMENT XII.

SILVER.

A bit of silk was immersed in the solution of phosphorus; as soon as the ether evaporated, and the phosphorus began to fume; a few drops of the solution of silver in alcohol were applied: immediately a black stain, intermixed with some brown, appeared; and, after some time, obscure films of reduced silver presented themselves; these appeared on different parts of the stain, but were so minute as to be scarcely visible. The only difference between this and the preceding experiment is the order, in which the solutions were applied; but even this modifies the result in some measure.

That these imperfect reductions depended on water, deposited in the silk by the alcohol, during its evaporation, or attracted from the air by the phosphorus during its combustion, will appear from the following experiment.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

SILVER.

A small phial was well dried in hot sand, then corked, and removed to a cool place: after the phial cooled, it was nearly filled with ether, and a small bit of phosphorus which was repeatedly washed in alcohol to free it from any aqueous moisture, that might adhere to it, was introduced; the phial was then corked and placed in hot sand; when the phosphorus melted, I shook the phial and obtained a strong solution.

Into this solution a small bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of silver in alcohol, and dried, was introduced; the phial was corked, the silk instantly assumed a brown colour, but not a particle of reduced silver could be seen, though the experiment was continued about three months, nor did the solution of phosphorus become turbid, or deposit any precipitate, as happened in similar experiments on gold.

At the end of this period the silk was taken out of the phial wetted with water, and suspended in a window, and after a considerable time, reduced silver was manifest on different parts of the silk.

With the solution of phosphorus, in which the silk stood during that time, I reduced gold and silver with the assistance of water.

In order to compare the effects of water with those of ether and alcohol, I made the following experiments.

EXPERIMENT XIV.

SILVER.

I dipped a bit of silk in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, and dried it at the fire; the silk thus dried retained its white colour, the solution of phosphorus was then applied, and immediately produced a brown colour, which soon, in proportion as the phosphorus fumed acquired a deeper tinge verging on. black, and slight signs of reduction appeared after a little time on the margin of the stain.

Another bit of silk, treated in the same manner, but dried much better, exhibited still fainter signs of reduction, for the brown stain did not appear on this: piece as soon as on the former, nor was it so intense; however, after some minutes exposure to the air, the stain became deeper, and its margin acquired a livid, white appearance, owing to a partial reduction of the silver.

It has been often remarked, that the reduction commences first on the margin of the stain, which the solution of phosphorus and that of the metal produce in the silk; I was a long time at a loss to account for this appearance, but the cause was acci- dentally discovered; for happening to spill a few drops of the solution of phosphorus on a table, I observed, that as they evaporated, watery circles were formed round the spaces on which the drops fell, and that all the parts within the circles were dry.

This explains why the reduction begins on the margin of the stain.

I observed the same of alcohol, for if it be dropped on a level surface, it leaves a watery ring behind, though not near so soon as a solution of phosphorus in ether does; this is the reason why alcohol seems to promote the reduction of some metals; I say seems, for it does not promote it, but in proportion to the quantity of water it contains, or attracts from the air, and deposits in the silk during its evaporation.

How essential water is to the reduction of metals will appear from the following experiment.

EXPERIMENT XV.

SILVER.

I immersed a piece of silk in the solution of phosphorus, and after the ether evaporated, and the phosphorus began to fume, a solution of nitrate of silver in water was applied; instantly the silver was restored to its metallic splendour.

This experiment is very amusing, and well calculated to strike the beholder with surprise.

The reduction is sometimes attended with spangles of a beautiful blue, which appear chiefly where the solution of silver is most abundant.

The solution of silver is commodiously applied by a camel's hair pencil.

I also tried the effects of the vapour of phosphorus on bits of silk dipped in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, and exposed to the vapour, in the same manner as in experiment the 9th, and the silver was always reduced; but a solution of phosphorus in ether seems preferable to the vapour.

A small glass tube, resembling a thermometer, with its bulb terminating in a smaller and nearly capillary tube, I found useful, and economic, especially in experiments on gold: by immersing the smaller end in the metallic solution, and inspiring through the tube at the same time, the bulb may be filled: by this means a single drop, or more if necessary, may be applied to the silk, and thus a great number of experiments can be made on a single grain, or a much less quantity of gold, or any other metal.

This little instrument may be used also to app\y the solution of phosphorus to the silk; and it was by using it for this purpose, I discovered, that phosphorus has not the power of reducing silver without the aid of water; for blowing the solution of phosphorus from the tube on bits of silk, which had been dipped in a solution of silver and dried, I was surprised to find films of reduced silver frequently appear; whereas none appeared, when I applied the solution of phosphorus in a different manner: this unexpected event often occurred, before I learned the cause; at length I suspected it might depend on the moisture of the breath; and I was soon convinced by moistening the silk with water, that the suspicion was well founded.

It is evident from these experiments on silver, that water is essential to the reduction of this metal by phosphorus; and that ether and alcohol do not promote it.

It is also evident that these experiments, and those made on the reduction of gold, mutually illustrate each other; and confirm the conclusions drawn from them.

EXPERIMENT XVI.

PLATINA.

I immersed a bit of silk in a solution of nitro-muriate of platina in distilled water and dried it in the air; the solution of phosphorus was then applied to the silk but no appearance of reduction could be perceived.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of phosphorus; when the ether evaporated and the phosphorus began to fume, the solution of platina was applied to the silk, and in some time, delicate films of reduced platina were visible where the water was most abundant. These films of platina commonly disappear, and nothing remains but a brown tinge which, however, is more intense than what the solution of platina alone gives the silk.

To succeed in this experiment the silk should be replete with phosphorus, which is easily done by applying the solution twice or thrice, and waiting after each application till the fumes begin to appear. It is also necessary to keep the silk constantly wet with water. Sometimes it requires from ten to twenty minutes to reduce platina in this manner.

EXPERIMENT XVII.

MERCURY.

I dipped a bit of silk in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury and dried it in the air, then the solution of phosphorus was applied; when the ether evaporated and the phosphorus began to fume, a yellow stain commenced on the margin and gradually appeared over the whole.

To compare the effects of different degrees of moisture, I immersed a bit of silk in the same solution of mercury, and dried it carefully at the fire; the solution of phosphorus was then applied; the silk began to fume, but no change except a very slight ring of a yellow hue appeared. The rest of the silk retained its white colour.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of phosphorus; when the ether evaporated and the phosphorus began to fume, the same solution of mercury in distilled water was applied, and in a few seconds a bright film of reduced mercury was visible on the margin of the part to which the metallic solution was applied, and after some time appeared on the whole. The reduction was attended with the colours of the rainbow.

After a little time these colours vanish and the metallic film becomes much more obscure, according as the silk dries, and is succeeded by a yellow stain.

EXPERIMENT XVIII.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk was dipped in a solution of nitrate of mercury in distilled water, and dried at the fire; then the solution of phosphorus was applied; and when it began to fume, a brown stain commenced at the margin, which soon diffused itself over the whole and gradually acquired a faint tinge of black.

Another piece of silk, treated in the same manner, but dried in the air, exhibited the same appearances; except that the brown tinge verged more on black.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of phosphorus, and when it began to fume, the solution of nitrate of mercury was applied; a brown colour instantly appeared, accompanied with a film of reduced mercury, which was most evident where the metallic solution was most abundant. This film soon disappeared and was succeeded by a black stain, in which, however, reduced mercury was visible. No colours but black and brown appeared in this experiment.

It appears from these experiments on mercury, that the reduction kept pace with the quantity of water present.

EXPERIMENT XIX.

COPPER.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper and dried in the air: then a strong solution of phosphorus was applied; the silk acquired a brown colour, but no other visible alteration occurred.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of copper and dried at the fire much better than the preceding; the solution of phosphorus was applied; when the ether evaporated and the phosphorus began to fume, a brown tinge commenced on the margin of the silk, and gradually diffused itself over the whole; but the stain was by no means so intense as that produced in the preceding piece; so that there can be no doubt that the difference was owing to the different degrees of moisture in the silk.

After this piece remained in the air for some time, the brown tinge became more intense, a proof that it attracted water from the air. This difference in the appearances of pieces dried in the air and at the fire, I frequently remarked.

EXPERIMENT XX.

COPPER.

A strong solution of phosphorus was applied to a piece of silk, when the ether evaporated and the phosphorus began to fume, a solution of sulphate of copper was applied; a brown stain was instantly produced, and its margins were soon covered with a white metallic film, parts of which, after some time, verged on the colour of copper, intermixed with purple, green and blue. If the solution of phosphorus be weak, which is always the case when the ether is bad, nothing appears on the silk but the brown stain and the white metallic film. As the silk dries most of these appearances vanish; but some of the blue tinge survives, and the silk looks very unseemly.

A bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of copper, and exposed to the vapour of phosphorus, as in experiment the 9th, but no change was produced on the silk, except a few brown spots, though the heat was such that the vapour filled the phial, and circulated through it: the vapour corroded a brass pin which was used to suspend the silk in the phial. This induced me to try its effects on copper, which was corroded by it in a remarkable manner, and changed into a black substance resembling a mixture of charcoal and oil. It appears then that phosphorus is ill adapted to the reduction of this metal.

EXPERIMENT XXI.

TIN.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water, and dried in the air, the solution of phosphorus was then applied to the silk, and though it fumed considerably, no change whatever could be perceived in the colour of the silk, nor was there the smallest appearance of reduction.

I poured some of the solution of phosphorus on a bit of silk, and when it began to fume the solution of tin was applied; after a few seconds, white metallic films appeared, first on the margin, and were gradually diffused over that part of the silk to which the muriate of tin was applied, a yellow colur intermixed with red sometimes attends the reduction. After some little time these films of reduced tin vanish, and scarcely leave a stain behind.

I did not succeed in reducing acetite of lead, muriate of arsenic, or sulphates of iron, and zinc, in this way.

These experiments on tin shew that water is essential to its reduction by phosphorus, and give additional force to the preceding conclusions.

M. Sage discovered that gold, silver, &c. are precipitated from their solutions in the metallic form, by pieces of phosphorus, which are covered at the same time with bright coats of gold, silver, &c.

To determine if water were essential to these reductions performed by M. Sage, I made the following experiments.

EXPERIMENT XXII.

GOLD.

Some solution of phosphorus in ether was poured into a china cup, and a few drops of the ethereal solution of gold were added, instantly a brown powder was precipitated similar to what appeared in experiment the 6th, but no gold in its metallic form could be perceived.

EXPERIMENT XXIII.

GOLD.

A solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water was poured into a china cup, containing a solution of phosphorus in ether, instantly the gold began to assume its metallic splendour, attended with a variety of colours, as purple, blue, and red, the beauty of which cannot be described; the quantity of the blue was gradually diminished, and what remained, was dispersed over the surface in small films, intermixed with spangles of reduced gold. Most of the blue films were of a circular figure, some had a central speck of ruby red, and were fringed with purple; some had a round central speck of a darker blue than the surrounding parts, and some were of an irregular figure, fringed with purple or ruby red. I often observed these blue films assume the real colour of gold without suffering any intermediate change of colour, and I think, I observed the same of one of the largest specks of ruby red, that appeared in this experiment. All these colours disappeared, when the reduction was completed.

The variety of colours, which these films assume, depends on the different degrees of reduction; that is to say, on the quantity of oxygen combined with the metal, in proportion as the metal is deprived of the oxygen, it assumes various colours, which often succeed each other in a regular order, shewing the different stages of the reduction; thus when gold is reduced, the first perceptible change is a green which soon becomes olive, this is succeeded by blue and purple, and sometimes by a ruby red; the purple tinge is a mixture of blue and red.

The various colours which metals and their calces communicate to glass and other substances, are explicable on these principles, and the difficulty of obtaining a ruby-coloured glass by gold is readily understood from the facility with which that metal parts with oxygen.

EXPERIMENT XXIV.

GOLD.

A thread was passed by means of a needle through a small bit of phosphorus which was freed from any moisture that might adhere to it, by immersing it for some time in alcohol, it was then suspended by means of the thread in a solution of gold in ether, contained in a phial, which was carefully dried in hot sand; in a few minutes the solution became turbid, an effervescence commenced, and a brown precipitate was formed; according as the precipitate fell the solution became clear, lost its yellow colour, and the whole of the gold seemed to have been precipitated, but not a particle of reduced gold could be seen.

Another bit of phosphorus was suspended in the same manner in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water, and in a few minutes got a splendid coat of reduced gold.

EXPERIMENT XXV.

SILVER.

A few drops of a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol were poured into a china cup containing a solution of phosphorus in ether, instantly a black precipitate with a tinge of brown was formed, but no silver in its metallic state could be perceived.

After some time the precipitate attracted moisture from the air, and some films of reduced silver appeared.

The same experiment was made in a phial, which was corked to exclude the moisture of the air, and nothing but the black precipitate appeared.

Some of the same solution of silver was diluted with water, and dropped on a solution of phosphorus in ether, and instantly films of reduced silver floated on the surface.

EXPERIMENT XXVI.

SILVER.

A bit of phosphorus was suspended by a thread in some of the same solution of silver in alcohol, contained in a phial carefully dried, a black precipitate with a tinge of brown soon appeared, but no silver in its metallic state could be observed; part of the precipitate adhered to the phosphorus, and part fell to the bottom of the phial.

In another experiment made in a phial not sufficiently dried, a few small films of reduced silver were observed on the sides of the phial, but not a particle of silver in its metallic form could be seen on the phosphorus.

Another bit of phosphorus was suspended in a diluted solution of nitrate of silver in water, and in some hours, the phosphorus was covered with reduced silver.

The case of silver, which covered the phosphorus prevented its spontaneous combustion in the air; the same was observed of the bit of phosphorus coated with gold.

Hence it appears, that M. Sage's success in reducing metals by phosphorus, depended on the water of the metallic solution.

These experiments were often repeated with nearly the same result, but some variety often occurs, depending on various circumstances, as the strength of the metallic solution, and that of the phosphorus, the quantity of water present, and the purity of the materials employed.

It is difficult to obtain ether, or alcohol, with the least possible quantity of water, and equally difficult to expel all moisture from the surface of glass; for this reason the bits of phosphorus in the experiments made with alcohol and ether, were suspended by threads, so as not to touch the sides of the glass.

I shall conclude this chapter with a general view of the inferences, which seem naturally to flow from these experiments with phosphorus.

1. Water is essential to the reduction of metals by phosphorus, for these experiments shew that the re- duction is effected only in proportion to the quantity of water present.

2. Phosphorus does not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston.

3. Phosphorus does not reduce the metals by uniting with, and separating their oxygen.

How then is the reduction effected? are we not to conclude, that it is effected by the decomposition of the water, in the following manner?

The phosphorus attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state with the oxygen of the metal, and effects the reduction.

Hence it follows, that the phosphorus is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the metal is restored to its combustible state.

Thus what could never be affected by a single, is readily performed by a double affinity, which always takes place in preference to a single affinity, as the experiments of Messrs. Monnet and Kirwan, mentioned in the preceding chapter, shew.

It is well known, that phosphorus kept in water acquires an oxygenated crust, which could not happen without a decomposition of the water; this fact serves to confirm the explanation here offered.

And indeed the decomposition of water in these experiments must be granted, or it must be supposed, that water itself reduces the metals by uniting with their earths, and constituting their phlogiston; or by uniting with, and separating their oxygen; suppositions repugnant to our present knowledge of chymistry.

CHAPTER III.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
SULPHUR.

THOUGH Sulphur, as far as my reading extends, has seldom been considered as a reducer of the metals, yet as it holds a distinguished rank among combustible bodies, analogy led me to examine its powers in reducing and fixing the metals in the fibres of silk.

The vapour of sulphur appeared to be the most simple form in which it could be applied to this pur- pose, and may be obtained by placing a phial containing flowers of sulphur in hot sand; as the sulphur melts, it assumes the form of vapour, which soon fills the phial, expels the atmospheric air, and bears a considerable heat before it inflames; a bit of silk prepared for the experiment may be held over the vapour as it issues from the phial, or immersed in it. The neck of the phial should be of a convenient size for this purpose.

But these experiments are more conveniently made by means of a sulphurous match, and a glass funnel, in which the silk imbued with the metallic solution may be suspended by a thread passed through it, and made fast with a cork, which also serves to confine the vapour.

The glass is then placed on a table, and by moving it a little beyond the verge of the same, a lighted match is readily introduced, which, as soon as the glass is filled with vapour, may be withdrawn; the vapour is confined by making the glass glide back on the table; and thus the phenomena of the experiment can be easily observed.

Though the vapour obtained in this manner be chiefly sulphurous acid gas; yet its effects are not less interesting on that account.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A bit of silk was dipped in a solution of gold in ether and dried, it was then suspended in the glass funnel, and exposed for some time to the vapour obtained from a burning match; but no change could be perceived, except that the silk became a little brown.

Another bit of silk prepared in the same manner was immersed in the vapour of sulphur, formed in a phial placed in hot sand, with the same result.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro muriate of gold in water, suspended in the glass funnel, and exposed while wet to vapour of sulphur, formed by a burning match; no sooner did the vapour touch the silk than the reduction commenced, and in a few seconds the whole piece was covered with a splendid coat of reduced gold, permanent and retentive of its lustre, but had a few specks of a dull violet hue.

The silk viewed by transmitted light appeared of a beautiful blue colour; and being removed from the vapour, and suspended in the air, began in about ten minutes to exhale a vapour which continued about two hours, and smelled acid and pungent.

Another bit of silk, dipped in the same solution of gold and dried, was wetted with alcohol and exposed to the same vapour: the silk acquired a brownish hue, and a small white metallic film appeared on its lower end, where the alcohol most abounded: the silk was then wetted with water and replaced in the vapour; instantly a lively purple with a bright pellicle of reduced gold appeared.

EXPERIMENT III.

SILVER.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, and suspended in the air of a dark closet to dry; the silk retained its white colour, though it remained in the air twenty-four hours; it was then exposed fourteen hours to the vapour obtained from a burning match; but suffered no change, except that it acquired a brown tinge: it was now wetted with alcohol, and replaced in the vapour for some time; no signs of reduction appearing, it was wetted again with the alcohol and exposed to the vapour: but still no signs of reduction could be perceived: I then wetted the silk with distilled water, replaced it in the sulphureous vapour; and in about a minute reduced silver appeared.

EXPERIMENT IV.

SILVER.

I dipped a bit of silk in a solution of nitrate of silver in distilled water, and exposed it, while wet, to the vapour of sulphur, as in the preceding experiment; in a few seconds the silver appeared in its metallic form, attended with a variety of lively colours: the most remarkable of these were a pleasant blue, orange, purple and yellow, which soon disappeared: the reduced silver also disappeared in a great measure, some faint traces only remaining. The silk was removed from the vapour into the air, but exhaled no vapour, as happened in experiment the second.

A small bit of sulphur was suspended in a phial containing a solution of nitrate of silver in water; and after some weeks the sulphur was coated with reduced silver of no great lustre.

EXPERIMENT V.

PLATINA.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of the ore of platina in distilled water, and dried in the air; it was then suspended in the glass funnel, and exposed to the vapour of a burning match: but no signs of reduction could be observed; the silk retained the colour the solution gave it.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of platina, and exposed, while wet, to the sulphureous vapour; in a few seconds the reduction was very evident. The silk was immerged in a glass of clear water, and transferred bright films of reduced platina to the surface of that fluid; most of them were of the same colour as the spangles in the ore of platina; and some were distinguished by lively blue and purple colours.

Another bit of silk, dipped in the same solution of platina, was immersed, while wet, in the vapour of sulphur, formed in a phial placed in hot sand; the reduction soon commenced, and was much more per- fect and permanent than in pieces exposed to the vapour obtained from ignited matches.

It is remarkable that sulphur reduced this metal much better than phosphorus or hydrogen gas did, but the reduced platina disappears after some time, and leaves nothing behind but a brown stain.

If the films be transferred from the silk to water, they may be preserved in their metallic form.

EXPERIMENT VI.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of nitrate of mercury in distilled water, and dried; parts of the silk immediately acquired a slate colour; the silk was then exposed to the vapour of sulphur, obtained from a burning match, but it suffered no change, except that the colour became a little more intense.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of mercury, and exposed while wet to the same vapour; the reduction instantly commenced in a very evident manner, accompanied with several colours, as blue, purple and yellow.

The silk was removed from the vapour and soon lost most of its lustre, which was succeeded by a slate colour, through which some particles of reduced mercury were observed to shine.

EXPERIMENT VII.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in water and dried in the air; it was then exposed to the sulphureous vapour obtained from a burning match; but the silk underwent no visible change. This solution of mercury does not change the white colour of silk, as that of nitrate does.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury, and exposed, while wet, to the vapour; in a few seconds reduced mercury appeared, unattended by any colour, except a slight tinge of citron yellow on part of the silk. After some time the whole of the reduced mercury vanished.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

COPPER.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper and dried; It was then suspended in the glass funnel and exposed to the vapour obtained from a burning match; but the silk suffered no change, retaining the colour, which the solution gave it.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of copper and exposed, while wet, to the vapour of an ignited match; in a short time a white metallic film appeared, accompanied with a brown tinge: the silk becoming dry was wetted with water and exposed to a brisk vapour from another match; the film became more evident and parts of it verged on yellow, bordering on a copper colour. After some time this white metallic film disappears, and nothing remains but a light brown stain.

EXPERIMENT IX.

LEAD.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water, and dried in the air; it was then exposed to the sulphureous vapour of a burning match; but underwent no visible change whatever.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of lead, and exposed, while wet, to the vapour; reduced lead soon appeared all over the silk; but after some time this reduced lead disappears, unless it be transferred to the surface of water.

EXPERIMENT X.

TIN.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water, and dried in the air: it was then exposed to the vapour obtained from a burning match, which soon filled the glass; but produced no visible change on the silk.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of tin, and exposed, while wet, to the sulphureous vapour; and in a few seconds reduced tin appeared all over the silk; but the tin soon disappears, if not transferred to water.

EXPERIMENT XI.

ARSENIC.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of arsenic in distilled water, and dried in the air; it was then exposed to the vapour of sulphur, obtained from a burning match; but the silk suffered no apparent alteration.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of arsenic, and exposed, while wet, to the vapour: in a few seconds the arsenic was reduced, but not in a very evident manner; the silk was immerged in water, and several bright films of reduced arsenic floated on the surface of that fluid.

EXPERIMENT XII.

BISMUTH.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of nitrate of bismuth in distilled water, and dried in the air; it was then exposed to the vapour of sulphur obtained from a burning match, but no signs of reduction appeared.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of bismuth, and exposed, while wet, to the sulphureous vapour; the bismuth was soon reduced, accompanied with a brown stain, but the metallic lustre soon disappeared.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

ANTIMONY.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of tartrite of antimony in water, and dried; it was then exposed to the vapour of a burning match; but no change could be observed; nor did the silk immerged in water deposit any films on its surface.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of antimony, and exposed, while wet, to the vapour: the silk, in a few seconds, acquired a yellow colour, and a bright bluish film of reduced antimony appeared on the lower end of the silk, where the water was most abundant: the silk was then immerged in a glass of water, and transferred a large pellicle of reduced antimony to the surface of that fluid.

EXPERIMENT XIV.

IRON.

A bit of silk was immersed in a largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron in distilled water, and dried in the air, it was then exposed to the vapour of sulphur obtained from a burning match; after some time the colour of the silk became a little brown, but no reduced iron could be seen, nor did the silk immerged in a glass of clear water transfer any thing metallic to its surface.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of iron, and exposed while wet to the sulphureous vapour; in a short time the silk was withdrawn, and a minute shining film of a livid white colour, was visible on its lower margin, where the water most abounded; the silk was then immerged in a glass of water, and transferred a large film of reduced iron to its surface.

This experiment succeeded also with the vapour of sulphur formed in a phial placed on hot sand. The films of reduced iron were seldom visible on the silk, but were soon rendered visible by transferring them to water.

EXPERIMENT XV.

ZINC.

A piece of silk was dipped in a diluted solution of sulphate of zinc and dried, it was then exposed to the vapour obtained from a burning match, no change whatever could be perceived; the silk was immerged in a glass of water, but deposited no film on its surface.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of zinc, and immersed while wet in the vapour of sulphur formed in a phial placed on hot sand; in about half a minute the silk was withdrawn from the vapour, and some parts of it had a shining livid appearance, which I took for reduced zinc; in order to determine if the reduction were real, the silk was immerged in a glass of clear water, and transferred to its surface a bright film of reduced zinc.

If the silk be kept too long in the vapour, some sulphur will be condensed on its surface, and give it a yellow colour; if it be then dipped in a glass of water, it will deposit both the sulphur and the metallic films on its surface, but the appearance of the sulphur is so different from that of the reduced metal, that they are easily distinguished,

Another bit of silk was immersed in a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc, and exposed while wet, to the vapour obtained from a burning match; the silk being withdrawn exhibited a few minute shining films on its lower end, and on immersion in water left bright films of reduced zinc floating on the surface of that fluid.

Very often these films cannot be seen, until they are transferred to water, which I found a very useful test in doubtful cases; they are better seen in the gray light than in sunshine.

These experiments on the reduction of metals by sulphur were often repeated with nearly the same result; but some variety occurs depending on the quantity of water present, the strength of the metallic solution, and sulphureous vapour, and also on the time the silk is exposed to the vapour.

When the experiments are made in a phial placed in hot sand, part of the metallic solution frequently drops from the silk, and falling on the bottom, or sides of the phial is reduced, covering these parts with a metallic crust, on which the sulphur soon reacts, and changes the greater part into a sulphure. The phial commonly cracks.

The following conclusions are deducible from the experiments related in this chapter.

1. Water is essential to the reduction of metals by sulphur, for this effect is always in proportion to the quantity of water present.

2. Alcohol does not promote these reductions without the aid of water.

3. Sulphur does not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston, nor by uniting with and separating their oxygen, for were either of these opinions just, the sulphur so minutely divided by heat, should reduce metallic solutions in alcohol as effectually as it does metallic solutions in water.

When we compare these reductions by sulphur, with those effected by phosphorus, and consider that water is essential to both, we must conclude, that the reduction is effected in the same manner, viz. by the decomposition of water, which may be thus explained.

The sulphur attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state to the oxygen of the metal, and restores it to the metallic form.

Hence it follows, that the sulphur is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the metal is restored to its combustible state.

It also follows, that a quantity of water equal to that consumed is formed by the hydrogen of the water, and the oxygen of the metal.

This explanation is supported by a fine experiment of Dr. Priestley, who obtained inflammable air by passing the vapour of water through sulphur heated in an earthen tube;18 and farther confirmed by the experience of some judicious makers of oil of vitriol, who always sprinkle the sulphur with a certain proportion of water, before they inflame it.

The decomposition of water in these reductions must be granted, or it must be supposed that a single takes place in preference to a double affinity; which cannot be admitted.

These experiments point out several errors in M. Lavoisier's Table of the Affinities of the Oxygenous Principle; for he has placed sulphur at a much greater distance from that principle than any of the metals treated of in this chapter except gold, and even in this instance his table is erroneous, unless it be proved that sulphur reduces metals by directly uniting with, and separating their oxygen; a supposition which implies, that the reduction is effected by a single affinity, and therefore inadmissible.

I shall close this chapter with a short extract from the Chymical Essays of Bishop Watson, as it seems to have some relation to the experiments related here.

His lordship says, that his experiments on "the Derbyshire lead ore instruct us to believe, that the lead in this kind of ore is in its metallic state; as the ore was changed into lead without the addition of any substance containing the inflammable principle."19

But the reduction of lead by sulphur and water, related in this chapter, points out an evident source of the inflammable principle; for the ore itself must contain some water, a constituent part of which is hydrogen, or the base of inflammable air; beside his lordship thinks no appearance of lead would have taken place, had there been no communication with the external air; but as air always holds water in solution, an ample source of the inflammable principle is evident.

CHAPTER IV.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
ALKALINE SULPHURE.

THE Sulphure I made use of, was prepared by fusing equal parts of carbonate of potash and flowers of sulphur, till the effervescence ceased.

M. Gengembre has made a very important observation on alkaline sulphure, prepared in this way, which is, that this substance has no smell, and that it exhales no gas while it continues dry, but that when it is dissolved in water, or attracts humidity from the air, it diffuses an offensive smell.

From this circumstance M. Gengembre inferred, that the disengagement of this gas depended on the decomposition of water; for he discovered both by analysis and synthesis, that this air consists of hydrogen, one of the principles of water, combined with sulphur and caloric.

There can then be no doubt, but alkaline sulphure has the power of decomposing water; and may therefore be happily employed to illustrate the mode of action of sulphur, and other combustible substances, treated of in this essay.

When diluted acids are poured on solid alkaline sulphure, the decomposition of the water is promoted and accelerated, sulphurated hydrogen gas being formed in great abundance.

I made two solutions of this alkaline sulphure, one in water, and the other in alcohol.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A bit of silk was immersed in the solution of sulphure in alcohol, and then a solution of gold in ether was applied; a brown matter was formed in the silk, but no reduced gold could be perceived.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of sulphure in alcohol, and a solution of nitro muriate of gold in water was applied; a white metallic film was slowly formed, but no other signs of reduction were visible.

This experiment was repeated on another bit of silk with this difference, that the solutions of the gold and sulphure were both in water, and the white metallic film was instantly formed, accompanied by a considerable precipitate of a brown matter.

It is obvious then, that water accelerates, and is necessary to the appearance of this film: for when both solutions were in water, it appeared much sooner.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

A piece of silk was immersed in an aqueous solution of gold, in which the acid predominated, then a few drops of the aqueous solution of sulphure were applied; a white pellicle which looked like silver was immediately formed, and the silk got a deep brown colour.

To another piece of silk dipped in the same solution of gold, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, a white metallic film appeared, but not so evident or so soon as in the preceding experiment, wherein the solution of sulphure in water was used, beside the film produced by the aqueous solution of sulphure was more permanent, and the stain, which the silk acquired, was more intense, than those produced by the solution of sulphure in alcohol.

EXPERIMENT III.

SILVER.

I immersed a piece of silk in a solution of the sulphure in alcohol, and after most of the spirit evaporated, a solution of nitrate of silver in alcohol was applied; nothing appeared on the silk but a brown stain. The nitrate of silver used in this experiment was fused, to expel as much water as possible.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of sulphure; when most of the alcohol evaporated, a solution of crystallized nitrate of silver in water was applied to the silk, and instantly the metallic lustre of the silver appeared, attended with a brown slain.

EXPERIMENT IV.

SILVER.

A piece of silk was dipped in the solution of alkaline sulphure in water, and an aqueous solution of crystallized nitrate of silver was applied; the silver was immediately reduced in greater quantity than in the preceding experiment, in which the alkaline sulphure employed was dissolved in alcohol. The stain produced in the silk was also more intense.

EXPERIMENT V.

SILVER.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of the sulphure in water, and then a solution of nitrate of silver in alcohol was applied, but nothing appeared on the silk, except a brown stain. The nitrate of silver used in this experiment, was fused, which deprived it of a great part of its acid. That this was the circumstance which prevented the reduction of the silver, appears from the following experiment.

A bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of silver in alcohol, then some diluted nitric acid was applied, lastly the aqueous solution of sulphure was dropped on the silk, and instantly the silver was restored to its metallic splendour. It is evident then, that acids contribute to the reduction of silver by alkaline sulphure, which they effect by promoting the decomposition of water.

In some time the reduced silver disappears for the most part, and indeed the white metallic films which were produced in the experiments on gold, totally disappeared.

EXPERIMENT VI.

PLATINA.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of the ore of platina in distilled water and dried, then the solution of sulphure in alcohol was dropped on the silk; nothing appeared but a brown stain.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the aqueous solution of sulphure, and a little of the solution of platina applied; in a short time, a film of reduced platina appeared.

To another bit of silk which was dipped in the solution of platina, a few drops of distilled vinegar were applied, and then the solution of sulphure in water was added; a brown stain was immediately produced, and more platina reduced than in the preceding experiment.

EXPERIMENT VII.

MERCURY.

To a bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in water, and dried in the air, some of the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, but no change, except a light yellowish brown, was produced.

After the silk was some time exposed to the air, some very faint shades of black were visible on parts of it.

To a piece of silk which was immersed in the solution of sulphure in water, some of the same solution of mercury was applied, immediately the metal was restored to its metallic lustre in a very striking manner, and it was remarkable, that the precipitate on the silk was very small.

This experiment was repeated with this difference, that the silk was first wetted with distilled vinegar, and more of the mercury was reduced than in the preceding experiment, attended with an olive precipitate, which gradually turned blackish; the quantity of precipitated matter in this was much greater than in the former experiment, but the reduced metal was not so bright.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk which was dipped in a solution of nitrate of mercury and dried in the air, had no change produced on it by a solution of sulphure in alcohol, except a stain compounded of the slate colour, which the nitrate imparts, and the yellow of the sulphure.

To another bit of silk which was immersed in the aqueous solution of sulphure, some of the same solution of mercury was applied; the metal was immediately reduced, and a very black stain attended the reduction.

EXPERIMENT IX.

COPPER.

A piece of silk was dipped in a solution of sulphate of copper and dried in the air, a solution of the sulphure in alcohol was applied to it, but no change except a brown stain was produced.

To another bit of silk immersed in the aqueous solution of sulphure, some of the same solution of copper was applied, a white metallic film was slowly formed, attended with a brown colour.

On another bit of silk, which was dipped in the same solution of copper, and placed on a saucer, some distilled vinegar was dropped, and then a few drops of the aqueous solution of sulphure were added: immediately a white metallic film appeared in greater quantity than in the preceding experiment.

EXPERIMENT X.

LEAD.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water, and dried in the air, then the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, but nothing appeared on the silk except a brown stain.

A bit of the same silk was dipped in the same solution of lead, then the solution of sulphure in water was applied; the lead was soon reduced to its metallic state; a brown stain and precipitate of the same colour attending the reduction.

The same experiment was repeated with this difference, that the silk was first wetted with distilled vinegar, and instantly the lead was reduced of greater lustre, and in greater quantity, than in the preceding experiment.

This experiment was tried on a bit of white calico dipped in distilled vinegar, and placed on the palm of my hand, and instantly the metallic lustre of the lead, which was reduced in great quantity, appeared in a very remarkable manner, attended with a brown stain.

EXPERIMENT XI.

TIN.

To a bit of silk dipped in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water and dried in the air, the solu- tion of sulphure in alcohol was applied, nothing appeared but a brown stain.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of sulphure in water, then the same solution of muriate of tin was applied, in a short time some reduced tin appeared on the silk. Vinegar promoted the reduction of this metal also in a remarkable manner.

EXPERIMENT XII.

ARSENIC.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of arsenic in distilled water and dried in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was then applied, the silk first looked yellow, in a short time the yellow colour almost entirely disappeared, leaving behind a whitish precipitate, but no other change was produced.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of sulphure in water, then sume of the same solution of arsenic was applied, a yellow precipitate was formed, and shortly after this precipitate was surrounded by a violet margin, but no other change could be observed.

I immersed another bit of the same silk in the same solution of arsenic, some distilled vinegar was then dropped on it, and lastly the aqueous solution of sulphure was applied, after some time a few minute films of reduced arsenic bright as silver were visible.

Some attention is necessary to discover the reduced arsenic, as the particles reduced are few, and minute, and sometimes none can be seen.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

BISMUTH.

To a bit of silk which was dipped in a solution of nitrate of bismuth in distilled water and dried in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, the silk appeared first yellow, then brown, but no farther change could be observed.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of sulphure in water, some of the same solution of bismuth was then applied to it, the metal was immediately reduced, and a brown precipitate was formed. Vinegar seems neither to promote nor retard the reduction.

Two bits of white calico were dipped in the same solution of bismuth, to one of these placed on a saucer some distilled vinegar was added, then a single drop of the solution of sulphure in water was applied, and the whole of the calico except that part on which the drop fell was covered with reduced bismuth, which looked exceedingly bright; the same appearance was observed on the other bit, to which no vinegar was added.

EXPERIMENT XIV.

ANTIMONY.

To a bit of silk which was dipped in a solution of tartrite of antimony in distilled water and dried in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied-, the silk got a yellow colour, whose margins some time after, acquired an orange hue, but no other change was perceived.

Another bit of the same silk was immersed in the aqueous solution of sulphure, the same solution of antimony was then applied, part of the metal was reduced, though in small quantity, attended with an orange precipitate.

The acids of vinegar and tartar seemed to impede the reduction, the muriatic acid also seemed to have the same effect, though not in so great a degree as the two former.

EXPERIMENT XV.

COBALT.

To a bit of silk which was dipped in a solution of nitrate of cobalt and dried in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied; the silk soon became brown, but no farther change could be perceived.

To another bit of silk which was immersed in the solution of sulphure in water, a few drops of the same solution of cobalt were applied, the silk immediately acquired a dark colour, and in a little time some of the metal was reduced, attended with a dull blue precipitate, which changed to a blackish brown.

Muriate of cobalt was reduced in the same manner; vinegar promoted the reduction of both these preparations of cobalt.

EXPERIMENT XVI.

IRON.

To a piece of silk which was immersed in a solution of sulphate of iron largely diluted, and dried in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, the silk soon became black, but no other change could be perceived.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of sulphure in water, some of the same solution of iron was then applied, the silk instantly assumed a black colour, but no reduced iron appearing, it was immerged in a glass of water, and transferred a bright film of reduced iron to the surface of that fluid.

Sometimes part of the film has not the metallic lustre, which is very evident in other parts of it, so that the parts completely reduced can be easily distinguished from the dull and imperfectly reduced black oxid of iron, intermixed with these bright films.

The same experiments were repeated on bits of calico with the same result, the calico from its spongy texture is better suited to produce strong films than silk is.

Vinegar did not promote the reduction of iron in these experiments.

EXPERIMENT XVII.

ZINC.

To a bit of silk which was immersed in a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc, and dried in the air, some of the solution of sulphure in alcohol was applied, nothing appeared on the silk, but the yellow colour which the solution of sulphure imparts.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of sulphure in water, and some of the same solution of zinc was applied, the yellow colour which the solution of sulphure gave the silk soon became white; but no reduced zinc could be seen. The silk was then immerged in a glass of clear water and transferred a bright film of reduced zinc to its surface.

In another experiment made with white calico, the pellicle transferred to the surface of water was brighter, and more zinc was reduced than in the preceding experiment.

Sulphate of zinc also was reduced both on silk and calico, with this difference, that black and olive precipitates attended the reduction,

EXPERIMENT XVIII.

MANGANESE.

I dipped a bit of silk in a diluted solution of nitrate of manganese, and dried it in the air, the solution of sulphure in alcohol was then applied, the silk acquired a yellow colour which soon disappeared, but no other change eculd be observed.

To another bit of silk, which was immersed in the solution of sulphure in water, a drop of the same solution of manganese was applied, instantly a pearl-white precipitate was formed, the margin of which soon acquired a bright film of reduced manganese. Under this film a violet tinge was evident.

The nitrate of manganese used in this experiment was very acid.

A solution of alkaline sulphure in water after a certain length of time loses the power of reducing the metals, in which respect it resembles an old solution of sulphate of iron.

Having procured a more neutral solution of nitrate of manganese, I immersed a bit of silk in the solution of sulphure in alcohol, when most of the spirit evaporated; a single drop of this solution of manganese was applied, instantly a bright film of reduced manganese appeared, attended with a violet tinge, and a brown precipitate. After some time the violet tinge disappears.

On another bit of silk immersed in the same solution of sulphure in alcohol, a drop of a solution of sulphate of manganese in distilled water was applied, instantly films of reduced manganese bright as silver appeared, accompanied with a faint violet tinge, and a pearl-white precipitate. These films soon disappear.

A solution of alkaline sulphure in alcohol does not by age lose its power of reducing the metals, as that in water does; I kept the former solution more than two years, and found it at the end of that time as capable of reducing the metals, as when it was made.

It is manifest from the experiments related in this chapter,—

1. That water is essential to the reduction of metals by alkaline sulphure.

2. That alcohol does not promote these reductions without the aid of water.

3. That alkaline sulphure does not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston, nor by uniting with, and separating their oxygen, for were either of these opinions true, a solution of alkaline sulphure in alcohol should reduce them as effectually as a solution of the same in water does.

4. That acids contribute to these reductions by promoting the decomposition of water.

Now since M. Gengembre has demonstrated, that water is decomposed by alkaline sulphure, who can doubt that it is decomposed in these reductions?

The manner in which metals are reduced by this substance, seems to be the following.

An hydrure of sulphur, that is, a combination of hydrogen and sulphur is formed: this hydrure of sulphur attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state, with the oxygen of the metal, and reduces it.

The experiments in this chapter leave us no room to doubt of the decomposition of water in metallic reductions by alkaline sulphure, and serve to illustrate and confirm the manner in which sulphur, phosphorus, and other combustible bodies, effect the reduction of metals.

CHAPTER V.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
SULPHURATED HYDROGEN GAS.

HAVING treated of the effects of hydrogen gas and sulphur separately, I shall next treat of their effects, when combined in the form of sulphurated hydrogen gas.

I obtained this elastic fluid by pouring water, acidulated with sulphuric acid on alkaline sulphure, prepared in the manner mentioned in the preceding chapter; but had it been prepared with a caustic alkali, it is probable the gas would be more powerful. The sulphure of the shops is generally unfit for these experiments.

It is necessary in experiments with sulphurated hydrogen gas, hydrogen gas, &c. to have some mode of conveying them into a chimney, as they are offensive and unwholesome.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water, and dried in the air, was exposed to sulphurated hydrogen gas, the silk got a slight tinge of brown, but no other change occurred; it was then wetted with alcohol, and after some time, the brown became more intense, and white films appeared on some parts of the silk, owing to moisture collected from the gas, which is always replete with water.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of gold and exposed, while wet, to the gas, the yellow colour, which the solution of gold gave the silk, was immediately changed to a brown, and a white metallic pellicle appeared, and covered the whole surface of the silk opposed to the gas; but no purple or other colours, that usually attend the reduction of this metal by other agents, could be perceived. This pellicle did not entirely disappear as the silk became dry; though it lost most of its lustre and looked more like silver, or some other white metal imperfectly reduced, than gold.

This elastic fluid, and alkaline sulphure, have an effect on the reduction of gold, very different from that of the vapour of sulphur obtained from a burning match, which further appears from the following experiment, made with sulphurated hydrogen gas, that happened to be mixed with some sulphurous acid gas.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

A piece of silk, which was dipped in a solution of gold in ether and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of sulphurated hydrogen gas, containing some sulphurous acid gas; but no signs of reduction could be perceived: the silk was then wetted with alcohol, still no visible change was produced, except a brown stain where the alcohol most abounded; this stain, after some minutes exposure to atmospheric air, was covered with a white metallic film, which soon disappeared; after some minutes the silk was wetted with water and exposed again to the gas, a white metallic film immediately appeared, and the brown stain began to change slowly to a purple; the silk was soon covered with various colours, as blue, red, and orange, and some spots of reduced gold of its own proper colour appeared; after some time the white film and all the colours, except the purple, disappeared, some specks of the perfectly reduced gold were permanent.

Another bit of silk, which was immersed in an aqueous solution of gold and exposed to the same mixed gas, exhibited nearly the same appearances.

EXPERIMENT III.

GOLD.

Having found that sulphurated hydrogen gas had a powerful effect in reducing other metals, I was desirous of trying its effects on a larger scale, thinking it might be attended with more success; I therefore immersed a quarter of a yard of silk in an aqueous solution of gold and exposed it while wet, to this gas in close vessels; the silk was soon covered with a white metallic pellicle, which disappeared in a short time: the experiment was continued about twelve hours, and on withdrawing the silk from the gas, I could not perceive the smallest vestige of reduced metal, or purple, or other colours, that constantly attend the reduction of gold.

The silk had a dull brown hue verging on a slate colour.

EXPERIMENT IV.

SILVER.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of sulphurated hydrogen gas, but no change could be perceived for some time; at length, when the silk collected moisture from the gas, some particles of reduced silver were visible, accompanied by a brown stain.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of nitrate of silver, and exposed while wet, to the gas; the silver was instantly reduced all over the side of the silk opposed to the current, a great variety of beautiful colours, as red, orange, yellow, green, and blue, attended the reduction; most of these disappeared, but part of the silver remained permanently reduced.

I found that, if the silk be immersed in a solution of silver in alcohol and dried, and then moistened with water, and exposed while wet to the gas, none of these colours appear.

This experiment was repeated on a quarter of a yard of silk in close vessels, and immediately both sides of the silk were covered with reduced silver, attended with the same beautiful colours; the silk was left exposed to the gas seven or eight hours, and being then examined, no reduced silver could be seen; nothing remained but a strange medley of colours, chiefly blue, green, purple, and orange, unequally mixed, some prevailing more than others in certain parts of the silk; however, the die is by no means disagreeable.

EXPERIMENT V.

SILVER.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol, and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of the gas; but no change could be perceived for some time: it was then wetted with alcohol, still no alteration could be observed, till the silk attracted moisture from the gas, when small particles of reduced silver began to appear, attended with a brown stain.

If the silk immersed in the solution of silver in alcohol, and exposed while wet to the gas, be kept constantly wet with alcohol, these appearances take place sooner.

A piece of silk, which was dipped in a solution of muriate of silver in ammonia, and exposed, while wet, to the gas, had in a short time its surface covered with reduced silver; but another piece of silk dipped in the same solution of silver and dried, underwent no such change.

EXPERIMENT VI.

PLATINA.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of nitro-muriate of the ore of platina in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of sulphurated hydrogen gas, but underwent no perceptible change.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of platina and exposed while wet, to the gas; the whole surface of the silk, opposed to the current, was instantly covered with reduced platina, which soon lost its lustre; nothing remaining but a brown colour, with some faint vestiges of the reduced metal.

This experiment was repeated on a bit of linen with the same result.

EXPERIMENT VII.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in distilled water, and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of the gas; the only visible change produced was a slight shade of yellow on part of the silk.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of mercury and exposed, while wet, to the gas; the mercury was immediately reduced, but soon lost its lustre; the gas reacting changed most of it to a substance of a dull white colour.

The same experiments were made with nitrate of mercury, with the same result.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

COPPER.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper in distilled water, and suspended in the air to dry; it was then exposed to a current of the gas, the silk assumed a brown colour; but no other change appeared.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of copper, and exposed while wet to the gas, a white metallic film attended with a brown stain, immediately appeared, some parts had a yellow film approaching to the colour of copper; these films all disappeared leaving behind a brown stain; the parts which were covered with the yellow film resembling copper, exhibited after some time, a dull bluish disagreeable matter.

EXPERIMENT IX.

LEAD.

Having dipped a piece of silk in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water and dried it in the air, I exposed it to a stream of the gas; the silk became a little brown, but no other change could be observed.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of lead, and exposed while wet to the gas; no sooner did it touch the silk, than a brown tinge diffused itself like a passing shadow over the whole surface of the silk, accompanied with a bright coat of reduced lead, whieh resembled silver.

The brown tinge, which the silk acquires, resembles what happens when white paper is slightly singed by holding it near a burning body.

This experiment was repeated on a quarter of a yard of silk in close vessels, and the silk was immediately covered with a coat of reduced lead, which had the brilliance of silver, and was attended with a brown tinge; the experiment was continued several hours, after which the silk was examined, and found to have lost all the argentine lustre, which was succeeded by a sparkling gray die; a sulphure of lead, or galena, being formed in the fibres of the silk. The same experiment was repeated on two other pieces of silk with the same result.

This elastic fluid is so powerful a reducer of the metals, that if chambers painted with white lead, have any considerable degree of moisture, and are exposed to its influence, the lead on the surface of the walls is reduced, and that chiefly where the humidity is most abundant; this effect I observed, was produced, even at the distance of three chambers from the place where the gas was formed; and the lead was reduced most evidently behind the window shutters where the moisture of the wall was most considerable.

It is a common experiment with chymists, in order to shew the effects of this gas, to draw characters with a solution of sugar of lead on paper, which they place over a glass of water containing some alkaline sulphure; in some time the characters drawn on the paper acquire a brown, or black colour, and become visible; which amuses the spectators.

But it is surprising, that the metal has never been reduced in this experiment even by chance; and not less so, why lead should be singled out for this trial of skill, in preference to other metals, which are equally affected by this gas.

EXPERIMENT X.

TIN.

A piece of silk was dipped in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water and dried in the air; the silk on exposure to a current of the gas, scarce underwent any change, except a few brown specks dispersed over its surface.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of tin, and exposed while wet to the gas, which no sooner touched the silk, than the surface opposed to the current was covered with reduced tin of great brightness; in some time various colours, as blue, orange, and a faint purple, appeared, and became more evident, as the reduction proceeded.

The gas does not re-act on this metal so much as on mercury, and some other metals, part of the reduced tin remained permanent, but most of it disappeared, and left behind a disagreeable brown stain.

EXPERIMENT XI.

ARSENIC.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of arsenic in distilled water and dried in the air, it was then exposed to a stream of sulphurated hydrogen gas, but no change could be observed, except a faint tinge of citron yellow, which appeared on some parts of the silk.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of arsenic and exposed while wet to the gas, the arsenic was instantly reduced all over the surface, opposed to the gas, attended with a citron yellow colour.

The gas soon re-acted on the reduced arsenic; and nothing remained but the yellow stain.

EXPERIMENT XII.

BISMUTH.

.

I dissolved some bismuth in nitric acid, and evaporated the solution to dryness, the salt was then dis- solved in distilled water, and the solution deposited a copious white precipitate, but retained a quantity of the metal sufficient for these experiments.

In this solution of bismuth a piece of silk was immersed, and dried in the air, it was then exposed to a stream of the gas, and the only visible effect produced was a very faint tinge of brown.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of bismuth, and exposed wet to the gas, the silk was instantly covered with a bright pellicle of reduced bismuth, which soon lost most of its metallic lustre, being changed by the reaction of the gas to a sulphure.

Mr. Kirwan in his experiments on hepatic air, found that nitrous solution of bismuth, by mixture with a solution of hepatic air in water, changes to a reddish brown, and even assumes a metallic appearance.

He also found that nitrates of silver, lead, and acetite of lead, were precipitated black.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

ANTIMONY.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of tartrite of antimony in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to a stream of the gas, but suffered no visible change, except that a few specks of yellow and orange appeared.

A bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of antimony, and exposed while wet, to the gas, the antimony was immediately reduced to its metallic form, attended with a deep orange colour; in some time, most of the metallic lustre disappeared, a few specks only remaining permanent.

EXPERIMENT XIV.

IRON.

A piece of silk was immersed in a diluted solution of sulphate of iron in distilled water and dried; it was then exposed to a current of the gas, but underwent no visible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of iron and exposed while wet, to the gas; the silk soon began to acquire a dark colour, which gradually increased, and at length became black, attended with an obscure metallic film. The silk was immersed in water, and deposited a bright metallic film on the surface of that fluid.

EXPERIMENT XV.

ZINC.

A bit of silk which was immersed in a diluted solution of sulphate of zinc in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to a current of the gas, but underwent no visible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of zinc and exposed while wet, to the gas, but no change in the colour of the silk, or sign of reduction could be perceived; the silk was then immerged in a glass of clear water, and transferred to its surface a bright metallic film of the colour of zinc.

When a languid stream of gas was employed in these experiments the films transferred to water were scarce visible.

EXPERIMENT XVI.

ZINC.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc and dried in the air, was exposed to a brisk current of sulphurated hydrogen gas, but underwent no visible alteration.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of zinc, and exposed while wet, to the same brisk current of gas; instantly the surface of the silk opposed to the gas, was covered with a bright coat of reduced zinc, attended with faint orange and purple colours.

Though the reduced zinc was quite evident, yet I had the curiosity to examine its appearance on the surface of water; I therefore immersed the silk in a glass of that fluid, and a bright metallic pellicle, which retained the texture of the silk, as wax retains the impression of a seal, was transferred to its surface.

Another bit of silk, dipped in the same solution of zinc, and exposed for a longer time to the gas, lost its metallic lustre, the zinc being changed to a sulphure by the re-action of the gas.

These experiments, on sulphate and muriate of zinc, show that the acid in which the metal is dissolved, influences the reduction in a remarkable manner.

It is evident from the experiments related in this chapter,

1. That water is essential to the reduction of metals by sulphurated hydrogen gas.

2. That alcohol does not promote these reductions without the aid of water.

3. That sulphurated hydrogen gas does not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston, nor by uniting with and separating their oxygen; for, were either of these opinions well founded, metallic solutions in alcohol should be as effectually reduced by this gas, as metallic solutions in water are.

When we consider that alkaline sulphure reduces the metals by decomposing water, we have every reason to conclude that sulphurated hydrogen gas reduces ihem in the same manner, since the same cir- cumstances are necessary to both; the hydrure of sulphur, which constitutes the base of this gas attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state, with the oxygen of the metal, and reduces it.

Hence it follows, that the hydrure of sulphur is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the metal is restored to its combustible state.

CHAPTER VI.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
PHOSPHORATED HYDROGEN GAS.

THE effects of hydrogen gas and phosphorus on the reduction of metals in the fibres of silk have been treated of separately in the two first chapters; in this, I shall briefly treat of their effects, when combined in the form of phosphorated hydrogen gas, which from its high degree of inflammability seemed well adapted to this purpose.

The spontaneous inflammation of this kind of air was known to M. Gengembre in 1783, and his experiments were published in Rosier's journal for October 1785.

Mr. Kirwan also, without any knowledge of M. Gengembre's experiments, discovered the same air, which he calls phosphoric air; and published his experiments in the 76th volume of the Philosophical Transactions for 1786.

This elastic fluid may be obtained by digesting a solution of potash in water with about half its weight of phosphorus in a heat sufficient to melt the latter, and may be received in glass vessels over mercury.

But finding it inconvenient to introduce pieces of silk prepared for these experiments over mercury in close vessels, I exposed them to the gas, as it issued from the neck of the phial in which it was prepared.

Part of this elastic fluid is spontaneously inflammable, but the other has not that property, which M. Gengembre imputes to the presence of carbonic acid; for the sake of brevity, I shall designate the latter by the term gas, or phosphorated hydrogen gas; and the former by the epithets spontaneously inflammable, or detonating gas, which I found does not burn or scorch silk wetted with metallic solutions.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in distilled water, and suspended in the air twelve hours to dry, was divided into three parts.

One of these was exposed to a stream of phosphorated hydrogen gas: the silk became brown, and its margins, which happened to touch the sides of the phial, acquired a violet tinge: but no reduction took place.

Another of these parts was wetted with alcohol, and exposed to the gas; but no signs of reduction could be perceived.

The remaining part was wetted with water, and was no sooner exposed to the gas, than the reduction commenced over the whole silk, which was soon covered with a bright coat of reduced gold.

EXPERIMENT II.

SILVER.

A piece of silk was dipped in a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol, and dried in the air: it was then divided into three parts.

One of these, in order to dissipate moisture more effectually, was dried still better by a gentle heat, and exposed to the gas; the silk acquired a brownish dark colour: but no other alteration could be perceived.

Another of these parts, which was also better dried by a gentle heat, was wetted with alcohol, and exposed to the gas: the silk acquired a dark brown colour; but no other change could be observed.

The remaining part was wetted with water, and exposed to the gas: the reduction commenced immediately, and in a short time the silk was covered with reduced silver.

EXPERIMENT III.

PLATINA.

A piece of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of the ore of platina in distilled water, and dried in the air; it was then divided into three parts.

One of these parts was exposed to the gas, but suffered no visible change.

Another of them was wetted with alcohol, and exposed to the gas; but underwent no perceptible change.

The remaining part was wetted with water, and exposed to the gas: in about three or four minutes, a bright metallic film, of great lustre, appeared on the side of the silk, opposed to the gas.

Another bit of silk, which was dipped in the same solution of platina, and exposed, while wet, to the spontaneously inflammable gas, was immediately covered with reduced platina, which being transferred to the surface of water, looked bright as silver, and retained the impression of the silk.

EXPERIMENT IV.

MERCURY.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of mercury in distilled water, and dried in the air, was exposed to the gas; but underwent no visible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of mercury, and dried: it was then wetted with alcohol, and exposed to the gas, but no sign of reduction appeared.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of mercury, and exposed to the gas; the metal was instantly reduced all over the silk; a great variety of beautiful colours attending.

A piece of silk was dipped in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in distilled water, and dried in the air: it was then divided into two parts.

One of these was exposed to the gas: no change appearing, it was wetted with alcohol, and exposed again to the gas; but still no alteration could be perceived.

The remaining part was wetted with water, and was no sooner exposed to the gas, than the mercury was reduced over the whole silk. No colours attended the reduction.

Mr. Kirwan introduced some precipitate per se to a small portion of phosphoric air: the precipitate soon grew black, and a white smoke appeared; in two days the precipitate remained solid, yet acquired a pale white colour like that of steel: the air lost its spontaneous inflammability.20

EXPERIMENT V.

COPPER.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper in distilled water and dried in the air, was divided into two parts.

One of these was exposed to the gas, but no visible change occurred.

The remaining part was wetted with water and exposed to the gas, in a few minutes a brownish matter appeared in the silk, but nothing metallic could be seen; the silk was then dipped in a glass of clear water, and transferred a small white metallic pellicle to its surface.

In another experiment made with the spontaneously inflammable gas, a white metallic pellicle was immediately formed, attended with a brown stain, this pellicle resembled silver or a white metal; but the gas soon re-acted on it, and formed a disagreeable brown matter in the fibres of the silk.

EXPERIMENT VI.

LEAD.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to the gas, but suffered no visible change.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of lead, and exposed while wet to the gas, but nothing metallic could be seen; the silk, however, on immersion in water, transferred a few minute bright films to the surface of that fluid.

In another experiment made with the detonating gas, the reduced films were more evident.

EXPERIMENT VII.

TIN.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to the action of the gas without suffering any visible alteration.

Another piece of silk was immersed in the same solution of tin and exposed while wet to the gas, but no signs of reduction could be perceived; the silk was then immersed in water and transferred a delicate metallic film to its surface.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

ARSENIC.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of muriate of arsenic in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to the gas, but no change could be perceived.

Another bit of silk, immersed in the same solution of arsenic and exposed while wet to the gas, acquired in a few minutes a brown stain, but nothing metallic could be seen on the silk; which, however, on being dipped in water, transferred a very minute film of reduced arsenic to its surface.

In another experiment made with the detonating gas, the films of reduced arsenic were much more evident, of greater brilliance and attended with a brown stain produced in the fibres of the silk.

EXPERIMENT IX.

BISMUTH.

A piece of silk, which was dipped in a solution of nitrate of bismuth in distilled water and dried in the air, was exposed to the gas but no alteration could be observed.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the same solution of bismuth, and exposed while wet to the gas; the silk in two or three minutes got a brown stain, which gradually became more intense, and a very delicate metallic film appeared; the silk was then immerged in water, and transferred a bright film of reduced bismuth to the surface of that fluid; the film retained the impression of the silk.

EXPERIMENT X.

ANTIMONY.

A bit of silk immersed in a solution of tartrite of antimony in distilled water and dried in the air was exposed to the gas, but suffered no apparent change.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of antimony, and exposed while wet to the gas, but no signs of reduction appeared; the silk was then immerged in water, to the surface of which it transferred one small spangle.

This experiment was repeated with the detonating gas, which with difficulty produced some sparkling films; the silk was immersed in water and transferred the films to its surface.

A white matter was visible in the fibres of the silk.

EXPERIMENT XI.

COBALT.

A piece of silk immersed in a solution of muriate of cobalt and dried in the air, was exposed to the gas, but suffered no visible alteration.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of cobalt, and exposed while wet to the gas, but no sign of reduction appeared, nor did the silk transfer a film to water.

Another bit of silk was immersed in a solution of nitrate of cobalt, and exposed while wet to the detonating gas, no signs of reduction were visible for some time; but at length a few small spangles of the metal appeared on the silk, and were very brilliant, and when transferred to water were still more so; a white matter could be seen in the fibres of the silk.

EXPERIMENT XII.

IRON.

A bit of silk was immersed in a largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron in distilled water, and dried, it was then exposed to the action of the gas; but no alteration could be perceived.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the same solution of iron and exposed while wet to the gas, in a few minutes some parts of the silk acquired a light brown colour; but no reduced iron could be seen on the silk, which however, transferred a very minute and delicate film to water.

This experiment was repeated with a strong detonating gas, and a very brilliant metallic film about four lines in diameter was reduced on the silk, accompanied with a brown stain, but nothing like the black oxid of iron appeared.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

ZINC.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc was exposed dry to the gas, but underwent no visible alteration.

Another piece of silk was dipped in the same solution of zinc and exposed wet to the gas; no signs of reduction appearing, the silk was immerged in water, and left a very minute metallic film on its surface, which could with difficulty be seen.

The experiment was repeated with the detonating gas, and a very bright metallic film of zinc, four or five lines in diameter, was reduced on the silk.

This experiment succeeded also with a largely diluted solution of sulphate of zinc.

The silk, viewed by transmitted light, exhibited a brown stain beneath these films of iron and zinc.

The experiments detailed in this chapter shew,

1. That water is essential to the reduction of metals by phosphorated hydrogen gas.

2. That alcohol does not promote these reductions without the aid of water.

3. That this elastic fluid does not reduce metals by giving them phlogiston, nor by combining with, and separating their oxygen; for, were either of these suppositions true, it should reduce them as well with alcohol as with water.

After explaining the manner, in which sulphurated hydrogen gas reduces the metals, the mode of agency of phosphorated hydrogen gas is sufficiently obvious.

The gas attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state with the oxygen of the metal and reduces it.

Hence it follows that the hydrure of phosphorus, which constitutes the base of this gas, is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the metal is, at the same time, restored to its combustible state.

By hydrure of phosphorus, is meant a combination of hydrogen and phosphorus, containing less caloric than is necessary to the gaseous state.

CHAPTER VII.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
CHARCOAL.

FINDING several combustible bodies, as hydrogen, phosphorus, sulphur, and combinations of these, capable of reducing the metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere; I was desirous of knowing if charcoal also possessed that power.

Charcoal may be applied with this view in several forms. M. Rouelle has observed that caustic fixed alkali dissolves a considerable quantity of this substance.

Charcoal also exists in a very attenuated state in ether, alcohol, gum, &c.

I have examined some of its effects on the reduction of metals, in these different forms, in which it probably exists combined with hydrogen, and also some of its effects in the solid form.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A small bit of well burned charcoal was suspended by a thread in a phial containing a diluted solution of nitro-muriate of gold in distilled water; some air bubbles soon appeared on the charcoal; and in about two hours reduced gold was. evident on its lower surface, and increased gradually, till the charcoal was nearly coated with gold of its proper colour.

This experiment was repeated with a richer solution of gold; the reduction did not commence near so soon, nor was the quantity reduced so great, or brilliant, as in the preceding experiment.

EXPERIMENT II.

GOLD.

A small bit of charcoal was suspended in a solution of gold in ether: an effervescence immediately commenced, and continued for a considerable time: but the solution suffered no change of colour, nor was there a particle of the gold reduced.

I should not be surprised if the gold were reduced in this experiment, as charcoal contains a large quantity of water, which it powerfully attracts from the surrounding air: however not a vestige of reduced gold could be perceived.

Bits of charcoal were suspended in the same manner in most of the metallic solutions treated of in this essay: no change was perceived on those immersed in solutions of arsenic, manganese, and fused nitrate of silver in water: but a bit immersed in a solution of the same nitrate in alcohol, had parts of it covered with bright sparkling particles, which seemed to vegetate from the charcoal, and were evidently reduced silver: for they were not soluble in water, on the surface of which the bit of charcoal deposited some small spangles of great lustre. The bits immersed in solutions of sulphate of iron and zinc exhibited some very faint signs of reduction.

But these experiments were not repeated, nor sufficiently varied, to enable us to form a just opinion of the power of charcoal in reducing metals in this way.

A small quantity of charcoal, reduced to fine powder, was digested several days in a strong solution of caustic potash in alcohol; the phial was frequently shaken to promote the solution.

Some of the clear solution, which was of a reddish colour, was poured into a phial for use.

EXPERIMENT III.

GOLD.

A few drops of this solution of charcoal, or carbon, were applied to a bit of silk; after the alcohol evaporated, a solution of gold in ether was dropped on, and immediately produced a brown, which, in about half an hour, was changed to a purple hue, owing to water attracted from the air, but no other sign of reduction appeared.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of carbon, and when the alcohol evaporated, a few drops of an aqueous solution of gold were applied; a brown stain was instantly formed; the silk was kept wet with water; the stain gradually assumed a purple tinge, and in about five minutes, some reduced gold of its proper splendour and colour appeared: and in some time after every part of the silk, to which the solutions of carbon and gold were applied, was coated with reduced gold, which remained permanent. During the experiment, it is necessary to keep the silk constantly wet with water.

If the solution of gold be applied before the alcohol evaporates, a black precipitate is formed, along with the brown stain. In an experiment made in this manner, a metallic film, whitish and obscure, appeared in the beginning; but soon vanished: and in some time after, the gold was reduced of its proper colour; and a speck of ruby red appeared on the margin.

The silk viewed by transmitted light presented various colours, as purple, blue, and some green.

EXPERIMENT IV.

SILVER.

A few drops of the solution of carbon were applied to a bit of silk: when the alcohol evaporated, a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol was applied: a light brown stain was immediately produced in the silk; but no reduced silver could be seen.

The solution of carbon was applied to another bit of silk, and when the alcohol evaporated, an aqueous solution of fused nitrate of silver was dropped on: a brown stain was instantly formed, and in about ten minutes, minute films of reduced silver were visible.

The silk was kept wet with water during the experiment; and the brown stain was gradually changed to black. In some little time the metallic films disappeared.

If the solution of silver be applied to the silk, before the alcohol evaporates, black and brown precipitates are immediately formed; and commonly no reduced silver can be seen; but sometimes very minute films appear.

EXPERIMENT V.

PLATINA.

To a bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitro muriate of platina in distilled water, and dried in the air, a few drops of the solution of car- bon were applied; but no visible change was produced.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of carbon, and when the alcohol evaporated, a few drops of the solution of platina were applied: a yellow precipitate was immediately formed, and in about ten minutes delicate films of reduced platina were visible: these metallic films soon vanished; and nothing but a yellow stain and the precipitate remained.

A bit of calico, on which this experiment was repeated, transferred a bright film of reduced platina to the surface of water.

During these experiments, the silk and calico were kept wet with water.

EXPERIMENT VI.

MERCURY.

On a bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of oxygenated muriate of mercury in distilled water and dried in the air, a little of the solution of carbon was dropped, but the silk underwent no visible change.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of carbon, and when the alcohol evaporated, a little of the same solution of mercury was applied, a yellow precipitate was immediately formed, and soon after small films of reduced mercury appeared on the margin of the stain.

This experiment was repeated with a solution of nitrate of mercury, and the reduction of the metal was very evident on the margin of the stain, which was black; the precipitate on the bit of silk was of the colour of sulphur.

EXPERIMENT VII.

COPPER.

To a bit of calico, which was immersed in a solution of acetite of copper in distilled water and dried in the air, a few drops of the solution of carbon were applied, but no visible change was produced.

On another bit of calico which was dipped in the same solution of copper, some of the solution of carbon was dropped, the calico acquired a slight tinge of brown; it was kept wet with water, and in about twenty minutes several white metallic films were evident.

A bit of silk on which this experiment was made, acquired a beautiful red colour, similar to the ruby red with which copper tinges glass, and depending on the same cause, viz. the quantity of oxygen combined with the metal.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

LEAD.

A bit of white calico was immersed in a solution of acetite of lead in distilled water and dried in the air, then a few drops of the solution of carbon were applied, but no visible alteration took place.

On another bit of the same calico, which was dipped in the solution of carbon, a little of the same solution of lead was dropped, and in a few seconds films of reduced lead bright as silver appeared, the calico was then immergcd in water, and transferred a continuous pellicle of reduced lead to its surface.

This experiment was often repeated, both on silk and calico; sometimes the lead is reduced in an instant, but at other times five or six seconds elapse before any reduced lead becomes visible.

I also found that a solution of potash in alcohol reduces lead; but not so soon, or effectually, or in such quantity as the former solution does, but it is evident, that these solutions differ only in the quantity of carbon which they contain.

EXPERIMENT IX.

TIN.

To a bit of calico, which was immersed in a solution of muriate of tin in distilled water, and dried in the air, some of the solution of carbon was applied; but no signs of reduction appeared, nor was the colour of the calico much altered.

On another bit of calico which was dipped in the solution of carbon, some of the same solution of tin was dropped, a white precipitate was instantly formed, attended with bright films of reduced tin; the calico was immerged in water, and left a bright metallic film on the surface of that fluid.

The same experiment succeeds on silk.

EXPERIMENT X.

BISMUTH.

A piece of silk which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of bismuth in distilled water and dried in the air, suffered no visible alteration on applying the solution of carbon.

To a bit of calico which was dipped in the solution of carbon, a few drops of the same solution of bismuth were applied, and immediately films of reduced bismuth were evident. The calico was immerged in water, and transferred a bright metallic film to its surface.

This experiment succeeded also on silk.

EXPERIMENT XI.

ARSENIC.

A bit of silk was immersed in a solution of muriate of arsenic in distilled water and dried in the air, then a little of the solution of carbon was dropped on the silk, but no visible alteration took place.

Another bit of silk was dipped in the solution of carbon, and when the alcohol evaporated, some drops of the same solution of arsenic were applied; and in a short time a few minute metallic films were visible on the silk, which when transferred to water, were still more so.

Tartrite of antimony treated in the same manner, transferred a very delicate film, scarcely visible, to the surface of water.

EXPERIMENT XII.

IRON.

A bit of calico which was dipped in a largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron, and dried in the air, suffered no perceptible change on applying the solution of carbon, except a slight tinge of brown.

Another bit of calico was immersed in the same solution of iron, and placed on a bit of deal board, a few drops of the solution of carbon were then applied, the calico was kept constantly wet with water, and in about fifteen minutes films of reduced iron were visible, the calico was immersed in water and left a bright metallic film on its surface.

EXPERIMENT XIII.

ZINC.

To a bit of silk which was dipped in a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc, and dried in the air, a few drops of the solution of carbon were ap- plied, but scarce any alteration of colour, or other visible change occurred.

A piece of calico was immersed in the same solution of zinc, and placed on a bit of thin deal board, a few drops of the solution of carbon were then applied, the calico was kept constantly wet with water, and in about fifteen minutes films of reduced zinc were evident; the calico was immerged in water and transferred a very bright metallic film of the colour of zinc to its surface.

I also reduced muriate of cobalt in this manned

EXPERIMENT XIV.

MANGANESE.

To a bit of silk which was dipped in a diluted solution of nitrate of manganese, and dried in the air, some drops of the solution of carbon were applied, but nothing appeared except a brown stain.

Another bit of silk was immersed in the solution of carbon, when the alcohol evaporated, a few drops of the same solution of manganese were applied; a brown stain was soon produced, the silk was kept wet with water, and in about twenty minutes films of re- duced manganese of a bluish white colour were evident on the silk.

This experiment did not succeed with a strong solution of nitrate of manganese.

The same experiment succeeds also on linen and calico, both with nitrate and sulphate of manganese, the reduction is attended with violet and purple colours, such as this metal imparts to glass and other substances, in which it exists combined with different proportions of oxygen; this difference is the cause of the different colours which solutions of manganese assume.

The bright films of reduced manganese soon disappear, the cause of which has been explained in the first chapter of this essay; the explanation there offered is confirmed by the following facts.

"Regulus of manganese," says Mr. Bergman, "when well fused, generally persists in a dry place, but sometimes undergoes spontaneous calcination, and falls down in a brownish black powder.

"Moisture, but particularly the access of aerial acid assists this operation. A small piece put into a dry bottle well corked, remained perfect for the space of six months, but afterwards exposed to the open air of a chamber for two days, contracted a brownness on its surface, together with so much friability as to crumble between the fingers. The internal parts however, retained an obscure metallic splendour, which disappeared in a few hours."21

I shall now relate a few experiments made with ether, alcohol, and gum.

EXPERIMENT XV.

GOLD.

I evaporated a solution of gold in nitro-muriatic acid to dryness, and dissolved the salt in pure alcohol, the solution was poured into a phial carefully dried in hot sand, and rinced with pure alcohol, the solution filled about three-fourths of the phial, which was carefully corked, and though it was nine months exposed to the gray light, no films of reduced gold appeared.

Part of the same solution was poured into a phial, and diluted with water, films of reduced gold soon appeared.

EXPERIMENT XVI.

GOLD.

A phial half filled with a solution of gold in sulphuric ether was exposed nine months to the gray light; but no films of reduced gold were produced.

On a bit of silk, which was dipped in part of the same solution of gold, and exposed to the gray light, and kept wet with water, reduced gold appeared in the space of a few hours.

EXPERIMENT XVII.

GOLD.

I mixed an aqueous solution of gold with a solution of gum arabic in distilled water, in such proportion, as to prevent the solution from spreading in the silk.

With this solution I drew several stripes on a piece of silk, and exposed it to the gray light of a chamber; in some time the gold was reduced attended with blue and purple colours.

Similar stripes were drawn on another piece of silk, which, after the stripes became sufficiently dry, was placed over the vapour of hot water; and in about fifteen minutes the gold was reduced in a beautiful manner.

This solution was applied to another bit of silk, which after it became sufficiently dry, was placed between the leaves of a blank book, to exclude the action of light: the gold, after some time, was reduced.

I found that small stripes and spots, made with this solution, were reduced by breathing on them for some time.

Sugar also, mixed with the solution of gold, promotes the reduction; but not so well as gum.

A bit of silk was dipped in a solution of nitrate of silver in distilled water, and exposed, while wet, to the smoke of a common fire; in a short time reduced silver appeared.

The following inferences are deducible from the experiments related in this chapter.

1. Charcoal is capable of reducing the metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere.

2. Water is essential to the reduction of metals by charcoal: for these experiments prove, that the reduction cannot be effected without water.

3. Charcoal does not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston; nor by uniting with and separating their oxygen; for were either of these opinions true, metallic solutions in ether and alcohol, should be as effectually reduced by charcoal, as metallic solutions in water are.

4. Ether and alcohol do not promote the reduction of metals without the aid of water; but when this is present in sufficient quantity, they effect the reduction, in the same manner, that charcoal and other combustible bodies do.

It is evident then that charcoal reduces the metals by decomposing water; which seems to be effected in the following manner.

The carbon of the charcoal attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state, with the oxygen of the metal, and reduces it.

Hence it follows that the carbon is oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, and forms carbonic acid, while the metal is restored to its combustible state.

This explanation is supported by the following facts: M Gengembre has observed, that if charcoal be immersed in water, and kept at a temperature of thirty degrees of the thermometer of M. De Reaumur, the water is gradually decomposed, and inflammable gas is formed.22

That charcoal effects the reduction of metals, in high degrees of heat also, by decomposing water, is evident from the following observations.

The great force with which charcoal attracts water is a fact sufficiently established; Dr. Priestley is so convinced of this, that he expresses himself in the following strong terms. "I did not know, nor could believe the powerful attraction, that charcoal, or iron appear to have for water; when they are intensely heated, they will find and attract it in the midst of the hottest fire through any pores in the retort."23

Now since water is essential to the reduction of metals in low degrees of heat; and since that fluid is always present, when metals are reduced by charcoal in high degrees of heat; it is manifest, that charcoal acts in the same manner in both these temperatures; and since water is easily, and instantly, decomposed by charcoal at a red heat, as the Antiphlogistians themselves allow; it clearly follows that their theory of metallic reduction is erroneous: for since the water is instantly decomposed by the charcoal, it is a necessary consequence, that its carbon must unite with the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state, with the oxygen of the metal, and reduces it, forming a new quantity of water equal to that decomposed: this new quantity of water may be decomposed in its turn: so that a thimble full of water would be sufficient to reduce any quantity of metal; provided the water were prevented from escaping, and time enough allowed.

Beside this source of water, the air of the atmosphere, which contributes to support the fire is an inexhaustible magazine of water: and the hotter the air is, the more water it holds in solution; as M. Le Roy has demonstrated.24 Moreover all metallic oxids and ores contain a large proportion of water.

From this view it appears, that the manner in which charcoal and other combustible bodies effect the reduction of metals, is by assisting to decompose water, the hydrogen of which is therefore the only reducer of the metals.

In order to point out the difference between this opinion and that of the Antiphlogistians, I shall present the reader with M. Lavoisier's idea of metallic reduction.

"It cannot be doubted," says that celebrated chymist, "that charcoal at a red heat takes oxygen from all metallic substances; this is a fact against which no exception can be made; and it is the foundation of the whole theory of metallic reduction."

But the experiments in this essay demonstrate, that this assertion is erroneous in every instance of metallic reduction; for, so far is it from being true, that charcoal takes oxygen from all metallic substances; it never does so in one single instance, since its carbon always unites with the oxygen of the water, the hydrogen of which unites immediately to the oxygen of the metal, and reduces it.

"But this action of charcoal on oxygen," adds M. Lavoisier, "this property, which it possesses of taking it from metallic substances, is not so strong in the cold, as at a red heat, since we are unacquainted with any metallic revivification effected by charcoal without heat."25

It is evident that this mode of reasoning is no longer of any weight, since charcoal does reduce metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere.

The reason charcoal is more powerful in high degrees of heat, than other reducers of the metals, is its great fixity in the fire, and the immense force with which it attracts and imprisons water in its pores, thus preventing its escape till it be decomposed by an affinity, which is much more complex than has been hitherto imagined.

Another reason of the superior power of charcoal in metallic reduction is, that it forms a volatile elastic fluid with the oxygen of the water, which flies off, and consequently does not re-act on the metal, or disturb, or impede by its presence, the action of the reducing powers; advantages that phosphorus or any other combustible substance, which forms a fixed acid, that re-acts on the metal, can never possess.

CHAPTER VIII.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
LIGHT.

THE next substance I shall treat of, is Light, which seems well adapted to illustrate the theory of metallic reduction; as in experiments made with this substance, water can be more effectually excluded, than in trials with any other reducer of the metals.

Before any decisive experiments could be made on light, or indeed any other reducer of the metals, it is obvious that we should first ascertain the effects of water itself in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere; to determine this point the two following experiments were made.

EXPERIMENT I.

GOLD.

A piece of silk was immersed in an aqueous solution of nitro-muriate of gold, and suspended in a phial over water; the phial was corked, covered with black silk, and placed in a dark closet to prevent the action of light. The experiment was continued from the 20th of July to the 20th of October, during which time the silk was frequently observed, and found to continue moist, but no alteration could be perceived, except that the yellow colour which the solution of gold gave the silk, was changed to a light brown.

The silk was now taken out of the phial, and a solution of phosphorus in ether applied to it; shortly after, a white metallic film appeared; the silk was then kept wet with water, and in some time reduced gold of its proper colour appeared.

EXPERIMENT II.

SILVER.

A bit of silk which was dipped in an aqueous solution of nitrate of silver, was suspended in a phial over water, and placed in a dark closet from the 20th of July to the 20th of October, and examined from time to time, but no alteration could be observed, its white colour continued pure and unchanged.

The silk was now taken out of the phial, and the silver was immediately reduced by means of a solution of phosphorus in ether.

Hence it appears, that water alone has not the power of reducing metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere.

EXPERIMENT III.

GOLD.

On the 24th of July a piece of silk was immersed in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water, and dried by a gentle heat; it was then suspended in a window exposed to the sunbeams as much as possible; no change was perceived on it till the 26th, when the margin of the silk began to assume a purple tinge, which increased gradually, and on the 29th exhibited a few obscure specks of reduced gold on the side of the silk opposed to the light.

The purple tinge continued to increase, and the yellow which the solution of gold gave the silk decreased gradually, till on the 27th of August the colour was a mixture of purple and light brown.

The reduction of the gold seemed to keep pace with these changes of colour, and was very evident on some parts of the silk even in the gray light, but much more so in sunshine; these changes were observed till the 20th of October; the experiment was then discontinued, and scarce any reduced gold could be seen on the side of the silk not opposed to the light.

That this slight reduction of the gold and changes of colour in the silk, depended on water absorbed from the air of the chamber, will appear from the following experiments.

EXPERIMENT IV.

GOLD.

A bit of silk which was dipped in the solution of gold employed in the preceding experiment was dried and suspended in a chrystal phial over dry carbonate of potash; the phial was then corked, and further secured from external humidity by covering the cork with wax: it was now placed in a dark closet twenty-four hours, that the carbonate of potash might have sufficient time to attract all the moisture it could from the air of the phial, before exposing it to the action of light.

The phial was then placed in a window exposed as much as possible to the solar light, from the 24th of July to the 20th of October, and carefully observed; the same side of the silk was always opposed to the light, and had the yellow tinge, which the solution of gold gave, altered to a brownish yellow: but the other side of the silk suffered no visible change whatever, nor could any purple tint, or the smallest vestige of reduced gold be perceived.

Another bit of silk which was immersed in the same solution of gold and dried by a gentle heat, was suspended over some dry carbonate of potash, contained in a chrystal phial covered with black silk, and placed in a dark closet during the same space of time, but underwent no visible change whatever.

Both these bits of silk were now taken out of the phials, and the gold was instantly restored to its metallic splendour by means of water and a solution of phosphorus in ether; a proof that the nitro-muriate of gold in these bits of silk, suffered no change during that space of time.

EXPERIMENT V.

GOLD.

A piece of silk, which was dipped in the same solution of gold, and placed on a china plate exposed to the sunbeams, was kept moderately wet with water during the experiment; the first alteration observed was, that the yellow colour of the silk began to change to a faint green, succeeded by a purple tinge, which in about fifteen minutes exhibited some particles of reduced gold; soon after the threads of the silk, which acquired this purple tint were gilded with gold; and, in about an hour, the whole of the silk was covered with a superb coat of reduced gold, exhibiting the texture of the silk in a beautiful manner.

The purple tinge, which attended the reduction, verged in some parts on red, and in others on blue.

This experiment, which is very amusing, I have repeated times unnumbered; and when the sun is powerful, and the solution of gold properly prepared and of due strength, the coat of reduced gold is so bright and dazzling, as to distress the eye of the beholder.

I find that the best way of preparing a solution of gold for this purpose, is to separate the oxid of gold from its solution in nitro-muriatic acid by means of good ether.

The silk may be dipped in this solution, and when the ether evaporates, kept moderately wet with distilled water.

It was with this solution in ether that I first reduced gold in the fibres of silk, and it was by means of the same I discovered, that water was a necessary condition in these reductions by light.

EXPERIMENT VI.

GOLD.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of nitro-muriate of gold on alcohol, and placed in a china saucer exposed to the sunbeams, was kept wet with alcohol for the space of an hour, but no change even in the colour, which the solution of gold gave the silk, could be perceived.

The alcohol diffused the solution of gold unequally through the silk, the rays of the sun being intercepted, suspended the experiment; there was no sunshine on the following day: on the third day the silk was again exposed to the sunbeams, and kept wet with alcohol, which extracted a yellow tincture; a proof that the gold in the silk suffered no degree of reduction; the sun shone pretty strong for an hour or more, and at length a faint tinge of purple, followed by some reduced gold, appeared.

The preceding experiments leave us no room to doubt that the purple tinge, and the small quantity of reduced gold, that appeared in this experiment, depended on water attracted from the air, or deposited in the silk by the alcohol during its evaporation.

Mr. Scheele reduced a solution of nitro-muriate of gold in water by exposing it in a phial for a fortnight to the rays of the sun.26

Mr. Lewis also made many experiments on the staining of marble, and other substances with metallic solutions, and light.27

EXPERIMENT VII.

SILVER.

A piece of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, was dried by a gentle heat, and exposed to the light of the sun as much as possible, in the window of a chamber from the 20th of July to the 20th of October.

In less than an hour the silk acquired a reddish brown colour; next day the colour became more intense and gradually increased, till on the third day it bordered on black, which increased slowly; at length part of it became gray, and a few minute particles of reduced silver could be distinguished; the black tinge gradually disappeared, and the silk was of a reddish brown colour; the reduced silver had a gray cast.

The following experiments demonstrate, that the changes of colour and the few particles of semi-reduced silver, depended on water attracted from the atmosphere.

EXPERIMENT VIII.

SILVER.

A bit of silk was immersed in part of the same solution of nitrate of silver in water, and dried in the dark, the silk retained its white colour; it was then suspended over dry carbonate of potash in a chrystal phial, which was corked and secured from the ingress of moisture by covering the cork with wax.

The phial was left in a dark closet twenty-four hours, that the salt might imbibe as much moisture as possible from the silk and air.

The phial was then placed in a window, exposed as much as possible to the rays of the sun, from the 24th of July to the 20th of October; the silk scarcely suffered any visible change, except a very faint tinge of reddish brown, which was best seen by transmitted light; for the silk viewed by reflected light appeared nearly white; but that even this tinge, slight as it was, depended on a minute quantity of moisture, which the carbonate of potash was unable to extract, appears from the next experiment.

EXPERIMENT IX.

SILVER.

A piece of silk was dipped in a solution of fused nitrate of silver in alcohol and carefully dried; it was then suspended over a quantity of concentrated sulphuric acid in a chrystal phial, which was coated with a double fold of black paper and gum arabic, reaching somewhat above the level of the acid to prevent the light from acting on it; the phial was corked, and to exclude moisture more effectually, the cork was covered with wax.

The phial was now placed in a dark closet twenty-four hours, that the humidity of the enclosed silk and air might be attracted by the acid; it was then placed in a window, exposed as much as possible to the rays of the sun, from the 19th of July to the 26th of October, but the silk underwent no visible change whatever; its white colour remained pure and unaltered.

The silk at the end of this period was taken out of the phial, and wetted with water, a solution of phosphorus in ether was then applied to it, and instantly the metallic splendour of the silver appeared,

Another bit of silk which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, and dried in the dark, was suspended over dry carbonate of potash in a phial, and placed in a dark closet about two months; the silk underwent no visible alteration whatever; its white colour remained pure.

I was desirous of knowing if the nitrate of silver in this bit of silk suffered any change, that might render it incapable of reduction; I therefore took it out of the phial, and divided it into two parts; one of these was wetted with water, and the silver was instantly reduced by a solution of phosphorus in ether. The other part, which was suspended in a window, exposed to the air of the chamber and rays of the sun, soon acquired a reddish brown colour.

Hence it is evident, that these changes of colour indicate partial reductions of the metal, and that they never happen without the presence of water.

EXPERIMENT X.

SILVER.

A bit of silk, which was dipped in a solution of nitrate of silver in water, was placed on a China saucer, exposed to the rays of the sun, and kept moderately wet with water; in a few minutes the white colour of the silk was changed to a reddish brown, which by degrees became darker, and in about three or four hours, though the solar rays were often languid and intercepted, acquired a blackish gray colour, most of the reddish brown having disappeared; next day there was no sunshine, but towards the evening, particles of reduced silver were visible on the side of the silk opposed to the light.

EXPERIMENT XI.

SILVER.

A bit of silk, which was immersed in a solution of nitrate of silver in alcohol, and exposed to the beams of the sun, as in the preceding experiment, was kept moderately wet with alcohol, but resisted the action of the light much longer than the preceding; however in some time, specks and lines of a reddish brown began to appear on some parts of the silk; next day, though there was no sunshine, the reddish brown colour increased a little; on the third day it became more intense, but no black, or gray colour, or particle of reduced silver, could be observed.

Whoever compares this with the preceding experiments, can have no doubt that the changes of colour which appeared in this experiment, depended on water attracted from the air, or deposited in the silk by the alcohol during its evaporation.

The experiments detailed in this chapter, prove beyond the power of contradiction,

1. That water is essential to the reduction of metals by light; for these experiments demonstrate that the reduction cannot take place without water, and that it is always in proportion to the quantity of that fluid present.

2. That light does not reduce metals by giving them phlogiston, as Messrs. Macquer and Scheele supposed; for was this opinion true, light should reduce them without the aid of water, and as well with alcohol as with water.

3. Light does not reduce metals by fusing and expelling their oxygen, as the Antiphlogistians imagine; for were this its mode of agency, the reduction should happen without the assistance of water, and as well with alcohol as with water.

4. Light is a combustible body, for it acts like hydrogen, phosphorus, sulphur, and charcoal, in the reduction of metals.

Since water then is essential to the reduction of metals by light, and since light does not reduce metals by giving them phlogiston, nor by fusing and expelling their oxygen, it follows, that the water is either decomposed, or that it unites with metallic earths, and constitutes their phlogiston, or that it unites with and separates their oxygenous principle; but as the two last suppositions are inadmissible, it is obvious that light reduces the metals by decomposing water.

After explaining the manner in which other combustible bodies reduce the metals by decomposing water, it will not be difficult to explain how light too produces the same effect.

But in order to facilitate the explanation, it must be premised,

1. That it is a law of attraction, that when any body is deprived to a certain degree, of another, for which it has a strong affinity, the attraction of the former for the latter is much increased.

2. That light has a strong attraction for oxygen, or the base of vital air.

3. That when oxygen is condensed, and fixed in any substance, it contains much less light and caloric than it does in the gaseous state.

4. That the oxygenous principle exists in water in this condensed state, and consequently has a strong attraction for light.

Therefore when light reduces the metals, it attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites in its nascent state to the oxygen of the metal and reduces it, forming at the same time a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

Hence it follows that the light is oxygenated and changed into vital air, while the metal is restored to its combustible state.

CHAPTER IX.
REDUCTION OF METALS
BY
ACIDS.

IT is well known that solutions of gold throw up films of the reduced metal to the surface of the fluid, and sides of the phials that contain them.

It has been shewn in the seventh chapter, that this effect depends on the presence of water, which is further illustrated by the following experiments.

EXPERIMENT I.

SILVER.

A drachm of saturated solution of nitrate of silver in distilled water was mixed with half an ounce of vinegar, in a few minutes a precipitate was formed; the whole was then poured on a filter and washed with distilled water; the precipitate acquired a bluish gray metallic appearance; the liquor which passed the filter, got a brown colour and became blackish; next day bright films of reduced silver floated on the liquor, and in some months after, a considerable part of the inner surface of the phial was coated with reduced silver. Distilled vinegar did not produce this effect.

EXPERIMENT II.

PLATINA.

If a solution of the ore of platina in nitro-muriatic acid be evaporated to dryness, and the salt dissolved in water, films of a livid white metallic appearance are thrown up to the surface.

EXPERIMENT III.

TIN.

Some tin, which was dissolved in a china cup in muriatic acid and evaporated to dryness, was dissolved in distilled water; immediately white metallic films appeared on the surface of the liquor, and after some hours, the whole surface of the solution was covered with a continuous metallic pellicle, which reflected all the colours of the rainbow, in a beautiful manner.

EXPERIMENT IV.

MERCURY.

Mr. Bergman says, "calcined mercury is reduced by digestion in acid of salt; but the cause has not yet been sufficiently explored."28

As this reduction of mercury by muriatic acid is doubted of by some, I made the following experiment.

A quantity of precipitate per se was put into a china cup placed on hot sand, and some muriatic acid was poured on it; the oxid was gradually dissolved, and the digestion continued till the acid was nearly evaporated, some distilled water was then poured on the salt, and minute films of a bright metallic appearance floated on the surface.

A nitrate of mercury was evaporated to dryness, the salt acquired a slight tinge of yellow; the cup was removed from the hot sand, and some water poured on the salt; immediately bright films of reduced mercury appeared, and in about three or four hours the whole surface of the solution was covered with a metallic pellicle, parts of which had the colour and splendour of the metal, and other parts reflected a wonderful variety of the most beautiful calours.

EXPERIMENT V.

ARSENIC.

A quantity of white oxid of arsenic and muriatic acid was digested in the same manner in a china cup, a smart heat was continued till most of the acid evaporated and left behind a mass of the consistence of tar, the surface of which had a gray appearance; after it cooled, some distilled water was poured on, it diffused a disagreeable smell, and films of reduced arsenic were thrown up to the surface; these were for some time remarkably bright, but soon became of a dull gray colour, owing to the rapid tendency of this metal to spontaneous calcinafion.

EXPERIMENT VI.

MANGANESE.

Some concentrated sulphuric acid was poured on a quantity of the [missing words] china cup, placed on hot sand; an effervescence was visible, but no sulphurous acid gas was exhaled; the cup was removed from the sand, before any perceptible quantity of the acid evaporated; then some water was poured on the mixture, and instantly the surface of the fluid was covered with very brilliant metallic films, and at the same time the solution acquired a rose colour.

Some of the same oxid of manganese was dissolved in nitric acid, in which a bit of sugar was put, the solution was poured into a china cup placed on hot sand, and as the evaporation proceeded, bright metallic films appeared on the surface.

Mr. Bindheim of Moscow relates, that he reduced the aerated calx of manganese dissolved in nitrous acid; "the solution was placed upon an open fire in a glass retort."29

Happening to pour out a very largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron, I was surprised to find the flags of the court in an hour or two after, covered with large films of a livid white metallic aspect, these films after the water evaporated, remained on the flags several days.

In consequence of this I poured a largely diluted solution of sulphate of iron into several shallow vessels [missing words] found the surface of the solution covered with abundance or bright metallic films.

I also found that a largely diluted solution of muriate of zinc throws up bright metallic films to the surface.

The reduction of metals by acids is a very convincing proof of the decomposition of water, and seems inexplicable on any other principle.

The reduction and calcination of metals by heat and electricity are naturally explained on the same principle; Dr. Priestley informs us in his History of Electricity, Vol. I. p. 344, that S. Beccaria revived several of the metals by the electric shock. It is obvious that the electric fluid produces this effect in the same manner, that other combustible bodies do, viz. by decomposing water. When the red oxid of mercury is reduced in close vessels by heat, the latter attracts the oxygen of the water, contained both in the oxid and in the air of the vessels, while the hydrogen of the water unites to the oxygen of the mercury, reduces it, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

It is found, that if light and caloric act both at the same time, the reduction is effected with more facility than if either acted separately; in this case, the superior efficacy of the combined action of light and caloric resembles that of other compound reducers of the metals; as that of sulphurated hydrogen gas, phosphorated hydrogen gas, alkaline sulphure, &c. which are more powerful than simple hydrogen gas, sulphur, or phosphorus.

This superior efficacy of compound reducers, is similar to what happens with some other combinations of combustible bodies, as pyrites, pyrophori, a mixture of lead and tin, &c. which have a more powerful attraction for oxygen, than any of their ingredients in a separate state.

Other acids, as the gallic, the tartarous, the formic, &c. and also alkalis, as ammonia and soda, hare the power of reducing some of the metals, facts well known to chymists.

CHAPTER X.
OXYGENATION
OF
COMBUSTIBLE BODIES.

IT has been shewn, in the preceding chapters, that water is essential to the reduction of metals; that it is always decomposed in that process, and that the reducing substances are oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter reduces the metals.

That water is also decomposed in every instance of oxygenation, and that the oxygen of water alone oxygenates combustible bodies will appear from the following observations.

AZOTE.

The first case of oxygenation, we shall consider, is that of Azote, in an experiment of Dr. Priestley, which has been urged by Mr. Kirwan with great success against the Antiphlogistians.

"If the electric spark be taken in nitrous air, it will be reduced to one-third of its bulk, and the residuum is mere phlogisticated air, and a little acid is deposited. Now the Antiphlogistians own that nitrous air contains both pure air and phlogisticated air; since therefore this pure air disappears, is it not evident that it was converted into water? and since the formation of water requires the presence of inflammable air, does it not follow that the nitrous air contained this also?"30

To this objection M. Berthollet replies, that the diminution of the nitrous gas "is owing to the combination of the mercury with the oxygen, which existed in the gas."31

But this answer is insufficient, as it does not account for the water and acid that appeared; and indeed by this experiment, the Antiphlogistians are refuted on their own principles, and the decomposition of water is incontestably proved; for as nitrous acid could not be formed without more oxygen than what existed in the nitrous air, is it not evident that this oxygen must be derived from the water contained in the nitrous air? It is obvious then, that the water of the gas was decomposed, which seems to have been effected in the following manner.

The electric spark diminishes the attraction of the constituent principles of the water for each other; hence the azote of the gas unites with the oxygen of [missing words] the hydrogen of the latter combines with the oxygen of the gas; and thus water and nitrous acid are formed.

The formation of nitrous acid in Mr. Cavendish's noted experiment, cannot be explained on any other principle than the decomposition of water: when the electric spark is taken in a mixture of azotic gas and vital air, the water of these airs is decomposed; the electric flame lessens the force with which the oxygen and hydrogen of the water adhere; hence the azote seizes the oxygen of the water and forms nitrous acid, while the hydrogen of the water unites with the oxygen of the vital air, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

When nitrous and vital air are mixed, the whole mass "hisses, turns red, grows warm, and contracts in bulk," the azote of the nitrous air attracts the oxygen of the water and forms nitrous acid, while the hydrogen of the water unites in its nascent state with the oxygen of the vital air, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

Hence while the azote of the nitrous air is oxygenated, the caloric is restored to its combustible state.

"But it is to be observed," says M. Bergman, treating of this experiment, "that the decomposition of nitrous air is the effect of a double attraction; the phlogiston is attracted by the vital [missing words] part by the water. Therefore, when the mixture is made in a phial immersed in mercury, the experiment fails."32

HYDROGEN.

The combustion of hydrogen gas with vital air is explicable only on the decomposition of the water contained in these airs; thus when flame, or a glowing body is applied to a mixture of them, the attraction of the principles of the water for each other is dimi- nished; therefore the hydrogen of the inflammable air unites with the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter seizes the oxygen of the vital air; thus the whole bulk of the airs which are changed into water disappears, and their light and caloric are restored to the combustible state.

Hence it appears that water is not formed during the combustion of vital and inflammable air, in the manner the Antiphlogistians suppose.

Indeed it is obvious, that if these airs contained no water they could never be burned; for since they are already saturated with light and caloric, they can have no attraction for any additional quantity of these fluids; and consequently can suffer no other change from the light or caloric of a glowing body than a greater degree of expansion, and therefore could never unite.

The same reasoning applies to the combustion of all elastic fluids.

PHOSPHORUS.

Vital air always contains a large proportion of water; when phosphorus is burned in this air it attracts the oxygen of the water, and forms phosphoric acid, while the hydrogen of the water unites with the oxygen of the gas, and forms water which unites with the acid.

Hence the weight of the acid formed is equal to the weights of the oxygen gas and phosphorus consumed; and the light and caloric, which appear during the combustion are restored to their combustible state.

This explanation is confirmed by an observation of Mr. Bergman, who says,

"In vital air, without the aid of external heat, phosphorus is consumed very slowly, and scarce at all unless water be present."33

Therefore the phosphorus does not unite to the oxygen of the vital air as M. Lavoisier supposes, but to the oxygen of the water contained in the oxygen gas.

SULPHUR.

When sulphur is burned in vital air it attracts the oxygen of the water and forms sulphuric acid, while the hydrogen of the water attracts the oxygen of the gas, and forms a quantity of water equal to that de- composed: the light and caloric are at the same time restored to their combustible state.

The sulphur then does not unite with the oxygen of the vital air as the Antiphlogistians imagine, but with the oxygen of the water contained in that gas.

CHARCOAL.

In like manner during the combustion of charcoal in vital air, the carbon attracts the oxygen of the water, and forms carbonic acid, while the hydrogen of the water unites with the oxygen of the vital air, and forms a new quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

Hence the carbon of the charcoal does not unite with the oxygen of the vital air as M. Lavoisier supposes, but with the oxygen of the water contained in that gas.

That water is decomposed in every instance of combustion, is further proved by attending to what passes during the burning of a common fire; the carbon of the fuel combines with the oxygen of the water and forms carbonic acid, while the hydrogen of the water unites partly with the oxygen, and partly with the azote of the atmosphere, and forms water, and the ammonia which abounds in soot.

From these observations it is evident, that M. Lavoisier's account of the formation of water and acids is erroneous, and inadequate to explain the phenomena.

The different kinds of fermentation are so many instances of the decomposition of water; in every case of them, combustible bodies are oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while others are restored by its hydrogen to their combustible state.

Hence the azote, ammonia, and carbonic acid of fermentation, the inflammable air of marshes, mines, &c. – the azotic and hydrogen gases ascend into the atmosphere, and there meeting the vital air discharged from the water of plants, &c. form new quantities of air and water.

When the azote is oxygenated, it unites with the oxygen of the water contained in the air and forms atmospheric air, and sometimes perhaps nitrous acid; the hydrogen of the water combines at the same time with the oxygen of the vital air, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

But when the hydrogen is oxygenated, a quantity of water double that decomposed is regenerated; for the hydrogen of the gas unites with the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter seizes the oxygon of the vital air; and thus a quantity of water double that decomposed is formed, and that part of it which the atmosphere cannot suspend descends in the form of rain.

When these decompositions arc rapid, the phenomena of thunder and lightning appear.

This account of the renovation of our atmosphere explains why the phenomena of thunder and lightning appear sometimes with, and sometimes without rain; and also accounts for the production of the nitrous acid, which Mr. Margraaf discovered in the purest snow.

The breathing of fishes is a striking proof of the decomposition of water in respiration.

For this view of the formation of our atmosphere I am indebted to a friend well acquainted with the experiments related in this essay, and also for the application of the opinion which I venture to advance to the respiration of animals.

The phenomena of vegetation cannot be explained on any other principle, than the decomposition of water by heat and light, which uniting to the oxygen of the water contained in vegetables, change it into streams of vital air that serve to renovate our atmosphere; the hydrogen of the water at the same time contributes to form the oil and other principles of plants, and when these are decomposed by the various processes of combustion, forms a quantity of water equal to that consumed in their formation.

The changes, which nitric acid suffers by exposure to heat or light, are explained with ease on this principle; the light unites with the oxygen of the water contained in the nitric acid and forms vital air, while the hydrogen of the water combines with the oxygen of the acid, and forms a new quantity of water equal to that decomposed; thus the nitric is converted into the ruddy nitrous acid.

METALS.

According to the Antiphlogistians, "In every metallic solution by an acid, the metal in order to become oxided, decomposes either the acid itself or the water of solution, or it obtains from the atmosphere the requisite quantity of oxygene. In the second case, hydrogenous gas in a state of greater or less purity is disengaged, and the acid remains entire without decomposition, which is proved by the quantity of alkali necessary to saturate it. In the first case, one of the principles of the acid, or the acid deprived of part of its oxygene is disengaged and fused in the caloric, which is separated at the same time; such are ni- trous gas and sulphurous acid gas. In the third case, neither the water nor the acid are changed; such is the solution of copper by the acetous acid.

"The muriatic acid and the vegetable acids, which are formed of radicals, or acidifiable principles, which have more affinity with oxygene than the metals have, are not decomposed by these metals, and the oxygene is always afforded to these last by the water or atmosphere. Hence the solutions by these acids afford only hydrogenous gas, or do not effervesce at all.

"There are some cases in which the water and the acid, are at the same time decomposed by the metal, as in the solution of tin in the nitric acid, according to the observation of M. De Morveau.

"Tin is so greedy of oxygene, and requires so large a quantity for its saturation, that after having absorbed that of the nitric acid, and reduced it to the state of azote, it decomposes likewise the water, and disengages hydrogen. These two principles being separated from their first compounds, unite together and immediately form ammoniac. Hence there is no disengagement of elastic fluid. In this case it appears, that the formation of ammoniac, in the solution of tin by the nitric acid always takes place; for by throwing quicklime or caustic fixed alkali into this solution, there is always a disengagement of ammoniac."34

It is evident then that this account of the oxygenation of metals, given by the Antiphlogistians, is equally complex as their account of metallic reduction, and improbable; since every case, in which they deny the decomposition of water, and derive the oxygen from other sources, is easily and naturally explained on that principle, as will appear from what follows.

Thus when mercury or silver is dissolved in nitric acid, the metal attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites with and separates more or less of the oxygen of the acid, which is thus changed into nitrous air.

The same thing happens during the solution of other metals in this acid, the only difference being the greater or less energy and rapidity with which they combine with the oxygen of the water.

This decomposition of water is confirmed by the solution of tin in this acid, in which the Antiphlogistians allow the decomposition of the acid, and the water too, for ammonia is formed by part of the hydrogen of the water, and azote of the acid.

In every case of metallic solution by sulphuric and muriatic acids, whether concentrated or diluted, water is decomposed; the metals attracting the oxygen of the water, while its hydrogen escapes in the form of inflammable air, or unites partly with the oxygen of the acid, and partly with caloric; hence the volatile sulphurous acid, and muriatic acid air obtained, always contain some hydrogen gas, as appears from the following observation of M. Bergman.

"By means of vitriolic acid, inflammable air is obtained from zinc and iron, as also by means of marine acid; but from the other metals dissolved in vitriolic acid, we obtain another species of air, called vitriolic acid air: and by the marine acid, another similar to the former, called muriatic air, but both, more or less mixed with inflammable air."35

Again, when copper is dissolved in the acetous acid, the copper attracts the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites with the oxygen of the atmosphere and forms water; hence no effervescence appears.

When alkalies dissolve metals, the latter are always oxygenated at the expense of the water, which holds the alkali in solution; thus when lead and copper are dissolved, the metals combine with the oxygen of the water, while its hydrogen unites to the oxygen of the atmosphere and forms water; hence no hydrogen gas appears.

The oxygenation of metals and other substances by heat and air is easily explained on the same principle; the metals, &c. unite with the oxygen of the water contained in atmospheric air, while the hydrogen of the water combines with the oxygen of the air, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

This explanation is clearly proved by an experiment of Mr. Bergman on the regulus of manganese, which if kept in a dry place, retains its metallic splendour, but if exposed to moisture, is soon oxygenated, and loses its lustre.36

It is further confirmed by the authority of the distinguished Mr. Scheele, who says that "the water contained in common atmospheric air is the chief cause of the ignition of pyrophorus," which he proved by the following experiment.

"I made a very dry air by putting some very small pieces of quicklime into a small matrass, then I put the neck of another matrass into that of the first, so that the air of both might communicate, and I luted the crevices with wax. Two days afterwards I separated the empty matrass, and poured half an ounce of pyrophorus from my phial into it, and immediately carefully shut the aperture up; but I did not observe that it grew in the least warm; an hour after this I put a sponge moistened in water into the matrass, and shut it up again: a few minutes after the pyrophorus began strongly to be heated, and some pieces kindled spontaneously."37

Many other facts might be adduced to prove, that oxygenation cannot take place without water, as the combustion of mixtures of iron filings, sulphur and water, of alkaline sulphure and water, &c. in which the water is decomposed, and the combustible bodies oxygenated by its oxygen.

It is evident then from the experiments and observations related in this essay, that water is essential to the oxygenation of combustible bodies, and that it is the only source of the oxygen that oxygenates them: it is also evident that when one body is oxygenated, another at least is restored to the combustible state: hence it appears that the oxygenation of combustible bodies is never effected by a single affinity.

The Antiphlogistians treating of the precipitation of metals by each other say,

"Since the metals cannot remain united to the acids, but in the state of oxides of a determinate degree, it is easily conceived, that by plunging into a metallic solution a metal which has a stronger affinity with oxygene than that which is dissolved, the former must deprive the latter of its oxygene, take its place in the acid, and cause the second to subside in a form more or less metallic, accordingly as it has deprived it of more or less oxygene. This is the reason of the precipitation of silver by copper, copper by iron,"38 &c.

But this account of the precipitation of metals by one another cannot be admitted, for it has been proved in every instance of reduction related in this essay, that water is decomposed, and that its hydrogen, is the only substance that restores bodies to their combustible state.

There is no reason then to suppose that nature deviates in this particular case, from that uniform simplicity, which she constantly observes in all her operations.

Therefore it is obvious, that when one metal precipitates another in a form more or less metallic, the precipitant unites with the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter combines with and separates the oxygen of the precipitated metal, and thus reduces it.

The experiments made with phosphorus and metallic solutions in ether, alcohol, and water, prove the truth of this explanation, and shew that when one metal precipitates another in the metallic form, it acts like a stick of phosphorus, decomposing the water.

This account of the reduction of one metal by another is supported by the opinion of Mr. Bergman, who says,

"It is well known, that the calx of copper dissolved in vitriolic acid is precipitated in its metallic form on the addition of iron; and that by means of a double elective attraction, for the iron dissolving in the acid would form an inflammable air by its phlo- giston, were not the copper present, which takes it up."39

The same author remarks, that a small excess of acid is necessary, and that without it no precipitation begins.

Now since water is decomposed by iron and sulphuric acid, it must be allowed, that when iron is immersed in a solution of sulphate of copper, the water is decomposed by the iron and excess of acid, the iron attracting the oxygen of the water, while the hydrogen of the latter unites to the oxygen of the copper, reduces it, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

The precipitation of silver in its metallic form by iron and other metals is to be explained in the same manner, and not by a single affinity as the Antiphlogistians imagine.

The reduction of gold and some other metals, by solutions of sulphate of iron and muriate of tin, is readily accounted for on the principles advanced here; for fresh made solutions of sulphate of iron and muriate of tin contain hydrogen, and have the power of decomposing water; the oxygen of which unites with the iron and tin, while its hydrogen seizes the oxygen of the gold, &c. reduces it, and forms a quantity of water equal to that decomposed.

The decomposition of water is further proved by the large dilution necessary to form the arbor Dianæ, the purple precipitate of Cassius, and other instances of the reduction of metals by one another.40

CHAPTER XI.
CONCLUSION.

I SHALL conclude with a general view of the inferences, which I ventured to advance in this essay.

1. Neither the Phlogistians nor Antiphlogistians account in a satisfactory manner for the increase of weight, which bodies acquire during combustion.

2. Their account of the formation of water, acids, and oxids, is erroneous; for it has been shewn that the oxygen of water alone oxygenates combustible bodies.

3. Combustible bodies, as hydrogen, phosphorus, sulphur, charcoal, light, &c. are capable of reducing the metals in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere; and indeed I might add at a much lower temperature, as I frequently experienced.

4. Combustible bodies do not reduce the metals by giving them phlogiston, as the Phlogistians suppose; nor by uniting with and separating their oxygen, as the Antiphlogistians maintain.

5. Water is essential both to the reduction and oxygenation of bodies, and is always decomposed in these operations.

6. Water does not contribute to metallic reduction merely by dissolving and minutely dividing the particles of metallic salts, and thus removing the impediment opposed to chymical attraction by the attraction of cohesion; for were this the case, metallic solutions in ether and alcohol, in which that impediment is equally removed, should be as readily and effectually reduced as metallic solutions in water are.

This circumstance, in which all the experiments on metallic reduction detailed in this essay exactly coincide, merits particular attention, and shews that the manner, in which combustible bodies effect the reduction, is the same in them all.

7. When one body is oxygenated, another at least, is restored at the same time to its combustible state; and vice versa when one body is restored to its combustible state, another at least is at the same time oxygenated.

8. Quantities of air and water, equal to those decomposed in the different species of combustion, are constantly forming.

Thus nature by maintaining this balance of power between combustible and oxygenated bodies, prevents the return of original chaos.

Since then in every act of combustion, one body at least is oxygenated, and another restored at the same time to its combustible state, the phenomena of combustion may be referred to two heads, viz.

Oxygenation, or the union of oxygen with combustible bodies, and

Reduction, or the restoration of oxygenated bodies to their combustible state.

And since in every instance of combustion water is decomposed, and one body oxygenated by the oxygen of the water, while another is restored to its combustible state by the hydrogen of the same fluid, it follows,

1. That the hydrogen of water is the only substance, that restores bodies to their combustible state.

2. That water is the only source of the oxygen, which oxygenates combustible bodies.

3. That no case of combustion is effected by a single affinity.

This view of combustion may serve to shew how nature is always the same, and maintains her equilibrium by preserving the same quantities of air and water on the surface of our globe; for as fast as these are consumed in the various processes of combustion, equal quantities are formed, and rise regenerated like the Phenix from her ashes.

NOMENCLATURE OF CHYMICAL TERMS
USED IN THIS ESSAY.

NEW NAMES.OLD NAMES.AmmoniaCaustic volatile alkali.Acetite of leadSugar of lead.— copperVerdigris.Azote (nitrogen)Base of phlogisticated air.Azotic gasPhlogisticated air.Alkaline sulphureLiver of sulphur.AlcoholHighly rectified spirit of wine.CarbonPure coal.Carbonic acidFixed air.CaloricHeat.HydrogenBase of inflammable air.— gasInflammable air.Hydrure of sulphurA compound of hydrogen and sulphur.— phosphorusA compound of hydrogen and phosphorus.Muriate of tinSalt of Jupiter.— silverLuna cornea.— arsenicArsenic combined with muriatic acid.— zincMarine salt of zinc.— cobaltMarine salt of cobalt. Nitric acidDephlogisticated nitrous acid.Nitro-muriatic acidAqua regia.Nitro-muriate of goldA compound of gold and aqua regia.— platinaA compound of platina and aqua regia.Nitrate of silverLunar nitre, chrystals of the moon.— mercuryMercurial nitre.— bismuthNitre of bismuth..— manganese— manganese.OxygenBase of vital air.— gasVital air.Oxygenated muriate of mercuryCorrosive sublimate.Prussiate of mercuryA compound of mercury and prussic acid.Phosphorated hydrogen gasPhosphoric air.PotashCaustic vegetable alkali.Sulphuric etherVitriolic ether.Sulphureous acid gasVolatile sulphureous acid.Sulphurated hydrogen gasHepatic air.Sulphate of copperBlue vitriol.— zincWhite do— ironGreen do.— manganeseVitriol of manganese.SodaCaustic mineral alkali.Tartrite of antimonyEmetic tartar.

THE END.

NOTES.

[Page v]

1 Vol. III. p. 127, 138.

[Page vi]

2 Accum's Syst. of Chemistry, Vol. I. p. 247. 2d Eng. Ed.

[Page 28]

3 Essay on Phlogiston, by Mr. Kirwan, new edition, p. 21 and 16.

[Page 30]

4 Experiments on Air and Fire. Eng. trans, p. 174.

[Page 31]

5 Essay on Phlogiston, a new edition, p. 38-166.

[Page 32]

6 Essay on Phlogiston, p. 207.

[Page 33]

7 Essay on Phlogiston, p. 205.

[Page 34]

8 Essay on Phlogiston, p. 14.

[Page 35]

9 Essay on Plogiston. p. 13-15.

10 Ibid. p. 25. and Philo. Trans. Vol. 78. p. 314.

[Page 51]

11 Scheele, p. 161, French translation. This is the usual process for obtaining the Prussic acid.

[Page 55]

12 Roz. Journ. Feb. 1782.

[Page 59]

13 Elective Attractions, English Translation, p. 87.

[Page 62]

14 Or, which is most probable, from water contained in the alcohol, owing to the great difficulty of procuring it perfectly rectified. Am. Ed.

[Page 67]

15 M. Monnet Dissolution de Metaux, p. 159.

16 Phil. Trans. Vol. 73. An. 1783.

[Page 68]

17 Essay on Phlogiston, a new Edit. by M. Kirwan, p. 46.

[Page 119]

18 Priestley, Vol. VI. p. 150.

[Page 120]

19 Chem. Essaye, Vol. III. p. 219.

[Page 167]

20 M. Kirwan. Phil. Trans. for 1786.

[Page 191]

21 Chem. Essay, Vol. II. p. 206 and 207, Eng. trans.

[Page ]

22 Essay en Phlogiston, new ed. by M. Kirwan, p. 61.

23 Phil. Trans. 1785. Vol. LXXV. p. 289.

[Page 196]

24 El. Nat. Hist. & Chem. Eng. Trans. in three volumes, p. 163. Vol. I.

[Page 197]

25 Essay on Phlog. a new ed. by M. Kirwan, p. 60.

[Page 206]

26 Experiments on Air and Fire. Eng. Trans. p. 82.

[Page 207]

27 Commerce of the Arts.

[Page 217]

28 Elective Attractions, Eng. trans, p. 223.

[Page 220]

29 Crell's Chem. Journal, Vol. II. p. 48, Eng. trans.

[Page 224]

30 Essay on Phlogiston, new Ed. p. 82.

31 Ibid. p. 122.

[Page 226]

32 Elec. Attr. Eng, Trans. p. 211.

[Page 228]

33 El. Att. Eng. Trans. p. 213.

[Page 234]

34 Essay on Phlog. new Ed. by Mr. Kirwan, p. 233-235.

[Page 235]

35 Chem. Essays, Vol. II. p. 358. Eng. trans.

[Page 236]

36 Chem. Essays, Vol. II. p. 206 and 207. Eng. trans.

[Page 237]

37 Exp. on Air and Fire, Eng. trans. p. 112 and 130.

[Page 238]

38 Essay on Phlogiston, new edit, by Mr. Kirwan, p. 236 and 237.

[Page 240]

39 Chem. Essays, Vol. II. p. 236, Eng. trans.

[Pages 241-242]

40 It appears impossible to explain, except by the play of double affinity here pointed out, (by which the decomposition of one substance is accompanied with the formation of another,) the uniform state of the atmosphere at all times, and in all places: without this wise provision, let us for a moment consider the immense consumption of oxygen from the atmospheric mass, by the constant processes of respiration from one thousand million inhabitants of the globe; from at least as many animals, and probably myriads of insecls, &c. which all require their proportion of this vivifying element. To these we must add the consumption from domestic and volcanic fiies, from fermentation and other processes continually going on in every region – and with these data, let us estimate the probable amount.

By Hale's experiments, a candle with a flame of half a cubic inch, consumed per minute twenty-six cubic inches of air; which by calculation amounts to about six hundred and fifty nine cubic feet per annum. Now supposing each person, in respiration, to consume the same per annum, it will afford an amount of six hundred and fifty nine thousand millions of cubic feet; as much for animals; probably as much for insects; certainly as much for fires, candles, and other sources of combustion; and the same for every species of fermentative process; and we have the above amount five times multiplied, without extending the view to fish: or equal to three billions, two hundred and ninety-five thousand millions of cubic feet of pure air annually expended; to supply which, nothing but the constant extrication of a similar quantity by co-instantaneous operations, can be supposed adequate to keep the atmosphere in the same uniform state of purity. This apparently could not be the case, were atmospheric oxygen, the sole, or even principal source of supply in these extensive operations: and this view however imperfect, may serve to corroborate the sentiments of the ingenious author.

Am. Ed.

About This Edition

Notes have been moved from the ends of the pages on which they appeared to the end of the book, and numbered sequentially. Page numbers appear at the beginning of the page to which they apply.

Edited by Mary Mark Ockerbloom

INVESTIGATION Former Trump staffers are ‘on the battlefield’ for a Canadian fossil fuel giant

The Narwhal By Matt Simmons (Local Journalism Initiative Reporter) and Mike De Souza

This article is part of a series about revelations from leaked recordings of TC Energy executives.Subscribe to our newsletter,for more on this investigation

In 2017, Michael Evanoff was tapped by former U.S. president Donald Trump to serve as assistant secretary of state for diplomatic security. In his testimony to the Senate foreign state committee, he detailed his previous experience in the foreign service, noting he had completed eight overseas postings, four of which were designated high threat. 

“Among other things, I established the first [diplomatic security] liaison position with a U.S. military regional command, managed the largest Russian spy case and damage assessment in NATO history and designed a post-9/11 informant ‘walk-in’ program at our Islamabad embassy that contributed to the capture of Khalid Sheik Muhammad,” he said at the time.

Evanoff now works for TC Energy, a Calgary-based multinational fossil fuel company with offices in Houston and Mexico City. His official title is director of national security policy, geopolitical intelligence and research. From his home in Washington, D.C., the former Trump appointee uses his extensive geopolitical and military background to protect the company’s interests: crude oil and natural gas pipelines in Canada, the United States and Mexico, which earned TC Energy $11 billion in 2023.

A leaked recording of a February TC Energy “lunch and learn” session featuring Evanoff and his colleagues is now pulling back the curtain on internal company discussions, including its apparent strategies about how to influence governments, benefit from geopolitical crises and leverage existing relationships with a range of senior government officials — including the head of Canada’s spy agency.

While TC Energy’s Canadian headquarters are in Calgary, the multinational fossil fuel corporation employs a team of analysts in Washington, D.C., to advise company executives on geopolitical issues. Photo: Jeff McIntosh / The Canadian Press

The conversations, reviewed by The Narwhal, provide fresh insight into how some senior officials at the company believe they are locked in an existential battle as governments around the world move away from fossil fuels in an effort to address the climate crisis. They cover a wide range of discussions about international events that could seriously affect the business of TC Energy and other fossil fuel companies, such as President Joe Biden’s recent decision to pause new permits for liquefied natural gas exports.

“Our focus as a team is to look at what exposes us to hostile complex threats such as nation-states using asymmetric tactics, cyber-threats exploiting vulnerabilities, geopolitical uncertainties impacting global markets and supply chains and evolving regulatory challenges,” Evanoff said on the recording.  

While there is nothing unusual about a large multinational company recruiting top politically connected talent and prioritizing robust security measures to protect its assets, most details about their strategies are often tightly guarded secrets.

TC Energy did not directly respond to questions sent by The Narwhal about its team in Washington, D.C., and its influence in Canada. 

In an emailed statement, Patrick Muttart, TC Energy’s senior vice-president of external relations, said TC Energy was “disappointed” that recordings of its recent “lunch and learn” sessions “were released externally without authorization.” 

Muttart added TC Energy’s operations include providing energy to customers “in North America and around the globe” but did not elaborate on how the company gathers intelligence about geopolitical issues. 

‘On the battlefield trying to … protect the TC tower’

The recording appears to be from a presentation that took place on or around February 22, 2024. On the call, several TC Energy staffers based in Washington, D.C., spoke about how they support TC Energy’s external relations work across North America.

Julia Nesheiwat, a former U.S. military intelligence officer and homeland security advisor to Trump, said she and her colleagues are “on the battlefield trying to work every day to protect the TC tower.”

“Sometimes of course we’re on the defense and doing damage control and … making the best of those situations,” Nesheiwat, who is now TC Energy’s vice-president of policy and insights, said on the call. She added the company’s goal is to be proactive and stay “on the offense, when we’re taking it to our opponents.” 

Evanoff struck a similar tone. Opening with a military term, he described the team as a “force multiplier.” 

“We’re in challenging times here, we all know that,” he said. “The geopolitical intelligence and research team — the GIR team — is vital, and I would say paramount, in safeguarding … TC’s North American energy division.”

In response to The Narwhal’s questions, Muttart, the company’s senior vice-president,  explained the company’s mission was to deliver secure, affordable and sustainable energy that powers homes and businesses around the world.

TC Energy builds and operates natural gas pipelines across North America. In Western Canada, the company recently completed construction of its Coastal GasLink pipeline, connecting underground shale gas reserves in B.C.’s northeast to a liquefaction and export facility on the Pacific coast. Photo: Marty Clemens / The Narwhal

“To achieve our mission, we engage with all levels of government and across every community where we operate,” Muttart said. “With governments, opinion leaders and policy-makers across jurisdictions, our role is to advocate for the changes needed to ensure energy security, job creation, affordability and sustainability. We do so for our colleagues, for our customers and for the communities where we operate. We do so with solid, robust and compliant practices and policies for engagement, while always looking for ways to improve.”

TC Energy executive discusses conversations with spy agency

On the February call, Evanoff said the company is actively working to influence global intelligence sharing. 

On the recording, he gave details of a meeting he said happened between company CEO François Poirier and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault at an intelligence summit in Palo Alto, Calif., in October 2023. The summit, hosted by U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation director Christopher Wray, brought together leaders of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, a bloc made up of senior officials from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

“The [detection of] political threats that come out of [Five Eyes intelligence] are shared and … four countries are actually sharing that with the business community,” Evanoff said. “The fifth one, Canada, is unfortunately hamstrung with the CSIS Act law that stops CSIS from sharing actual security intelligence to Canadian companies. This is a miss, a huge miss, that’s been going on since 1984 — way before the internet.”

David Vigneault, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), met with TC Energy CEO François Poirier in October 2023. The fossil fuel executive would like to see classified security intelligence shared with industry. Photo: Justin Tang / The Canadian Press

He said Poirier witnessed discussions between Vigneault and Wray in California that revealed “the sharing of information, especially with [the People’s Republic of China] and Russian threats, [is] not getting to our companies in Canada.” 

Evanoff said Poirier was “pretty charged” about finding a way to change this. According to the leaked audio, a conversation between the TC Energy CEO and the CSIS director ensued.

“The director of CSIS, David Vigneault, basically said, ‘I have a plan, will you work with me?’ ” Evanoff recounted. “And so [Poirier] absolutely said, ‘Yes, what can we do?’ ”

Evanoff alleged TC Energy analysts then supplied the CSIS director with a document supporting amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act that would pave the way for the federal government to share classified security intelligence with industry. He said the approach was consistent with methods used in the United States in the 1980s, with a government department called the Overseas Security Advisory Council.

“We wanted to convey that to the Canadians, to the director. So he’s taken that advice from us to start this,” Evanoff said.

Evanoff said after meetings with the CSIS director and other intelligence officials, Poirier joined a Business Council of Canada committee on national security, and is now in regular contact with Vigneault. 

“Our CEO … co-chairs that with Mastercard CEO Canada and it’s something that we’re very proud of and we’ll continue to feed the information to him twice a year,” Evanoff said. “We believe this is great for TC. It’s also great for us to … be top of mind with the Canadian intelligence service and even with the National Security Justice Department and also with RCMP.”

Evanoff did not respond to questions from The Narwhal about his recorded comments.

Investigating problems. Exploring solutions

The Narwhal’s reporters are telling environment stories you won’t read about anywhere else. Stay in the loop by signing up for a weekly dose of independent journalism.

SUBSCRIBE

Eric Balsam, a spokesperson with CSIS, declined an interview request, but confirmed in a statement that Vigneault and Poirier met in Palo Alto. Balsam said discussions between the two men occurred “in the context of strategic-level engagements with the Business Council of Canada” and its national security group co-chaired by TC Energy’s Poirier. Balsam said the security agency will continue to engage with the business community.

“CSIS works with its partners across the private sector to ensure they are aware of the threat environment and that they have the tools and information they need to protect their interests,” he noted.  

He also said the federal government launched public consultations on possible amendments to the legislation in November 2023 to ensure the spy agency has more tools to defend Canada against security threats including foreign interference.

Public consultations about updating the CSIS Act concluded in February, with a majority of participants agreeing the agency should have more tools to share information about threats with industry, universities, local governments and law enforcement as well as other potential targets. A report summarizing the consultations also said a minority of participants expressed concerns about whether any proposed changes would increase threats to privacy. Some also expressed “the need for strong oversight and accountability.”

President Biden and the ‘the battle to define natural gas’

On the February recording, former White House staffer Edward Burrier, now TC Energy’s director of public policy, told his colleagues Biden’s pause on liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, announced Jan. 26, 2024, is making waves across the industry. (On July 1, a Trump-appointed federal judge blocked Biden’s pause.)

He suggested the Biden administration implemented the pause as a response to worries about the upcoming election and explained how innovative techniques in extracting gas from underground shale reserves pushed companies like TC Energy into the spotlight.

“Thanks to the shale revolution, in just a few short years the U.S. went from importer to exporter of natural gas, becoming the number one last year, surpassing Qatar and Australia,” he said. “The success of [the] industry has definitely put it in the crosshairs of activists.” 

“President Biden has really struggled with key demographics: war in the Middle East, student loans, environmental activism,” he continued. “In some ways we’re kind of laughing but it is an eye opener: the White House had top officials meeting with 25-year-old TikTok influencers that were producing LNG videos. It’s through this prism that it’s clear this was entirely a political decision by the White House.”

He added he believes the decision was “facilitated by a group of activists and academics” and said the impact isn’t limited to the United States. 

“This decision isn’t just important to us but it’s reverberating around the world. Our allies are worried about U.S. leadership and our adversaries are doing a victory lap.”

TC Energy executives Michael Evanoff, Julia Nesheiwat and Edward Burrier work from Washington, D.C., to protect company interests. Both Evanoff and Nesheiwat are former Trump appointees, and Burrier was a longtime White House staffer before he started his work with the fossil fuel company. Photos: Diplomatic Security Service / Flickr; Wikimedia Commons; Concordia

Burrier noted on the call that Biden’s fossil fuel policies had become an election issue, and predicted  Trump, if elected, would overturn the pause on liquefied natural gas exports on day one of a new mandate.

He said he’s paying close attention to messaging from opponents of fossil fuel development, noting “the battle to define natural gas is on.”

Natural gas is a fossil fuel mostly composed of methane. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, over a 20-year period, methane is 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide in terms of heating the planet.

In B.C., TC Energy recently completed the Coastal GasLink pipeline project which will transport the fossil fuel to the Pacific coast, to be converted into liquefied natural gas and shipped overseas. The oil and gas industry has proposed a number of LNG facilitiesalong the coast to support more production and exports.

Proponents say the gas can help countries like China, Japan and Korea reduce reliance on other fossil fuels, such as coal. That argument is contested by climate scientistswho maintain emissions and leaks during extraction, processing and transport make liquefied natural gas worse for the climate than coal.

Burrier isn’t buying it.

“I often wake up and kind of wonder if I’m on a different planet — reading studies that LNG is dirtier than coal is one of those moments,” he said on the internal call, referring to a study by a Cornell University professor who he described as “a long time anti-natural gas advocate.” He noted the paper wasn’t peer-reviewed.

“I grew up as a young staffer on Capitol Hill and the debate was about drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge,” he continued. “It was a major kind of fight. [There’s] not one Democrat who says that they’re for that. Keystone XL — these guys don’t even have to think about it. They said they’re instinctively against it. We are at this spot where we cannot let that happen for natural gas exports.”

‘Success of environmental activism’ in U.S. could inspire action in B.C., TC Energy exec worries

Canada’s first major liquefied natural gas export project is nearing completion. LNG Canada, which will be supplied by TC Energy’s Coastal GasLink pipeline, will start shipping the fossil fuel to Asia next year. 

“In the short term, in Canada, I think we’ll see some renewed interest in LNG Canada as Asian partners look to diversify,” Burrier said of the impact of the U.S. pause. “But I think if we’re talking about a real opportunity, we’d really have to see the Canadians — the federal government [and] the province — really ready to push through the next set of projects. And I think, to be honest, the Canadian government really doesn’t do competitive policy like that all that well.”

LNG Canada is poised to begin shipping natural gas overseas next year. Edward Burrier, a senior executive with TC Energy, said he doesn’t think President Joe Biden’s pause on U.S. LNG exports will affect Canadian exports much beyond “renewed interest“ in the B.C. export facility. Photo: Marty Clemens / The Narwhal

He cautioned the impacts of Biden’s pause could be more subtle.

“We do have to be worried that the success of environmental activism in the United States could be a jolt for their brethren in B.C.,” he said. “I know again that they’ve called for a pause of Canadian exports, which I always laugh to myself, since they’re still at zero right now.”

“I think we often have to remember that Canada’s aggressive climate policies can themselves present reliability of supply questions to our partners,” he added. 

Nesheiwat, the former Homeland Security advisor and now TC Energy vice president, said that’s one of the challenges her team helps to address.

In January, The Narwhal reported how TC Energy lobbied the federal government to exempt liquefied natural gas facilities from a proposed cap on heat-trapping pollution from oil and gas activities. At that time, a federal spokesperson said the government would not grant any exemptions, noting the LNG sector was expected to grow.

“In Canada, our team is dealing with stringent and evolving climate policies or regulatory inefficiencies,” Nesheiwat said on the leaked recording. “The fact is, as a company we’re often navigating these public perceptions and again across multiple countries and cultures.”

Burrier, Nesheiwat and other TC Energy executives spent much of their careers developing and influencing policy in the U.S. TC Energy did not respond to questions about why it hired a Washington D.C.-based team to influence Canadian policies.

‘We literally did the government’s homework for them’

Burrier said one example of “successful shots fired” in Canada was how the company lobbied the federal government around the Impact Assessment Act, legislation that gives decision-makers the means to consider environmental impacts when approving or rejecting major industrial development projects. The government is amending the act after the Supreme Court of Canada found it to be unconstitutional last fall, but Burrier suggested TC Energy was behind the government’s openness to changes that benefit industry. 

“As many on this call will remember, early last year the Canadian government had two sentences in their proposal saying that they wanted to make improvements on its permitting process,” he said in the recording. “We used that as our opening. We produced for government a deliberate, thoughtful, 20-plus-page paper with recommendations.” 

He explained TC Energy staffers based in the U.S. capital developed a case study for Canadian government officials that dissected how Germany “built three LNG import terminals in less than a year” by enacting special legislation.   

“We literally did the government’s homework for them,” he added.

Dixie Quintanilla, a spokesperson with the Impact Assessment Agency, said the federal government met with numerous stakeholders, including TC Energy, as part of the process to develop proposed amendments. 

She said the agency “did not receive any submissions from TC Energy on amendments to the Impact Assessment Act.”

When asked by The Narwhal about the claims, federal Environment Minister Steven Guilbeault said Burrier’s statement is “an outrageous claim and it’s so preposterous.” At an interview during a conference organized by the Toronto Region Board of Trade on June 27, Guilbeault said TC Energy was one of 30 stakeholders and 60 Indigenous organizations consulted over the changes and that he didn’t believe the company had put its thoughts in writing. 

A spokesperson said the minister’s office “relied on the best available science and on the unbiased, high-quality advice of the Impact Assessment Agency” for amendments to the legislation. 

The Supreme Court ruling was “the only reason we made changes,” Guilbeault said. “To think that I would take my orders from a company on something like that? I think it’s someone who is grossly overestimating their importance and the role they played … It’s ridiculous.” 

Burrier also said he and his colleagues helped with efforts to weaken a “climate scheme that British Columbia was advancing.”

“I won’t bore you with the details here because it does get pretty technical but we helped … the team in B.C. with assessing the proposals and providing recommendations and, lo and behold, it worked,” he said. “The final recommendations came out and in the next few years we’ll see savings of hundreds of millions of dollars in compliance costs and it factors up to billions if you look out at 25 years from now.”

It appears he was referring to provincial regulations that restrict emissions from the oil and gas sector. On another leaked recording, a TC Energy executive who resigned after The Narwhal began its reporting said the company was successful in excluding “midstream” infrastructure — namely, pipelines — from the new rules. 

A spokesperson with the Office of the Premier in B.C. did not directly respond to the claim, saying only that the premier maintains a “clear and persistent commitment to B.C.’s climate plan,” which includes an emissions cap for the oil and gas industry.

— With files from Fatima Syed

Small drones will soon lose combat advantage, French Army chief says

By Rudy Ruitenberg | https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/06/19/small-drones-will-soon-lose-combat-advantage-french-army-chief-says/

 Wednesday, Jun 19, 2024

French Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pierre Schill inspecting a Rapid Eagle anti-drone system at the Eurosatory defense show in Paris on June 19, 2024 (RUDY RUITENBERG/DEFENSE NEWS)

PARIS — The advantage now enjoyed by small aerial drones on battlefields including in Ukraine is but “a moment in history,” French Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pierre Schill said at the Eurosatory defense show in Paris.

While anti-drone systems are lagging and “leave the sky open to things that are cobbled together but which are extremely fragile,” countermeasures are being developed, Schill told reporters during a tour of the French Army stand at the show June 19. Already today, 75% of drones on the battlefield in Ukraine are lost to electronic warfare, the general said.

”The life of impunity of small, very simple drones over the battlefield is a snapshot in time,” Schill said. “Right now it’s being exploited, that’s clear, and we have to protect ourselves. Today, the sword, in the sense of the aerial drone, is powerful, more powerful than the shield. The shield is going to grow.”

This year’s edition of Eurosatory featured dozens of anti-drone systems, including shotguns, cannons and missiles, while companies including Safran, Thales and Hensoldt presented soft-kill solutions to eliminate drones by electronic means. Schill said vehicles in France’s Scorpion collaborative combat program will all be anti-drone systems in two years time, linking their detection capability with turrets that can fire a missile or a 40mm airburst grenade.

First-person view drones currently carry out about 80% of the destruction on the front line in Ukraine, when eight months ago those systems weren’t present, according to Schill. The general said that situation won’t exist 10 years from now, and the question could be asked whether that might already end in one or two years. Schill cited the example of the Bayraktar drone, “the king of the war” at the start of the conflict in Ukraine but no longer being used because it’s too easy to scramble.

The general said he doesn’t consider that the war in Ukraine calls into question the French choice of a maneuvering army built around medium armor, with a focus on speed and mobility. The vehicles that the Army is introducing as part of the Scorpion program -- the Griffon, Serval and Jaguar – can be equipped with either active or passive protection, even if a strong emphasis of mine protection means they’re “quite massive.”

Griffons, Servals

The French Army is receiving around 120 Griffons and 120 Servals every year as part of Scorpion, as well as more than 20 Jaguars. The vehicles are equipped with “extremely powerful” information systems, and a vehicle such as the Griffon may contain more lines of code than a Rafale fighter jet, according to Schill.

Vehicles developed before the Scorpion program, such as the Leclerc main battle tank, are being reconfigured to become part of the collaborative combat system, which for example allows a target detected by one vehicle to be attacked by another. Scorpion was “extremely ambitious,” works, and has met expectations, according to Schill.

“Everything we had planned is perfectly in place, but it’s just a question of cost effectiveness on certain capabilities,” the general said.Something not considered five years ago is the rapid development of microprocessors, which means the gathered data can now be analyzed within the vehicle rather than externally. In combination with on-board artificial intelligence, that will allow for capabilities such as immediate threat detection, including of drones.

When looking to draw lessons from Ukraine, there needs to be a distinction between what is situational and related the type of terrain and battles being fought, and what is structural, the general said. The war in eastern Europe doesn’t mean the issues of the past 30 years around risk and crisis management will disappear. “We must remain a versatile army.”

The French choice has been to not separate the army into distinct parts suited for different theaters, for example an intervention army that is agile and mobile and a mechanized armor army prepared to fight a war like the one in Ukraine today, with “perhaps more rugged, lowered vehicles, but which, when they hit a mine will kill crews.”

Schill said he wants to preserve the “warrior aspect” of the French army, in which every soldier is aware they can be deployed in operation, rather than a soldier in a territorial defense army “who will never do anything.”

The pace of military drone development means that Army can’t commit to large buying programs, because an acquired capability can become obsolete in five months, according to the general. Schill said today’s drones fly better than those two or three years ago, with more computing power onboard that is capable of terrain-based navigation or switching frequencies to escape jamming.

Drones can’t be compared to 155mm shells, which can be stocked and will remain relevant in 10 years time, and the Army needs to find “the right system in this fast-moving world of new technology,” Schill said. The challenge is creating an industrial model that can produce in mass if necessary, and sufficiently standardized.

Future buying of electronic gear such as drones but also small radios and smart phones may be done in batches to allow for technology evolution, for example renewing equipment at the brigade level rather than multiple-year programs to equip the entire Army with a new piece of equipment, Schill said.

‘Just not possible’

The general also commented on the future French-German Main Ground Combat System, which will consist of several vehicles, some of them manned and others automated, combining anti-drone weapons, close-defense anti-aircraft capabilities, missiles and a canon. Putting all of that on a single tank would create a vehicle weighing 80 metric tons, which “is just not possible.”

Development of the system is going to 10 to 15 years because the land-based robotics are “not completely mature yet,” according to Schill.Schill said he doesn’t know whether the right main gun for the future tank system will be 120mm, 130mm or 140mm, saying that will depend on issues such as stealth and mobility requirements, as well as what the gun bore would add in terms of penetration. KNDS, which is involved in the MGCS program, presented a gun that can swap its barrel to fire either 120mm or 140mm shells.

The French Leclerc tank probably won’t get a second upgrade beyond the current XLR version being rolled out, according to the general. He said the French-German agreement is for the next-generation system in 2040, making the Leclerc question a secondary issue.

It’ll be in France’s interest to piggyback on any capability additions made by the United Arab Emirates, another Leclerc user, between now and 2040 as a way to finance intermediate innovations, Schill said. The introduction of the MGCS won’t immediately mean the end of the Leclerc, which the general expects to be in service in the French Army until 2045.

About Rudy Ruitenberg

Rudy Ruitenberg is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. He started his career at Bloomberg News and has experience reporting on technology, commodity markets and politics.

The Architect: Dave Weagle suspension revolution

FORWARD By Travis McCracken

In the spirit of relentless pursuit and innovation, this article draws inspiration from the journey of Dave Weagle, a master of mechanical engineering and mountain biking. His story teaches us that constraints are not obstacles but catalysts for creativity and success. In the following article, you'll discover how embracing your limitations can lead to groundbreaking achievements and new paths to success.

FREEHUB ARTICLE

Dave Weagle has had a very large roll in the development of mountain bike suspension. From the DW-link and split pivot to the DELTA system, it's safe to say mountain bikes would be very different if it weren't for Weagle's love of F1 racing and the fact that he didn't have space for a motorcycle.

Words by Brion O'Connor | https://freehub.com/articles/the-architect

Mountain bikers should thank their lucky stars that suspension guru Dave Weagle didn’t have a bigger apartment.

Weagle grew up in central Massachusetts, an all-around athlete who played hockey, basketball and baseball, and rode motocross. Plenty of motocross. In the mid-1990s, after high school, he moved east to Boston, and the Wentworth Institute of Technology, to pursue a mechanical engineering degree and his dreams of working for a Formula 1 racing team.

“I had basically tailored my schooling toward that,” Weagle says. “But when it came time to pull the trigger, I had met my now-wife, and decided I really didn’t want to move to the UK to pursue F1 racing. I had done my due diligence, and it really didn’t seem like the right move for me.”

Instead, in 1998 the newly minted graduate went to work for Draper Laboratory, a contractor for the United States Department of Defense. Living in the Boston area, Weagle still had the itch for some throttle twisting.

But his apartment had space limitations. “I would have never, ever, ever bought a mountain bike,” he says. “I would have continued to ride motocross. But I couldn’t fit a motocross bike in my apartment.

“All of my buddies had mountain bikes, and they were having fun, riding in Lynn Woods, so I took a shot. I went out with them a couple of times, and that was pretty much it.”

Weagle’s inquisitive, analytical mind shifted gears—literally.

“As I got into mountain biking a little further, I started looking at these bikes and saying ‘What the heck is going on with these things?’” he says. “I had the suspension background, I had the athletic background, and I really melded the two together. And started thinking about what the heck is this thing actually doing?

“It’s crazy, but nobody had actually published any kind of technical analysis of how chain-driven wheel suspension actually functions. It’s insane to think that in the 100 years of motorcycles, no one had actually taken the time to do it. But if you think about motorcycles, you hit the gas, and it really doesn’t matter.”

Motorcycles simply evolved. “They would just move things around until things worked, and it was all good,” Weagle says. Being human-powered, mountain bikes were a different animal—or, more accurately, machine—altogether.

Suspension is only ever one part of the entire machine. Weagle does a little custom fabrication on one of his many other projects.

Weagle says he had an idea of what he was feeling while riding, but wanted to quantify those sensations. One, for example, is what he calls the “language of feel,” which he wanted to define mathematically. It was a sensation he believes first developed in both his early riding and his activities outside of biking.

“I’ve always attributed the fact that I have a propensity for feel, or maybe a finer-tuned sense than most people, to the fact that my main sport growing up was playing hockey,” Weagle says. “I was on blades my whole life. I don’t know if there’s any truth to that, but that’s what I’ve always imagined.”

Weagle built a language for the math, and soon wrote a paper on how “chain-driven suspension actually reacts to acceleration forces.” Now he just had to decide what to do with it.

Weagle continued to ride, and race, with a distinct preference for downhilling. While he’s learned (reluctantly, he says) to pedal over the years, he still prefers spending his day using another machine—a chairlift—over grinding out long climbs.

“I would have never had success in mountain biking if I wasn’t able to ride the bike, and, at one point, ride at a reasonably high level.”

“I was pretty notorious in the NORBA pits for suspension tuning and helping people sort through their own bikes,” Weagle says. “Suspension tuning back in the day was quite a bit more rudimentary than it is now.”

Weagle specifically targeted the dampers that were popular at the time, which he says “didn’t function all that well. So just making them work at all was really, really important.”

He began tinkering with existing suspension platforms and building his own bikes. Together with some friends, Weagle launched Evil bikes in 1999, followed by e*thirteen drivetrain components in 2002. But his work at NORBA races was also turning heads.

“You had bikes like Intense that were amazing bikes for the time, but they had a lot of adjustments,” he says. “And only a couple of the adjustments were functional in any real way. Understanding how they functioned, why they functioned, what the limitations of the existing dampers were, and helping riders through that, I got myself a reputation in the pits.”

Dave Weagle’s workspace is as much a shop as it is a museum. Years, if not decades, of mountain bike history dangle from the ceiling, and past, present and future projects are scattered throughout. For Weagle, the best design is the next one.

A good workshop has as many tools as it does projects. Being able to create one-off components and parts allows Weagle to fine tune his designs—and make just about anything.

Those experiences and the subsequent reputation he earned led to an offer to develop a product line for Iron Horse, which had started to heavily invest in its mountain bike department. Weagle said he took the suspension methodology he had developed and eventually created a “kind of idealized system that became [the] DW-link.” The title came from his nickname at the time, and was officially coined by a friend.

This groundbreaking suspension design marked a watershed moment in mountain biking. From a pure downhilling perspective, it was a sort of mechanical revolution akin to the Repack pioneers in the 1970s, bombing down Mount Tamalpais in California’s Marin County aboard their “clunkers” and “ballooner” bikes: It defined what was possible, and set the standard for what was to come.

The terminology is a bit intimidating, but the design is centered on the concept that “varying anti-squat can be used to counteract the negative effects of load transfer on a bicycle suspension,” Weagle says. “I didn’t invent anti-squat. That’s just a known phenomenon in vehicle suspension. Your car has that. Your city bus has that.”

Essentially, “anti-squat” helps suppress natural weight transfer under acceleration, which helps the rider to keep the bike’s wheels in contact with the ground while providing enough suspension to keep the rider’s backside in the saddle, instead of acting like a catapult.

Like many landmark inventions, the DW-link and Weagle’s work with those temperamental dampers has withstood the test of time.

“If you go back and look at pre-2003 bikes, and post-2003, the direction [of suspension design] has moved a lot closer to what I was doing early on and farther away from any other design,” he says. “There’s really no other design. Every design has moved this way.

“That’s made bikes better for everybody. It’s made suspension more compliant.”

Weagle left Draper Labs in 2003. “Eventually, I saw a gun mounted on a robot that I had designed, and decided that perhaps military engineering wasn’t for me,” he says.

Free to do what he wanted, he then committed himself full time to bike and bike suspension design. And Weagle has never once sat on his laurels.

“In terms of suspension design, where we were 10 years ago, the designs that I put out there, that I worked on, were definitely [utility] knife-type products,” Weagle says. “You could use them for anything. I would say today, in 2016, nearly every single product that is sold has gone in the direction of what I was doing in 2005 and 2006.”

In the past 16 years, he has created a number of suspension designs, led by several iterations of the DW-link (on Iron Horse, Pivot, Ibis and Turner bikes), the DELTA system found on Evil bikes, and the Split Pivot (on Devinci and Salsa bikes). The goal, Weagle says, has always been to help the bike vanish underneath the rider.

“For me, [suspension design] is more about the people,” he says. “My biggest goal, my biggest achievement, is when the product really disappears. It’s just gone. It’s totally transparent.”

Asked what his specific goals are when designing a bike or a suspension system, Weagle says, “However the rider really wants it.”

“I can’t necessarily prescribe that, unless we’re talking about a race bike for a specific athlete, in which case that specific athlete has areas where they’re better and some areas where they’re struggling, so we’ll work specifically with that,” he says. “A downhill bike is a downhill bike, and a cross-country bike is a cross-country bike, just from a pure geometry standpoint, and a suspension travel standpoint.

“There are divisions there, but, by and large, trail bikes today, it’s really about preference,” Weagle says. “You want to ride a longer travel bike, that’s fine. You want to ride a shorter travel bike, that’s fine too. It’s really nothing wrong with either.”

From an idea to a prototype, a lot of things can come to life in a shop with the right tools. Dave Weagle works in the virtual before going to the the physical.

That’s why Weagle is comfortable working with numerous clients, since every bike manufacturer has a slightly different type of ride in mind.

“My goal when consulting partners is to help them build their best possible product,” he says. “Some lines, like the Evil line, I get to do from the ground up. I get to choose the geometry, I get to choose what the product line looks like, I can choose the suspension. I do everything, essentially. Obviously, there are other people working on the project, but I’m the architect of the line.”

Regardless of the company he’s working for, “my job is to coach them on geometry and do all the suspension design for them,” Weagle says.

He also emphasizes that it’s important to respect the specific vision of every company he consults with, and does his best to meet those ideals, not his own. “My goal, from a field standpoint, is to understand who the people behind the companies are, how to make that bike fit with who they are,” he says.

“An Ibis and a Pivot do not ride the same,” Weagle says. “The guys behind the companies are different people, and I think a little bit of division is nice.”

Today, Weagle has set up shop in Martha’s Vineyard, a well-known tourist retreat just off the southern arm of Massachusetts’ Cape Cod where he shares a home with his wife, Linley. The island will never be considered a mountain biking mecca, much like Moab or British Columbia’s North Shore. But that doesn’t bother him.

“My wife grew up here, and that’s where we got married,” he says. “And I like being married. So I’m on Martha’s Vineyard.”

The home office doesn’t hinder his vision. A far cry from that original, cramped apartment, the Weagle workshop is sort of a museum, with more than two-dozen bikes and frames hanging from the walls. Asked if he has a favorite design, Weagle replies without hesitation: “The next one.”

“I’m trying to live more in the present,” he says. “I’ve always enjoyed riding the bikes of the time, or the ones slightly ahead of their time.

“Still, I never really choose favorites. There’s always something better. By the time somebody sees something that I’ve worked on, I’ve already dissected it and I’m completely sick of it. I’ve been looking at it for two-and-a-half years, and probably just done with it.”

Weagle’s engineering interest originated with Formula 1 cars but found a home in mountain bikes after his years of racing motocross. All vehicles have suspension of sorts, and it was just up to Weagle to determine how to best to use it while racing downhill.

However, Weagle is guarded when it comes to future projects, regularly answering with a flat “Can’t talk about it” when asked. That’s understandable, given how many of his designs, from suspension systems to thermoplastic bash guards, have been “borrowed” by other manufacturers over the years.

“If I had a nickel for everyone who told me I was a complete dumbass for trying to build a plastic bash guard, I’d be retired,” he says. “But you can’t buy a metal bash guard anymore.”

Weagle’s work continues to fascinate and invigorate him, especially with the advent and popularization of 29- and 27.5-inch wheels, which offer new dynamics and new challenges. And his continued involvement in the industry, again, is a blessing for mountain bikers everywhere.

“What really excites me are the mechanical problems,” he says. “That’s what I really enjoy—solving difficult challenges. That’s what drives me.”

Weagle readily admits his attitude toward mountain biking has undergone a 180-degree change since he begrudgingly saddled up along with his buddies on the technical trails of Lynn Woods on Boston’s North Shore two decades ago.

“I love the fact that I can work in mountain biking. I love the fact that my work makes people’s lives better, makes people happier,” Weagle says. “People go through their lives dealing with some crappy job, or whatever. Everyone’s got something going on. We all have things personally, or professionally, making us crazy.

“I know that if I go out on my bike, that stuff tends to disappear,” he says. “I’ve heard that time and time again from other riders. Getting out on the trails is like their church.”

Researchers plan to retract landmark Alzheimer’s paper containing doctored images

Senior author acknowledges manipulated figures in study tying a form of amyloid protein to memory impairment

• 4 JUN 2024

• 3:10 PM ET

• By Charles PILLER

• Science.org

Karen Ashe of the University of Minnesota Twin Cities stands by the conclusions of her team’s 2006 paper.

Authors of a landmark Alzheimer’s disease research paper published in Nature in 2006 have agreed to retract the study in response to allegations of image manipulation. University of Minnesota (UMN) Twin Cities neuroscientist Karen Ashe, the paper’s senior author, acknowledged in a post on the journal discussion site PubPeer that the paper contains doctored images. The study has been cited nearly 2500 times, and would be the most cited paper ever to be retracted, according to Retraction Watch data.

“Although I had no knowledge of any image manipulations in the published paper until it was brought to my attention two years ago,” Ashe wrote on PubPeer, “it is clear that several of the figures in Lesné et al. (2006) have been manipulated … for which I as the senior and corresponding author take ultimate responsibility.”

After initially arguing the paper’s problems could be addressed with a correction, Ashe said in another post last week that all of the authors had agreed to a retraction—with the exception of its first author, UMN neuro-
scientist Sylvain Lesné, a protégé of Ashe’s who was the focus of a 2022 investigation by Science. A Nature spokesperson would not comment on the journal’s plans.

“It’s unfortunate that it has taken 
2 years to make the decision to retract,” says Donna Wilcock, an Indiana University neuroscientist and editor of the journal Alzheimer’s & Dementia. “The evidence of manipulation was overwhelming.”

The 2006 paper suggested an amyloid beta (Aβ) protein called Aβ*56 could cause Alzheimer’s. Aβ proteins have long been linked to the disease. The authors reported that Aβ*56 was present in mice genetically engineered to develop an Alzheimer’s-like condition, and that it built up in step with their cognitive decline. The team also reported memory deficits in rats injected with Aβ*56.

For years researchers had tried to improve Alzheimer’s outcomes by stripping amyloid proteins from the brain, but the experimental drugs all failed. Aβ*56 seemed to offer a more specific and promising therapeutic target, and many embraced the finding. Funding for related work rose sharply.

But the Science investigation revealed evidence that the Nature paper and numerous others co-authored by Lesné, some listing Ashe as senior author, appeared to use manipulated data. After the story was published, leading scientists who had cited the paper to support their own experiments questioned whether Aβ*56 could be reliably detected and purified as described by Lesné and Ashe—or even existed. Some said the problems in that paper and others supported fresh doubts about the dominant hypothesis that amyloid drives Alzheimer’s. Others maintained that the hypothesis remains viable.

That debate has continued amid the approval of the antiamyloid drug Leqembi, which modestly slows cognitive decline but carries risks of serious or even fatal brain swelling or bleeding.

Lesné, who did not reply to requests for comment, remains a UMN professor and receives National Institutes of Health funding. The university has been investigating his work since June 2022. A spokesperson says UMN recently told Natureit had reviewed two images in question, and “has closed this review with no findings of research misconduct pertaining to these figures.” The statement did not reference several other questioned figures in the same paper. UMN did not comment on whether it had reached conclusions about other Lesné papers with apparently doctored images.

“How is manipulating figures not misconduct?” asks Elisabeth Bik, a scientific integrity consultant who validated whistleblower findings about the paper for Science’s investigation. Such cases should be investigated by independent bodies, she says, not the accused scientists’ universities, which face financial and reputational conflicts of interest.

Ashe’s most recent PubPeer post maintains that “the manipulations did not change the conclusions of the experiments.” In a recent paper in iScience, she and colleagues claim to confirm the findings of the 2006 paper. “I continue to believe that Aβ*56 could play an important role in Alzheimer’s disease and targeting its removal could lead to significant clinical benefits,” she wrote on PubPeer.

In an email to Science, Ashe said Nature“declined to publish” a requested correction to the 2006 paper, making retraction “the only other option available to us.” (Naturewould not comment on her account.)

“We all share the same values—preserving the integrity of the scientific record—but express them differently,” Ashe added.

Wilcock calls Ashe’s claims that her new paper replicated the Nature findings “an overstatement.” And Vanderbilt University neuroscientist Matthew Schrag, who works on scientific integrity issues independent of his employer and discovered most of the problems in Lesné’s work, disputed Ashe’s conclusions about the iScience paper in detailed comments on PubPeer. But he calls Ashe’s decision to retract “an important step in the right direction” for a field plagued with research integrity issues. “It’s taken a while, but she has taken a stand for integrity.”

Other journals that published suspect papers by Lesné have been waiting for UMN to conclude its investigation. John Foley, editor of Science Signaling, which published two of the papers, says UMN recently told him it will soon have more to say about its review.

This story was supported by the Science Fund for Investigative Reporting.

Victims of Iranian regime celebrate the death of President Raisi

Daily Mail

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has declared the nation will observe five days of mourning following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a devastating helicopter crash in the mountainous northwest of the country yesterday. But there are plenty of Iranians who are instead celebrating the unexpected death of the president, who has earned a reputation as a brutal, hardline executor of Khamenei's will.

A slew of other videos shared to social media appeared to show people setting off fireworks in the streets of Tehran in celebration - though these clips are yet to be verified. Raisi, who became president of Iran in 2021, was widely seen as a vassal for the regime and a yes man to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He stormed to the presidency with a huge majority following the 2021 elections - but less than half of Iran's electorate turned out to vote after many more moderate candidates were barred from running.

The daughters of Minoo Majidi - a 62-year-old Iranian woman who was one of hundreds of people shot dead by security services during the nationwide fallout following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 - shared a video to social media raising a glass to the president's demise. That clip was followed swiftly by two more Iranian women, Mersedeh Shahinkar and Sima Moradbeigi, dancing and smiling in response to the news Raisi's helicopter had plunged into the mountainside. Shahinkar was blinded by the security forces' brutality amid the 2022 protests, while Moradbeigi lost the use of one of her arms after an armed guard blasted her elbow apart from point-blank range.

As a young student at a religious seminary in the holy city of Qom, Raisi took part in protests against the Western-backed Shah in the 1979 revolution. His contacts with religious leaders in Qom made him a trusted figure in the judiciary, and he became Iran's deputy prosecutor aged just 25. Raisi quickly worked his way to the top - and in doing so earned himself the moniker 'the Butcher of Tehran'.

As deputy prosecutor and subsequently chief prosecutor, Raisi stood on the so-called 'death committee' - a group of four judges who presided over tribunals in 1988 that were assembled to 're-try' the regime's political prisoners. Thousands of these prisoners were ruthlessly executed and dumped in unmarked graves. The exact number of deaths is not known but rights groups estimate roughly 5,000 people were killed following Raisi's brutal judgement.

Victims of Iranian regime celebrate the death of President Raisi

Not only was Raisi loyal to the Republic and its Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, but throughout the 1980s he had developed a close relationship with the then-president of Iran, Ali Khamenei. Khamenei went onto become Iran's Supreme Leader following the death of Khomeini in 1989, and is undoubtedly responsible for charting Raisi's path to the presidency in 2021 . Following Raisi's election, his hardline position became yet more evident. In 2022, he ordered tighter enforcement of Iran's 'hijab and chastity law' restricting women's dress and behaviour.

It was under these orders that 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was detained in September 2022 by Iran's 'morality police' for wearing 'improper' hijab and died three days later in hospital, sparking mass unrest. The resulting months of nationwide protests presented one of the gravest challenges to Iran's clerical rulers since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Hundreds of people were killed, according to rights groups, including dozens of security personnel who were part of a fierce crackdown on the demonstrators. 'Acts of chaos are unacceptable,' the president insisted. Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), said Raisi's death represented a 'monumental strategic blow to the mullahs' Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the entire regime', adding his death could spur people to rebel against the government.

Mrs. Rajavi added: The curse of mothers and those seeking justice for the executed, along with the damnation of the Iranian people and history, mark the legacy of Ebrahim Raisi, the notorious perpetrator of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners.' Iranian authorities first raised the alarm on Sunday afternoon when they lost contact with Raisi's helicopter as it flew through a fog-shrouded mountain area of the Jolfa region of East Azerbaijan province. Raisi had earlier met Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev on their common border to inaugurate a dam project.

On the return trip, only two of the three helicopters in his convoy landed in the city of Tabriz, setting off a massive search and rescue effort, with multiple foreign governments soon offering help. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi at first spoke of a 'hard landing' and urged citizens to ignore hostile foreign media channels and get their information 'only from state television'. Army personnel, Revolutionary Guards and police officers joined the search as Red Crescent teams walked up a hill in the fog and rain as rows of emergency services vehicles waited nearby. Muslim faithful across the majority Shiite nation started to pray for those missing, including in mosques in Raisi's hometown, the shrine city of Mashhad.

As the sun rose on Monday, rescue crews said they had located the destroyed aircraft with nine people on board. State television channel IRIB reported online that the helicopter had 'hit a mountain and disintegrated' on impact. Iran's Red Crescent chief Pirhossein Koolivand confirmed that its staff were 'transferring the bodies of the martyrs to Tabriz' and that 'the search operations have come to an end'. Some Iranians took to the streets to pray for Raisi overnight following news his chopper had crashed. 'We were very sad when we learnt the news,' said one Tehran resident, 63-year-old retiree Nabi Karam. 'Our president was a very good leader, may God bless him.'

Secret Hamas Files Show How It Spied on Everyday Palestinians

Hamas monitored political activity, online posts, and apparently even love lives. Palestinians were stuck between an Israeli blockade and a repressive security force.

NEW

Listen to articles

Tap the Play button at the top of any article to hear it read aloud.

Listen to this article · 9:37 min Learn more

A rally in support of Hamas in Gaza City in 2022. A secret police force overseen by Hamas’s leader in the enclave utilizes an extensive network of informants.Credit...Fatima Shbair/Associated Press

By Adam Rasgon and Ronen Bergman

Adam Rasgon reported from Jerusalem, and Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv.

May 13, 2024

The Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has for years overseen a secret police force in Gaza that conducted surveillance on everyday Palestinians and built files on young people, journalists and those who questioned the government, according to intelligence officials and a trove of internal documents reviewed by The New York Times.

The unit, known as the General Security Service, relied on a network of Gaza informants, some of whom reported their own neighbors to the police. People landed in security files for attending protests or publicly criticizing Hamas. In some cases, the records suggest that the authorities followed people to determine if they were carrying on romantic relationships outside marriage.

Hamas has long run an oppressive system of governance in Gaza, and many Palestinians there know that security officials watch them closely. But a 62-slide presentation on the activities of the General Security Service, delivered only weeks before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, reveals the degree to which the largely unknown unit penetrated the lives of Palestinians.

The documents show that Hamas leaders, despite claiming to represent the people of Gaza, would not tolerate even a whiff of dissent. Security officials trailed journalists and people they suspected of immoral behavior. Agents got criticism removed from social media and discussed ways to defame political adversaries. Political protests were viewed as threats to be undermined.

Everyday Gazans were stuck — behind the wall of Israel’s crippling blockade and under the thumb and constant watch of a security force. That dilemma continues today, with the added threat of Israeli ground troops and airstrikes.

“We’re facing bombardment by the occupation and thuggery by the local authorities,” Ehab Fasfous, a journalist in the Gaza Strip who appeared in the files of the General Security Service, said in a phone interview from Gaza.

Mr. Fasfous, 51, is labeled in one report as among “the major haters of the Hamas movement.”

The documents were provided to The Times by officials in Israel’s military intelligence directorate, who said they had been seized in raids in Gaza.

Reporters then interviewed people who were named in the files. Those people recounted key events, confirmed biographical information and, in Mr. Fasfous’s case, described interactions with the authorities that aligned with the secret files. The documents reviewed by The Times include seven intelligence files ranging from October 2016 to August 2023. The military intelligence directorate said it was aware of files containing information on at least 10,000 Palestinians in Gaza.

The General Security Service is formally part of the Hamas political party but functions like part of the government. One Palestinian individual familiar with the inner workings of Hamas, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, confirmed that the service was one of three powerful internal security bodies in Gaza. The others were Military Intelligence, which typically focuses on Israel, and the Internal Security Service, an arm of the Interior Ministry.

Basem Naim, a spokesman for Hamas, said the people responsible for the General Security Service were unreachable during the war.

With monthly expenses of $120,000 before the war with Israel, the unit comprised 856 people, records show. Of those, more than 160 were paid to spread Hamas propaganda and launch online attacks against opponents at home and abroad. The status of the unit today is unknown because Israel has dealt a significant blow to Hamas’s military and governing abilities.

The Israeli intelligence authorities believe that Mr. Sinwar directly oversaw the General Security Service, according to three Israeli intelligence officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. They said the slide show was prepared for Mr. Sinwar personally, though they did not say how they knew that.

The presentation said that the General Security Service works to protect Hamas’s people, property and information, and to support its leadership’s decision-making.

Some slides focused on the personal security of Hamas leaders. Others discussed ways to stamp out protests, including the “We Want to Live” demonstrations last year that criticized power shortages and the cost of living. Security officials also tracked operatives from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an ideologically aligned militant group that often partners with Hamas.

Some tactics, like amplifying Hamas’s own message, appeared to be routine politicking. In other instances, officials suggested using intelligence to undermine opponents and distort their reputations, though the files were vague about how that was to be done.

“Undertaking a number of offensive and defensive media campaigns to confuse and influence adversaries by using private and exclusive information,” the document read.

Updated 

May 14, 2024, 12:47 p.m. ET5 hours ago

5 hours ago

• The U.N. lowered its count of women and children killed, citing incomplete information on many of the dead.

• Israel strikes on a home and a school building kill dozens of people, as fighting rages across Gaza.

• Qatar says cease-fire talks are nearing an impasse, and other news.

Security officers stopped Mr. Fasfous on his way to a protest last August, seized his phone and ordered him to leave, a report says. Mr. Fasfous confirmed that two plainclothes officers had approached him. The authorities searched his recent calls, and wrote that he was communicating with “suspicious people” in Israel.

“We advise that closing in on him is necessary because he’s a negative person who is full of hatred, and only brings forth the Strip’s shortcomings,” the document said.

The documents discussed ways to stamp out protests last year over power outages and difficult living conditions.Credit...Associated Press

The most frustrating thing, Mr. Fasfous said, was that the officers used his phone to send flirtatious messages to a colleague. “They wanted to pin a moral violation on me,” he said.

The report does not include that detail but does describe ways to “deal with” Mr. Fasfous. “Defame him,” the report said.

“If you’re not with them, you become an atheist, an infidel and a sinner,” Mr. Fasfous said. He acknowledged supporting protests and criticizing Hamas online, but said the people he was in touch with in Israel were Palestinians who owned food and clothing companies. He said he helped run their social media accounts.

The General Security Service’s goals are similar to those of security services in countries like Syria that have used secret units to quell dissent. The files of the General Security Service, though, mention tactics like censorship, intimidation and surveillance rather than physical violence.

“This General Security Service is just like the Stasi of East Germany,” said Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli military intelligence officer specializing in Palestinian affairs. “You always have an eye on the street.”

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, last year at a rally in Gaza City.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

Palestinians in Gaza live in fear and hesitate to express dissent, analysts said.

“There are a lot of people practicing self-censorship,” said Mkhaimar Abusada, a professor of political science from Gaza City. “They just don’t want problems with the Hamas government.”

That view clashes with the most strident comments of Israel’s leaders, like President Isaac Herzog, who blamed Gazans for not toppling Hamas before the Oct. 7 attacks.

“There’s an entire nation that is responsible,” he said. “This rhetoric about civilians were not aware, not involved, it’s absolutely not true. They could have risen up.”

The General Security Service, the files show, also tried to enforce a conservative social order.

In December 2017, for example, the authorities investigated a tip that a woman was acting immorally with a man who owned a clothing shop. A security report noted that she visited the shop for an hour on one day, then more than two hours the next. The report presented no evidence of wrongdoing, but proposed that “relevant parties” address the matter.

An October 2016 report described young men and women performing unspecified “immoral acts” at a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Khan Younis at night. Hamas sees the Palestine Liberation Organization as a compromised entity, whose leader too often favors Israeli interests. The report offered no evidence of misdeeds but recommended summoning a man who claimed to be in possession of videos and pictures.

The files also show that Hamas was suspicious of foreign organizations and journalists.

Fishermen in the Port of Gaza in 2022. Even though many of the reports contain nothing more than notes on daily lives of Gazans, many people in the strip “think four times before doing any small thing,” said Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli intelligence officer specializing in Palestinian affairs.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

When Monique van Hoogstraten, a Dutch reporter, visited a protest encampment along the border with Israel in April 2018, the authorities noted the most banal of details. They noted the make and model of her car and her license plate number. They said she took pictures of children and tried to interview an elderly woman. Ms. van Hoogstraten confirmed the reporting trip in an interview with The Times.

The file recommended further “reconnaissance” on journalists.

None of the files reviewed by The Times were dated after the start of the war. But Mr. Fasfous said the government remained interested in him.

Early in the war, he said he took images of security forces hitting people who fought over spots in line outside a bakery. The authorities confiscated his camera.

Mr. Fasfous complained to a government official in Khan Younis, who told him to stop reporting and “destabilizing the internal front,” Mr. Fasfous recalled.

“I told him I was reporting on the truth and that the truth won’t hurt him, but that fell on deaf ears,” he said. “We can’t have a life here as long as these criminals remain in control.”

Adam Rasgon reports from Israel for The Times's Jerusalem bureau. More about Adam Rasgon

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

A version of this article appears in print on May 14, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Secret Files Show Hamas Spying on Its People. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

H1: Hamas monitored political activity, online posts, and apparently even love lives. Palestinians were stuck between an Israeli blockade and a repressive security force.

Civil Disobedience by Henry David Thoreau

“Civil Disobedience”

originated as a Concord Lyceum lecture delivered on January 26, 1848. It was published as “Resistance to Civil Government,” in May of 1849, in Elizabeth Peabody’s Aesthetic Papers, a short-lived periodical that never managed a second issue. The modern title comes from A Yankee in Canada, with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers, an 1866 collection of Thoreau’s work. It’s not known if Thoreau ever used the term “civil disobedience.”

While Walden can be applied to almost anyone’s life, “Civil Disobedience” is like a venerated architectural landmark: it is preserved and admired, and sometimes visited, but for most of us there are not many occasions when it can actually be used. Still, although seldom mentioned without references to Gandhi and King, “Civil Disobedience” has more history than many suspect. In the 1940’s it was read by the Danish resistance, in the 1950’s it was cherished by those who opposed McCarthyism, in the 1960’s it was influential in the struggle against South African apartheid, and in the 1970’s it was discovered by a new generation of anti-war activists. The lesson learned from all this experience is that Thoreau’s ideas really do work, just as he imagined they would.

This work is compiled from http://thoreau.eserver.org/civil.html using wayback machine

Chapter 1

I HEARTILY ACCEPT the motto, — “That government is best which governs least”; 1 and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe, — “That government is best which governs not at all”; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.

This American government — what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed on, even impose on themselves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India rubber, would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions, and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.

But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.

After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule, is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience? — in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, 5 and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts — a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniments, though it maybe

“Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note, As his corse to the rampart we hurried; Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot O’er the grave where our hero we buried.”

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others, as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders, serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. Avery few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be “clay,” and “stop a hole to keep the wind away,” but leave that office to his dust at least: — “I am too high-born to be propertied, To be a secondary at control, Or useful serving-man and instrument To any sovereign state throughout the world.”

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

How does it become a man to behave toward this American government to-day? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave’s government also

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of ‘75. If one were to tell me that this was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is the fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.

Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions, in his chapter on the ‘‘Duty of Submission to Civil Government,” resolves all civil obligation into expediency; and he proceeds to say that “so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God that the established government be obeyed, and no longer” — “This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other.” Of this, he says, every man shall judge for himself. But Paley appears never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expediency does not apply, in which a people, as well as an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people.

In their practice, nations agree with Paley; but does any one think that Massachusetts does exactly what is right at the present crisis?

“A drab of state, a cloth-o’-silver slut, To have her train borne up, and her soul trail in the dirt.’’

Practically speaking, the opponents to a reform in Massachusetts are not a hundred thousand politicians at the South, but a hundred thousand merchants and farmers here, who are more interested in commerce and agriculture than they are in humanity, and are not prepared to do justice to the slave and to Mexico, cost what it may. I quarrel not with far-off foes, but with those who, near at home, co-operate with, and do the bidding of those far away, and without whom the latter would be harmless. We are accustomed to say, that the mass of men are unprepared; but improvement is slow, because the few are not materially wiser or better than the many. It is not so important that many should be as good as you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere; for that will leaven the whole lump. There are thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do nothing to put an end to them; who, esteeming themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their hands in their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing; who even postpone the question of freedom to the question of free-trade, and quietly read the prices-current along with the latest advices from Mexico, after dinner, and, it may be, fall asleep over them both. What is the price-current of an honest man and patriot to-day? They hesitate, and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but they do nothing in earnest and with effect. They will wait, well disposed, for others to remedy the evil, that they may no longer have it to regret. At most, they give only a cheap vote, and a feeble countenance and Godspeed, to the right, as it goes by them. There are nine hundred and ninety-nine patrons of virtue to one virtuous man; but it is easier to deal with the real possessor of a thing than with the temporary guardian of it.

All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.

I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to? Shall we not have the advantage of his wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions? But no: I find that the respectable man, so called, has immediately drifted from his position, and despairs of his country, when his country has more reason to despair of him. He forthwith adopts one of the candidates thus selected as the only available one, thus proving that he is himself available for any purposes of the demagogue. His vote is of no more worth than that of any unprincipled foreigner or hireling native, who may have been bought. Oh for a man who is a man, and, as my neighbor says, has a bone in his back which you cannot pass your hand through! Our statistics are at fault: the population has been returned too large. How many men are there to a square thousand miles in this country? Hardly one. Does not America offer any inducement for men to settle here? The American has dwindled into an Odd Fellow — one who may be known by the development of his organ of gregariousness, and a manifest lack of intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief concern, on coming into the world, is to see that the almshouses are in good repair; and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect a fund for the support of the widows and orphans that may be; who, in short ventures to live only by the aid of the Mutual Insurance company, which has promised to bury him decently.

It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it,

and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man’s shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. See what gross inconsistency is tolerated. I have heard some of my townsmen say, "I should like to have them order me out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico; — see if I would go”; and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. The soldier is applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and authority he disregards and sets at naught; as if the state were penitent to that degree that it hired one to scourge it while it sinned, but not to that degree that it left off sinning for a moment. Thus, under the name of Order and Civil Government, we are all made at last to pay homage to and support our own meanness. After the first blush of sin comes its indifference; and from immoral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, and not quite unnecessary to that life which we have made.

Chapter 2

The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. Some are petitioning the State to dissolve the Union, to disregard the requisitions of the President. Why do they not dissolve it themselves — the union between themselves and the State — and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury? Do not they stand in the same relation to the State, that the State does to the Union? And have not the same reasons prevented the State from resisting the Union, which have prevented them from resisting the State?

How can a man be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy it? Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved? If you are cheated out of a single dollar by your neighbor, you do not rest satisfied with knowing that you are cheated, or with saying that you are cheated, or even with petitioning him to pay you your due; but you take effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount, and see that you are never cheated again. Action from principle — the perception and the performance of right — changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divides states and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.

Unjust laws exist; shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels?

One would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offence never contemplated by government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate, penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings for the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who placed him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again.

If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go; perchance it will wear smooth — certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.

As for adopting the ways which the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong. It is not my business to be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to petition me; and if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way; its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconciliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is an change for the better, like birth and death which convulse the body.

I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already.

I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year — no more — in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer, is the very man I have to deal with — for it is, after all, with men and not with parchment that I quarrel — and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well what he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he shall treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborliness without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action? I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name — if ten honest men only — ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State’s ambassador, who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister — though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her — the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject the following winter.

Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place to-day, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race, should find them; on that separate, but more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her — the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, “But what shall I do?” my answer is, “If you really wish to do anything, resign your office.” When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now.

I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods — though both will serve the same purpose — because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man — not to make any invidious comparison — is always sold to the institution which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; and it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as what are called the "means” are increased. The best thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians according to their condition. “Show me the tribute-money,” said he; — and one took a penny out of his pocket; — if you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar’s government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it; “Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar’s, and to God those things which are God’s” — leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know.

When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax-bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject of the Turkish government. Confucius said, “If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are the subjects of shame.” No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case.

Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. “Pay,” it said, “or be locked up in the jail.” I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster: for I was not the State’s schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax-bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing: — “Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined.” This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find a complete list.

I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through, before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.

Thus the State never intentionally confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to have this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a government which says to me, “Your money or your life,” why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man.

Chapter 3

The night in prison was novel and interesting enough. The prisoners in their shirt-sleeves were enjoying a chat and the evening air in the doorway, when I entered. But the jailer said, “Come, boys, it is time to lock up”; and so they dispersed, and I heard the sound of their steps returning into the hollow apartments. My room-mate was introduced to me by the jailer as “a first-rate fellow and a clever man.” When the door was locked, he showed me where to hang my hat, and how he managed matters there. The rooms were whitewashed once a month; and this one, at least, was the whitest, most simply furnished, and probably the neatest apartment in the town. He naturally wanted to know where I came from, and what brought me there; and, when I had told him, I asked him in my turn how he came there, presuming him to be an honest man, of course; and, as the world goes, I believe he was. “Why,” said he, “they accuse me of burning a barn; but I never did it.” As near as I could discover, he had probably gone to bed in a barn when drunk, and smoked his pipe there; and so a barn was burnt. He had the reputation of being a clever man, had been there some three months waiting for his trial to come on, and would have to wait as much longer; but he was quite domesticated and contented, since he got his board for nothing, and thought that he was well treated.

He occupied one window, and I the other; and I saw that if one stayed there long, his principal business would be to look out the window. I had soon read all the tracts that were left there, and examined where former prisoners had broken out, and where a grate had been sawed off, and heard the history of the various occupants of that room; for I found that even here there was a history and a gossip which never circulated beyond the walls of the jail. Probably this is the only house in the town where verses are composed, which are afterward printed in a circular form, but not published. I was shown quite a long list of verses which were composed by some young men who had been detected in an attempt to escape, who avenged themselves by singing them.

I pumped my fellow-prisoner as dry as I could, for fear I should never see him again; but at length he showed me which was my bed, and left me to blow out the lamp.

It was like travelling into a far country, such as I had never expected to behold, to he there for one night. It seemed to me that I never had heard the townclock strike before, nor the evening sounds of the village; for we slept with the windows open, which were inside the grating. It was to see my native village in the light of the Middle Ages, and our Concord was turned into a Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village-inn — a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town . 26 I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about.

In the morning, our breakfasts were put through the hole in the door, in small oblong-square tin pans, made to fit, and holding a pint of chocolate, with brown bread, and an iron spoon. When they called for the vessels again, I was green enough to return what bread I had left; but my comrade seized it, and said that I should lay that up for lunch or dinner. Soon after he was let out to work at haying in a neighboring field, whither he went every day, and would not be back till noon; so he bade me good-day, saying that he doubted if he should see me again.

When I came out of prison — for some one interfered, and paid that tax — I did not perceive that great changes had taken place on the common, such as he observed who went in a youth and emerged a tottering and gray-headed man; and yet a change had to my eyes come over the scene — the town, and State, and country — greater than any that mere time could effect. I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived. I saw to what extent the people among whom I lived could be trusted as good neighbors and friends; that their friendship was for summer weather only; that they did not greatly propose to do right; that they were a distinct race from me by their prejudices and superstitions, as the Chinamen and Malays are; that in their sacrifices to humanity, they ran no risks, not even to their property; that after all they were not so noble but they treated the thief as he had treated them, and hoped, by a certain outward observance and a few prayers, and by walking in a particular straight though useless path from time to time, to save their souls. This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that many of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village.

It was formerly the custom in our village, when a poor debtor came out of jail, for his acquaintances to salute him, looking through their fingers, which were crossed to represent the grating of a jail window, “How do ye do?” My neighbors did not thus salute me, but first looked at me, and then at one another, as if I had returned from a long journey. I was put into jail as I was going to the shoemaker’s to get a shoe which was mended. When I was let out the next morning, I proceeded to finish my errand, and, having put on my mended shoe, joined a huckleberry party, who were impatient to put themselves under my conduct; and in half an hour — for the horse was soon tackled — was in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off, and then the State was nowhere to be seen.

This is the whole history of "My Prisons .”

I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow-countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax-bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man or a musket to shoot one with — the dollar is innocent — but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases.

If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.

This, then, is my position at present. But one cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his action be biased by obstinacy or an undue regard for the opinions of men. Let him see that he does only what belongs to himself and to the hour.

I think sometimes, Why, this people mean well; they are only ignorant; they would do better if they knew how: why give your neighbors this pain to treat you as they are not inclined to? But I think, again, This is no reason why I should do as they do, or permit others to suffer much greater pain of a different kind. Again, I sometimes say to myself, When many millions of men, without heat, without ill-will, without personal feeling of any kind, demand of you a few shillings only, without the possibility, such is their constitution, of retracting or altering their present demand, and without the possibility, on your side, of appeal to any other millions, why expose yourself to this overwhelming brute force? You do not resist cold and hunger, the winds and the waves, thus obstinately; you quietly submit to a thousand similar necessities. You do not put your head into the fire. But just in proportion as I regard this as not wholly a brute force, but partly a human force, and consider that I have relations to those millions as to so many millions of men, and not of mere brute or inanimate things, I see that appeal is possible, first and instantaneously, from them to the Maker of them, and, secondly, from them to themselves. But, if I put my head deliberately into the fire, there is no appeal to fire or to the Maker of fire, and I have only myself to blame. If I could convince myself that I have any right to be satisfied with men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and I ought to be, then, like a good Mussulman and fatalist, I should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are, and say it is the will of God. And, above all, there is this difference between resisting this and a purely brute or natural force, that I can resist this with some effect; but I cannot expect, like Orpheus , to change the nature of the rocks and trees and beasts.

I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity.

“We must affect our country as our parents, And if at any time we alienate Our love or industry from doing it honor, We must respect effects and teach the soul Matter of conscience and religion, And not desire of rule or benefit .”

I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better a patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; but seen from a point of view a little higher, they are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?

However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him.

I know that most men think differently from myself; but those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects, content me as little as any. Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly behold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are wont to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Webster never goes behind government, and so cannot speak with authority about it. His words are wisdom to those legislators who contemplate no essential reform in the existing government; but for thinkers, and those who legislate for all time, he never once glances at the subject. I know of those whose serene and wise speculations on this theme would soon reveal the limits of his mind’s range and hospitality. Yet, compared with the cheap professions of most reformers, and the still cheaper wisdom and eloquence of politicians in general, his are almost the only sensible and valuable words, and we thank Heaven for him. Comparatively, he is always strong, original, and, above all, practical. Still, his quality is not wisdom, but prudence. The lawyer’s truth is not truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency. Truth is always in harmony with herself, and is not concerned chiefly to reveal the justice that may consist with wrong-doing. He well deserves to be called, as he has been called, the Defender of the Constitution. There are really no blows to be given by him but defensive ones. He is not a leader, but a follower. His leaders are the men of ‘87 . “I have never made an effort,” he says, “and never propose to make an effort; I have never countenanced an effort, and never mean to countenance an effort, to disturb the arrangement as originally made, by which the various States came into the Union.” Still thinking of the sanction which the Constitution gives to slavery, he says, “Because it was a part of the original compact — let it stand.” Notwithstanding his special acuteness and ability, he is unable to take a fact out of its merely political relations, and behold it as it lies absolutely to be disposed of by the intellect — what, for instance, it behooves a man to do here in America to-day with regard to slavery, but ventures, or is driven, to make some such desperate answer as the following, while professing to speak absolutely, and as a private man — from which what new and singular code of social duties might be inferred? “The manner,” says he, “in which the governments of those States where slavery exists are to regulate it is for their own consideration, under their responsibility to their constituents, to the general laws of propriety, humanity, and justice, and to God. Associations formed elsewhere, springing from a feeling of humanity, or any other cause, have nothing whatever to do with it. They have never received any encouragement from me, and they never will.”

They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and drink at it there with reverence and humility; but they who behold where it comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and continue their pilgrimage toward its fountain-head.

No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the much-vexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free-trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufacturers and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations. For eighteen hundred years, though perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been written; yet where is the legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which it sheds on the science of legislation?

The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to — for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well — is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

About the Author

Henry David Thoreau was an American essayist, poet, and philosopher. A leading transcendentalism he is best known for his book Walden, a reflection upon simple living in natural surroundings, and his essay “Civil Disobedience”, an argument for disobedience to an unjust state. He work was inspiration to leaders like Gandhi & Martin Luther King